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Summary 
Communication between doctors and patients in clinical settings is notorious for being 
difficult.  This problem has inspired a wealth of empirical research from a variety of academic 
fields on the subject of doctor-patient communication.  However, very little attention has been 
paid to the role of modern medicine‟s intellectual self-image as natural science in interactions 
within clinical medical settings.  The aim of the current study was to philosophically 
investigate the influence of the medical profession‟s intellectual self-image on communication 
between doctors and patients.  Jürgen Habermas‟ work on Universal Pragmatics was used to 
comment on doctor-patient communication as it is described in the existing empirical research 
literature.  Michel Foucault‟s work on discourse and power was used to analyse and describe 
medical discourse and the nature of power in doctor-patient relationships.  The outcome of 
this philosophical analysis leads to the conclusion that modern medicine‟s intellectual self-
image has a pervasive and negative influence on communication between doctors and patients 
during clinical consultations.  This is because medicine‟s positivist world-view results in an 
almost exclusive focus on the physical aspects of disease in clinical medicine.  The patient‟s 
mind and his/her social world are not of great significance from the natural scientific 
perspective.  Medical professionals may thus easily regard their clinical task solely as the 
physical treatment of physical disorders.  They are very likely to consider many 
communicative activities as unrelated to their clinical task.  Inadequate doctor-patient 
communication can easily affect the quality of medical care and patient outcomes in a 
negative manner, as well as diminish the quality of the doctor‟s occupational experience.  For 
this reason I conclude that medicine‟s natural scientific intellectual self-image is not 
appropriate for the task of providing medical care to individual patients.  Two additional 
reasons support this conclusion, namely the misidentification of clinical medicine as a natural 
science and the inappropriateness of a scientific conception of truth for the context of doctor-
patient interactions.  The implications of these conclusions are that the intellectual self-image 
and world-view of modern medicine should change to better agree with the nature of clinical 
practice and to make room for the psychological and social dimensions of the patient‟s life 
within health care.  The medical profession should also revise its conception of science to a 
theory that acknowledges that interpretive reasoning and knowledge without guaranteed 
certainty are legitimate elements of science.  I advocate for consciousness among the medical 
profession of the reality of medical discourse and its effects on doctors, patients and on their 
interaction with one another.    
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Opsomming  
Kommunikasie tussen dokters en pasiënte in kliniese omgewings is daarvoor berug om 
moeilik te wees.  Hierdie probleem het ‟n magdom empiriese navorsing vanuit ‟n 
verskeidenheid van akademiese velde omtrent dokter-pasiënt kommunikasie geïnspireer.  
Baie min aandag word egter gewy aan die rol van moderne geneeskunde se intellektuele 
selfbeeld as ‟n natuurwetenskap in interaksies in kliniese mediese omgewings.  Die doel van 
die huidige studie was om die invloed van die mediese professie se intellektuele selfbeeld op 
kommunikasie tussen dokters en pasiënte filosofies te ondersoek.  Jürgen Habermas se werk 
oor Universele Pragmatiek (Universal Pragmatics) is gebruik om kommentaar te lewer oor 
dokter-pasiënt kommunikasie soos wat dit beskryf word in die empiriese navorsingsliteratuur.  
Michel Foucault se werk oor diskoers en mag is gebruik om mediese diskoers en die aard van 
mag in dokter-pasiënt verhoudings te ontleed en te beskryf.  Hierdie filosofiese ontleding gee 
aanleiding tot die gevolgtrekking dat moderne geneeskunde se intellektuele selfbeeld ‟n 
deurdringende en negatiewe invloed op kommunikasie tussen dokters en pasiënte gedurende 
kliniese konsultasies het.  Die rede hiervoor is dat geneeskunde se positivistiese 
wêreldbeskouing lei tot ‟n byna uitsluitlike fokus op die fisiese aspekte van siekte in kliniese 
geneeskunde.  Die pasiënt se verstand en gees (mind) en sy/haar sosiale wêreld is nie van 
groot belang vanuit die natuurwetenskaplike perspektief nie.  Persone in die mediese beroep 
mag hul kliniese taak dus maklik as bloot die fisiese behandeling van fisiese afwykings 
beskou.  Dit is baie waarskynlik dat hulle vele kommunikatiewe aktiwiteite as onverwant tot 
hul kliniese taak beoordeel.  Ontoereikende dokter-pasiënt kommunikasie kan die kwaliteit 
van mediese sorg en pasiënte se gesondheidsuitkomste maklik negatief beïnvloed, en ook die 
kwaliteit van die dokter se ervaring van sy/haar beroep verlaag.  Om hierdie rede maak ek die 
gevolgtrekking dat geneeskunde se natuurwetenskaplike intellektuele selfbeeld nie toepaslik 
is vir die opdrag om mediese sorg aan individuele pasiënte te lewer nie.  Twee verdere redes 
ondersteun hierdie gevolgtrekking, naamlik die verkeerdelike identifikasie van kliniese 
geneeskunde as ‟n natuurwetenskap en die onvanpastheid van ‟n wetenskaplike konsepsie van 
waarheid vir die konteks van dokter-pasiënt interaksies.  Die implikasies van hierdie 
gevolgtrekkings is dat die intellektuele selfbeeld en wêreldbeskouing van moderne 
geneeskunde moet verander om beter ooreen te stem met die aard van die kliniese praktyk en 
om ruimte te maak vir die sielkundige en sosiale dimensies van die pasiënt se lewe in 
gesondheidsorg.  Die mediese professie moet ook haar konsepsie van die wetenskap hersien 
na ‟n teorie wat erken dat interpreterende redenasie en kennis sonder gewaarborgde sekerheid, 
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geregverdigde elemente van die wetenskap is.  Ek pleit vir bewustheid onder die mediese 
professie van die realiteit van mediese diskoers en die effek daarvan op dokters, pasiënte en 
op hul interaksie met mekaar.   
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All heirs have the right, have had the right from time immemorial, to live their fathers’ 
lives in their own vocabulary. 
 
Milan Kundera (1984: 273) 
 
 
Why separate the science of the doctors from that of philosophers?  Why distinguish 
between two studies that share a common origin and end? 
 
C.-L. Dumas
1
   
                                                 
1
 C.-L. Dumas.  Montpellier, Year XII:21, as cited in Foucault 1973:128 
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General Introduction and problem statement 
 
There are times in one‟s life when the question of knowing if one can think differently than 
one thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if one is to go on 
looking and reflecting at all. 
Michel Foucault
2
 
It is often said that modern medicine
3
 is in crisis.  This crisis entails a number of factors.  I am 
especially interested in what can be referred to as medicine‟s crisis of care4 or “the decline of 
humanistic medicine” (Kriel, 2000:24).  Humanistic medicine refers to “medical practice that 
focuses on the whole patient and not solely on the patient‟s disease” (Schwartz & Wiggins, 
1988 in Kriel, 2000:40).  Patients and caregivers of patients frequently feel uncared for in 
their dealings with the medical profession.  Medicine is often not regarded as a caring 
profession (Schwartz & Wiggins, 1985:331; Fehrsen, 2000: xvii).  This is not least because 
biomedicine tends to reduce the human person to the biological functioning and structure of 
the body and thereby runs the risk of excluding the distinctive human dimensions of a 
patient‟s life from its area of interest.  
At least two other factors need to be considered when discussing the crisis in modern 
medicine.  Firstly, the rising cost of health care, (often growing at a rate greater than the 
overall inflation rate of a nations‟ economies [Bodenheimer, 2005:847]) makes the World 
Health Organisation‟s ideal of achieving health for all, almost unattainable.  Secondly, the 
medical profession itself is facing a crisis.  Doctors increasingly feel “caught in the middle” of 
the expectations and demands of those who pay for medical services (insurance companies 
and government organisations), health care institutions and doctors‟ own patients (and 
sometimes the patients‟ caregivers).  Jonsen (2000: 80) quotes Robert Berenson who wrote an 
editorial for the New York Times in July 1989, entitled “Meet Dr. Squeezed” on the demands 
                                                 
2
 The quotation is from The history of sexuality, Vol. II:  The use of pleasure (Foucault, 1985:8 as cited in Mills, 
2003:6). 
3
 The term modern medicine refers to the form of medicine that developed late in the eighteenth century based 
on the natural sciences, namely physics, chemistry and biology.  Modern medicine is also referred to as 
biomedicine or scientific medicine and is currently the dominant approach to health care worldwide (Helman, 
2007:94).   
4
 Throughout the text I use bold font to emphasize word or concepts.  
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placed on present-day doctors.  Berenson wrote that “most doctors accept the inevitable 
conflicts between cost and quality, patient wishes and clinical judgement, professional 
autonomy and consumer protection.  Nevertheless, physicians feel increasingly beleaguered.  
Their recommendations and decisions are being questioned, constrained and overruled”.   
Le Fanu (1999: xviii-xix) refers to the paradox of disillusioned doctors.  He writes that the 
“prodigious and indubitable success” of modern medicine stands in contrast with survey 
results that show that doctors‟ satisfaction with their choice of profession and the percentage 
of medical graduates who enter medical practice have decreased since the nineteen sixties.  Le 
Fanu cites the results of a study by the Policy Studies Institute in London (United Kingdom) 
which reveals that 14% of doctors surveyed in 1966 experienced „regrets‟ over their choice of 
career compared to 26% of the 1976 cohort, 44% of the 1981 group and 58% of the 1986 
study group.  Furthermore, it is a recent trend that a proportion (25% in 1996) of medical 
graduates decide not to practice clinical medicine after graduation, but rather to enter the job 
market in a different field (for instance as an employer of a company that manufactures and 
develops pharmaceutical products).  Similarly, patients are becoming increasingly 
disillusioned with the medical profession.  The medical profession has been demythologised 
in countries like the United States of America where patients and advocacy groups emphasise 
patients‟ right to be fully informed and involved in decision-making about their health care 
(Van Niekerk, 2002b: 227).  The above-mentioned perceptions of doctors and patients are 
probably related in complex ways to modern medicine‟s crisis of care.   
It seems that the crisis of care has a dual nature.  Not only patients, but also doctors (and 
other, if not all, health care professionals) feel uncared for.  Doctors do not feel protected by 
the state and sometimes the communities in which they work.  This is especially true in 
crime-ridden neighbourhoods where doctors‟ (and nurses‟) property and lives may not be 
protected by the community despite the efforts of health care personnel to relieve suffering 
and save lives within the community.  Fehrsen (2000, xviii) makes a very important point 
when he says that “caring is clearly not a purely personal matter.  It is embedded in a wider 
socio-political and economic context”.  Many factors contribute to modern medicine‟s crisis 
of care.  In this dissertation I focus on one very specific issue, namely modern medicine‟s 
continuing intellectual adherence to the world-view of nineteenth century natural science.  I 
specifically want to investigate the influence of this world-view (or modern medicine‟s 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  3 
intellectual self-image)
5
 on the communication between doctors and patients, and the role of 
communication in the care of patients.   
Communication between doctors and patients is central to the practice of medicine (Gatens-
Robinson, 1986: 175-176; Malterud, 1995:184; Montgomery, 2006:34).  It is estimated that a 
doctor will conduct 200 000 interviews with patients in his/her professional lifetime.  
Communication skills form a core component of a doctor‟s clinical competence, together with 
knowledge and skills in problem solving and physical examination (Kurtz et al., 2005:14).  
Interaction between doctors and patients accomplish and assist in many of the tasks of the 
medical consultation, for instance arriving at a diagnosis, establishing the doctor-patient 
relationship, information exchange and shared decision-making (Charon et al., 1994:955; Ong 
et al., 1995:903-905).  The critical, complex and fascinating nature of doctor-patient 
interaction has attracted the attention of researchers from a variety of academic disciplines 
within the humanities and health sciences and has lead to a vast academic literature on this 
topic (Charon et al., 1994:955).  Kurtz et al. (2005: 14-16) give various examples of such 
research to illustrate the six main problems of communication between doctors and patients.  
The problems are as follows.  1.) Doctors often do not interact with patients in a way that 
allow them to discover the patient‟s reason for visiting the doctor.  This is due to many 
doctors‟ poor habit of interrupting the patient after his/her opening statement (wrongly 
assuming that the patient‟s first complaint is of greatest importance to the patient) and/or a 
failure to elicit all (or the majority) of the patient‟s concerns.  2.) Doctors typically have 
difficulty in gathering relevant and important information during consultations due to their 
habit of structuring the interaction according to their medical objectives.  Medical 
professionals use a „high control style‟ in which they pose very specific questions for patients 
to answer rather than allowing the patient to spontaneously tell the story of their illness and 
voice (all of) their concerns. Furthermore, in most cases doctors respond only to a small 
proportion of the patient‟s cues during interaction.  3.) Doctors frequently do not give patients 
enough information or involve patients sufficiently regarding treatment plans during 
consultations.  Patients often have difficulty to comprehend and recall doctors‟ messages after 
                                                 
5
 I treat the terms „world-view‟ and „paradigm‟ as synonyms in this dissertation.  With these terms I refer to the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions associated with a particular outlook on the world or life.  [I relied 
on Kriel (2000:14) and „world, n.‟ (2013) for these definitions].  The phrases “world-view of modern medicine” 
and “natural science paradigm” are thus also used as synonyms and refer to the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions of the natural sciences (Kriel, 2000:14).  With the terms „self-image‟ or „self-understanding‟ of 
modern medicine I simply  refer to the view that the medical profession has of itself.  The self-image of modern 
medicine is ultimately influenced by its world-view. 
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their medical appointments.  4.) Patients often do not adhere to prescribed treatment plans.  
The financial cost of non-adherence is high considering the cost of unused or wrongly used 
medication, as well as the cost of additional medical consultations, laboratory tests, 
medication and so forth.  5.) Poor doctor-patient communication is the primary cause of 
malpractice lawsuits against doctors.  6.) Patients often experience a lack of empathy and 
understanding from doctors.  One is likely to come across reports of such instances in the 
media.  
Kurtz et al. (2005:16-19) go on to present evidence that specific communication strategies can 
overcome the problems listed above and that such communication strategies can and should 
be taught to medical students and qualified doctors alike.  For instance, when doctors listen to 
patients, ask open-ended questions, respond to patients‟ cues and allow patients to ask 
questions, more information is received in a shorter time.  Patient satisfaction has been found 
to be directly proportional to the amount of information delivered to patients.  Specific 
communication techniques improve patient recall, understanding and adherence to treatment, 
such as asking patients to repeat the doctor‟s explanation in the patient‟s own words, or when 
doctors summarize or repeat their messages or provide diagrammatic representations of 
information.  There is even evidence that specific communication skills influence patients‟ 
health outcomes, such as the degree and rate of symptom resolution and physiological 
outcomes, such as blood pressure and glucose control for patients with hypertension and 
diabetes respectively.  Finally, research indicates that doctors who pay attention to 
communication with patients may significantly reduce the length of patients‟ hospitalization 
and thereby reduce health care costs.  Such doctors are also less likely to be involved in 
malpractice lawsuits.   
The specific communication techniques that are associated with the positive outcomes 
mentioned above may be grouped together and termed „patient-centred‟ communication, that 
is communication according to the patient-centred clinical method.  The patient-centred 
method developed over the past four decades in the medical discipline of Family Medicine (or 
General Practice) as reaction against the traditional medical model which focuses merely on 
the biological dimensions of disease and only on the patient‟s body (as the site of disease) at 
the cost of non-material realities such as the patient‟s perceptions and psychological needs.  
The patient-centred method wants to be a holistic method that fully acknowledges (in 
theorizing and practice) the biological, psychological and social aspects of disease and the 
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patient‟s experience of disease.  Kurtz et al. (2005: 20-27) argue that patient-centred 
communication can be taught and that communication skills training should be included in 
undergraduate medical curricula and continued professional development programmes for 
qualified doctors
6
.  I agree that attention to communication skills should form an integral part 
of medical curricula at all levels of training.  Yet, I do not think that the patient-centred 
method or more attention to communication skills is sufficient to pull modern medicine from 
its crises of care or its greater professional crisis.  I agree with Kriel (2000:44) that medicine 
can only be transformed when its view of reality (its ontology) transforms to include the non-
material aspects of the human condition.  
I mentioned earlier that an impressive cross-disciplinary literature on doctor-patient 
encounters exists.  The research that is conducted on this subject is informed by a diversity of 
theoretical and methodological standpoints and reasons for studying doctor-patient 
communication.  Ainsworth-Vaughn (2003:453) divides the literature on doctor-patient 
encounters into two separate categories which she terms “praxis literature” and “discourse 
literature”.  Praxis literature represents the majority of research on doctor-patient interaction.  
The research studies that form praxis literature are mostly directed towards medical praxis or 
the consultation process and focus on the structure of the consultation “from greeting to 
closure” and describe and measure concepts7 such as patient and doctor centeredness (Elwyn 
& Gwyn, 2006:186).  The praxis literature is atheoretical about language and thus regards 
language as merely expressive, as a transparent vehicle of meaning and communication.  
Discourse literature refers to research that is interested in the “analysis of talk itself” as 
informed by theories of discourse (Ainsworth-Vaughn, 2003:453).  The term „discourse‟ 
indicates a critical view of language.  The structuralist and post-structuralist view of language 
as a system “with its own rules and constraints, and with its own determining effect on the 
way that individuals think and express themselves” is adopted in discourse literature of 
clinical communication (Mills, 1997:8).  Discourse analysis is a research method that is often 
followed in the discourse literature.  Despite the recognition in praxis and discourse literature 
that the complexity, importance and problems of doctor-patient communication stem from a 
                                                 
6
 Sarangi (2008) provides the following important criticism of the patient-centred method .  He argues that this 
method, with its emphasis on open-ended questions and eliciting the patient‟s story of his/her illness places 
communicative pressure on the patient.  Patients from linguistic and cultural minority groups may struggle with 
these communicative tasks and doctors may have difficulty to elicit information from such patient‟s about their 
subjective illness experiences.   
7
 Pilnick & Dingwall (2011:1374) refer to the praxis literature as “code-and-count” research.  
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variety of related factors
8, very little attention has been paid to the influence of medicine‟s 
intellectual self image as natural science on interactions within the clinical medical setting.  I 
believe that research on the latter is much needed to better understand the crisis of care and 
the communicative problems in clinical medicine.  I also believe that philosophical analysis is 
a very useful study design for the first work in this direction.  Through philosophical analysis 
of the existing empirical information on doctor-patient communication and medical 
discourse
9
, the researcher can comment on these matters in general and is not restricted to 
specific instances of clinical communication, as is the case with empirical research designs.  
Empirical studies can assess and test the validity of the conclusions and recommendations of 
philosophical analyses for specific clinical contexts and consultations.   
The aim of the current study is then to philosophically investigate the influence of the medical 
profession‟s natural scientific intellectual self-image on communication between doctors and 
patients.  The research follows the design of a philosophical analysis.  Empirical data was 
thus not collected or analysed as part of the research process (Mouton, 2001:146, 178).  I 
perform my philosophical investigation with the aid of the work of two philosophers, namely 
Jürgen Habermas (1929- ) and Michel Foucault (1926-1984).  Although my study is not 
empirical in nature, I examined the vast empirical research literature on doctor-patient 
communication.  I describe this research literature and summarise its findings in Chapter 4 of 
the dissertation.  In Chapter 5 I look at these research results through the lens of Habermas‟ 
universal pragmatics.  In Chapter 6 I use Foucault‟s thoughts on the nature of discourse to 
analyse medical discourse, based on the descriptions of this discourse in scholarly writings.  
Yet, Chapters 5 and 6 and the dissertation as a whole do not constitute discourse analysis.  I 
shall now briefly discuss discourse analysis as a particular type of social research and 
thereafter I will indicate how the current project differs from discourse analysis.   
Discourse analysis is a field which grows rapidly and continues to develop.  Various and 
diverse academic disciplines use discourse analysis for research purposes.  The study of 
discourse originated in disciplines such as linguistics, anthropology and philosophy.  The 
models and analytic methods developed by these pioneering disciplines have been applied - 
and therefore extended – by disciplines such as communication, social psychology, cognitive 
                                                 
8
 Such as doctor and patient characteristics (most notably social class, gender, age and race [Waitzkin, 
1989:233]), the broader health care context, practice or system characteristics (Aita et al., 2005:303) as well as 
the specific disease under discussion. 
9
 I define the terms doctor-patient communication and medical discourse later in this Introduction. 
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psychology and artificial intelligence (Schiffrin et al., 2001:1).  In the light of this disciplinary 
diversity it is not surprising that the definitions for “discourse” and “discourse analysis” vary 
between scholars from different academic domains.  Currently many books on discourse start 
with a review of definitions of the term.  The various existing definitions of discourse can be 
divided into three categories, namely: 
 
i. discourse defined as any instance of language which extends beyond the sentence.  
This is a common definition, particularly in linguistics; 
ii. discourse defined as “the study of language use” (pragmatics); 
iii. discourse as it is used in phrases such as “discourse of power” or “discourse of 
feminism”.  In this definition discourse is a count noun which refers to a wide range of 
linguistic and non-linguistic social practices and ideological beliefs which together 
form, continuing the example above, power or feminism.  This definition is used by 
critical theorists and scholars influenced by critical theory (Schiffrin et al., 2001:1).   
 
The following three features are shared by most approaches to discourse analysis.   
 
i. Discourse analysis is pervasively understood as “the examination of actual (not 
hypothetical) text and / or talk”.  Based on that understanding theory and data are 
viewed as “inseparable and mutually enriching”:  theoretical insights are necessary for 
the analysis of discourse to reach beyond “instance-specific insights”, and in contrast 
the analysis has to be based on actual cases of language so that theory is constructed 
empirically and within realistic constraints (Schiffrin et al., 2001:6-7).  Discourse 
analysis does not have a single coherent theory but includes a diversity of theories and 
methodologies.  Different approaches to discourse analysis draw on different types of 
data, ranging for instance from “political speeches to everyday conversation to literary 
texts”; consider different contexts such as “community, institutional and ideological 
contexts” and reflect theoretical paradigms and methodologies of many different 
types, including for instance “relevance theory and systemic-functional linguistics” 
and “interpretive, statistical, and formal methods” (Schiffrin et al., 2001:5-6).  
Discourse analysts such as Schiffrin et al. (2001:5-7) view this theoretical and 
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methodological diversity as a strength rather than a weakness.  One reason for this 
view is the range of problems which has been and can continue to be addressed by 
discourse analysis.  These problems include linguistic phenomena, for example word 
meaning; interdisciplinary phenomena, for example literary pragmatics; and social 
problems for example discrimination against minority groups and patients‟ 
compliance with doctors‟ advice (Schiffrin et al., 2001:6).   
ii. Most forms of discourse analysis are interested in linguistic units which extend 
beyond the boundaries of the single sentence.  Discourse analysis is interested in the 
interconnection of utterances in continuous conversation or text
10
.  This supra-
sentential concern
11
 of discourse analysis separates it from the concern with 
phonology and syntactic structure of the more dominant perspectives in linguistics 
(Thompson, 1984:99).   
iii. Most forms of discourse analysis are to some extent interested in the connection 
between linguistic and non-linguistic activity.  Traditionally the links between 
“language and perception, language and thought, language and culture” were studied.  
Yet more recently discourse analysts have become interested in the ways that language 
is used in particular social contexts and thereby acts “as a medium of power and 
control”.  This sociological turn in discourse analysis makes it relevant in a 
methodology aimed at the study of ideology (Thompson, 1984:99).   
 
Thompson (1984:74) provides a critical survey of work in English regarding methods of 
discourse analysis
12
.  Although he found aspects of the different approaches surveyed 
interesting and original he considers the results delivered by these approaches as 
                                                 
10
 Discourse analysts refer to the “gift of discourse”, that is the fact that new meanings are produced by the 
relationship between sentences.  Yet the “curse of discourse” is how to decide, given that more than one meaning 
can be produced, which meaning is intended, justifiable and/or the most sensible (Schiffrin et al., 2001: 10).   
11
 All words that appear in italics in quoted phrases or sentences in this dissertation are similarly italicized by the 
authors whose work I quote.  I also use the italic font for all non-English words or phrases, such as et al., 
etcetera and ad hoc.  
12
 Thompson (1984: 100-126) included the work of the following authors in his survey:  John Sinclair, Malcolm 
Coulthard and other researchers associated with these scholars‟ Research Group at the University of Birmingham 
who focused their studies on the exchange structure of everyday talk; Harvey Sacks, Emanuel Schegloff, Gail 
Jefferson and others involved in the study of conversational structure; and finally the work of Roger Fowler, 
Robert Hodge, Gunter Kress and Tony Trew who studied the connection between the grammatical structure of 
discourse and the social world.  
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disappointing from the perspective of an interest in ideology (Thompson, 1984:8; 115)
13
.  
Thompson (1984:8) attributes the limitations of the results delivered by discourse analysis to 
limitations of the methodologies of these approaches.  He criticizes the approaches to 
discourse analysis which he surveyed for neglecting to consider “some of the most interesting 
issues” in everyday interaction (Thompson, 1984:115).  For instance, he criticizes Sinclair et 
al.‟s approach for only paying attention to the structure of conversation and not to the content, 
that is to “what is being said” (Thompson, 1984:106).  Similarly, Thompson (1984:115-118) 
criticizes Sacks et al. for not considering questions of power and social structure in their 
description of the turn-taking systems, the organization of repair and the “narratives of 
everyday life
14” which appear in conversation.  A further criticism by Thompson (1984:126) 
of the methods of discourse analysis which he surveyed is that their study of the non-
linguistic sphere is not adequate.  According to Thompson (1984:126) linguists such as Roger 
Fowler and his colleagues at the University of East Anglia are correct in searching for 
connections between “language and society”.  However, the terms which these scholars use to 
refer to aspects of the social world are not clearly defined and are not placed within “a 
systematic social theory”.  It seems that these theorists‟ understanding of social phenomena is 
far less sophisticated than their analysis of language.  Although they attempt to provide a 
critical perspective on the use of language, their approach to the study of discourse remains 
mostly linguistic, that is “bound to syntactic analysis” (Thompson, 1984:124-125).   
This dissertation is not a discourse analysis.  I did not record and analyse actual interactions 
between doctors and patients.  Instead, I made a summary of what is known through empirical 
research published in scholarly journals and books about the nature of doctor-patient 
communication and medical discourse.  I then comment on the nature of doctor-patient 
communication from the point of view of Habermas‟ universal pragmatics.  I also apply 
Foucault‟s thoughts on the nature of discourse to medical discourse.  The analytic dimension 
of my dissertation is contained in this task of applying the thoughts of two philosophers to the 
current academic knowledge about the nature of doctor-patient communication and medical 
discourse.  My aim in using the work of these two philosophers is to gain insight into the 
                                                 
13
 Thompson (1990:6–7) defines ideology as a concept which “can be used to refer to the ways in which meaning 
serves, in particular circumstances, to establish and sustain relations of power which are systematically 
asymmetrical” or so-called “relations of domination”. Ideology according to Thompson is “broadly 
speaking…meaning in the service of power”. 
14
 One instance of a narrative of everyday life is the telling of or listening to a joke (Thompson, 1984:117).  
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influence of modern medicine‟s intellectual self-image on communication between doctors 
and patients.  
I selected Habermas‟ (1979) universal pragmatics as an analytical tool since it is focussed on 
linguistic communication between a speaker and listener and is thus appropriate to my 
investigation into communication between doctors and patients.  Another reason for my 
decision to use universal pragmatics is the connection between the goals of doctor-patient 
interaction and universal pragmatics.  The goal of the doctor-patient encounter can be thought 
of as reaching understanding or “agreement regarding treatment of the patient‟s illness” 
(Skirbekk, 2004:246).  Habermas (1979:3) states as the goal of universal pragmatics “to 
analyse the process of understanding” by looking at how agreement between a speaker and a 
hearer is brought about.  Universal pragmatics thus offers great potential for meaningful 
insight into doctor-patient communication.  Several scholars have fruitfully applied 
Habermas‟ work to the study of doctor-patient communication (Tanenbaum, 1998; 2006; 
Skirbekk, 2004; Greenhalgh et al., 2006) and in Chapter 5 I refer to their work.  The medical 
sociologist Graham Scambler (1987:181) regards Habermas‟ work on pragmatics as useful for 
the study (and revelation) of inconspicuous or hidden forms of domination in modern, 
capitalist societies; such as doctors‟ exercise of power over patients during clinical 
interactions.   
Foucault‟s work on discourse is also very appropriate and useful for the aim of my study.  
Foucault views discourses as a regulated practices.  He is more interested in the rules and 
practices that generate meaningful utterances and texts, than in the actual utterances of 
speakers and texts of writers (Mills, 1997:7; Hall, 2001:72).  In order to investigate the 
influence of medicine‟s intellectual self-image on doctor-patient communication I wanted to 
describe the general rules of medical discourse.  Foucault‟s (1972; 1981a) theory of discourse 
and principles for the analysis of discourse supplied me with a tool for a general and critical 
analysis of medical discourse.  More specifically, his description of discursive formations set 
out in „The Archaeology of Knowledge‟ (Foucault, 1972) provided me with a conceptual 
framework and terminology for the study of medical discourse.  His description of the 
procedures that control discourse in the essay „The Order of Discourse‟ (Foucault, 1981a) 
allowed me to explain the restrictions on what can be said about sickness and health in 
medical discourse, by whom and how.  Furthermore, Foucault regards discourse and power as 
integrated.  This position is very useful for any study on doctor-patient communication, since 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  11 
power relations fundamentally influence communication in clinical situations.  No complete 
analysis of medical discourse can ignore the power struggles that accompany doctor-patient 
encounters.   
At this stage it will be useful to clarify my usage of some of the central terms in this 
dissertation.  To start I pay attention to the closely connected terms „medical discourse‟ and 
„doctor-patient communication‟.  First I shall describe the meanings I attach to the terms 
discourse and medical discourse.  In this dissertation I use Foucault‟s definition(s) of 
discourse.  Foucault defines discourse in a number of ways in his various writings and 
interviews.  I use his definitions of discourse as “an individualizable group of statements” and 
“as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements” (Foucault, 1972:90). 
Stuart Hall gives the following useful definition of Foucault‟s understanding of discourse: 
By „discourse‟ Foucault meant „a group of statements which provide a language for 
talking about – a way of representing the knowledge about – a particular topic at a 
particular historical moment…Discourse is about the production of knowledge through 
language…‟ (Hall, 1992 as cited in Hall, 2001:72).  It governs the way a topic can be 
meaningfully talked about and reasoned about.  It also influences how ideas are put into 
practice and used to regulate the conduct of others (Hall, 2001:72).   
When I use the word medical discourse in this dissertation I am referring to the discourse of 
the medical profession.  In this sense medical discourse forms “an individualizable group of 
statements” (Foucault, 1972:90), namely the statements that doctors may legitimately use in 
the practice of their profession.  I also use the term medical discourse to refer to the rules 
responsible for the production, distribution and circulation of doctors‟ statements (Foucault, 
1972: 90; Young, 1981:48).  In my use of the term medical discourse thus refers to the rules 
that doctors (have to) follow when they think and talk about health and disease (in order to be 
regarded as competent).  Three of the most prevalent genres
15
 of medical discourse are: the 
research paper, the doctor-patient encounter, and the textbook (Macdonald, 2002: 447).  I am 
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 Wilce (2009:203) provides the following definition of (discourse) genres:  “types of discourse linked to event 
types, patterned to fit recipients‟ expectations of both the discourse and the broader event”.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  12 
particularly interested in the discourse surrounding the interaction between a doctor and a 
patient, or the discourse of medical practice
16
.   
The term doctor-patient communication (and its earlier mentioned synonyms
17
) has its 
usual meaning in my writing.  The Oxford Advanced Learner‟s Dictionary (2005:291) defines 
communication as “the activity or process of expressing ideas and feelings or of giving people 
information”.  Doctor-patient communication occurs in clinical settings between a doctor and 
his/her patient and/or caregiver(s).  The communication behaviour of doctors as well as 
patients is included in the meaning of the term.  To achieve the aim of my study, namely to 
investigate the influence of the medical profession‟s intellectual self-image on communication 
between doctors and patients, it is necessary to analyse both medical discourse and doctor-
patient communication.  Medical discourse reflects the positivist assumptions of modern 
medicine.  I chose Foucault‟s work on discourse as the analytic tool for examining the nature 
of medical discourse.  I use Habermas‟ universal pragmatics to analyse doctor-patient 
communication.   
I also want to make a comment about the way I use the term „modern medicine‟, „medicine‟ 
for short, and its synonyms.  With these terms I refer to the cultural institution of biomedical 
care, the globally dominant system of caring for the ill (Nutton, 1996:52; Helman, 2007:94).  
I refer to medicine in the same manner as Foucault (1972:46) in the following quotation: 
“…as an institution possessing its own rules, as a group of individuals constituting the 
medical profession, as a body of knowledge and practice, as an authority recognized by public 
opinion, the law, and government…”  With the term medicine I thus do not refer to single 
medical doctors „as individuals‟.  When I write about the philosophical assumptions or world-
view of modern medicine I do not imply that individual medical professionals wholly or 
personally subscribe to this belief system.  What I refer to with the term medicine is rather the 
norms for legitimate knowledge, practice and reasoning that doctors are taught and expected 
to follow.  It is entirely possible, and indeed there is testimony of this in the writings of 
doctors with a humanistic or patient-centred orientation, that doctors‟ personal world-views 
are in conflict with the philosophical assumptions of medicine and that this may be a source 
of great professional frustration for these individuals.   
                                                 
16
 My definition of medical discourse is much narrower than the definition used by James Wilce (2009:199) in a 
recent review article on medical discourse.  Wilce broadly defines medical discourse as “discourse in and about 
healing, curing, or therapy; expressions of suffering; and relevant language ideologies”.   
17
 See “Terms treated as synonyms in this dissertation” that appears before the start of this introductory chapter. 
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I would like to share how I came to approach this particular project with philosophical 
analysis.  I am qualified as a speech-language therapist and audiologist.  The research study I 
undertook for the purposes of my master‟s degree in speech-language therapy was a 
qualitative phenomenological enquiry into the experiences of doctors, mothers of sick 
children and interpreters regarding communication in a public paediatric multilingual 
HIV/AIDS clinic in South Africa (Cilliers
18
, 2005).  I have also acted as supervisor for 
students who completed research projects on doctor-patient communication in paediatric 
(Garcia, 2004; Steenkamp, 2004) and adult HIV/AIDS care settings (Carstens, 2005; Gouws, 
2005; Strauss, 2005), as well as on communication in HIV/AIDS counselling (Rust, 2005).  
Six of these student research studies involved conversation analysis, a form of discourse 
analysis, of recorded and transcribed clinical consultations.  I found this empirical work on 
doctor-patient communication fascinating.  Nevertheless, it sparked my interest in what may 
underlie the difficulties of doctor-patient interactions.  Many material factors have been 
identified as influences on doctor-patient communication and their effects have been studied 
and documented.  These include the context of the interaction, the personal characteristics of 
the doctor and the patient, and the specific disease(s) they are discussing.  Yet one serious 
question is seldom addressed directly by the empirical research on clinical communication.  
This is the question about the influence of medicine‟s positivist view of the world and of itself 
on communication between two persons, a doctor and a patient; engaged in a very human 
activity, namely attempting to identify and treat disease and to lessen the suffering that comes 
with it.  To my mind reflection on this basic question will bring us to a fuller understanding of 
clinical communication.  
I am critical of biomedicine in this dissertation.  This is not to deny the immense benefits of 
biomedicine for humankind, or at least for those with access to medical services and products.  
Modern medicine saves and improves lives.  A few common examples of biomedical 
technologies that enhance human lives are vaccinations against potentially life threatening or 
disabling diseases, antibiotic therapy for infection, and anaesthetic that makes even invasive 
surgery possible and bearable.  The benefits of modern medicine have become so  
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 My maiden name and surname at the time of submitting the thesis.  
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commonplace that people living in the twenty first century can easily take them for granted
19
.  
Yet the prospect of life without these biomedical benefits, as was the case not so very long 
ago, is terrifying.  I do not blame medical professionals, or anyone else involved in 
biomedicine, for medicine‟s crisis of care.  If anything, I admire and am grateful to these 
skilled and learned individuals for their ability to administer the benefits of modern medicine.  
I am also concerned about the constraints that medical discourse places on doctors in their 
interactions with patients.  What I want to achieve with this dissertation is to stimulate a 
consciousness of the effects that medical discourse may have on clinical interaction.  In this 
way, my dissertation wants to play a role in liberating the medical profession from a 
restrictive self-image and making communicatively effective care for patients possible.   
To start the conversation of the influence of modern medicine‟s scientific intellectual self-
image on doctor-patient conversations, it is necessary to describe medicine‟s alleged identity 
as a natural science.  I do this in the next chapter.  In Chapter 2 I describe Habermas‟ research 
on what he terms Universal Pragmatics.  Chapter 3 is devoted to a description of Foucault‟s 
theory on the nature of discourse.  In Chapter 4 I provide a description of doctor-patient 
communication and medical discourse based on the praxis and discourse literature on this 
subject.  I start the analytical work of my project in Chapters 5 and 6.  Chapter 5 is a 
description of doctor-patient communication in terms of Habermas‟ universal pragmatics.  In 
Chapter 6 I apply Foucault‟s thoughts on the nature of discourse to medical discourse.  The 
task of critique is reserved for Chapter 7.  In this chapter I critique the appropriateness of 
modern medicine‟s intellectual self-image in the light of the effects thereof on communication 
between the doctor and his/her patient.  I also make some concluding remarks and 
recommendations based on the outcome of my philosophical analysis.   
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 I want to declare my personal indebtness to biomedicine for twice saving my life, or at least protecting me 
from serious disability.  The first time was after a car knocked me off my bicycle on my way to high school and I 
broke almost every bone on the right side of my body.  Doctors (literally) sewed and screwed me back together, 
nurses (and my mother) bathed and fed me, and physiotherapists helped me to regain movement of my limbs.  
The second time I was seventeen years old and I suffered from Guillain-Barré syndrome.  A skilled neurologist 
promptly diagnosed the disorder and recommended plasmapheresis.  This treatment was extremely effective and 
restored the functioning of my nerves within a matter of weeks.  My gratitude is specifically directed at the 
health care professionals who treated me and to the nameless scientists who created the knowledge and 
technology that benefited me so greatly.  I fully recovered from both these traumatic events with only a few 
unobtrusive scars to show for it.   
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  Chapter 1
Modern medicine’s intellectual self-understanding 
 
We don‟t see things as they are, we see things as we are 
Anaïs Nin
20
 
1.1 Introduction  
Today‟s doctor is first and foremost regarded as a scientist.  His academic discipline, 
medicine, views itself specifically as a natural science (Simon, 2010:337).  The natural 
sciences are the academic fields of physics, chemistry and biology.  Medicine‟s practitioners 
and users did not always see their discipline as a science, nor is it self-evident that medicine 
should assume the self-image of natural science.  Various historical, social and political 
factors and decisions shaped medicine into the mould of natural science as we know it today 
(Kriel, 2000:2).  
If the above statements are true, a number of questions arise.  One is interested in the 
historical development, or story behind medicine‟s self-identification as natural science.  The 
character of medicine gradually changed from an art, as it was regarded since antiquity and 
throughout the Middle Ages, to a science since the eighteenth-century.  Secondly, one might 
ask what it means to say that medicine regards itself as a natural science, and what medicine‟s 
understanding of science is.  The implications of medicine‟s scientific status, specifically for 
the meaning of three concepts central to medicine, namely patient, disease and therapy (Kriel, 
2000:7), also come into question.  Finally, and of special concern to the aims of this project, 
the question regarding the nature of the doctor-patient relationship and specifically 
communicative interaction within this relationship according to a natural science framework, 
can be asked.  This chapter will attempt to answer these four questions.  This may seem like 
an ambitious goal, given the wealth of information available for responses to these questions.  
Yet, I shall sketch my story of how medicine came to be regarded as a science and the 
meaning thereof in broad strokes, given the limitations of the context of this text as doctoral 
dissertation and elaboration in later chapters on issues which hold special importance for the 
current project.  The focus of this project is on the clinical method (the practice of medicine or 
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 As cited in Beveridge, 2002:101 
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the interaction between doctor and patient) and not on biomedical research or education, since 
the doctor-patient relationship and communication, two of the central concepts of this project, 
are matters belonging to the sphere of the physical encounter between doctor and patient.   
 
1.2 From and art to a science  
Illness and systems for dealing with the ill, the institution of medicine, have existed since the 
origin of mankind
21
.  This is evident from skeletons and other archaeological findings that 
date back to the times before humans lived together in large groups (civilisations) and from 
the writings and drawings of the ancient civilisations (Nutton, 1996:52) up to our modern 
media.  Medicine‟s goal and reason for existence has always been to promote the welfare of 
patients (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:205), to treat the ill and to relieve their pain and 
suffering (Helman, 2007:121).  A number of different systems of healing have existed 
throughout history and continue to exist today.  Societies view illness and healing in 
accordance with their world-view, especially their views on the nature of reality (an ontology) 
and the nature of human persons (an anthropology).  Helman (2007:125) reminds us that 
“medicine has always been more than a system of scientific ideas and practices; it has also 
been a symbolic system, expressing some of the basic underlying values, beliefs and moral 
concerns of the wider society”. 
One of the best known, respected and still honoured physicians of all time was Hippocrates 
who lived in ancient Greece in the fifth-century before Christ.  Since antiquity up to the 
beginning of the nineteenth-century, the practice of medicine can be characterised as 
Hippocratic.  The practice of Hippocratic medicine was based on a collection of written works 
named the Hippocratic Corpus.  The writings were developed over decades by a variety of 
authors and represent “a consistent doctrine of medical theory and practice, relatively free 
from superstition and speculative philosophies, and setting forth rational empiricism of a 
strictly scientific nature” (Van Zyl, 1997:15).  The Hippocratic Corpus suggests a humoral 
theory of illness.  According to this theory any form of physical or mental difficulty is 
attributed to a problem in the balance of the four most important bodily fluids namely blood, 
phlegm, yellow bile and black bile.  Illness was also believed to be closely connected with the 
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 I am indebted to Kriel (2000:1-44) for the structure of the sections numbered two (2) to four (4) in this 
chapter, as well as much of the content in the chapter.  However, in the interest of not unnecessarily 
complicating the structure of the text, I only include in-text references to Kriel (2000) when paraphrasing or 
quoting directly from this source.  
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life story of the ill patient (Van Niekerk, 2002b:228).  The humoral theory of illness 
corresponds with the dominant view of the time regarding the structure of the world as 
consisting of four elements namely fire, water, air and earth.   
In the Hippocratic tradition doctors did not physically examine patients, but talked to them.  
Kriel (2000:4) explains this practice: 
[Up to] the eighteenth-century, doctors did not examine patients.  Apart from possibly 
feeling the forehead for signs of fever, or examining the pulse and noting the facial 
expression and state of the tongue, doctors only talked to patients.  This is 
understandable.  For these doctors, disease was not located in an organ of the body, 
even though they had good anatomical knowledge, but was caused by a disturbed 
balance of the humors in the body.  It was not necessary to examine the body, since an 
assessment of the balance of the humors depended on the report by the patient of his or 
her experience of the illness. 
What the modern health care provider and consumer possibly find most striking about the pre-
modern practice of medicine described above is the absence of the concept of disease (as we 
understand it today) and that no distinction is made between physical and psychological 
ailments.  In the pre-modern era medicine was a form of art.  The art entailed forming a 
personal relationship with the patient based on his/her humanity and to apply medical 
knowledge in a way that recognised this humanity as well as the patient‟s unique 
characteristics.  This art was not based on scientific knowledge, but rather on practical 
wisdom which was acquired through experience and apprenticeship under the guidance of 
experienced physicians.  To be considered a good physician, the clinician needed a reputation 
as skilled in the clinical method as well as virtuous of character (Van Zyl, 1997:26).  It is 
interesting to note that altruism became part of the (expected) moral characteristics of medical 
professionals only from the second century AD, when Christian ideals became influential.  
There is very little evidence of altruism in the ethics of Hippocratic medicine.  Jonsen 
(1990:9) describes the moral nature of ancient Greek medicine in the excerpt below. 
Hippocratic medicine was a skill, its practitioners were craftsmen, and their objective 
was a good living.  The etiquette that went by the name of ethics consisted of counsels 
of self-interest:  “Act in this or that way with your patients if you want to build a 
reputation and a clientele.” 
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In the ancient Greek medical tradition the main goal of medical care was to increase or 
maintain the physician‟s reputation.  Jonsen (1990:9) points out that the self-interest of 
Hippocratic physicians was not immoral or problematic since it was accompanied by the 
principle of non-maleficence, “at least do no harm”.  After some initial avoidance of 
Hippocratic medicine
22
, the Christian church accepted “care of the sick as a duty of charity” 
(Jonsen, 1990:9).  Medieval Western medicine had a Judeo-Christian nature in which 
“altruism and medical care were bound in a moral covenant” (Jonsen, 1990:7).  
In the renaissance of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the medieval worldview started to 
change.  During the Enlightenment, which started in the seventeenth-century, the world-view 
of the natural sciences replaced the pre-modern worldview.  This new way of thinking and 
seeing proved powerful in explaining and manipulating the natural world.  Although this 
paradigm was initially intended for studying the non-living natural world, it was later applied 
to the world of living matter based on the assumption that living material was structurally 
similar to non-living material.  It was thus thought that living matter could be explained by 
the same principles of physics and chemistry that explained the non-living material world.  
Living material was simply seen as a more complex type of phenomenon compared to non-
living material systems.  As a consequence of the power of the natural science paradigm to 
explain the world and its consequent rise in social status, the way that illness and medicine 
were conceived and practiced was gradually transformed until medicine identified itself as a 
natural or empirical science and emphasized the need for a concrete understanding of disease 
through the examination of individual bodies (Levin & Solomon, 1990:519; Kriel, 2000:11; 
Rich et al., 2008:221-222).  The science of medicine is concerned with objectively describing 
disease processes
23
 and uncovering the universal laws that explain the mechanical workings 
of the human body, or as Helman (2007:122) puts it “discovering and quantifying 
physicochemical information about the patient”.  Medicine that is conceptualised and 
practiced according to the natural science paradigm is known as biomedicine, scientific 
medicine, or allopathy and is currently the dominant approach to  
                                                 
22
 The early Christian Church avoided Hippocratic medicine, since it believed that God alone was the healer of 
man‟s afflictions and that relief from suffering should be asked from God through prayer.  Medicine was 
gradually embraced in the Middle Ages (Van Niekerk 2002b:226; Van Zyl 2000:22).   
23
 The description of facts is important in scientific medicine.  Amard (1821:62, as cited in Foucault, 1973:140) 
states that “The art of describing facts is the supreme art in medicine: everything pales before it”. 
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health care worldwide (Kriel, 2000: 21; Helman, 2007:94)
24
.  The emphasis on objective 
empiricism and materialism leaves little room in biomedicine for subjective and less 
measurable psychological, social and cultural factors that impact patients‟ illness experiences 
and interactions in the health care environment (Helman, 2007:122).  This is even true for 
psychiatry.  I pay more attention to the nature of psychiatry later in this chapter (see section 
1.4).   
Various activities form part of the institution of scientific medicine.  Three broad categories 
exist, namely medical science (the generation of knowledge through scientific research and 
the development of technology), medical practice or the clinical method (the application of 
medical knowledge in treating a patient‟s disease) and medical education (the transfer of 
scientific and clinical knowledge and skills to future and current doctors).  The change from 
Hippocratic to scientific medicine did not happen simultaneously across the three institutions.  
In fact, a duality between medical science and practice, or the science and the art of medicine, 
existed for approximately two centuries.  Medical science has its origins in the seventeenth-
century when the scientific method was applied to the study of the function of the body 
(physiology).  Many basic discoveries in the physiology and anatomy of the human body 
were made during this time, such as the circulation of blood and the existence of red blood 
cells (Lewinsohn, 1998:1263-1264; Kriel, 2000:4).  Medicine‟s clinical method transformed 
at the end of the nineteenth-century to represent the natural science paradigm
25
.  Medical 
                                                 
24
 Alternative forms of health care exist alongside biomedicine as the official (legally supported) system of 
health care in the West.  Examples of such smaller health care systems are homeopathy, herbalism and spiritual 
healing (Helman, 2007: 81).  Biomedicine makes up a small percentage of health care in most parts of the world 
due to the scarcity of manpower and the greater concentration of doctors in the urban areas of non-industrialised 
societies (Helman, 2007: 94).  
25
 Lewinsohn (1998:1263-1265) emphasizes that a chasm has always existed “between medical theory and 
practice”.  This chasm was particularly great between the sixteenth- and the beginning of the twentieth-century.  
Girolamo Fracastoro‟s theory of contagious disease (published by in 1546), Harvey‟s theory of blood circulation 
and Descartes‟ mechanistic philosophy made no difference to the way that medicine was practiced, and therefore 
were of no benefit to the patient, until the early 20
th
 century.  There are various reasons for the great cleft that 
existed between medical science and practice since the scientific revolution (dated at approximately 1550) until 
the start of the previous century.  Firstly, scientific medical theories could not be used by the doctor who was 
“limited to surface phenomena” in his/her examination of the patient.  That is, the doctor had only his/her senses 
available to observe the physical signs and symptoms of the patient‟s disease.  Secondly, these theories were not 
in agreement with the established medical dogma of the time and were therefore not accepted.  As Lewinsohn 
(1998:1264) eloquently puts it: “As for Descartes, for all his enormous influence on all subsequent philosophy 
and science, insofar as medical practice up to the twentieth century was concerned, he might as well never have 
had a single thought or written a single word”.  Finally, it was not so much advanced anatomical knowledge, but 
rather overcoming the “triple barrier of pain, bleeding and sepsis” that enabled surgeons to “penetrate the depths 
of the living body and tissues”.  Surgeons‟ interventions were restricted to surface phenomena before the advent 
of anaesthesia in 1846 and the means to combat sepsis in 1877.   
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  20 
education became rooted in the natural sciences only in 1910 after the American medical 
profession accepted the Flexner Report.   
Since medicine started to move away from the Hippocratic tradition a number of changes took 
place before it took on the form of biomedicine as we know it today.  In The birth of the clinic 
Foucault (1973) discusses the changes that took place in medicine at the end of the eighteenth 
century.  During this period medicine transformed from classificatory medicine to the 
anatomo-clinical method that is still used today (Sheridan, 1980:38)
26
.  Classificatory 
medicine was dominated by Gilibert‟s27 classificatory rule: “Never treat a disease without first 
being sure of its species”.  Classificatory medicine was a medicine of nosology.  Diseases 
were organised in hierarchies of “families, genera and species” (Foucault, 1973:3).  Foucault 
(1973:24) refers to Thomas Sydenham (1624-1689) as “the initiator of classificatory thought”.  
Sydenham was an admired English doctor, known as the „English Hippocrates‟.  He 
emphasised observation rather than theory in clinical medicine.  He urged physicians to 
differentiate between diseases and to seek remedies specific to every isolated form of disease.  
His empirical method lead to a nosology of individual diseases, each described in terms of its 
unique signs and symptoms (Jonsen, 1990:84; Porter, 1996:168-169).  In modern medicine 
disease is not seen as a single, uniform entity.  Different forms of empirically identifiable 
substantive diseases are recognised, each with a unique pathology, specific cause and 
responsive to specific treatment.  This view stands in stark contrast to the unified humoral 
concept of illness of Hippocratic medicine (Van Niekerk, 2002:227-228; Rich et al., 
2008:222).  Interestingly, in classificatory medicine, the presence of disease in a particular 
organ was not “absolutely necessary to define a disease:  this disease could travel from one 
point on the body‟s surface to another and remain identical in nature” (Sheridan, 1980:39).   
“The act of seeing” (Sheridan, 1980:39), or the “gaze” in Foucault‟s (1973:2) terminology, 
dominated the medicine of the late eighteenth century.  The doctors of classificatory medicine 
observed disease up to the point of the death of its host – the death of the diseased patient.  
The “great break in the history of Western medicine” (Foucault, 1973:179), the birth of the 
anatomo-clinical method, occurred with the birth and raise in importance of pathological 
                                                 
26
 This reference is to Alan Sheridan‟s book, Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth.  Sheridan (1980:1) describes 
his book as a guidebook to Foucault‟s work, a guidebook that is “profusely illustrated” with lengthy and frequent 
quotations to the original work and much of the rest “précis or disguised quotation”.  Sheridan translated a 
number of Foucault‟s books from French to English, including The Birth of the Clinic and The Archaeology of 
Knowledge.  I occasionally refer to Sheridan to illustrate or illuminate Foucault‟s ideas where I did not find 
sufficient clarity in the original text. 
27
 Foucault (1973:2) quotes Gilibert and indicates the source of this quotation as Neuchâtel, 1772, vol. I, p.198).   
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anatomy.  Bichat (1801:xcix, as cited in Foucault, 197:180) advised the doctors of 
classificatory medicine:  
for twenty years, from morning to night, you have taken notes at patients‟ bedsides on 
affections of the heart, the lungs, and the gastric viscera, and all is confusion for you in 
the symptoms which, refusing to yield up their meaning, offer you a succession of 
incoherent phenomena. Open up a few corpses: you will dissipate at once the darkness 
that observation alone could not dissipate.   
Soon after the French Revolution French physicians, including René Théophile Hyacinthe 
Laennec, started the practice of attending post-mortem examinations to correlate the clinical 
findings of examinations in hospital wards before patients died, with the organ pathology 
revealed by the post-mortem examination.  This “simple change in clinical practice” (Kriel, 
2000:3) changed the conceptual structure of classificatory medicine that has death as its outer 
limit, the point at which doctors‟ actions as well as disease end (Sheridan, 1980:39,41).  The 
conceptual structure of the anatomo-clinical method is a trinity formed by “life, disease and 
death”.  Death is the summit of this triangular figure.  “It is from the height of death that one 
can see and analyse organic dependences and pathological sequences” (Foucault, 1973:176-
177).  Whereas observation in classificatory medicine was aimed at defining “the structures of 
pathological kinship”, observation in the anatomo-clinical method has “the task of mapping 
the figures of localization”.  The “notion of seat” replaced the “notion of class”.   
„What is observation‟, Bichat was…asking, „if one is ignorant of the seat of the 
disease?‟28  And Bouillaud was to reply:  If there is an axiom in medicine it is certainly 
the proposition that there is no disease without a seat.  If one accepted the contrary 
opinion, one would also have to admit that there existed functions without organs, 
which is a palpable absurdity.  The determination of the seat of disease or their 
localization is one of the finest conquests of modern medicine‟29 (Foucault, 1973:171-
172).   
                                                 
28
 Bichat, X.  1801.  Anatomie générale appliquée à la physiologie et à médicine.  3 vols.  Paris. p. xcix (as cited 
in Foucault 1973:171) 
29
 Bouillaud.  Philosophie médicale, p. 259.  (as cited in Foucault 1973:172).  This is the most complete 
reference to these words of Bouillaud in The Birth of the Clinic.  
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Kriel (2000:3-4) agrees with Bouillaud that the change in the French physicians‟ methods 
radically influenced medicine‟s clinical method:  
Apart from advances in therapy, most of the conceptual and technological advances of 
twentieth-century medicine are more sophisticated ways of examining patients and of 
defining tissue-pathology and pathophysiology.  Modern technologies enable clinicians 
to image tissue changes and pathologists to obtain tissue and body fluid samples, 
without having to wait for the post-mortem room.  Twentieth-century medicine can be 
described as a series of footnotes to the change in conceptual framework brought about 
by Laennec and his colleagues.   
The humoral theory of illness was thus replaced with the concept of disease, namely organ 
pathology
30
.  The birth of disease may be seen as the birth of modern medicine (Tavassoli, 
1987 as cited in Kriel, 2000: 4).  A transformation in the clinical method, from Hippocratic to 
scientific had thus occurred.  The discovery of disease and the developments in medical 
treatment which followed as a consequence, were very significant in the sense that doctors 
acquired true power over disease in a manner unknown in previous times  (Van Niekerk, 
2002b:228).  The role of the doctor in the scientific clinical method is to identify the 
appropriate disease label to classify the patient‟s condition by matching the disease history as 
elicited from the patient with the results of the physical and other special investigations, 
namely objective laboratory information.  The disease label further determines the therapy to 
be followed in treating the disease.   
Kriel (2000:6) believes that the new clinical method that developed at the end of the 
nineteenth-century was born out of a desire to follow the methodology of the physical 
sciences which has proved powerful in explaining and manipulating the physical world.  In 
the following two sections I describe biomedicine‟s understanding of itself and of science, 
and how these philosophical assumptions manifest in clinical medicine.   
  
                                                 
30
 Disease was first viewed as organ pathology.  With developments in medical science and technology disease 
was later viewed as cellular pathology (nineteenth-century) whereas molecular pathology is the twentieth-
century and current definition of disease.  Today‟s scientific medicine regards a disease as understood when its 
molecular basis can be fully described.   
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1.3 Modern medicine’s scientific intellectual self-image  
For the past hundred years at least medical professionals have been considering medicine as a 
science (Kriel, 2000: 10; Montgomery, 2006:30; Simon, 2010:337).  Simon (2010:337) points 
to two matters to support the above statement.  Firstly, he mentions a document called the 
Physician Charter or the Charter on Medical Professionalism which was prepared over several 
years by leaders of the following three important medical organisations: the American Board 
of Internal Medicine Foundation, the American College of Physicians Foundation, and the 
European Federation of Internal Medicine (2002: 243-246).  The Physician Charter was 
simultaneously published in two highly regarded academic journals in 2002, namely the 
Annals of Internal Medicine and The Lancet (Sox, 2002: 243).  Since its publication more 
than 130 world-wide organisations have endorsed the Charter and it has been translated into 
12 languages (ABIM Foundation, n.d.).  The Charter sets out three fundamental principles 
and 10 commitments or professional responsibilities to which all medical professionals in the 
twenty first century can and, according to its authors, should aspire.  One of the professional 
responsibilities of medical professionals stated in the Charter is the “commitment to scientific 
knowledge”.  According to this commitment “physicians have a duty to uphold scientific 
standards, to promote research, and to create new knowledge and ensure its appropriate use” 
(American Board of Internal Medicine Foundation, the American College of Physicians 
Foundation, and the European Federation of Internal Medicine, 2002: 245).  Simon (2010: 
337) takes this statement as “perhaps the most explicit formulation of medicine‟s self-
conception as a science”.  He finds a second indication of medicine‟s self-image as a science 
in the methodology of clinical research.  He describes this methodology as “modeled as 
closely as possible on basic [natural] science research with a premium placed on objectivity, 
hypothesis testing, and repeatable outcomes” (Simon, 2010: 337).   
If it can be said that medicine views itself as a science, this claim can be made more specific 
by stating that modern medicine perceives itself as a natural science.  What does this claim 
mean?  It is by no means easy to provide an adequate definition of the concept of “science”.  
A fairly traditional conception of scientific practice is that it is a way or a method that 
humankind has developed to gain access to and a grip on the reality that she is faced with 
(Van Niekerk, 1992:4).  Scientific practice can be defined as the systematic acquisition and 
transfer of knowledge (Rossouw, 1993:95).  The modern day sciences or „science subjects‟ 
each operate within a clearly demarcated area of investigation.  Every individual science, such 
as physics or biology, corresponds with a particular modality of the knowable reality and aims 
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to find relevant and factual information about this specific feature of reality (Van Niekerk, 
1992:5).  The knowledge terrain of the natural sciences is the natural, physical aspects of 
reality (as opposed to the aspects of reality that are connected with the creations and actions 
of people)
31
.  It can thus be said that the paradigmatic natural sciences, for example physics, 
chemistry and molecular biology, use certain well-defined methods to study features of the 
natural world in order to produce accurate knowledge about the structure and behaviour of 
those features (Oxford Advanced Learner‟s Dictionary, 2005:1307; Simon, 2010:337).  
Following this basic definition of natural science, the claim that medicine is a natural science 
is to say that medicine 
just like physics, chemistry, and molecular biology, investigates the entities of the 
natural world within its own domain and returns knowledge of those entities and that 
world, albeit knowledge of a particularly useful sort that allows us to improve and 
prolong the functioning of our bodies (Simon, 2010:337).   
The claim that medicine conceives of itself as a natural science can be analysed more closely.  
We can ask, what is medicine’s understanding of science?  According to Kriel (2000: 14) 
medicine‟s understanding of science corresponds with the logical positivist view of science.  
Claims are made that most Western medical practitioners and scientists (and many researchers 
in the natural sciences in general) as well as the general public with a high school or 
university education subscribe to this positivist view of science (Van Huyssteen, 1986:16, 22; 
Kriel 2000:10).  Kriel (2000:21) even refers to modern medicine as “positivist medicine”.  A 
look at logical positivism and the conception of science that developed from this philosophy, 
which may be referred to as the standard image of science, will give us insight into 
biomedicine‟s intellectual self-image.  I shall thus now provide a brief description of logical 
positivism and the standard image of science.   
  
                                                 
31
 The aspects of reality that have been created by humans are the subjects of the human sciences (Van Niekerk, 
1992:1).   
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  25 
1.3.1 Logical positivism 
Logical positivism refers to a set of ideas that originated among a group of intellectuals 
(among them philosophers, mathematicians and physicists) who met regularly in the 1920s in 
the Austrian city of Vienna.  This group of intellectuals are known as the Vienna Circle 
(Hanfling, 1981:2; Blackburn, 2005:214). The term „logical positivism‟ helps us to 
understand the orientation and interests of the Vienna Circle and those who adopted their 
ideas, collectively known as the Logical Positivists.  The seventeenth-century French 
philosopher and sociologist Auguste Comte (1798-1857) used the term „positivism‟ 
(Hanfling, 1981:6).  It refers to the view “…that the highest or only form of knowledge is the 
description of sensory phenomena” (Blackburn, 2005:284).  According to positivism our 
knowledge of the world is the result of sense observation („Comte, Auguste (1798 - 1857)‟ 
1999) and all our knowledge stems from observable phenomena (Hanfling, 1981:6).  In 
positivism sense experience is regarded as the ultimate basis of all forms of knowledge (Van 
Huyssteen, 1986: 16).  The word „logical‟ indicates the Vienna Circle‟s dependence on logic 
or its special interest in language.   
Hanfling (1981:13) identifies three main strands in the thought of the Logical Positivists, 
namely: “the verification principle, the elimination of metaphysics and the unity of science.”  
I shall now pay brief attention to each of these ideas and concerns in the order that they are 
listed above. The Logical Positivists were
32
 particularly interested in the meaning of 
statements.  Their theory about what determines the meaning of statements is known as the 
verification principle and it is formulated as follows:  “the meaning of a proposition is the 
method of its verification” (Hanfling, 1981:6-7; „verificationism‟ 1999).  To illustrate how 
this principle works Hanfling (1981:7) provides the example of „the postman at the door‟.  If 
we were to ask the Logical Positivists the question, “What does the following statement 
mean: „the postman is at the door?‟”, they would answer, in accord with the verification 
principle, as follows:  
                                                 
32
 I refer to the Logical Positivists in the past tense since very few present-day philosophers fully identify 
themselves with this philosophical movement or would be willing to call themselves Logical Positivists.  Logical 
Positivism thrived for approximately twenty or thirty years after it was established in the 1920‟s (Hanfling, 
1981:1; „logical positivism also called positivism‟ 1999).  The opening line of Hanfling‟s (1981:1) book on 
logical positivism illustrates the current status of this philosophical movement:  “„Logical positivism‟, we are 
told in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, „is dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes.‟”  
Hanfling indicates the source of his quotation as follows: John Passmore, in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Paul Edwards (1972), under „Logical Positivism‟.   
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How would one verify that the postman is at the door?  By looking, listening, etc.?  
Very well.  The meaning of that proposition consists in nothing else than these methods 
of verifying it – or perhaps, in what happens when these methods are employed.   
Following their positivist position, the Logical Positivists conceived of verification mainly in 
empiricist terms (Hanfling, 1981:7).  In the positivist tradition, in order for a statement to 
have a claim to truth, it needs to possible to verify the statement by means of sense 
experience.  Statements that cannot be empirically verified are not regarded as true or as 
meaningful (Van Niekerk, 1983:15-17; Van Huyssteen, 1986: 16).  According to the Logical 
Positivists only two types of meaningful statements exist, namely empirical statements and 
analytical statements.  Empirical statements are verifiable by observation (Hanfling, 1981: 9).  
These statements are based on experience and can be traced back to sense experience by 
means of logical analysis (Van Huyssteen, 1986:18).  “The postman is at the door” is an 
example of an empirical statement (Hanfling, 1981:9).  Analytical statements are not 
empirical but their truth or falsity can be established by analysing the meaning of the words 
contained in the statement (Hanfling, 1981:9; Van Huyssteen, 1986:18). Examples of 
analytical statements are: “a postman delivers letters” (Hanfling, 1981:9) and “all circles are 
round” (Van Huyssteen, 1986:215).  To verify an analytical statement it is not empirical 
observation that is required but rather “a knowledge of the meanings of the words” in the 
statement (Hanfling, 1981:9).  The statements of the formal sciences, namely logic and 
mathematics were also considered as analytical statements by the Logical Positivists 
(Hanfling, 1981:9; Van Huyssteen, 1986:18).   
The Logical Positivists excluded metaphysical, religious and ethical statements from their 
realm of meaningful utterances, since such statements cannot be verified empirically.  In other 
words they do not correspond with anything that one would be able to identify empirically, as 
required by the verification principle of meaning.  According to the Logical Positivists ethical 
utterances are devoid of cognitive content.  Such statements do not represent knowledge and 
are at most an expression of particular feelings.  The goal of the Logical Positivists was to 
analyse the language and method of science and to remove all metaphysical content from it.  
In this way logical positivism formed the first systematised philosophy of science (Van 
Huyssteen, 1986:16-18).  In fact, the greatest value of logical positivism is probably that it 
made an extremely detailed analysis of science possible (Van Huyssteen, 1986:20).   
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The third main component of logical positivism is the idea of the unity of science.  The idea 
of the unity of science refers to the belief that all the empirical sciences ultimately share one 
particular epistemological structure.  The most developed science of the time, namely natural 
science, determines this structure.  According to the doctrine of the unity of science, only 
those sciences and viewpoints that correspond with the theory of knowledge of the natural 
sciences, can be described as sciences (Van Huyssteen, 1986:17; „unity of science‟ 1999).   
 
1.3.2 The standard image of science 
The work and the ideas of the Logical Positivists lead to what may be referred to as the 
standard image of science
33
 (Rossouw, 1980:2; Van Huyssteen, 1986:19; Van Niekerk, 
1992:48).  The standard image of science had been a strong influence on philosophers of 
science and scientists at the beginning of the twentieth-century, but has lost much of its 
prestige in the second half of the previous century, especially among the philosophical 
community (Van Niekerk, 1992:48).  Yet, the standard image of science is still the dominant 
conception of science in modern medicine (Kriel, 2000: 14).  I shall now describe the 
standard image of science, drawing mostly on Van Niekerk‟s (1992:49-52) description of this 
conception of science.   
The standard image of science has been developed as a description of the method of 
knowledge acquisition in the natural sciences, and this was viewed as the model for all 
scientific knowledge acquisition.  According to the standard image of science, “…the only 
truly reliable knowledge about reality…” is scientific knowledge, that is knowledge produced 
by the natural sciences, and more specifically by physics (Van Niekerk, 1992:49).  The 
special status of scientific knowledge rests primarily on two aspects, namely 1.) the 
objectivity of scientific knowledge claims and 2.) the rationality of the method of 
scientific knowledge acquisition.  I shall now pay attention to these two aspects.   
Nel (1981:89) provides us with Paul Guillaume‟s 34  (1946:163) definition of the term 
„objectivity‟ in the context of the logical positivist philosophy of science: 
  
                                                 
33
 Chalmers (1999:3) refers to this conception of science as “…a common view of science.” 
34
 Guillaume, P. 1946.  Introduction á la Psychologie. Paris: J. Vrin.   
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The word objectivity has a double meaning: it means…correspondence of the thoughts 
with its object, … In the second meaning of the word, the science is objective because 
the truth thereof is impersonal, universal; an observation is objective when all the 
observers agree regarding the fact which is observed (my translation). 
The positivist claim that scientific knowledge is objective, means that this type of knowledge 
is viewed as a reflection of the nature of reality as it truly is, unclouded by the personal 
reactions of the knowing subject to that which (s)he experiences (Rossouw, 1980:3; Nel, 
1981:89; Van Niekerk, 1992:49).  The standard image of science is characterised by what 
Popper (1963:5) refers to as “epistemological optimism: by a most optimistic view of man‟s 
power to discern truth and acquire knowledge.”  This optimism is based on the belief that 
“truth is manifest”.  According to this belief it is possible for the truth about reality to reveal 
itself to humankind, or for us to reveal the truth.  Once the truth is revealed, we are capable of 
knowledge about it.   
At the heart of this new optimistic view of the possibility of knowledge lies the doctrine 
that truth is manifest.  Truth may perhaps be veiled.  But it may reveal itself.  And if it 
does not reveal itself, it may be revealed by us.  Removing the veil may not be easy.  
But once the naked truth stands revealed before our eyes, we have the power to see it, to 
distinguish it from falsehood, and to know that it is truth (Popper, 1963:5).   
In the pursuit of scientific knowledge it is necessary and possible to eliminate any subjective 
emotional responses, projections of the imagination, and expectations from our scientific 
engagement with the world.   Subjective phenomena such as these result in an unreliable and 
warped image of the world (Van Niekerk, 1992:49).  The basic idea in the positivist 
conception of science is “true scientific objectivity”, that is the idea that facts must speak for 
themselves in a neutral and unhindered manner by means of direct observation.  Direct 
observation is seen as observation unaffected by theories or ideologies in the mind of the 
observer (Van Huyssteen, 1986:21).   
Within the standard image of science, the claim that scientific knowledge is objective also 
means that this type of knowledge is impersonal and universally valid.   According to the 
positivist image of science, the scientific character of a knowledge claim is not at all affected 
by the person who makes the scientific statement.  The reliability and credibility of the 
speaker has no effect on the truth of his/her statement.  The only thing that needs to be 
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considered is the truth of the statement and this can be verified through procedures that are 
universally accessible and valid (Nel, 1981:89; Van Niekerk, 1992:49). Similarly, the content 
and reliability of scientific theories are not fundamentally affected by the social circumstances 
or the historical context in which these theories are developed (Van Niekerk, 1992:50).  In the 
positivist view scientific knowledge claims are universal and timeless.  They apply to all 
persons, all time periods and in all circumstances and are thus completely objective (Van 
Niekerk, 1992:50).  
The other aspect that bestows on scientific knowledge such a very high status in the standard 
image of science is the rationality of the procedure
35
 by means of which such knowledge is 
acquired and justified (Van Niekerk, 1992: 50).  Van Niekerk (1992:50) points out that this is 
a stabilised procedure, meaning that any person with the required background will be able to 
master the procedure and produce research results that will be consistent regardless of where, 
when or by who the procedure is performed.  The point of departure of this procedure is 
believed to be the careful execution of repeatable experiments with the aim to establish 
publicly accessible facts in a controlled manner (Rossouw, 1983:3). Another assumption 
within the standard image of science is that the acquisition of scientific knowledge always has 
observations as starting point (Van Niekerk, 1992:50).  Van Niekerk (1992:50) describes 
experiments as “nothing else but controlled and stabilised observations.”  The „facts‟ that are 
determined via such observations are described in a neutral language of observation as so-
called single judgements, observation statements or protocol statements
36
 (Van Niekerk, 
1992:50).  According to the Logical Positivists scientific knowledge derives from an objective 
empirical basis. The empirical base on which the scientific body of knowledge rests, consists 
of single judgements or observation statements that express publicly accessible information or 
experiences in an impersonal and neutral manner that can be accepted by any observer (Nel, 
1981:90; Van Niekerk, 1992:51).  Examples of observation statements are “it is red”; “this is 
bigger than that” (Van Niekerk, 1992:51) and “there are mountains and craters on the moon” 
(Chalmers, 1999:10). 
  
                                                 
35
 This procedure is also referred to as the “scientific method” (Kriel, 2000:14-16).   
36
 Blackburn (2005:297) defines protocol statements, or Protokollsätze (the original German term) as follows:  
“The basic statements in the logical positivist analysis of knowledge, thought of as reporting the unvarnished and 
pre-theoretical deliverance of experience: what it is like here, now, for me.” 
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A further characteristic of the rationality of the process of scientific knowledge acquisition 
according to the standard image of science is an inductive logic  (Van Niekerk, 1992: 51).  
As time passes the observation statements that are obtained through controlled observation 
and experimentation accumulate.  Through close examination of this corpus of established 
facts the scientist is able to discover certain regularities and to formulate these as general, 
hypothetical statements (Rossouw, 1980:3; Van Niekerk, 1992: 51).  For instance, the 
observation that various metals expand when they are exposed to heat leads to the hypothesis 
that metals expand when they are heated (Van Niekerk, 1992:51).  The next step of the 
scientific method is to seek further experimental evidence in order to determine whether such 
preliminary hypotheses are true or not.  This step in the scientific process is an attempt at 
verification.  A knowledge claim only qualifies as a scientific fact once it is conclusively 
verified through supportive sense experiences, which are formulated as single judgements.  If 
the verification attempt is successful inductive generalisation is used to conclude that a new 
scientific law has been discovered that allows the explanation and prediction of phenomena.  
The formation of hypotheses and theories from observation statements is thus subject to rules 
that can be codified.  The conclusion of hypotheses and theories can also be rationally tested 
by means of the rules of inductive generalisation.  Correlation between different scientific 
laws that are „discovered‟ in this manner leads to more comprehensive theories that 
continually arrange more and more information according to a pattern (Rossouw, 1980:3; Van 
Niekerk, 1992:51).   
Scientific knowledge gradually grows as verifiable experiential information is collected and 
verified inductive theories are framed.  Through continuous observation and experimentation 
new facts are discovered and accumulate.  New hypotheses and theories that are based on 
these newly discovered facts also gradually increase in number.  By means of this process 
more comprehensive and accurate scientific theories are developed.  Such new theories are 
more comprehensive since they can explain a greater amount of facts as well as the 
relationships between facts.  They are also more accurate because they describe experiential 
phenomena in greater detail (Rossouw, 1980:3-4; Van Niekerk, 1992:51-52).  Van Niekerk 
(1992:51-52) neatly summarises the process of growth of scientific knowledge: 
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The body of scientific knowledge grows through the accumulation of factual and 
theoretical judgements that are true, that is judgements that raise the objective reality 
with certainty in a manner that is universally valid.  The quality of the truth of these 
judgements can be verified since it is possible to reconstruct the observations that the 
theories rest on, as well as the logical arguments that motivate the conclusion of 
hypotheses and theories (my translation).   
 
1.3.3 The ontological and epistemological assumptions of the 
natural science paradigm 
Kriel (2000:14) uses the term „natural-science paradigm‟ to refer to the ontological and 
epistemological or methodological assumptions of the natural sciences.  I use the term in a 
similar manner in this dissertation.  Ontological assumptions are beliefs regarding the nature 
of reality, whereas epistemological assumptions are beliefs about how that reality may be 
accessed.  An interrelationship exists between the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions of any thought system.  Assumptions about the nature of the world and reality 
imply the manner in which such a reality can be known or examined.  The knowledge that 
results from the application of the methodology of a science in turn influences the science‟s 
ontological and epistemological assumptions, sometimes to the point that a reformulation of 
ontological and epistemological standpoints is needed (Kriel, 2000:17).   
The epistemological beliefs of the natural sciences, and of modern medicine, were described 
in the section above on the standard image of science.  These beliefs are represented by the 
following five concepts:   
 
i. empiricism or positivism (I treat these terms as synonyms);  
ii. verification; 
iii. the unity of science; 
iv. objectivity; 
v. the scientific method (Kriel, 2000:14-16).  
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Kriel (2000:16-19) also describes the ontological assumptions of the natural sciences and of 
biomedicine based on four interrelated concepts; namely: 
 
i.) dualism; 
ii.) materialism; 
iii.) reductionism; 
iv.) linear (unidirectional) causality and determinism.  
 
I now briefly summarise his description and give examples of how some of these concepts 
manifest in biomedicine.  Firstly, a dualism is assumed between material and immaterial 
realities
37
.  The methods of natural science are more suitable to aspects of the material world, 
and therefore scientists placed their emphasis here.  A mind-body dualism has been extremely 
influential in biomedicine.  This means that the mind and body of a human being are 
considered as separate and qualitatively different entities.  The human body and observable 
disease processes or structural malformations which affect the normal functioning of the body 
belong, according to this dualism, to the material world.  All other aspects of the human 
condition, such as thoughts and emotions belong to the immaterial world.  Over time the 
immaterial aspects of reality became seen as mere by-products of material processes.  In this 
way dualism has been replaced by monistic materialism.  Monism refers to the belief or 
principle that the world is constituted by one fundamental substance (Marcum, 2008:394).  
Monistic materialism thus refers to the belief that “everything that exists is physical” 
(Blackburn, 2005:238).  The idea of mind-body dualism in the modern era is linked to 
Descartes (1596-1650).  Descartes thought of the body as the research domain of science, and 
of the mind as the domain of philosophy and religion.  More recently psychiatrists and 
behavioural scientists took ownership of the study of the mind, while the body belongs to 
medical science and is regarded as an “animated machine” (Helman, 2007:123).   
  
                                                 
37
 Two other dualisms also occur in the world-view of modern medicine, namely the dualisms of body and 
environment as well as individual and population (Levin & Solomon, 1990:533).   
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The natural world is further viewed as a complex whole based on a basic structure of atomic 
parts that interact with each other in various and complex ways to give rise to the entire range 
of existing physical and biological systems.  All material matter can be reduced to a specific 
and unique structure of interacting atoms.  These atoms are seen as the basic building blocks 
of reality.  The primary aspect of reality is thus seen as material in nature.  Immaterial 
phenomena, such as the human mind and soul are regarded as secondary to this basic material 
level of reality.  This view of reality is known as materialism.  
Thirdly, reductionism represents the view that the whole of a material system is the product 
of the interaction of its smallest constituent parts.  The structure and functioning of matter can 
therefore only be explained by reducing the phenomenon in question to its constituent 
elements and explaining the interaction between such elements.  Living organisms are thus 
seen as a specific arrangement and interaction of atoms.  Helman (2007:123) points out that 
modern medicine‟s tendency to focus on the individual patient, as opposed to the family and 
community of the patient, stems from its reductionist approach.   
The image of a machine or physical mechanism is the metaphor used in natural science to 
explain the world.  During the scientific revolution of the seventeenth-century nature came to 
be considered as analogous to an enormous machine, similar to a clock.  The aim of scientific 
activity is to discover the true inner workings of this machine and its outward observable 
manifestations (Doyal & Harris, 1986:31).  The notion of mechanism refers to the elements 
and processes which constitute an entity and the relationship between these constituent parts 
(Marcum, 2008:394).  In biomedicine the human body is viewed as a machine.  The body is 
seen as a totality of separately functioning parts (Levin & Solomon, 1990:552; Burger, 
2001:81).  The structure and the functioning of the body are regarded as a product of the 
interaction of its smallest constituent parts.  Disease may cause a breakdown in the workings 
of the machine.  Once the molecular structure and physiology of a disease process can be 
explained, that is the disease-mechanism, a treatment can be developed to remove the disease 
and restore the machine to its normal state of functioning.  A mechanistic view of reality thus 
operates in the natural sciences.   
The final concept illustrating the ontology of the natural sciences is unidirectional causality 
and determinism.  According to the doctrine of determinism a cause, or antecedent state, 
exists for every event.  The relationship between the antecedent state and the event is such 
that a natural law will be broken should the antecedent state occur without it being followed 
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by the event (Blackburn, 2005:97).  This doctrine is followed in natural science.  The model 
of scientific explanation that is followed in the natural sciences is known as the deductive-
nomological model.  According to this model to explain something is to describe it as an 
event of which the occurrence can be deduced from the existence of one or more universal 
laws and the presence of certain initial conditions (Popper, 1968:59-62; Van Niekerk, 
1992:7)
38
.  For the positivist a phenomenon can be fully explained once it has been broken 
down into its constituent parts, and the way that these parts behave to produce the event is 
explained.  Within the positivist framework the movement or direction of causality is always 
from the bottom, the behaviour of the parts, to the top, the nature of the whole.  The whole is 
not seen as having a reality independent of the interaction between its parts.  Therefore, a 
phenomenon such as consciousness is reduced to the outcome of the behaviour of its 
observable, material antecedent state – that is neural activity.   
 
1.4 Clinical biomedicine  
I have already stated that many doctors and members of the public consider clinical medicine 
to be a natural science (Montgomery, 2006:30).  Clinical medicine is regarded as a scientific 
practice based on two factors.  Firstly clinical medicine is seen as the direct application of 
scientific knowledge generated through medical science.  Secondly, the clinical method 
reflects the process of the scientific method where hypotheses are formulated and then 
tested
39
.  The clinical method refers to a systematic process that shapes the doctor-patient 
interaction.  Medical students are trained in this process and scientific doctors are expected to 
follow this procedure in their interactions with patients.  The nature of the doctor-patient 
relationship and interaction is thus determined by the doctor
40
.  The first task of the 
consultation is a systematic interrogation known as history taking in which the doctor directs 
specific questions to the patient regarding his/her symptoms (subjective illness experience) as 
                                                 
38
 As modern science came into being the nomological-deductive model of scientific explanation replaced the 
teleological model of explanation found in the Greek world-view.  A teleological explanation attempts to make 
an event understandable by ascribing a purpose to it (Doyal & Harris, 1986:27-28).  To explain something 
according to the teleological model means to identify its place within a greater totality (Van Niekerk, 1992:7).  
39
 Rich et al. (2008:225) point out that since modern medicine views the patient as the “object of medical 
science” the doctor may “experiment on the patient”, as long as the doctor‟s intention is to accurately diagnose 
and remove the disease.  For modern medicine “the experimentation on bodies became as indispensable as it is 
for the natural sciences”.  However, the bioethical principle of respect for autonomy demands that the patient 
provides informed consent for any experimentation intended by a doctor.   
40
 Waitzkin (1989:237) notes that the traditional format of the doctor-patient interaction is commonplace in most 
human societies where modern medicine is practiced.  
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well as factors that might be related to the “still-to-be-diagnosed disease” (Kriel, 2000:22) 
such as the history of disease in the patient‟s family, the patient‟s work history and lifestyle.  
The doctor then uses this information to form a hypothesis about the organ system in question 
and the specific disease affecting the organ and thus causing the symptoms.  The interaction 
between doctor and patient known as history taking is thus directed by the physician.  
Attention is paid to symptoms that are associated with or related to probable organ pathology.  
Kriel (2000:24) explains the way that history taking focuses solely on the biological 
dimension of the patient‟s condition in accordance with positivist ontological and 
methodological assumptions as follows.  “Through directed questioning, the patient‟s 
personal agenda is drawn into the reductionistic, mechanistic and materialistic medical agenda 
in order to make a physical diagnosis and prescribe physical treatment.  This happens even if 
the doctor is not a materialist in daily life” (Kriel, 2000:24).   
The next task of the consultation is for the doctor to physically examine the patient with the 
aim of finding physical signs to confirm or reject the hypothesis formulated on the basis of the 
patient‟s disease history.  Physical signs are objective evidence, such as a blood pressure 
reading above or below the range accepted as normal for the patient‟s age and gender.  The 
physical examination is often followed by special investigations.  These diagnostic 
technological procedures provide further objective evidence of the underlying organ 
pathology, and may include a laboratory analysis of a blood and/or urine sample or X-ray 
photographs.  When the history taking, physical examination and special investigations have 
been completed, the doctor needs to identify the disease label.  This is the disease process that 
best connects the history, the results of the physical examination and the results of the special 
investigations.  The doctor bases his/her treatment plan on the selected disease label.  If no 
objective evidence could be found during the physical examination or special investigations 
no disease is believed to exist, regardless of the patient‟s subjective experience of illness.  It is 
then that a doctor might use the ideas of neurosis, psychogenic or psychosomatic disorder to 
explain a patient‟s complaints.  When a patient has the subjective experience of being ill, but 
no objective physical evidence for the cause of the symptoms can be found (by means of the 
clinical diagnostic method), the condition is often related to the pressures of everyday life.  
An example of such a condition is irritable colon.  The doctor‟s reassurance that no disease is 
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physically present may not sufficiently treat the patient‟s illness 41  (Helman, 2007:150).  
Marks (1999:55-56) argues that there are sound clinical reasons for doctors to take patients‟ 
subjective complaints seriously even when no physical evidence can be found to explain the 
symptoms, such as pain.  The case of sickle-cell anaemia explains the argument.  Sickle-cell 
anaemia is a gene disorder that episodically affects the patient‟s red blood cells leading to 
short-term attacks of severe pain when “illness, stress, distress, exhaustion, dehydration or 
cold” is experienced.  Because the reason for the patient‟s pain is not readily observable and 
because pain cannot be verified, doctors often do not believe these patients‟ (extreme) 
complaints of pain and often deny these patients adequate pain medication
42
.   
Kriel (2000:23-25) describes what medicine‟s self-imposed identity as a natural science 
means for three of its central concepts, namely patient, disease and therapy.  I relay his 
comments in the following section.   
In modern medicine the patient is reduced to a biological organism
43
.  In accordance with 
Descartes‟ view a normal functioning biological system does not require the existence or 
functioning of the mind.  The non-material realities of consciousness, or the psycho-social 
realm, is not and cannot be accommodated by medicine‟s positivist world-view.  Doctors who 
regard persons as more than their biology face a tension between the biomedical clinical 
method and epistemology (which is reproduced and transferred to students in medical school - 
a process of enculturation [Helman, 2007:121]) and their personal beliefs.   
                                                 
41
 Medical anthropologists make a distinction between the terms illness and disease.  Illness refers to “the 
innately human experience of symptoms and suffering” (Kleinman, 1988:3).  Kleinman (1988:3-6) describes 
illness as the way that the sick person as well as his/her caregivers or broader social network “perceive, live with, 
and respond to symptoms and disability”.  Disease refers to the biomedical doctor‟s understanding of the 
patient‟s illness, namely an alteration in the structure or functioning of the patient‟s body.  Cassell (1976 as cited 
in Helman, 2007:126) describes illness as what a patient feels when he goes to the doctor, whereas disease is 
“what he has on the way home from the doctor‟s office…Disease, then, is something an organ has; illness is 
something a man has”.   
42
 Marks (1999:58-59) also makes the interesting observation that racism may play a role in (Western) health 
care professionals‟ inadequate responses to the complaints of patients with sickle-cell anaemia.  The disease 
“primarily affects people of African-Caribbean, Mediterranean, Middle-Eastern and Indian descent”.  Marks 
argues that patients with sickle-cell anaemia may be treated with suspicion in the health care sector for racist 
reasons.  There are reports of unequal treatment of black people in mental health care as well as criminal justice 
systems in Western, developed countries.   
43
 Burger (2001:81) points out that modern medicine‟s concept of biology is synonymous with the chemico-
physical processes in the body.  He regards this as a very narrow view of biology, and prefers the fuller 
conception of biology as “the science of life in all its aspects” (Ulrich, 1997 as cited in Burger, 2001:81).  In the 
latter conception of biology the physicol-chemical processes in the body constitute one part and not all of life.  
Burger describes biomedicine‟s reductionist concept of biology as equivalent to “somatology”.   
[Burger provides the following reference to Ulrich‟s book: Ulrich, G. 1997.  Biomedizin.  Die folgenschweren 
Wandlungen des Biologiebegriffs.  Stuttgart, New York: Schattauer.] 
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Medical anthropology describes how developments in diagnostic technology gave birth to a 
new patient population, namely „paper patients‟ in the form of “X-ray plates, scans, printouts 
of blood test results or the strips of paper from an electrocardiogram” (Helman, 2007:123).  
These paper patients may receive more medical attention than the human patients they are 
related to, and may be equally or even more interesting to the doctor than the actual patient.  It 
is understandable that paper patients may be seen as easier to work with than human patients 
within a biomedical framework.  Paper patients are products of, and therefore fully 
compatible with, scientific medicine.  “They are easier to interpret, control, quantify and 
monitor over time, and there is no danger of them being uncooperative” or contaminating 
physical disease with the unscientific notions such as cultural or religious beliefs.  It has to be 
kept in mind that doctors‟ overuse of medical technology has been forced on them, especially 
due to fears over medical malpractice litigation (Helman, 2007:103).   
Similar to the conception of a patient as a biological system, disease processes and disease 
causality are regarded as merely physical or biological in nature.  Disease, understood as 
pathology on the molecular level, is regarded as the reason for the malfunctioning of the 
body.  Diseases are perceived as „entities‟, each with a unique „personality‟ consisting of “a 
characteristic cause, clinical picture (symptoms and signs), results of hospital investigations, 
natural history, prognosis and appropriate treatment” (Helman 2007:123).  The personalities 
of diseases are regarded as universal, so that, for example, tuberculosis is seen as one and the 
same disease regardless of the geographic, cultural, socio-economic or any other 
characteristics of the patients suffering from the disease.  Excluded from this perspective are 
the psychological, social, and cultural aspects of the illness experience, and the nature of the 
context in which the illness occurs.  The aforesaid are the very factors that determine the 
meaning of disease for patients and those connected to them (Burger, 2001: 81; Fabrega and 
Silver, 1973 as cited in Helman 2007:123).  Furthermore, the role of social, political and 
environmental factors in the causation of disease is often ignored, such as poverty, national 
and/or international conflicts, pollution, and so on.  A health care system ignorant of the wide 
range of causes of disease beyond biological factors will be ineffective in promoting the 
health of populations.  The concept of illness as a biopsychosocial phenomenon is thus not 
regarded in biomedicine.   
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Medical professionals increasingly rely on diagnostic technology to objectively diagnose 
disease in patients, with less emphasis on the patients‟ verbal accounts of the nature and 
development of their symptoms.  As a result numerical definitions are increasingly used to 
express health and disease.  Helman (2007:122) explains:  
Health or normality are defined by reference to certain physical and biochemical 
parameters, such as weight, height, circumference, blood count, haemoglobin level, 
levels of electrolytes or hormones, blood pressure, heart rate, respiratory rate, heart size 
or visual acuity.  For each measurement there is a numerical range – the „normal value‟ 
– within which the individual is considered normal and „healthy‟.  Above or below this 
range is „abnormal‟, and indicates the presence of „disease‟.  Disease, then, is seen as a 
deviation from these normal values, accompanied by abnormalities in the structure or 
function of body organs or systems.   
Modern medicine‟s increasing reliance on diagnostic technology also results in patients being 
diagnosed with disease (often manifesting at the biochemical or cellular levels of the body), 
when they have no subjective experience of being ill.  This typically happens during routine 
health screening visits to medical facilities.  Examples are diagnoses of high blood pressure or 
cholesterol levels or even infection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) before 
patients begin to experience symptoms.  The possibility of early detection of harmful and life-
threatening disease conditions is a biomedical achievement that should be celebrated.  Yet, 
unfortunately, persons who are diagnosed with a disease without feeling ill often do not 
follow the treatment regimens that doctors prescribe (Helman, 2007:150).   
A question that needs to be addressed is what does the medical model of disease mean for 
the understanding of problems of the mind?  Two types of mental difficulty should be 
considered.  Firstly, there are psychological problems that may, and often do, accompany 
physical illness, such as anxiety and/or depression suffered by patients with cancer.  Problems 
of this kind are not regarded as part of the main authority and responsibility of medicine 
(Engel, 1977:129) and therefore doctors often do not pay much attention to the psychological 
difficulties of patients with (otherwise) physical conditions.  Secondly, there are the 
difficulties that solely involve the mind, such as depression in the absence of any (other) 
identifiable physical disease.  Within biomedicine the study and treatment of the latter 
category of mental difficulty is the subject of the discipline of psychiatry.   
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  39 
The medical model of disease poses a problem or even a crisis for psychiatry.  The problem 
concerns the question of whether the forms of illness treated by psychiatrists can be properly 
thought of as disease in the biomedical sense.  Psychiatry has great difficulty to clarify its 
status in the field of biomedicine.  Psychiatrists typically respond to this crisis in an 
exclusionist or reductionist way.  Their position is that mental disorders with biological 
causes, that is biochemical or neurophysiological disorders of the brain, belong to the domain 
of biomedicine; whereas problems that are more behavioural and psychological in nature 
should be the concern of non-medical disciplines (Ludwig, 1975: 603; Engel, 1977:129-130).  
The mind-body dualism and monistic materialism of biomedicine is reflected in its approach 
to problems of the mind.  Physical and mental disease are treated as two distinct categories.  
Observable disease processes or structural malformations of the body belong to the material 
world and are the concern of medicine and surgery.  All other aspects of the human condition, 
such as thoughts, emotions and relationships fall outside the scope of medicine.  The 
immaterial aspects of reality are seen as mere by-products of material processes
44
 (Kriel, 
2000: 17).   
Following from the conceptualisation of disease as a merely physical phenomenon, 
biomedical treatments are all physical in nature, taking either the form of pharmaceutical 
products, surgery or radiation therapy.  These therapies are understood as functioning 
objectively and mechanistically.  The role of psychological processes or cultural influences in 
the treatment process is not adequately recognised by biomedical science.  Modern medicine 
is “above all technological” (Jonsen, 1990:111) 45.  One ethical problem of technological 
medicine is that it is considered a “good” when the technology that the doctor applied has 
reached its specific objective, regardless of whether the result has benefited the patient in 
his/her particular situation.  To illustrate, in technological medicine the goal of antibiotics is 
to cure microbial infections as the goal of a ventilator is to artificially uphold breathing 
function.  Whether such reached objectives are beneficial to the patient who is treated with the 
technology, is not considered when contemplating the “good” of treatment.  For instance, 
when a potentially fatal microbial infection is cured (successfully treated) in an elderly patient 
                                                 
44
 The eliminativist view is a recent version of the physicalist perspective, that is the view that mind is merely 
“an epiphenomenon of matter”.  In the eliminativist view the idea of the mind is completely disappearing.  “The 
grand march of neuroscientific discovery will extinguish the last remnants of the mental as it will be discovered 
that all aspects of the mind can be explained in terms of neurobiology” (Beveridge, 2002:102).   
45
 Jonsen uses the word technology in a broader sense than merely referring to machines.  In Jonsen‟s (1990:112) 
definition the “fundamental attribute of technology [is] a rational system for replicating results”.  By medical 
technology is meant “a complex of medical thinking, medical devices, and coordination of medical workers”.     
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with dementia and late-stage cancer, it is not a self-evident “good”.  Neither is it self-evident 
that “artificially maintained respiration of an irreversibly comatose person” is always good.  It 
seems that modern medicine‟s technology obfuscates the distinction between results and 
benefits.  “Evaluation of a result as benefit requires a much more complex, more personal, 
and more humane consideration than recognition of the result itself” (Jonsen, 1990:117).  In 
critique on this very technical understanding of medical treatment the modern doctor‟s role 
has been equated with that of a plumber (McCormick, 1996:667).  Kriel (2000:24) describes 
the challenge that the humanistic physician faces in the institutions of biomedicine as follows: 
“Humanistic physicians are forced to function with a materialistic monism in their science 
and a dualism in their practice”.   
It is clear that the positivist world-view of modern medicine is problematic when it is 
translated into the clinical method.  What complicates the problem is that the medical 
community is not sufficiently aware that medical research and practice is controlled by the 
conceptual framework of the natural sciences and of the impact that this meta-theoretical 
commitment has on medical research and practice.  The natural science paradigm prescribes 
the areas and methods of medical research, as well as which findings and implications of 
research are meaningful.  The natural science paradigm also regulates the conceptual 
framework for the practice of medicine.  Modern medicine subscribes to a paradigmatic 
monism.  Medical researchers and clinicians miss “the fact that the methodology of the 
natural sciences…has an essential hermeneutic moment - a moment of interpretation”.  Due to 
this meta-theoretical ignorance medical discourse may be described as “naïve empiricism” 
(Kriel, 2000:30-32).   
In the final section of this chapter I shall discuss the nature of the doctor-patient relationship 
as it operates in biomedicine.   
 
1.5 The doctor-patient relationship in biomedicine 
The doctor-patient relationship provides the context for communication between doctor and 
patient.  Doctor-patient communication within the biomedical model of health care is one of 
the most complex forms of discourse.  It involves “interaction between individuals in non-
equal positions, is often non-voluntary, concerns issues of vital importance, is therefore 
emotionally laden and requires close cooperation” (Chaitchik, Kreitler, Shaked, Schwartz and 
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Rosin, 1992, as cited in Ong et al., 1995:903).  The clinical consultation may be seen as an 
interaction between the doctor‟s professional perspective and the patient‟s lay perspective on 
disease and its treatment.  This interaction is influenced by the physical context in which it 
occurs (for instance a private consultation room or a hospital ward) as well as the social class, 
ethnicity, age and gender of the participants.  Doctors‟ specialised, scientific knowledge and 
competitive, extended and gruelling training invest them with power.  This power may allow 
doctors to override patients‟ ideas about disease and treatment with the biomedical 
perspective and method (Scambler, 1987:179; Helman, 2007:130-149).   
The discovery of disease, in the modern sense, increased the power of medical science and 
thus of clinical practitioners over disease.  Due to this power, and the authority that society 
has bestowed on physicians because of it, practitioners of scientific medicine have become 
accustomed to unilaterally shape the structure of their relationships with patients.  This flows 
from doctors‟ understanding of their rights in terms of the seventeenth-century ideas of John 
Locke (1632-1704).  Locke was a physician himself (and a good friend of Thomas 
Sydenham) and also contributed to philosophy and politics.  Locke‟s philosophy views many 
fundamental human rights as property rights.  In Locke‟s thinking the concept „property‟ 
included a person‟s “life, liberty and estate…Every man has a property in his own person.  
This nobody has any right to but himself.  The labour of his body and the work of his 
hands…are properly his” (1966 as cited in Jonsen, 1990:86).  In Locke‟s view, when people 
entered into contracts with each other they not only exchanged or shared property among 
themselves, but also exchanged their liberty in a particular ways.  In a consensual contract one 
party might have to sacrifice certain freedoms in order to receive the benefits that the other 
party makes available.   
Jonsen (1990: 87-94) discusses the influence of this Lockean perspective on rights, on 
medical practice and doctor‟s modern conceptualisation of their rights.  The law regards the 
doctor‟s licence to practice medicine as the doctor‟s property.  Doctors created this property 
by virtue of their specialised and hard earned knowledge and skills and they have certain 
rights over that property.  The medical profession argues that the powerful benefits that 
modern medicine can bestow on patients depend on the condition that doctors have the 
freedom to determine the nature of the doctor-patient relationship.  The doctor-patient 
relationship is viewed as a contract into which the doctor enters with the patient.  The patient 
can benefit from the doctor‟s scientific knowledge and skills if the doctor determines the 
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contractual terms and supervise the patient‟s (and/or the patient‟s caregivers‟) compliance 
with these terms.  The nature of the doctor-patient relationship is thus determined by the 
doctor based on the physician‟s special knowledge and the assumption of his/her benevolence 
towards the patient.   
Furthermore, doctors started to regard the phenomenon of disease, as it presents in a patient‟s 
body, as the medical practitioner‟s property over which (s)he has certain rights.  Locke stated 
that “whatsoever a man removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he 
hath mixed his labour with it and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it 
his property” (as cited in Jonsen, 1990:93).  It might thus be argued that the doctor‟s medical 
skills are the labour that s(he) „mixes‟ with the natural occurring phenomenon of disease and 
that disease thereby becomes the doctor‟s property.  The doctor owns disease only to destroy 
it, and thereby returns the body to normal working order.  To gain access to disease the doctor 
has to enter into a contract with the patient.  Jonsen (1990:93) explains:  “The…physician 
acquires a right over the disease and the patient by double title: he mingles his labour with the 
disease and masters it; he contracts the patient to do his work.  Even though the physician 
must get access to the disease through the patient – he cannot trespass – he almost has an 
independent right over disease itself”.  The doctor‟s right over disease is sometimes viewed as 
stronger than the right of the patient to make decisions about what happens to his or her own 
body.  Doctors are often annoyed when they are prohibited to destroy disease should a patient 
or other regulatory body (for instance an ethics review board) deny them access to a diseased 
body.   
Over the past few decades the medical profession has been “demythologised” in countries 
such as the United States of America (USA)
46
 due to the (post-)modern society‟s insistence on 
patient‟s rights to liberty, autonomy and shared responsibility for their bodies and the 
structuring of their relationships with health care professionals (Van Niekerk, 2002b:227).  
Potter and McKinlay (2005:465-468) review the literature to describe the changes in 
theoretical conceptions of the doctor-patient relationship since the middle of the twentieth-
century to the early twenty-first-century.  The paternalism metaphor was used to describe the 
doctor-patient relationship in the middle of twentieth-century.  The relationship between 
doctor and patient was thus compared to the relationship between a parent and child.  The 
similarities between the role of parent and the role of doctor are based on three characteristics 
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influenced by the Bill of Rights in that country‟s Constitution.   
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of the parent‟s role.  Firstly, the parent‟s social role awards him/her with authority to make 
decisions on behalf of his/her child.  Secondly, the parent has superior knowledge and 
abilities which enable him/her to understand his/her child‟s best interest and how it can be 
achieved.  Thirdly, the parent is assumed to have an attitude of benevolence towards his/her 
child and thus desires to act in the child‟s best interest.  The paternalism that operated in 
doctor-patient relationships in the modern era differs from paternalism in the era of 
Hippocratic medicine.  Modern doctors have a duty of beneficence, rather than being required 
to have the virtue of benevolence, as in earlier times.  The modern doctor‟s duty to benefit his 
patients is stated in and enforced by professional and ethical codes which have legal status.  
According to the paternalism metaphor of the previous century the physician is seen as an 
authority figure that enters into a contractual relationship with patients (Van Zyl, 1997:32-35).  
According to this contract the doctor provides the best health care available and the patient 
does everything (s)he can to benefit from the treatment.  Even though power was not 
distributed equally in a paternalistic doctor-patient relationship this was not considered to 
threaten the quality of health care (Parsons, 1951 as cited in Potter & McKinlay, 2005:466).  
The long-term relationships and personal contact between doctors and patients were believed 
to prevent the abuse of the power imbalance between the two parties.   
Conflict was introduced as an aspect of the doctor-patient relationship for the first time in the 
academic literature in the 1970‟s.  It was suggested that the potential for doctors to abuse their 
power was inherent in the inequality in knowledge and (consequently in) power in the doctor-
patient relationship.  The developments in medical technology during this time period further 
widened the power differential and distance between doctors and patients.  Doctors placed 
more value on objective evidence of disease such as laboratory reports, than on the patient‟s 
account of his/her condition.  Engel (1977:132) expresses this as “bypassing the patient‟s 
verbal account by placing greater reliance on technical procedures and laboratory 
measurements”.  The paternalism metaphor was replaced by the “cynical consumer” 
metaphor
47
 in which “the doctor-patient relationship is a market transaction in which 
economic concerns are paramount to the perceived success or failure of the encounter” (Potter 
& McKinlay, 2005:467).  The status of the patient rose during the 1970s.  In the U.S.A., for 
example, courts now viewed the doctor-patient relationship as a partnership, and recognised 
patients‟ rights and emphasized the medical profession‟s duty to present all relevant 
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information to patients so that they can make informed decisions about their health care
48
.  
However, it seems “unlikely that the patient can be a true market consumer demanding 
appropriate value for money” in a relationship as unique as the one between doctor and 
patient – where doctors have intimate knowledge regarding their patients and patients depend 
on doctors for treatment (Potter & McKinlay, 2005:468).   
 
As the twentieth-century ended doctors as well as patients lost status.  A “corporatist 
metaphor” (Potter & McKinlay, 2005:468) now characterises the doctor-patient relationship.  
More people with more interests now play a role in the once private and relatively simple 
relationship between doctor and patient (Jonsen, 1990:80).  Physician employers, 
pharmaceutical companies and medical insurance companies that prescribe treatment 
protocols have increasing influence and control on the context in which health care is 
practiced, and have given medicine a commercial and impersonal face.  This is especially true 
in private health care environments and in countries with privatized health systems.  In an era 
where cost is a common component of discussions on health care, and health care expenses 
are at the centre of health policies (as opposed to patients), corporate executives have become 
the experts on health care provision (Potter & McKinlay, 2005:465-466).   
The practice of health care today is more complex than in the recent past.  “The technology is 
more elaborate, the institutions are more bureaucratic and the financing is more byzantine” 
(Jonsen, 1990:80).  As a consequence of these changes longstanding personal doctor-patient 
relationships have been replaced by “short-term encounters with numerous disparate 
specialists and other health workers” (Korsch et al., 1968:855).  The once private doctor-
patient relationship now more resembles what can be called an “encounter”, similar to the 
“fleeting relationship” between a cab driver and his fare (Davis, 1956 as cited in Potter & 
McKinlay, 2005:465).  The reductionist nature of modern medicine has lead to a hierarchy 
amongst medical practitioners based on their level of specialization.  Specialist doctors only 
diagnose and treat abnormalities of a specific part of the body.  “Their professional aim, is in 
a sense, to know more and more about less and less (and often the result is knowing less and 
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 The bioethical rule of informed consent has its roots in the case of Schloendorff v. New York Hospital in 1914.  
Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo delivered the verdict that:  “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has 
a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his 
patient‟s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.  This is true except in cases of 
emergency where the patient is unconscious and where it is necessary to operate before consent can be obtained” 
(Cardozo, 1999:517).   
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less about more and more)” (Helman, 2007:124)49.  A patient who is admitted to hospital is 
likely to be cared for by a number of physicians from various disciplines as responsibility for 
the patient‟s care is divided along disciplinary lines, and at times it is often difficult to decide 
who should take ultimate responsibility for the patient‟s care.  “The truly general physician 
has disappeared from our hospitals” (McCormick, 1996:667).  The (tertiary) hospital is the 
main institutional structure of modern medicine.  It has been described as a temple devoted 
“to the transcendent power of science over the forces of disease and death”.  Patients who are 
admitted to hospital are subjected to a “ritual of depersonalization”.  Hospital patients become 
a “case” in a ward of strangers, separated from their loved ones and community to be cared 
for by staff that they may not know.  They lose many of the artefacts of their social and 
personal identities, as well as control over their bodies, “personal space, privacy, behaviour, 
diet and use of time”.  The relationship between hospital patients and health care 
professionals is mostly one of “distance, formality, brief conversations, and, often, use of 
professional jargon” (Helman, 2005:99-100)50.   
Many general practitioners still have long-term relationships with their patients in which they 
know the patient‟s family and forms part of the patient‟s community.  Yet, the increase in 
group practices, duty rosters and the general mobility of modern societies are generally 
destroying continuing, personal doctor-patient relationships.  The intimacy of the doctor-
patient relationship is also endangered by the growth of the health care team (McCormick, 
1996:667).  Sir Theodore Fox (1960 as cited in MacCormick, 1996:667) expresses concern 
over the loss of contact between the general practitioner and patient as follows:  
…the particular object of his [the doctor‟s] independent existence may be defeated if he 
leaves all dressings to the nurse, sympathy to the receptionist, messages to the secretary, 
and the solution of home problems to the social worker…if somebody else is to do all 
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 Helman (2007:124) further points out that the income and status of specialist doctors are higher than those of 
generalists.  A “hierarchy of prestige” also exist among specialist doctors.  Those who are seen to cure (such as 
surgeons or other doctors who treat acute conditions) have a higher status than those who care (such as 
oncologists or those who treat chronic conditions).  In surgery there is a separate hierarchy based on the 
symbolic value that the society awards to different body parts.  Heart and brain surgeons have more prestige 
than, for instance, rectal surgeons.   
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 An example of this is the experience of the late Mary O‟Flaherty Horn (1999:940).  Horn was an internist or 
specialist physician who was diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), a degenerative and fatal 
neurological disease.  Her initial diagnosis of ALS was confirmed at a large tertiary teaching hospital.  She 
describes her one-off encounter with the physician who performed the diagnostic test (electromyography) at this 
large medical centre as traumatic, dehumanizing and “the antithesis of caring”. She writes for instance:  “I might 
not have been present except for the obvious need for my muscles”.   
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the small things for the patient under the doctor‟s distant supervision, personal contact 
will be reduced to a minimum.    
A third party became part of the doctor-patient relationship in recent modern medicine.  This 
third party is the machine.  The machine and medical technology in general has made large 
and important impacts on the practice of medicine.  New diagnostic technologies can detect 
disease even before birth and can bring diseases to the surface long before they become 
obvious to the patient and cause irreversible damage or even death.  Diseases can now be 
diagnosed with greater precision and accuracy than before.  Life sustaining technologies can 
help the body to function for long periods after the breakdown of vital organs that would have 
meant the end of life were the technology not available, as in the case of haemodialysis for 
patients with chronic kidney failure.  Yet, critics of modern medicine, such as Illich (1976 as 
cited in Helman, 2007:96) are worried that medical technology may harm the population‟s 
health by diminishing their autonomy, creating a dependence on the medical profession and 
injuring them with the side effects of medication and surgery.   
The central role that technology has come to play in the practice of medicine has created a 
distance between doctor and patient (Schwartz & Wiggins, 1985:331-332; Jaspers, 1989:254, 
256; Jonsen, 1990:98-99; 2005 RSNA Professionalism Committee, 2006; Helman, 2007:100-
104).  When technology takes over the role of the physician, the patient is treated in an 
impersonal way and the physician “is metamorphosing into a technocrat and a businessman.  
The physician retreats behind the machine and becomes an extension of the machine” 
(Grouse, 1983 as cited in Helman, 1990:104).  As Jaspers (1989:256) puts it, it is difficult to 
understand how “a thing which helps the physician at his successful work” (that is 
technology) “turns itself against the very being of the physician”, who appears “to have 
become a technician”.  Medical technology thus affects not only the diagnosis and treatment 
of disease but also the interaction between doctor and patient.  A current development in 
medical technology is that doctors are encouraged to collect and store all patient records in a 
standardised electronic format
51
.  The rationale is to reduce medical error and to make 
medical care safer by, for example, allowing easier transfer of patient‟s records between 
health care professionals when referrals are made or when patients are treated by more than 
one professional.  Yet, when doctors have to focus their attention on administering 
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 This is especially true in the USA where $17 billion of the federal economic stimulus package, resulting from 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 has been put aside for incentive payments to doctors and 
hospitals who change from traditional to electronic record keeping (Armstrong-Coben, 2009).   
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standardised questionnaires on computer screens they loose personal contact with the patient 
and the freedom to structure the clinical interview according to what naturally and 
spontaneously unfolds in the consultation room.  A paediatrician and critic of electronic 
record keeping writes in an Op-Ed contribution in the New York Times (Armstrong-Coben, 
2009) that “the computer depersonalises medicine.  It ignores nuances that we do not measure 
but [which] clearly influence care”.  She also makes the valid point that room for error in 
clinical medicine is not necessarily reduced by electronic recordkeeping.   
A box clicked unintentionally is as detrimental as an order written illegibly – maybe 
even worse because it looks official.  It takes more effort and thought to write a 
prescription than to pull up a menu of medications and click a box.  I have seen how 
choosing the wrong box can lead to the wrong drug being prescribed.   
Another factor that challenges doctor-patient communication in the biomedical model, which 
has been alluded to before, is the use of medical terminology in doctor-patient interactions.  
The vast expansion of scientific medical knowledge and the way that this knowledge has been 
transferred to medical students during their training have lead to a technical and esoteric 
medical language that is often not understood by the everyday man.  Mutual 
misunderstanding may occur when either the doctor or the patient uses a medical term as 
these two parties often do not interpret medical terms in similar ways.  The consequence of 
such misunderstandings may be serious since errors in diagnosis and prescribed treatment 
may result, or a patient may exercise the treatment instructions erroneously and thereby 
negatively influence his/her health outcome (Helman, 2007:151-152).   
Doctors‟ specialised and powerful knowledge and skills create an unequal distribution of 
power in the doctor-patient relationship.  Differences in socio-economic status and general 
level of education are often superimposed on the doctor-patient relationship, especially in 
developing nations such as South Africa and may increase the unbalanced power distribution 
even further.  Scepticism exists about whether even optimal respect for patient autonomy can 
ever level the distribution of power between doctors and patients.  McCormick (1996:667), 
for instance, considers the power balance in the doctor-patient relationship as a priori unequal 
since doctors are the gatekeepers to medical care.  Regardless of the extent to which 
information is provided to the patient, the doctor inevitably determines the nature of the 
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information
52
.  Furthermore, patients who are sick are in a vulnerable position.  When in pain 
people are reminded of their mortality.  The sick person regresses “towards childlike 
dependence” (McCormick, 1996:667).  Biomedicine doesn‟t help patients to find meaning in 
their suffering
53
.   
 
1.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I discussed modern medicine‟s intellectual self-understanding.  I started by 
describing the changes that occurred in the manner that doctors practice medicine as 
Hippocratic medicine was transformed into the biomedicine that exists today.  I then 
described modern medicine‟s view of itself as a natural science and its conception of science 
in line with the positivist standard image of science.  I also mentioned the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions of medicine.  Thereafter I described the implications of 
medicine‟s scientific self-understanding for clinical medicine.  I also described the doctor-
patient relationship and the changes that have occurred in the nature of this relationship over 
the past four decades.  The point was made that the doctor-patient relationship and 
consequently doctor-patient interaction is a complex phenomenon.  It also became clear that 
modern medicine‟s natural scientific character influences the doctor-patient relationship in a 
fundamental manner.   
This project wants to philosophically investigate the role that medicine‟s self-identification as 
natural science has on the interaction between doctors and patients.  In order to fulfil this aim 
certain tools for analysis are needed.  I selected Jürgen Habermas‟ universal pragmatics and 
Michel Foucault‟s theory on the nature of discourse for this purpose.  Habermas‟ work will be 
used in Chapter 5 to analyse the linguistic communication between doctors and patients 
during consultations.  Foucault‟s work is used in Chapter 6 to analyse of medical discourse, 
that is the rules that doctors must follow when they think and talk about health and disease.  
Attention to both doctor-patient communication as well as medical discourse is necessary to 
approach the current research problem in a complete and fruitful manner.  In the next two 
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 One has to keep in mind that in the age of the World Wide Web (internet) a wealth of health information is 
available at the fingertips of (computer literate) patients and caregivers.  The doctor‟s status and authority as sole 
possessor of valid medical advice is weaker than in previous eras.  Especially when one considers that the dawn 
of the internet age broke in the era of supremacy of human rights in the western world.   
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 In Jungian (depth) psychology the goal of life is seen as meaning, and not happiness (Hollis, 1996:8).  The 
illness experience may be a very rich source of meaning for the patient, yet biomedicine doesn‟t allow or equip 
the doctor to guide or even accompany the patient on this journey.   
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chapters I provide detailed descriptions of the works of Habermas and Foucault that I later 
apply in an analysis of clinical communication and medical discourse.   
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Chapter 2 
Habermas’ universal pragmatics  
 
What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: language. 
Thomas McCarthy (1978:287) 
2.1 Introduction  
In this chapter I shall describe Jürgen Habermas‟ (1929- ) research on what he terms 
universal pragmatics
54
.  I refer specifically to his essay entitled “What is Universal 
Pragmatics?” (Habermas, 1979).  I shall pay attention to the validity basis of speech as well as 
Habermas‟ model of linguistic communication.  Habermas (1979:7) regards the speech-act 
theory which was introduced by John L. Austin (1911-1960) as “the most promising point of 
departure for a universal pragmatics” and he primarily uses this theory as the basis of his 
research.  I therefore start this chapter with a description of the main features of Austin‟s 
(1962) theory of speech acts.   
I have already mentioned that Habermas‟ work is included in this dissertation for two reasons. 
Firstly, Habermas addresses the nature of linguistic communication between a speaker and 
listener.  The focus of this dissertation is on the influence of the medical profession‟s 
intellectual self-image on communicatively effective care to patients.  The communication 
between doctors and patients is central to the problem I consider and Habermas‟ insights into 
interpersonal communication promises to serve my purpose.  Secondly, Habermas‟ work is 
suited to my project due to the connection between the goals of doctor-patient interaction and 
universal pragmatics.   
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does not appear in Habermas‟ (1979) writing.  Whenever I quote a passage in which the author used the italic 
font for emphasis, the italics is preserved in my quotation.  All words that appear in italics in quoted phrases or 
sentences in this dissertation are thus similarly italicized by the authors whose work I quote.  I also use the italic 
font for all non-English words or phrases, such as et al., etcetera and ad hoc.   
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2.2 Austin’s theory of speech acts  
John L. Austin‟s (1962:1, 12) theory of speech acts questions an age-old assumption in 
philosophy, namely that to say something is “always and simply to state something”, and that 
to state something means to truly or falsely „describe‟ a situation or to “state some fact”.  In 
Austin‟s (1962:12) opinion the aforementioned assumption “no doubt is wrong”.  He argues 
that there are some cases and senses in which saying something amounts to doing something. 
A speech act is performed when a sentence is uttered.  In other words, linguistic utterances are 
actions in nature, they are speech actions.  One does things “by saying something” 
(Habermas, 1979:34) .  When a speaker utters a promise, an assertion or a warning (s)he also 
performs an action, namely an attempt “to make a promise, to put forward an assertion, to 
issue a warning” (Habermas, 1979:34).   
In Austin‟s opinion philosophers have for too long neglected to study this notion.  Yet it is 
increasingly realised that “the occasion of an utterance matters seriously, and that the words 
used are to some extent to be „explained‟ by the „context‟ in which they are designed to be or 
have actually been spoken in a linguistic interchange”.  It is not only the meaning (sense and 
reference) of words that should be studied, but also to the illocutionary force of utterances.  
The illocutionary force of an utterance refers to the particular action that was performed in 
saying something.  Speech has numerous functions and can be used in numerous ways.  The 
sense in which an utterance is used makes a great difference to a speech act.  Whether an 
utterance is a promise or the announcement of a vague intention makes a great difference 
(Austin, 1962:99-100).   
Austin (1962:94) attempts to answer the following question: “How many senses are there in 
which to say something is to do something?”  He concludes that language can be used in at 
least three senses.  These “three kinds of „actions‟” are listed and defined below (Austin, 
1962:108-109).   
 
i. The locutionary act.  In the sense of the performance of locutionary actions “…to say 
anything must always be to do something” (Austin, 1962:92).  The locutionary act is 
the act of saying something or the act of using speech (Austin, 1962:99).  It “is 
roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference, 
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which again is roughly equivalent to „meaning‟ in the traditional sense” (Austin, 
1962:108).   
ii. The illocutionary act refers to “the performance of an act in saying something”.  It 
refers to the way and the sense in which a sentence was used on a particular occasion 
(Austin, 1962:99).  Whereas the locutionary act has a meaning, the illocutionary act 
has a particular “force in saying something” (Austin, 1962:120).  The illocutionary 
force of a speech act may for instance be that of advising or suggesting or ordering 
(Austin, 1962:99).  The performance of a locutionary act is also and eo ipso the 
performance of an illocutionary act.  Every genuine speech act is both a locutionary 
act and an illocutionary act (Austin, 1962:98,146).   
iii. The perlocutionary act refers to the consequences or effects achieved by saying 
something, such as “convincing, persuading, deterring” (Austin, 1962: 101).   
 
In saying something a number of things are thus done or accomplished.  A speech act is 
happily or successfully performed if a certain effect is achieved.  “Generally the effect 
amounts to bringing about the understanding of the meaning and of the force of the locution” 
(Austin, 1962:115-116).  Before Austin (1962:6-7) arrived at the three ways in which we use 
language [which he calls the theory of speech-acts (Austin, 1962:149)], he investigated 
whether a clear distinction can be made between two types of utterances, namely constatives 
and performatives.  A constative utterance states a fact which is either true or false.  A 
“performative sentence” or performative utterance or in short “a performative” refers to 
utterances which are not statements of fact.  “The name is derived…from „perform‟, the usual 
verb with the noun „action‟: it indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of 
an action – it is not normally thought of as just saying something”.  Austin (1962:5) provides 
the following examples of performatives:  
“„I give and bequeath my watch to my brother‟ – as occurring in a will”, and  
“I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow”.   
Performatives may, at least with regard to their grammatical make-up, appear to be 
„statements‟ or constatives, yet it cannot be said of performatives that they are either true or 
false – which is traditionally the characteristic sign of a statement (Austin, 1962:12).  
Performatives are rather happy (successful) or unhappy (unsuccessful), that is they are 
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capable of infelicity (Austin, 1962:25).  Austin (1962:14-15, 26, 39) provides the following 
scheme of the conditions for the „happy‟ operation of performatives:   
 
A. An accepted conventional procedure must exist which has a particular conventional 
effect.  The procedure must include the uttering of particular words by particular 
persons in particular circumstances; 
B. The procedure must be performed correctly and completely by all participants;  
Γ Where the procedure is designed to be used by persons who have particular thoughts, 
feelings or intentions, or to inaugurate certain consequential behaviour on any of the 
participants‟ part, then a person who participates in and thereby invokes the procedure 
has to possess those thoughts, feelings, or intentions, and the participants must have 
the intention to act accordingly and must subsequently behave accordingly. 
 
If certain conditions must be satisfied for a performative utterance to be happy then certain 
statements must be true for a performative to be happy, for instance statements that particular 
conditions exist (Austin, 1962:45,53).  Similarly, a constative speech act implies that certain 
other statements are true.  Austin (1962:47) draws our attention to the fact that we can “do 
wrong” in uttering constatives in more than one way.  To explain what can go wrong with 
statements one cannot simply concentrate on the proposition involved as has been done 
traditionally.  The total situation in which an utterance was produced, that is the total speech-
act, must be considered to appreciate the problems which can be experienced with constatives.  
This leads Austin (1962:52) to question whether a significant distinction does in fact exist 
between statements and perfomatives. 
When attention is moved away from studying the sentence, and focus is placed on “the 
issuing of an utterance in a speech situation” it becomes clear that to make a statement is to 
perform an act (Austin, 1962:138).  Austin (1962:149) concludes that a dichotomy between 
performatives and constatives does not exist.  The theory of speech acts aims to elucidate the 
“total speech act in the total speech situation”.  Statements and descriptions are merely two 
“families” among many other families of illocutionary acts and do not have a unique position.  
They are not related to facts “in a unique way being called true or false” (Austin, 1962:147-
148).  Austin (1962:144) states that it is important to realise that the terms „true‟ and „false‟ 
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do not represent “anything simple at all”.  „True‟ refers to a general dimension of being the 
appropriate thing to say in contrast with the wrong thing in particular circumstances, to a 
particular audience, for particular purposes and with particular intentions.  Whether a 
statement is true or false does not merely depend on the meanings of words but on which act 
was being performed and in which circumstances.   
Austin‟s theory of speech acts made a very valuable contribution to philosophy and linguistics 
by pointing out that speech itself is a form of action, and not merely a way of describing or 
reporting actions.  An adequate account of language needs to take the active character of 
language use into account.  Theoretical and structural linguists‟ treatment of language as a 
homogenous and autonomous object which can be studied as though it had no exterior is 
misleading (Thompson, 1984:6-7; 175).  Critics of such modern linguists point out that 
language is acquired and used in specific social-historical conditions.  A speaker‟s 
competence should not be conceptualized merely as the ability to produce an infinite number 
of grammatically correct sentences, but rather as the ability to produce grammatical sentences 
which fit the particular speech situation and the power relations therein contained (Thompson, 
1984:7).   
Now that the speech act theory that forms the basis of Habermas‟ universal pragmatics has 
been described, I can continue with a description of universal pragmatics itself.   
 
2.3 What is Universal Pragmatics? 
“The task of universal pragmatics is to identify and reconstruct universal conditions of 
possible understanding” (Habermas, 1979:1).  The project of universal pragmatics wants “to 
analyse the process of understanding” by looking at how agreement between a speaker and a 
hearer is brought about (Habermas, 1979:3).  Habermas (1979:1) refers to the 
presuppositions of communicative action.  Communicative action is action “aimed at 
reaching understanding” (Habermas, 1979:1).  This action flows from the relation between at 
least two subjects who have the ability to speak and to act (Van Niekerk, 1992:182
55
).  
Habermas‟ (1979:1) universal pragmatics is built on the assumption that communicative 
action is the fundamental form of social action and that other forms of social action, for 
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 I occasionally refer to secondary texts to illustrate or illuminate Habermas‟ ideas where I did not find 
sufficient clarity in the original text or where I found exceptional clarity in the secondary source.   
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instance conflict and competition, are derivatives of communicative action.  Since 
communicative action happens mainly through language, Habermas (1979:1) focuses on 
“explicit speech actions56” in his theory of communication.  He does not pay attention to 
nonverbal actions or “bodily expressions”.  Habermas‟ (1979:4) focus is on “consensual 
speech actions”.  A consensual speech action is an “idealized case of communicative 
action…in which participants share a tradition and their orientations are normatively 
integrated to such an extent that they start from the same definition of the situation and do not 
disagree about the claims to validity that they reciprocally raise” (Habermas, 1979:208-209).   
 
2.3.1 The validity basis of speech 
Speakers and listeners involuntarily make certain presuppositions or assumptions the moment 
that they perform, understand or react to a speech act.  These presuppositions are the 
conditions of possible understanding.  With regard to the conditions of possible understanding 
Habermas (1979:2) refers to the “validity basis of speech”.  He develops the thesis 
that anyone acting communicatively must, in performing any speech action, raise 
universal validity claims and suppose that they can be vindicated {or redeemed: 
einlösen}.  Insofar as he wants to participate in a process of reaching understanding, he 
cannot avoid raising…validity claims.   
The speaker has to raise the following validity claims if (s)he wants to bring about 
understanding.  The speaker claims that his/her utterance is:  
 
i. understandable, in the sense that it is grammatically correct; 
ii. true, in the sense that it accurately represents a fact about the world of objects and 
events which can be known through sense experience; 
iii. truthful, in the sense that the utterance corresponds with the speaker‟s intentions; 
iv.  correct, concerning a prevailing normative background (Habermas, 1979: 2, 27; Van 
Niekerk, 1992:183). 
 
                                                 
56
 The term „explicit‟ speech act refers to utterances with the grammatical form of “first person singular present 
indicative active”.  “I promise that I shall be there” is an explicit speech action (Austin, 1962:62, 69).  
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The conditions for reaching understanding are the following.  The speaker has to use an 
utterance that is comprehensible in order for the speaker and the hearer to understand each 
other.  The speaker should also have the intention of uttering a proposition that is true in 
order that the hearer can share the speaker‟s knowledge.  Furthermore, the speaker should 
wish to produce a sincere expression of his/her intentions in order for the hearer to believe the 
speaker‟s utterance (so that the hearer can trust the speaker).  Lastly, the speaker has to use an 
utterance that is right, in order for the hearer to accept the utterance, and so that the speaker 
and the hearer “can agree with one another in the utterance” with respect to a reciprocally 
recognised normative background.  A further condition for undisturbed communicative action 
is that the participants have to believe that the validity claims which “they reciprocally raise 
are justified” (Habermas, 1979:2-3).   
The goal of coming to an understanding {Verständigung} is to bring about an 
agreement {Einverständnis} that terminates in the intersubjective mutuality of 
reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another.  
Agreement is based on recognition of the corresponding validity claims of 
comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness and rightness…Coming to an understanding is the 
process of bringing about an agreement on the presupposed basis of validity claims that 
can be mutually recognised (Habermas, 1979:3).   
When one acts communicatively, you do not merely say something but you say something 
based on the presupposition that what you say can be criticised or grounded.  Speakers and 
hearers in everyday contexts share a background consensus about those interpretations 
which they accept as a matter of course.  The four validity claims which are implicitly raised 
and reciprocally recognised constitute the background consensus of communicative action in 
everyday contexts.  This background consensus is crucial for reaching understanding 
(Habermas, 1979:3-4; Thompson, 1984:262; Van Niekerk, 1992:190).  Consensual action 
happens against an unproblematic background consensus.  The participants in communication 
implicitly know that each has to raise the necessary validity claims (McCarthy, 1978:290), 
and are convinced that any validity claims raised during the process of communication could 
be justified or vindicated since “the sentences, propositions, expressed intentions, and 
utterances satisfy corresponding adequacy conditions” (Habermas, 1979:4).  The “vindication 
… of validity claims” means that the speaker provides good reasons to support the claim‟s 
validity and that a suprasubjective recognition of the claim‟s validity is accomplished, either 
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through “an appeal to intuitions and experiences or through argumentation and action 
consequences”.  When the hearer accepts the validity claim that was raised by the speaker, the 
hearer “acknowledges the validity of symbolic structures; that is, he acknowledges that a 
sentence is grammatical, a statement true, an intentional expression truthful, or an utterance 
correct” (Habermas, 1979:4-5).  Social interaction must not be understood as static.  Typically 
the participants have to follow a dynamic process of working out or “negotiating” a shared 
definition of the situation (McCarthy, 1979:290).   
When the validity claims that the speaker raises implicitly cannot be redeemed, 
communicative action cannot continue.  The participants in communication can then resume 
their action aimed at reaching understanding at the level of discourse (Habermas, 1979:3-4).  
Habermas (2001:100-101) distinguishes between communicative action and discourse.  When 
validity claims cannot be vindicated in the context of interaction, it may require 
communicative partners to “step out” of the context of communicative action and to “step 
into” a discursive situation (McCarthy, 1978:289).  “In communicative action, the validity of 
utterances is naively presupposed in order to exchange information…In discourse, validity 
claims that have been problematized become explicit topics of discussion, but no information 
is exchanged”.  The goal of discourse is to reinstate the agreement which existed in 
communicative action and then became problematized.  The “discursively produced, justified 
agreement” thus achieved can “of course…settle once again into a traditionally pregiven, 
secondary habitual agreement” (Habermas, 2001:100).  In Habermas‟ thought the term 
discourse thus has a meaning distinct from the already wide-ranging definitions of discourse 
which appear in discourse theories, such as in the writings of Michel Foucault which will be 
discussed in the next chapter.   
Communicative partners do not necessarily resume their communication at the discursive 
level when validity claims cannot be justified in the context of interaction.  They may also 
break their communication off altogether and go their separate ways or switch to strategic 
action (Habermas, 1979:3-4; McCarthy, 1978:289), that is action aimed at achieving success 
or a self designed goal such as conflict or competition (versus communicative action which 
aims to achieve understanding) (McCarthy, 1978:290; Van Niekerk, 1992: 182).  With 
strategic action the speaker aims to produce an effect on the listener with his/her speech acts 
(Scambler, 1987:181).  Habermas realizes that discourse, the type of speech that is used to 
discuss problematic validity claims, does not often occur “in its pure form”, and that “breaks” 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  58 
in communicative action are usually resolved nondiscursively in the real world (Bernstein, 
1983:186).   
In conclusion, the research programme entitled universal pragmatics is aimed at 
“reconstructing the universal validity basis of speech” (Habermas, 1979:5).   
 
2.3.2 Locating Universal pragmatics on the semiotic map57 
In logical positivism as well as in mainstream linguistics an abstract distinction is made 
between the form and content of language (that is, phonetics, syntax and semantics) and the 
use of language (pragmatics).  Yet, in these disciplines only the former, that is the structure of 
language, has been submitted to logical or linguistic analysis.  The pragmatic aspect of 
language has only been studied empirically in disciplines such as psychology, sociolinguistics 
(McCarthy, 1978:273; Habermas, 1979:5-6) and speech-langauge pathology.  Habermas 
(1979:5-6) does not object to “an abstractive distinction between language as structure and 
speaking as process”.  In fact, he finds it meaningful.  Here language refers to a system of 
rules according to which expressions can be generated.  All properly formed expressions (for 
example, sentences) may then be accepted as elements of a particular language.  Conversely, 
subjects with the ability to speak can use such expressions when participating “in a process of 
communication”.  Such subjects can articulate sentences and can also understand and respond 
to the sentences expressed by other speakers.  Habermas (1979:6) argues that the fact that a 
distinction can be made between language and “the use of language in speech” does not lead 
to the conclusion that pragmatics cannot be studied formally
58
: 
The fact of the successful, or at least promising, reconstruction of linguistic rule systems 
cannot serve as a justification for restricting formal analysis to this object domain…not 
only language but speech too – that is, the employment of sentences in utterances – is 
accessible to formal analysis.  Like the elementary units of language (sentences), the 
elementary units of speech (utterances) can be analyzed in the methodological attitude 
of a reconstructive science.  
                                                 
57
 I borrow this phrase from McCarthy (1978:279). 
58
 Habermas (1979:15) uses the term “formal analysis” to refer to the method of rational reconstruction.  I shall 
shortly make a few remarks on the nature of rational reconstruction.   
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2.3.3 A note on the method of rational reconstruction  
A note on the nature of rational reconstruction is needed at this point.  Habermas describes his 
theory of communication as a reconstructive theory.  It is a scientific theory that seeks to 
reveal, by means of reflective (and not transcendental) enquiry, the conditions of possibility 
for achieving understanding by means of communicative action.  The methodological attitude 
of rational reconstruction is also evident in the theories of Chomsky, Piaget and Kohlberg.  
These theories attempt to reveal the universal conditions and rules which are implicitly 
assumed in the execution of individuals‟ linguistic competence and cognitive and moral 
development, respectively (McCarthy, 1978:278-279; Van Niekerk, 1992:189-190).  
Habermas (1979:9) describes reconstructive procedures as “characteristic of sciences that 
systematically reconstructs the intuitive knowledge of competent subjects”.   
Habermas (1979:12-13) borrows Ryle‟s59 distinction between and know-how and know-that 
knowledge to illuminate the nature of reconstructive theorising.  Know-how is “the ability of 
a competent speaker who understands how to produce or perform something” while know-
that is “the explicit knowledge of how it is that he understands this”.  In so far as a speaker 
produces an utterance that is correctly formed and therefore intelligible, (s)he produced the 
utterance by following certain rules or by basing the utterance on certain structures.  The 
competent speaker draws on his/her implicit knowledge and abilities when producing 
meaningful sentences without being aware that (s)he is following specific rules.  The 
competent speaker is also not able to explicitly describe the rules upon which his/her 
performance is based (McCarthy, 1978:276).  The speaker has a pre-theoretical understanding 
and knowledge of the rule system of his/her language and its context-specific application 
which at least allows him/her to produce well-formed, understandable utterances (Habermas, 
1979:12-13). “This implicit rule-consciousness is a know-how” (Habermas, 1979:13).  To 
understand the competent speaker‟s implicit knowledge, this know-how must be transformed 
to know-that.  The task of rational reconstruction is to reconstruct pre-theoretical rule 
consciousness, that is to make the structure and elements of a speaker‟s pre-theoretical know-
how explicit or, to put it another way, to reveal the rules and structures which speakers master 
in order to produce meaningful utterances (Habermas, 1979:13; McCarthy, 1978:276-277).  
Rational reconstruction refers to the “reconstruction of generative structures underlying the 
production of symbolic formations” (Habermas, 1979:12-13).   
                                                 
59
 Ryle, G. 1949.  The concept of mind.  London: Hutchinson's University Library.  Cited in Habermas 
(1979:12).   
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Reconstructive theories seek to explain pre-theoretical or intuitive knowledge, and not implicit 
opinions.  Reconstructions are aimed at understanding “pre-theoretical knowledge of a 
general sort”.  They are directed at universal capabilities and not only at the specific 
capabilities of individual groups or individuals.  For example, Chomsky‟s (reconstructive) 
grammatical theory aims to reconstruct the rule-consciousness shared by all competent 
speakers of all natural languages, and not only the competence of a specific group, such as 
persons speaking in a particular dialect, such as Low-German or Cape-Afrikaans.   
If the pre-theoretical knowledge that is to be reconstructed expresses a universal know-
how, a universal cognitive, linguistic, or interactive competence (or subcompetence), 
reconstruction is aimed at species-competences.  Such reconstructions can be compared 
with general theories in their range and status (Habermas, 1979:14)
60
.   
The reconstructive method belongs to the empirical sciences.  Habermas insists that the 
method of rational reconstruction is not transcendental in nature.  Rational reconstruction 
breaks with the strong apriorism of Kant‟s philosophy (Habermas, 1979:21).  However, in 
rational reconstruction the distinction between making use of a priori knowledge and making 
use of a posteriori knowledge becomes unclear.  Whereas the pre-theoretical knowledge or 
rule-consciousness of competent speakers is a priori knowledge for them, the linguist 
acquires a posteriori knowledge when (s)he questions competent speakers in order to 
reconstruct their rule consciousness. “The procedures employed in constructing and testing 
hypotheses, in appraising competing reconstructive proposals, in gathering and selecting data, 
are in many ways like the procedures used in the nomological sciences” (Habermas, 1979:24-
25).  Habermas does, however, make a distinction between reconstructive theories and 
empirical-analytic theories, typical of the natural sciences.  Empirical analytic studies follow 
the hypothetico-deductive method (Habermas, 1979: 15-16; Van Niekerk, 1992:189).  This 
means, most simply, that a hypothesis is formulated and that consequences are then deduced 
based on the hypothesis.  The postulated hypothesis is then subjected to testing against 
experience.  If the tested hypothesis proves to be false, some learning has occurred and an 
improved hypothesis can be formulated and tested.  If the hypothesis is proved correct, further 
tests can be attempted (Blackburn, 2005:175).  An empirical-analytic theory can thus rebut 
                                                 
60
 This quote from Habermas‟ (1979) essay “What is Universal Pragmatics” also appears in McCarthy‟s (1978) 
commentary on Habermas‟ critical theory.  McCarthy translated “What is Universal Pragmatics” in the 
collection of Habermas‟ (1979) essays.  In his 1978 commentary, McCarthy translated the quoted passage 
somewhat differently from the translation in Habermas (1979).  I use McCarthy‟s 1978 translation here to create 
coherence between the quotation and the paragraph preceding it.   
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the knowledge of a specific object domain which existed prior to scientific investigation, and 
replace it with theoretical knowledge that is provisionally regarded as true.  Conversely, a 
reconstructive theory can describe pre-theoretical knowledge to a degree of explicitness and 
adequacy, but it can never falsify the pre-theoretical knowledge which is its object domain 
(Habermas, 1979:16).   
At most, the report of a speaker‟s intuition can prove to be false, but not the intuition 
itself.  The latter belongs to the data, and data can be explained but not criticized.  At 
most data can be categorized as being unsuitable, that is, either erroneously gathered or 
wrongly selected for a specific theoretical purpose (Habermas, 1979:16).   
 
2.4 Three aspects of Universal Pragmatics  
Habermas (1979:26) states that the speech-act theory assumes that every competent speaker 
has an “implicit, reconstructible knowledge” which forms his/her communicative 
competence, that is the competence to use sentences in speech acts.  Habermas (1979:26) 
further states that the speech act theory also assumes that the core of this communicative 
competence is universal.  According to Habermas (1979:26) the goal of a general theory of 
speech acts would thus be to describe the fundamental system of rules which competent 
speakers master insofar as they are able to fulfill “the conditions for a happy employment of 
sentences in utterances”, regardless of the specific language of the sentences or the 
“accidental contexts” in which the utterances may be fixed (Habermas, 1979:25-26).   
A difference exists between “the production of sentences according to the rules of grammar” 
and “the use of sentences in accordance with pragmatic rules that shape the infrastructure of 
speech situations in general”.  It is only when a sentence is uttered that it becomes embedded 
in “relations to reality” (Habermas, 1979:27).  When it is uttered a grammatically correct 
sentence is placed in relation to  
 
i.) the external reality (the world of events and objects which is the basis for true or false 
statements); 
ii.) the internal reality (the speaker‟s inner world of intentions which can be expressed to a 
public either truthfully or untruthfully); 
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iii.) the normative reality of society (the shared values, norms, rules and roles of a social 
life world against which an interpersonal relationship can be judged to be legitimate or 
not) (McCarthy, 1978: 280; Habermas, 1979:27). 
 
When a speaker utters a sentence, the sentence is placed under validity claims which it did not 
have to and could not fulfill as a mere grammatical formation (“a nonsituated sentence”, or a 
sentence which is not embedded in a speech act).  A grammatical sentence only needs to 
satisfy one validity claim, namely “the claim to comprehensibility”.  The claim to 
comprehensibility is satisfied when a speaker utters a sentence which is comprehensible to a 
hearer who has mastered the grammatical rules of the language in which the sentence was 
expressed.  For an utterance to be successful three additional validity claims need to be 
fulfilled, namely claims to the truth, truthfulness and correctness of the utterance (Habermas, 
1979:28). 
… a successful utterance… must count as true for the participants insofar as it 
represents something in the world; it must count as truthful insofar as it expresses 
something intended by the speaker; and it must count as right insofar as it conforms to 
socially recognized expectations (Habermas, 1979:28).   
Habermas (1979:29) makes a distinction between linguistic competence and communicative 
competence.  To produce a grammatical sentence a speaker must have mastered the 
equivalent grammatical rule system.  This refers to the speaker‟s linguistic ability, which is 
susceptible to linguistic analysis.  For a speaker to succeed in using sentences in speech acts, 
that is to fulfil pragmatic functions, communicative competence is required.  An utterance has 
“three general pragmatic functions”, namely, “to represent something, to express an 
intention, to establish a legitimate interpersonal relation” (Habermas, 1979:28).  These 
pragmatic functions are occupied the moment that a sentence is uttered.  A mere grammatical 
formation, independent of a speech situation, does not occupy these functions.  
Communicative competence refers to the ability of a speaker who aims at achieving mutual 
understanding to fix a grammatical sentence in “relations to reality”, that is 
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i.) to select propositional content in such a way that he represents…an experience or fact 
(so that the hearer can share the knowledge of the speaker); 
ii.) to express his intentions in such a way that the linguistic expression accurately renders 
what is meant (so that the hearer can trust the speaker); and 
iii.) to carry out a speech act in such a way that it satisfies recognized norms or accepted 
self-images (so that the hearer can agree with the speaker in these values) (Habermas, 
1979:29
61
). 
 
To the degree that the above three abilities are not dependent on specific epistemic 
presuppositions and shifting contexts, but generally cause sentences to take part “in the 
universal pragmatic functions of representation, expression, and legitimate interpersonal 
relation”, they represent a communicative competence which “is susceptible only to 
pragmatic analysis” (Habermas, 1979:29).  Different speech actions are for the most part 
aimed at fulfilling one of the three general pragmatic functions.  The achievement of these 
general pragmatic functions is assessed “against the validity conditions for truth, truthfulness, 
and rightness” (Habermas, 1979:33).  Different types of speech actions are thus studied from 
different analytic perspectives.  A comprehensive universal pragmatics would have to 
combine the study of the representative, expressive and interactive functions of speech.  
However, Habermas is especially interested in communicative action, and for this the 
interactive function of communication, “namely the establishment of interpersonal relations”, 
is of most importance.  
 
2.4.1 The standard form of the speech act 
A speech act is performed when a sentence is uttered.  A distinction can be made between the 
semantic content and the relational aspects of an utterance.  This means that when a sentence 
is uttered it is embedded in particular interpersonal relations.  To some extent “every 
explicitly performative utterance both establishes and represents an interpersonal relation” 
(Habermas, 1979:34).  A further characteristic of speech actions is that a singular speech act 
can either succeed or fail, due to “the generative power of speech acts” (Habermas, 1979:34).  
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 Points i –iii are quoted from Habermas (1979:29).  Again I used McCarthy‟s 1978 translation (McCarthy, 
1978:280) in favour of the somewhat less lucid 1979 version.   
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An utterance can only be understood in a prearranged situation if it succeeds, at least 
implicitly, in establishing and bringing to expression a particular relation between the speaker 
and his/her communicative partner.  A speech act is successful if a relation - the relation that 
the speaker aimed at - is reached between the speaker and the hearer, and if the hearer can 
understand and accept the content of the speaker‟s utterance in the sense that it was suggested 
(for instance as a promise, a statement or a threat).  “We can also say that the illocutionary 
force
62
 of a speech action consists in fixing the communicative function of the content 
uttered” (Habermas, 1979:34).  The generative power of speech acts are found in the fact that 
the speaker, by executing a speech act, can influence the hearer to enter into an interpersonal 
relationship with him/her (Habermas, 1979:35).   
Habermas‟ (1979:216) universal pragmatics is restricted to the analysis of explicit, 
“propositionally differentiated and institutionally unbound speech actions” (Habermas, 
1979:39).  I shall now describe the meaning of these qualifications.  Habermas‟ (1979:39) 
analysis is limited to speech acts “with an explicit linguistic form”.  An explicit speech action 
has a surface structure with the standard form comprising of “an illocutionary and a 
propositional component” (Habermas, 1979:36).  The illocutionary component is made up 
of an illocutionary act which is performed with the help of a performative sentence.  A 
performative sentence generally has as its main parts a personal pronoun in the first person as 
subject, a personal pronoun in the second person in the object position and a performative 
verb as predicate (McCarthy, 1978:282; Habermas, 1979:36).  McCarthy (1978:282) provides 
the following examples of performative sentences:  “I (hereby) promise you…”; “I (hereby) 
command you…”; “I (hereby) assert to you…”  The predicate of performative sentences 
generally allows the particle “hereby” (Habermas; 1979:36), which indicates that the 
utterance is the instrument which effects the act represented by the performative verb (Austin, 
1962:57).  The propositional component of speech acts with the standard form is formed 
with the help of a sentence with propositional content.  Habermas (1979:36) refers to speech 
acts with this standard form as being propositionally differentiated.  This “level of 
differentiation of speech” is a prerequisite for the ability of an action to assume 
representational functions, namely “to say something about the world”.  A propositional 
                                                 
62
 Later in this chapter I pay specific attention to Habermas‟ thoughts on the nature of the illocutionary force of 
utterances.   
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content, which expresses a particular state of affairs, always belongs to an explicit speech 
action (Habermas, 1979:37)
 63
.   
Habermas‟ (1979:38-39) universal pragmatics is further restricted to institutionally unbound 
speech acts.  By this is meant speech acts which are not tied to only one institution.  An 
example of an institutionally bound speech act is to christen a child in a church or to marry 
two people.  To understand institutionally bound speech acts one needs to consult the 
institution represented by the act.  Habermas‟ (1979:38-39) project of universal pragmatics is 
only interested in speech acts which do not belong to a single institution but which can fit 
various institutions.  “With institutionally unbound speech actions, only conditions of a 
generalized context must typically be met for a corresponding act to succeed”64.  The final 
exclusion from Habermas‟ (1979:39) analytic project are “those explicit speech actions in 
standard form that appear in contexts that produce shifts of meaning”.  He (1979:39) is 
referring here to situations where the pragmatic meanings of context-dependent speech acts 
are different from the meanings of the sentences uttered in the speech acts.  Habermas 
(1979:39-40; McCarthy, 1978:427) does not regard the narrowing of his analytical focus (as 
mentioned above) as a threat to the generality of his work, since he adopts a weaker version of 
Searle‟s “principle of expressibility”, namely 
that in a given language, for every interpersonal relation that a speaker wants to take up 
explicitly with another member of his language community, a suitable performative 
expression is either available or, if necessary, can be introduced through a specification 
of available expressions” (Habermas, 1979:40).   
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 The grammatical form of explicit speech acts makes explicit that an utterance is performative, and also makes 
explicit which act is being performed (Austin, 1962:62).  Austin (1962:71-73) makes “a fair guess” that the 
explicit performative developed later in the evolution of language than utterances which are more primary.  
Primary utterances may be included as parts of explicit performatives, such as “…I shall be there” in the explicit 
performative “I promise that I shall be there”.  Language in its primitive stages is neither precise nor explicit.  
Precision in language means that the meaning (what is being said) of utterances are clear, whereas explicitness 
means that the force (how an utterance is to be taken) of utterances is clear.   
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 Habermas (1979:39) admits that the classification of speech acts in terms of “institutional bond” does not 
always allow an unambiguous classification.  “Commands can exist whenever relations of authority are 
institutionalized; appointments presuppose special, bureaucratically developed organizations; and marriages 
require a single institution (which is, however, found universally).  But this does not destroy the usefulness of 
the analytic point of view”.   
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2.4.2 The double structure of speech 
Habermas (1979:41) makes the following remark on the double-structure of speech actions 
with the standard form:  “…the illocutionary and propositional [components of speech acts] 
can vary independently of one another”.  The same propositional content can appear 
unchanged in relation to various types of speech acts.  Habermas (1979:41) refers to this 
phenomenon as “speech-act-invariance of propositional content”, and provides the following 
examples.  The propositional content of “Peter‟s smoking a pipe” can appear unchanged in 
different types of speech acts, such as  
“I assert that Peter smokes a pipe” 
“I beg of you (Peter) that you smoke a pipe.” 
“I ask you (Peter), do you smoke a pipe?” 
“I warn you (Peter), smoke a pipe.” 
The illocutionary and propositional components of speech acts can thus be uncoupled to form 
and transform speech acts.  This uncoupling allows the double structure of speech, that is, for 
speakers and hearers to communicate simultaneously on two different communicative levels.  
The two levels are: 
 
i. “the level of intersubjectivity” on which speaker and hearer, by means of illocutionary 
acts, set up the relations which allow them “to come to an understanding with each 
other”; 
ii. “the level of propositional content”, or “the level of experiences and states-of-affairs 
about which they want to reach an understanding in the communicative function 
determined by” i.) (Habermas, 1979:41-42; McCarthy, 1978:282) 65. 
 
Speakers and hearers must simultaneously reach an understanding on both communicative 
levels if they wish to communicate their intentions to each other.   
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2.4.3 Types of validity claims and modes of communication 
It was stated above that communication in language is only possible when the speaker and 
hearer simultaneously become involved in two levels of communication when communicating 
with each other regarding a particular topic.  Habermas (1979:50-53) now introduces another 
concept, namely “modes of communication”.  A speaker can make either of the two 
communicative levels the central theme of his/her utterance.  An “interactive use of 
language” thematizes the relation which the speaker and listener take up, while it only 
mentions the propositional content of the utterances.  Conversely, the theme of the “cognitive 
use of language” is the contents of utterances as statements about what is happening or could 
be happening in the world, expressed as knowledge claims that can be either true or false, 
while the interpersonal relation between the communication partners is only indirectly 
expressed.  The difference in thematization is caused by the difference in the validity claim 
that is stressed in the various modes of communication (Habermas, 19 79:53, 55)
66
.   
Different types of speech acts belong to the different modes of communication.  Each type of 
speech act presupposes a particular validity claim.  Only speech acts with a propositional 
component in the form of explicit propositions are allowed in the cognitive use of language.  
These speech acts are known as constative speech acts.  Examples of constative speech acts 
are “reports, explications, communications, elucidations, narrations, and so forth”.  Constative 
speech acts raise the validity claim of truth for the proposition that was expressed (Habermas, 
1979:52-53).  In the interactive use of language only regulative speech acts are allowed.  
These are speech acts which characterise a particular relation that the communication partners 
can adopt towards norms of action or evaluation.  Examples of regulative speech acts are 
commands, admonitions, prohibitions, refusals, promises, agreements, notices, excuses, 
recommendations and admissions.  Regulative speech acts always presuppose the validity of 
conventions, that is “the normative background of institutions, roles, socioculturally habitual 
forms of life”.  The illocutionary force of speech acts which brings about legitimate (or 
illegitimate) interpersonal relations between the communicative partners comes from “the 
binding force of recognised norms of action (or of evaluation); to the extent that a speech act 
is an action, it actualises an already established pattern of relations” (Habermas, 1979:53-54).  
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 Habermas (1979:57) points out that there is no mode of communication in which the intelligibility of an 
utterance is thematized, since all speech acts have to satisfy the presupposition of comprehensibility in the same 
manner.  “If in some communication there is a breakdown of intelligibility, the requirement of comprehensibility 
can be made thematic only through passing over to a hermeneutic discourse, and then in connection with the 
relevant linguistic system” (Habermas, 1979:57).   
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A regulative speech act contains an implicit claim that the interpersonal relation produced by 
the speech act is valid in terms of the normative context of the speech act.  The presupposed 
norm implicitly referred to by a regulative speech act is valid if it is intersubjectively 
recognised.  Regulative speech acts thus make a claim to rightness or appropriateness 
(Habermas, 1979:54, 56).  A regulative speech act can only succeed when the validity claim 
that the speaker implies is covered by existing norms, “and that means by (at least) de facto 
recognition of the claim that these norms rightfully exist” (Habermas, 1979:54).     
Habermas (1979:57-58) describes a third mode of communication, namely the “expressive use 
of language”.  Representative speech acts, such as “to reveal, expose, admit, conceal, 
pretend, deceive, express” (McCarthy, 1978:285) belong to this mode of communication.  
Representative speech acts include intentional verbs, such as “think, believe, hope, fear, love, 
hate, want, desire” (McCarthy, 1978:285) to disclose the speaker‟s desires, feelings, 
intentions, etcetera (Habermas, 1979:57).  A representative speech act stresses the 
truthfulness with which a speaker expresses his/her intentions.  “Truthfulness guarantees the 
transparency of a subjectivity representing itself in language” (Habermas, 1979:57).   
Habermas (1979:58-59) does not claim that every series of speech actions can be 
unambiguously assigned to one of the modes of communication he describes.  Furthermore, 
the validity claims of truth, rightness and truthfulness universally inhabit speech.  Although 
each speech act explicitly raises one particular validity claim in accordance with the mode of 
communication to which it belongs, the other validity claims implicitly inhabit that speech 
act.  For example, regulative speech acts stress the normative validity claim – the claim to 
rightness or appropriateness.  The claim regarding the truth of the propositional content of the 
speech act, as well as the claim that the speaker truthfully expressed his/her intentions (to 
create a specific interpersonal relation with the listener), remain implicit.  In this example the 
claims to truth and truthfulness are necessary conditions.  However, the importance lies in the 
question of whether the speech act is in accordance with the existing normative context 
(Habermas, 1979:54-55, 58).   
…every competent speaker has in principle the possibility of unequivocally selecting 
one mode [of language use] because with every speech act he must raise three universal 
validity claims, so that he can single out one of them to thematize a component of 
speech (Habermas, 1979:59).   
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2.4.4 The illocutionary force of utterances 
The next question that Habermas (1979:59) examines concerns the nature of the illocutionary 
force of utterances.  Habermas (1979:53-54; McCarthy, 1978:283) describes the illocutionary 
force of an utterance as its power to produce the interpersonal relation between speaker and 
listener which was intended by the speaker.  Only successful speech acts produce 
interpersonal relations.  Habermas (1979:59) analyses illocutionary force by investigating the 
“conditions of success or failure of speech acts”.   
An uttered content receives a specific communicative function through the fact that the 
standard conditions for the occurrence of a corresponding interpersonal relation are 
fulfilled.  With the illocutionary act, the speaker makes an offer that can be accepted or 
rejected (Habermas, 1979:59).   
Habermas (1979: 59) is not interested in the various contingent reasons which may cause the 
hearer to refuse to enter into the relationship offered by the speaker.  He is only concerned 
with situations in which the failure of the speech act is due to an unacceptable utterance 
produced by the speaker.  “When the speaker makes an utterance that manifestly contains no 
serious offer, he cannot count on the occurrence of the relationship intended by him” 
(Habermas, 1979: 59).  Habermas (1979:59) considers a speech act successful if the listener 
understands the meaning of the utterance and also enters into the relationship intended by the 
speaker.  He analyses “the conditions for the success of speech acts in terms of their 
„acceptability‟ ” (Habermas, 1979:59).  A speech act is considered acceptable only if the 
speaker “sincerely makes a serious offer”67 and not when the speaker merely pretends to make 
an offer.  A serious offer requires a certain engagement by the speaker (Habermas, 1979:59).   
Habermas (1979:60-61) uses Searle‟s68 analysis of the kinds of conditions that have to be met 
for a speech act to be successful as a point of departure (McCarthy, 1978:283).  Searle groups 
these kinds of conditions into three groups of rules, namely “preparatory rules”, “essential 
rules” and “sincerity rules” (Habermas, 1979:60-61; McCarthy, 1978:283).  Preparatory 
rules refer to “generalised or restricted contexts for possible types of speech actions” or 
“speech-act-typically restricted contexts” (Habermas, 1979:60, 65).  For example, a promise 
is only acceptable if the following conditions, among others, are fulfilled: 
                                                 
67
 In Austin‟s (1962:9-10) words: “…words must be spoken „seriously‟…to be taken „seriously‟…Thus, „I 
promise to…‟ obliges me – puts on record my spiritual assumption of a spiritual shackle”.   
68
 Searle, J.R. 1969.  Speech acts.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
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i. H (the hearer) prefers that S (the speaker) does A (a particular action) to S not doing 
A, and in addition S believes that this is the case; 
ii. It is not clear to S or H that S will perform A in the usual course of events.   
 
If conventional assumptions of this type are not satisfied there is no point in performing the 
act of promising, “that is, the attempt by the speaker to carry out the illocutionary act anyway 
makes no sense and is condemned to failure from the outset” (Habermas, 1979:60).  Essential 
rules seem to only paraphrase the meaning of the equivalent performative verb.  For instance, 
“requests: „count as an attempt to get H to do A‟; or questions: „count as an attempt to elicit 
information from H‟ ” (Habermas, 1979:61).  Such paraphrases all include the phrase “counts 
as an attempt to” (Habermas, 1979:61; McCarthy, 1978:284).  Sincerity rules place speech-
act-specific limits on the speaker‟s “psychological state”.  For instance, for a promise to be 
acceptable S must have the intention of performing A.  Different speech acts assume different 
psychological states on the part of the speaker, “for example, belief in asserting, wish or 
desire in entreating, intention in promising, gratitude in thanking”.  When a speaker does not 
have the required psychological state the relevant speech act is insincere (McCarthy, 
1978:284).   
Habermas (1979:61) considers the essential assumption for the success of a speech act as “the 
speaker‟s entering into a specific engagement, so that the hearer can rely on him.  The speaker 
must engage himself, that is, indicate that in certain situations he will draw certain 
consequences for action”.  In other words, an acceptable illocutionary act means that the 
speaker made an offer that (s)he is on the point of fulfilling to the degree that the hearer 
accepts it.  The “content of the engagement” (as referred to by essential rules) must be 
differentiated from the “sincerity of the engagement” (as referred to by sincerity rules).  When 
Habermas (1979:61) speaks about the speaker‟s engagement, he presupposes “both a certain 
content of engagement and the sincerity with which the speaker is willing to enter into his 
engagement”.   
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In the context of the aforementioned ideas regarding the acceptability of speech acts and the 
engagement of the speaker, Habermas (1979:65) makes the following statement regarding the 
illocutionary force of speech acts: “The illocutionary force of a speech act consists in its 
capacity to move a hearer to act under the premise that the engagement signalled by the 
speaker is seriously meant”.  When a speaker performs an illocutionary act (s)he enters into a 
bond, which  
means a guarantee that, in consequence of his utterance, he will fulfil certain conditions 
– for example, regard a question as settled when a satisfactory answer is given; drop an 
assertion when it proves to be false; follow his own advice when he finds himself in the 
same situation as the hearer; stress a request when it is not complied with; act in 
accordance with an intention disclosed by avowal, and so on (Habermas, 1979:62).  
The question that now arises is how a hearer can be motivated to base his/her action on the 
presumption that the speaker is serious about the engagement that (s)he suggested (Habermas, 
1979:62)?  Is there more to illocutionary force than the “power of suggestion”?  It is here that 
Habermas‟ thoughts “take a decisive turn” (McCarthy, 1978:285).  Habermas (1979:63) 
argues that the illocutionary force of (institutionally unbound
69
) speech acts has a rational 
basis.  In performing speech acts communicative partners raise validity claims and demand 
these claims to be recognised.  Such recognition does not have to follow irrationally, since 
validity claims are cognitive in character and “can be checked” (Habermas, 1979:63).  
Habermas (1979:63) defends the following thesis:  
In the final analysis, the speaker can illocutionarily influence the hearer and vice versa, 
because speech-act-typical commitments are connected with cognitively testable 
validity claims – that is, because the reciprocal bonds have a rational basis.  The 
engaged speaker normally connects the specific sense in which he would like to take up 
an interpersonal relationship with a thematically stressed validity claim and thereby 
chooses a specific mode of communication.   
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 In the case of institutionally bound speech acts, such as “betting, greeting, christening, appointing”, the hearer 
can possibly depend on the binding force of a recognized rule of action.  “In the case of institutionally unbound 
speech acts, however, illocutionary force cannot be traced back directly to the binding force of the normative 
context” (Habermas, 1979:54, 62).   
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Different types of constative speech acts have different particular meanings, yet the claim put 
forward in each of them is based on the truth of the matching propositions or on the subject‟s 
ability to have cognitions.  In the same way various types of regulative speech acts have 
different particular meanings, but the claim put forward in each of these different 
interpersonal relationships refers to the rightness of the normative context or the subject‟s 
ability to assume responsibility (Habermas, 1979:63).   
We might say that in different speech acts the content of the speaker‟s engagement is 
determined by different ways of appealing to the same, thematically stressed, universal 
validity claim.  And since as a result of this appeal to universal validity claims, the 
speech-act-typical commitments take on the character of obligations to provide grounds 
or to prove trustworthy, the hearer can be rationally motivated by the speaker‟s 
signalled engagement to accept the latter‟s offer (Habermas, 1979:63).   
In the cognitive use of language a “speech-act-immanent obligation to provide grounds” is 
offered by the speaker.  Constative speech acts include the offer to recur if needed to the 
“experiential source” from which the speaker obtains the “certainty” that the statement (s)he 
made is true.  If an ad hoc doubt is not dismissed by this immediate grounding, the 
problematic truth claim can be discussed in a theoretical discourse.  In the interactive use of 
language a “speech-act-immanent obligation to provide justification” is offered by the 
speaker.  Regulative speech acts include only the offer to point to, if needed, “the normative 
context” from which the speaker obtains the “conviction” that his/her utterance is correct, in 
other words that “the speech action performed fits an existing normative background”.  
Similarly, if an ad hoc doubt is not dismissed by this immediate justification, the problematic 
claim to rightness can be discussed in a practical discourse.  The subject of such a practical 
discourse is not the rightness claim immediately connected with the speech act, but “the 
validity of the very norm from which the rightness claim of the speaker is merely borrowed”.  
Lastly, in the expressive use of language a “speech-act-immanent…obligation to prove 
trustworthy” is offered by the speaker.  The consequences of the speaker‟s actions thus have 
to prove that the intention (s)he expressed is truly the intention which guided his/her 
behaviour.  If an ad hoc doubt cannot be dismissed by immediate “assurance expressing what 
is evident to the speaker himself”, the problematic truthfulness claim can only be verified 
against the consistency of the speaker‟s subsequent behaviour (Habermas, 1979:63-64).   
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2.5 Habermas’ (1979) model of linguistic communication 
The analysis of the illocutionary force of speech acts thus led Habermas (1979:65) back to 
“the validity basis of speech”.  A participant in communication can be said to aim towards 
reaching understanding on condition that (s)he acceptably raises three validity claims through 
understandable sentences in his/her speech acts, namely claims to truth, rightness or 
appropriateness and truthfulness.  Individual validity claims can be thematically stressed 
based on the mode of language use employed by the speaker, yet all the different types of 
validity claims come into play in each communicative action (Habermas, 1979:65-66).  
“…the system of all validity claims…must always be raised simultaneously, although they 
cannot all be thematic at the same time” (Habermas, 1979:66).   
Habermas (1979:66) explains the universality of the validity claims intrinsic to the structure 
of speech by referring to the “systematic place of language”.  “Language is the medium 
through which speakers and hearers realise certain fundamental demarcations” (Habermas, 
1979:66).  Through language the subject separates him/herself from four “domains of reality”: 
 
i. “External nature”, the environment that the subject objectifies “in the third-person 
attitude of an observer”.  External nature refers to the segment of reality which the 
subject can perceive and manipulate.  This includes inanimate nature as well as all 
objects and situations which can directly or indirectly be accessed through sense 
experience.   
ii. “Society”, an environment or “symbolically prestructured segment of reality” that the 
subject “conforms to or deviates from in the ego-alter attitude of…a participant in a 
system of communication”.  Valid interpersonal relations, institutions, cultural values, 
and traditions belong to this domain of reality.   
iii. “Internal nature”, the subject‟s own subjectivity which (s)he communicates or 
conceals “in a first person attitude”.  This domain includes all desires, feelings, and 
intentions “to which an „I‟ has privileged access and can express as its own 
experiences before a public”.   
iv. “Language”, that is “the medium of language itself”.  Communicative actions are 
performed in language but language also appears (preconsciously) to the speaker and 
actor as a domain of reality of its own kind, sui generis (Habermas, 1979:66-67).   
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According to Habermas (1979:66) the validity claims inherent in speech aimed at achieving 
understanding show that these four domains must always appear at the same time.  Habermas‟ 
(1979:67-68) model of linguistic communication depicts the correlations between the 
domains of reality, the basic attitudes of speakers which exist in the various modes of 
language use, validity claims and the general functions of speech.  According to this model 
grammatical sentences are embedded, by means of validity claims, in three connections to 
reality and as a result take on the equivalent pragmatic functions of “representing facts, 
establishing legitimate interpersonal relations, and expressing one‟s own subjectivity” 
(Habermas, 1979:67).  In Habermas‟ (1979:67) model language is the medium which 
connects three worlds.  A threefold relation exists in every successful communicative act 
between the utterance and i.) “the external world”; ii.) “our social world” and iii.) “a 
particular inner world (of the speaker)” (Habermas, 1979:67).  Every utterance can be 
examined in order to determine whether it is true or not, justified or not, truthful or not since  
in speech, no matter what the emphasis, grammatical sentences are embedded in 
relations to reality in such a way that in an acceptable speech action segments of 
external nature, society, and internal nature always come into appearance together.  
Language itself also appears in speech, for speech is a medium in which the linguistic 
means that are employed instrumentally are also reflected (Habermas, 1979:67-68).   
Table 2.1 below depicts Habermas‟ (1979) model of linguistic communication.   
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Table 2.1: A tabular depiction of Habermas’ model of linguistic communication (Adapted from Habermas, 1979:68 and Thompson, 
1984:265) 
 
Domains of reality Modes of 
communication: 
basic speaker 
attitudes 
Types of speech act Themes Validity claims General functions of 
speech 
“The” world of 
external nature 
Cognitive: 
Objectivating attitude 
Constatives Propositional content Truth Representation of 
facts 
“Our” world of 
society 
Interactive: 
Conformative 
attitude 
Regulatives Interpersonal relation Rightness Establishment of 
interpersonal 
relations 
“My” world of 
internal nature 
Expressive: 
Expressive attitude 
Representatives Speaker‟s intention Truthfulness Disclosure of 
speaker‟s subjectivity 
Language    Comprehensibility  
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2.6 Concluding remarks  
Habermas views the purpose of speech and language as understanding (McCarthy, 1978:287; 
Van Niekerk, 1992:184).  Universal pragmatics is aimed at identifing and reconstructing 
“universal conditions of possible understanding” (Habermas, 1979:1).  With regards to 
consensual speech actions, Habermas‟ (1979:2-4) central thesis is that understanding is based 
on a background consensus produced by the reciprocal raising and shared recognition of four 
universal validity claims, namely claims to comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness and 
rightness (McCarthy, 1978:288).  These validity claims may be thought of as “four different 
dimensions in which communicative interaction can break down or suffer disturbances” 
(McCarthy, 1978:288).  If the hearer cannot understand the speaker‟s utterance, 
communication cannot resume before the misunderstanding is solved within the interactive 
context “such as through explication, elucidation, paraphrase, translation, semantic 
stipulation” (McCarthy, 1978:288).  Consensus is also endangered if the truth, truthfulness or 
correctness of a speaker‟s utterance is questioned.  If the problematic validity claim cannot be 
vindicated in the interactive context the communicative partners face the alternatives of 
breaking off communication altogether, changing to strategic action or resuming 
communication at the discursive level (Habermas, 1979: 3-4; McCarthy, 1978:288-289).   
To the extent that ordinary interaction entails regarding the other as subject, it entails the 
supposition that “he knows what he is doing and why he is doing it, that he intentionally holds 
the beliefs and pursues the ends that he does, and that he is capable of supporting them with 
reasons if necessary” (McCarthy, 1978:291).  Even though the “supposition of responsibility” 
is often or mostly counterfactual, it is of fundamental importance for the structure of human 
relationships that we continue interaction as if the supposition were valid (McCarthy, 
1978:291):  “on this unavoidable fiction rests the humanity of intercourse among men who 
are still men” (Habermas, 1971:120 as cited in McCarthy, 1978:291)70.  McCarthy (1978:291) 
points out the significance of the possibility to discursively resolve differences in belief and 
values which may prevent the initiation or continuation of communicative relationships.  
Discourse represents an opportunity to establish or re-establish a consensual basis for 
communication without having recourse to force in any form (such as open violence or latent 
                                                 
70
 Habermas, J. 1971. Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetenz, in 
Habermas, J. & Luhmann, N. (eds.). Theorie der Gesellschaft order Sozialtechnologie – Was leistet die 
Systemforschung?  Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 101-141.   
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  77 
manipulation).  Discourse represents “the possibility of reaching agreement through the use of 
reason and thus by recourse to, rather than violation of, the humanity of those involved” 
(McCarthy, 1978:291).   
In Chapter 5 I shall comment on doctor-patient communication from the perspective of 
Habermas‟ universal pragmatics.  There I shall describe doctor-patient communication against 
the background of Habermas‟ model of linguistic communication.  I shall identify the mode 
of communication in which each member of the clinical dyad mostly communicates and I 
shall also discuss the interactive mode of communication in clinical encounters.  Furthermore 
I shall consider the validity claims that are typically raised and responded to during the 
medical interview in an attempt to cast light on the problematic character of doctor-patient 
interactions.  My Habermasian commentary on doctor-patient communication will 
continuously refer to the medical profession‟s natural scientific intellectual self-image.   
In the next chapter I shall describe Michel Foucault‟s (1926-1984) theory on the nature of 
discourse and power.  
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Chapter 3 
Foucault on discourse and power  
  
One cannot speak of anything at any time; it is not easy to say something new. 
 Michel Foucault (1972:49)  
3.1 Introduction  
In this chapter I shall describe Michel Foucault‟s (1926-1984) theory on the nature of 
discourse.  In Chapter 6 I will use Foucault‟s ideas on discourse to investigate the effects of 
medicine‟s identity as a natural science on medical discourse.  I turn to Foucault‟s work 
because it enables a general and critical analysis of the nature of medical discourse, as 
opposed to in-depth analyses of specific conversations between doctors and patients that 
mainly reveal specifics about the communication partners and the location of their 
communication.  A wealth of research studies of the aforementioned type exists, none of 
which, to my knowledge, pays sufficient attention to the influence of medicine‟s identity as a 
natural science on the effectiveness of communicative care to patients.  To my mind this issue 
is indispensable for an understanding of doctor-patient communication.  Furthermore, the 
outcome of any intervention with the aim of improving the quality of said communication is 
doomed to disappoint unless such a project is based on an overhaul of medicine‟s ontology 
and epistemology.  Moreover, Foucault views discourse and power as integrated.  This 
position is very helpful in any study regarding doctor-patient communication, as power 
relations fundamentally influence communication in clinical situations. 
My discussion of Foucault‟s work on discourse has two main parts.  The first part describes 
Foucault‟s understanding of discourse, mainly as articulated in two of the philosopher‟s 
earlier works, namely The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) and The Order of Discourse 
(1981).  The second part of my discussion focuses on Foucault‟s view of power, and 
specifically the relationship between discourse and power.  However, before I start with this 
description of Foucault‟s works a comment is needed about the way the works of Habermas 
and Foucault are used alongside each other in this dissertation.   
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I use specific works of each author for distinct purposes related to the general aim of this 
project, namely to investigate the influence of the medical profession‟s intellectual self-image 
on communication between doctors and patients
71
.  To achieve this broad aim it is necessary 
to analyse both doctor-patient communication and medical discourse.  I use Habermas‟ 
universal pragmatics to investigate doctor-patient communication, that is the interaction 
between doctors and patients in clinical settings.  This work will be especially helpful in 
examining the different perspectives from which the doctor and patient typically 
communicate and the difficulties that such differences in perspective may cause for the 
participants of clinical communication in terms of reaching understanding and agreement.  I 
further my investigation of the influence of medicine‟s natural scientific self-image on clinical 
communication by using a collection of Foucault‟s writings on discourse and on power to 
critically analyse medical discourse, the power relations within the doctor-patient dyad and 
the potential effects thereof on clinical interactions.  With „medical discourse‟ I refer to my 
Foucauldian-inspired definition of the term, namely the rules that doctors (have to) follow 
when they think and talk about health and disease (in order to be regarded as competent) 
(please refer to page 11 and 12 for a more detailed explanation of how I use this term).   
The mentioned works by Habermas and Foucault are presented and applied separately from 
each other in this dissertation.  I do not juxtapose Habermas‟ universal pragmatics and 
Foucault‟s writings on discourse and power at any point in the dissertation.  Such 
juxtaposition is not performed since the goal of my project is not to critique the works of 
Habermas and Foucault, but rather to use their insights for a critical analysis of doctor-patient 
interaction in our time.  However, I shall now briefly describe some of the broad similarities 
and differences between the thoughts of these two authors on the subjects of rationality, 
critique and power.  I mostly draw on an essay by Thomas McCarthy (1994) for this purpose.  
The similarities and differences in ideas outlined below refer mostly to Foucault‟s work that 
was published in the 1970s (and does not include The Archaeology of Knowledge) and 
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 The rationale for specifically selecting Habermas‟ universal pragmatics and a collection of Foucault‟s works 
on discourse as well as power as analytical tools for my project is provided in the general introduction of the 
dissertation (see page 10 and 11). 
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Habermas‟ The Theory of Communicative Action, volumes 1 and 272  (McCarthy, 1994:273-
274).   
As is characteristic of philosophers in the late twentieth century, both Habermas and Foucault 
critique subjectivistic rationalism (McCarthy, 1987:viii-ix; Kelly, 1994:4; McCarthy, 
1994:243-244).  They acknowledge the overwhelming and intrinsic impurity of reason.  They 
conceive of reason as embedded in culture and society, entangled with power and interest, and 
possessing categories and criteria that are historically variable.  They recognize that the 
subjects of knowledge are embodied and social beings and that their thoughts and actions are 
ineradicably marked by their situations and interests (McCarthy, 1994:243-244).  The two 
thinkers thus agree that reason is “a thing of this world” (McCarthy, 1987:x) and that 
knowledge is a social product (McCarthy, 1994:244-245).  According to both Habermas and 
Foucault to examine the “nature, scope and limits of human reason” it is necessary to study 
social practices by means of sociohistorical inquiry.  Both authors are of the opinion that 
sociohistorical analyses of the seemingly rational beliefs and practices that influence our lives 
provide a critical perspective on those practices with implications for practice (McCarthy, 
1994:244-249).   
Habermas and Foucault‟s work thus have much in common and may be considered as 
neighbours in the world of contemporary theory.  Yet, many disagreements exist between 
them that are as real as their agreements (McCarthy, 1994: 247-248). It will become clear in 
this chapter that Foucault‟s critique of reason is radical. According to Foucault power 
produces knowledge and practice and modern reason is simply a disguised will to power.  In 
contrast with Foucault‟s radical critique of reason, Habermas understands critique as a 
determinate negation of subject-centered reason in favour of a more adequate conception of 
reason, namely reason understood as communicative action (McCarthy, 1987:vii, xiii-xiv; 
Kelly, 1994:1-2; McCarthy, 1994: 248).  The description of universal pragmatics in the 
previous chapter indicated that Habermas construes reason in terms of an intersubjectivity that 
is noncoercive and characterised by mutual understanding and reciprocal recognition 
(McCarthy, 1987:xvi).  For Foucault the attempt to move beyond the subject-centeredness of 
modern Western philosophy means the “end of man” and the entourage of humanist 
conceptions that accompanies it.  Habermas on the contrary responds to the problematic of the 
                                                 
72
 Habermas, J. 1984.  The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 1: Reason & the Rationalization of Society. 
Boston: Beacon Press.; Habermas, J. 1984.  The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 2:  Lifeworld & 
System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Boston: Beaco  
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rational subject by attempting to reconstruct the concepts of subjectivity and autonomy in 
ways that are in agreement with the social aspects of individual identity as well as the situated 
nature of social action (McCarthy, 1994:248).  A further important difference between the 
approaches of Foucault and Habermas is that Foucault does not regard his analyses to be in 
the service of reason, truth, freedom and justice.  For Foucault we can never completely get 
away from the relations and effects of power since they correspond with and form part of 
social life (McCarthy, 1994:248).  According to the French thinker abstract concepts such as 
truth, justice and human reason are likely to reflect the interests of the dominant social group 
(Merquior, 1985:148-149).  Contrary to Foucault, Habermas regards the critique of ideology 
to have the function of reducing the relations and effects of power (McCarthy, 1994:249).  
For Habermas the role of critique is to suspend power so that the universal norms that are 
pragmatically presupposed in ethical, political and social theory can be justified (Kelly, 
1994:2).  The relation between communicative action and validity claims that permit 
argument and counterargument is what makes learning and consequent transformations of our 
world-views possible (McCarthy, 1987:xvii).   
It may be acceptable to set aside the differences between the approaches of Habermas and 
Foucault for the purposes of my current project.  However, when the focus of reflection is on 
the possibilities of bringing about change in the world-view and self-image of modern 
medicine as well as in the power relations within the doctor-patient dyad, these differences 
will have to be taken into account.   
 
3.2 Defining discourse  
Discourse is defined in various ways by different scholars and in different academic fields.  
Foucault (1972:90) admits that he has added to the fluctuating meaning of this term, and that 
he does not treat the term in the same manner throughout his writings.  He treats the term in 
the following three ways in his work: 
sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable 
group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain 
number of statements (Foucault, 1972:90).   
Foucault thus uses the term discourse either to refer to the totality of utterances that have 
meaning, or to a group of statements that forms a unity, such as the discourse of medicine, or 
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to the rules responsible for the production of statements.  It is specifically the rules that are 
responsible for the production of discourse and the rules that regulate the distribution and 
circulation of statements and discourses that interest Foucault.  Foucault‟s study of discourse 
moves beyond the actual words uttered by speakers and writers to include the a priori rules 
and categories that are regarded as a component of discourse, and thus knowledge, and which 
are so fundamental that they are not uttered or consciously thought of (Young, 1981:48).  For 
Foucault (1972:53-54) discourse, in the form of speech or written material, is more than an 
intersection of a materiality and a system of signs (language) which represent such a reality.  
Discourses are practices which follow rules to systematically bring about the objects to 
which they refer.  In a summary of a course that he presented at the Collège de France 
between 1970 and 1971 Foucault (1977:199) provides the following definition of discursive 
practices: 
Discursive practices are characterised by the delimitation of a field of objects, the 
definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of 
norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories.  Thus, each discursive practice 
implies a play of prescriptions that designate its exclusions and choices.   
The function of discursive practices is to make it almost impossible to think and speak outside 
their borders.  Whoever does so risks being regarded as insane or incompetent or in some 
other way outside of „the true‟ (Mills, 2003:57; Young, 1981:48; Foucault, 1981a:61).   
Foucault argues that objects in the material world do not carry a priori, inherent and ultimate 
meanings that can be revealed to us by the reading of discourse.  It is rather the case that 
discourse enables us to have knowledge of the world, to determine truth values and to map the 
scope of things that we can reasonably utter.  Foucault is not arguing that nothing exists 
beyond discourse.  Certainly there is a material reality outside of discourse, but meaning can 
only be found within the boundaries of discourse (Foucault, 1972:53-54; Hook, 2001: 536-
537).  We think about and experience physical objects and the world in total through 
discourse and the structures it forces on our thinking.  It is very difficult to recognise and 
challenge the structures that we use to categorise and interpret events and experiences, since 
they have infiltrated our thinking to the level that we regard them as self-evident (Foucault, 
1981b:6; Mills, 2003:56).  Discourse determines what are acceptable and unacceptable ways 
to talk, think, and conduct oneself in relation to a specific topic, such as health and illness.   
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In The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault provides a highly detailed and technical account 
of the rules that govern the formation of discourses.  These rules operate outside the 
consciousness of individuals and are not determined by the subjects of discourse or by 
external factors such as social, economic and political conditions.  Instead, Foucault regards 
the rules of discourse as an internal feature of discourse.  I will now provide a brief summary 
of Foucault‟s description of discursive regularities in The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
focussing on the issues that hold most value for the aims of the current project.  To structure 
the discussion I use the chapter titles of Foucault‟s book as subheadings.  The discussion that 
follows may seem overly technical.  I will explain the value of these ideas for the purposes of 
my project before commencing the discussion on the relationship between discourse and 
power.  
 
3.2.1. The unities of discourse 
Foucault (1972:23-29) wants us to question those notions, categories and themes whose 
validity seem self-evident and which organise our thoughts according to the principle of 
continuity.  An example is the division and grouping of discourse into discrete categories such 
as science and philosophy, or medicine and psychiatry.  Such divisions “are not intrinsic, 
autochthonous and universally recognizable characteristics” (Foucault, 1972:25) but are 
constructed.  We must scrutinise the rules and justification for the construction of such pre-
existing unities (Foucault, 1972:28).  Foucault (1972:27) wants us to break up the uncritically 
accepted continuities by which discourses are organised before the study of discourse 
commences.  Foucault (1972:27) urges us to renounce the wish  
that it should never be possible to assign, in the order of discourse, the irruption of a 
real event; that beyond any apparent beginning, there is always a secret origin – so 
secret, so fundamental that it can never be quite grasped in itself. 
Foucault thus rejects the idea of a fundamental moment of creation beyond any point present 
in history, which reduces the beginnings of all statements and discourses to mere 
commencements.  Another theme of continuity that must be given up in the analysis of 
discourse, is the idea that 
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all manifest discourse is secretly based on an „already-said‟; and that this „already-said‟ 
is not merely a phrase that has already been spoken, or a text that has already been 
written, but a „never-said‟, an incorporeal discourse, a voice as silent as a breath, a 
writing that is merely the hollow of its own mark (Foucault, 1972:27-28). 
The latter theme views discourse analysis as interpreting the voice of the „already-said‟ which 
is also a „not said‟.  In Foucault‟s (1972:28) view the task of discourse analysis is rather to 
abandon all ideas which work to ensure a limitless continuity of discourse.  Instead of 
searching for discourse‟s distant origins, “we must be ready to receive discourse in its sudden 
irruption” and treat it “as and when it occurs”.  Instead of uncritically accepting the validity of 
familiar ideas that create a unity between separate statements and discourses, all statements 
should be regarded as events.  Foucault (1972:31-32) wants to isolate the occurrence of the 
statement or event for two reasons.  Firstly, he wants to ensure that the occurrence of the 
statement is not related to synthesizing psychological operations, for instance the intentions, 
interests, methods and inspirations of an author.  Secondly, he wants “to be able to grasp other 
forms of regularity, other types of relations” between statements, groups of statements and 
also relations between groups of statements and events with a very different nature, for 
instance events that are “technical, economic, social, political”.   
 
3.2.2 Discursive formations 
Foucault (1972:40-41) asked himself what the basis of the unity of a large group of 
statements, such as medicine or economics, might be.  He hypothesised that the unity is 
created by homogeneity of the respective elements of discourse, namely the discourse‟s 
objects, concepts, themes or types of statement.  Yet, based on these said elements, any 
(apparent) discursive unity appears as a “series full of gaps, intertwined with one another, 
interplays of differences, distances, substitutions and transformations” rather than a “full, 
tightly packed, continuous” unity.  Following this realisation Foucault decided to turn to the 
dispersions between the elements of a group of statements in an attempt to discover some 
regularities.  Such an analysis would study forms of division and describe systems of 
dispersion.   
Foucault (1972:41) uses the term discursive formation to refer to a group of statements which 
has a regularity (“an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations”) 
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between its elements.  He uses the phrase rules of formation to refer to the conditions that 
influence the elements of a discursive formation.  “The rules of formation are conditions of 
existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification, and disappearance) in a given 
discursive division”.   
 
3.2.3 The formation of objects 
In order to provide content to the notion of rules of formation, Foucault (1972:44-54) asks 
how the objects of discourse
73
 are formed, or according to what rule their appearance 
occurred.  He specifies three types of rule to answer his question.  The first rule refers to the 
surfaces of the emergence, namely those social and cultural fields in which a discursive 
formation appears (Sheridan, 1980:97).  The second rule refers to the authorities of 
delimitation.  Since the nineteenth-century, for example, medicine became the main authority 
in the eyes of the law, public opinion and the government to define and describe insanity as 
an object based on the medical profession‟s corpus of knowledge and skills and professional 
and institutional structures.  The third rule refers to the grids of specification.  In the example 
of insanity these are the systems used to distinguish, compare and relate different types of 
insanity from and to each other “as objects of psychiatric discourse” (Foucault, 1972:46).  
These three rules in themselves do not supply objects that a discourse then merely has to 
name and classify and take up in “a network of words and sentences”. One must also not 
conceptualise the objects of discourse as pre-existing, “the object does not await in limbo the 
order that will free it and enable it to become embodied in a visible and prolix objectivity” 
(Foucault, 1972:49).  The object of a discourse emerges with the discourse itself, in a single 
process (Sheridan, 1980:98).  The objects of a discourse are formed when a group of relations 
are created between the “authorities of emergence, delimitation, and specification”.  The 
complex interaction between the rules of formation named above creates the conditions of 
possibility for an object of discourse to appear.  This explains why  
one cannot speak of anything at any time; it is not easy to say something new; it is not 
enough for us to open our eyes, to pay attention or to be aware, for new objects 
suddenly to light up and emerge out of the ground (Foucault, 1972:49).   
                                                 
73
 The objects of discursive formation are “that of which one can speak in a discursive practice” (Foucault, 
1972:201).  
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These constraints are not merely negative.  They create the conditions necessary for new 
objects to emerge (Sheridan, 1980:98).  Yet, these relations (“between institutions, economic 
and social processes, behavioural patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types of 
classification, modes of characterisation”) do not exist in the object itself.  They do not 
describe the internal structure of objects, but are merely the conditions necessary for an object 
to appear in the exterior (Foucault, 1972:49-50). A discursive formation can be defined if 
such a group of relations can be established, if it can be shown how a particular object of 
discourse finds the place and rule of its emergence in such a group of relations (Foucault, 
1972:47,49).   
Foucault (1972:54) argues that although discourses are made up of signs, (spoken or written 
words that represent external realities) discourses are more than this.  When discourses 
themselves, and not their referents or the meaning of specific words, are analysed the tight 
embrace which appear to exist between words (signs) and things loosens and a group of rules 
belonging to the practice of discourse emerges.  Discourses thus can not be reduced to speech 
and language.  Foucault wants to reveal and describe what discourses do above the task of 
using signs to refer to things.   
 
3.2.4 The formation of enunciative modalities 
By enunciative modalities Foucault means different types or styles of statement.  Different 
forms of statement occur in the same discourse.  Examples of the types of statement that 
occur in medical discourse are listed by Foucault (1972:55) as “qualitative descriptions, 
biographical accounts, the location, interpretation, and cross-checking of signs, reasonings by 
analogy, deduction, statistical calculations, experimental verifications”.  In order to answer 
the question of what ties these different types of statement together to form a unity Foucault 
(1972:55-58) investigates the rule that operates behind these statements, as well as the site of 
their origin.  In order to do this one needs to determine who the subject of the discourse is: 
who is awarded the right and is qualified to use this specialised type of language? Who 
receives his/her prestige from using this discourse and from whom does the subject receive 
the presumption that (s)he is speaking the truth?  What status does the individual have that is 
sanctioned to use this discourse?  Furthermore, the institutional sites wherein the discourse is 
used and that provides the discourse its source and “point of application” needs to be 
described.  Finally the various positions that the subject of a discourse is able to occupy in 
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relation to the perceptual field and information networks need to be defined.  In medical 
discourse for instance the subject of the discourse, that is the medical professional, may take 
up the position of interrogation, listening, observing or describing.  “He is situated at an 
optimal perceptual distance whose boundaries delimit the wheat of relevant information” 
(Foucault, 1972:58).  The medical professional‟s access to technology allows him or her to 
move beyond the immediate perceptual level, ever deeper into the “interior space of the 
body”: from outward symptoms, to signs in the organs, the tissues and finally the cells.  The 
positions that the medical professional (the subject of medical discourse) can occupy in the 
information networks include his/her position in teaching activities in the classroom or at the 
bedside and his/her position in spoken or written communication as the sender or receiver of 
messages in the form of “observations, case-histories, statistical data, general theoretical 
propositions, projects and decisions”.   
Diversity in modalities of enunciation of a discourse can be attributed to a relation between 
the elements discussed above, namely the status of the subjects, the site from which they 
speak and the position that they occupy as subjects.  A discourse, as a practice, creates this 
relation between various elements and provides it the quality of a unity.  The unity of a 
discourse is thus provided by a system of relations that are external and prior to the conscious 
activity of individuals (Sheridan, 1980:99).   
 
3.2.5 The formation of concepts  
The set of concepts that occur in a discipline such as biology does not form a coherent unit, 
but rather an organisation of disparate notions.  Foucault (1972:62-63) asks whether a law that 
explains or is responsible for the consecutive or simultaneous appearance of disparate 
concepts in a single discourse could be found.  To achieve this, a description of the 
organisation of the field of statements in which concepts occurred and circulated would be 
necessary.  This organisation includes forms of succession: “a set of rules for arranging 
statements in a series”.  The first of these rules is the different orderings of enunciative series.  
This includes the rule according to which statements are organised to form inferences and 
descriptions of matter and events.  The second rule concerns the different types of dependence 
of statements, such as the dependences between a hypothesis and its verification, an assertion 
and its critique or a general law and its practical application.  The final rule involves the 
different rhetorical schemata for the combination of groups of statements: “how descriptions, 
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deductions, definitions, whose succession characterises the architecture of a text, are linked 
together”.  The emergence and recurrence of concepts in a discipline is governed by the 
general organisation of the statements, the consecutive arrangement of statements to form 
particular wholes.  A discipline is not simply a form of knowledge that gives new definitions 
to (some of its) already existing concepts and introduces new concepts to a discourse, but it is 
an obligatory set of rules according to which statements are organised in a series.  A 
discipline is a schema that specifies rules of dependence, order and succession between 
statements in which concepts appear.   
 
3.2.6 The formation of strategies 
The discourses of disciplines, such as medicine, lead to “certain organisations of concepts, 
certain regroupings of objects, certain types of enunciation which form according to their 
degree of coherence, rigour and stability, themes or theories” (Foucault, 1972:71).  Foucault 
(1972:71) refers to these theories or themes as strategies.  He wants to find out how such 
strategies are distributed throughout time.  He asks whether it is possible to discover a 
regularity between such strategies and to define the shared system according to which they are 
formed (Foucault, 1972:72).  The following three elements are involved in the formation of 
discursive strategies: 
 
i. The points of diffraction of discourse.  Foucault (1972:73-74) talks here about points 
of incompatibility.  He refers to the situation where two different concepts, objects or 
types of statement belonging to the same discursive formation, cannot “enter…the 
same series of statements”.  These incompatible elements are referred to as points of 
equivalence.  Yet, rather than forming a faulty coherence these elements constitute an 
alternative, “they appear in the form of „either…or‟ ”.  Such elements do not 
necessarily appear at the same time, may not have equal importance or be equally 
distributed among the statements of their discursive formation.  These incompatible 
but equivalent elements are also link points of systematization.  Out of each 
occurrence of such incompatible but equivalent elements, a „discursive subgroup‟ 
develops: “a coherent series of objects, forms of statement and concepts”.  New points 
of incompatibility are possible in each of these discursive subgroups.   
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ii. However, not all of these possible alternatives are realized.  There are many discursive 
subgroups that could have developed, but did not.  To explain why only certain 
discursive subgroups were chosen to develop, the specific authorities that guided this 
choice must be described.  An important authority in this respect is the role of the 
discourse under study in relation to contemporary or related discourses.  Foucault 
(1972:74) refers to this as the economy of the discursive constellation to which a 
discourse belongs.  The discourse under study may for instance act as a formal system 
with other discourses as its applications, or it may play the role of a concrete model 
that is applied to more abstract discourses.  Furthermore, the discourse under study 
may be related to other discourses in the form of an analogy, as opposition or in a 
complementary manner.  Finally, relations of mutual delimitation may exist between 
discourses, in which each discourse defines the other by distinguishing its specific 
field of application.  An example is the differentiation between psychiatry and 
medicine that occurred at the end of the eighteenth century and which has 
characterised these two discourses ever since.  The relations between a particular 
discourse and other discourses act as a principle of determination that allows or 
disallows particular statements (concepts, types of statement and objects that are 
entirely possible in terms of the rules of formation pertaining to them), from entering a 
discourse.  For this reason a particular discursive formation may display new elements 
when it is positioned and interpreted in a new discursive constellation.   
iii. There is another authority that determines which discursive subgroups or theories are 
chosen to develop.  The first characteristic of this authority is the function that the 
discourse of interest plays in a domain of non-discursive practices.  This authority is 
also characterised by the rules and processes of appropriation of discourse.  In 
western, industrialised societies discourse as a property, belongs (often with legal 
permission) to a certain group of people.  Medical discourse, for instance, does not 
belong to all groups of individuals in our society but the chosen few who are accepted 
(based largely on their academic merit) as students by the health sciences faculties of 
universities.  The final characteristic of this authority is the possible positions of desire 
in relation to discourse.  Put in a different way, a particular discourse may be related 
to desire, or play a role in the realization of desire.  A discourse may for instance “be 
the place for phantasmatic representation, an element of symbolization, a form of the 
forbidden, and instrument of derived satisfaction” (Foucault, 1972:76).   
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A discursive formation can be defined by describing the system of formation of its different 
strategies.  A particular discursive formation “is defined by a certain constant way of relating 
possibilities of systematization interior to a discourse, other discourses that are exterior to it, 
and a whole non-discursive field of practices, appropriation, interests and desires” (Foucault, 
1972:77).   
 
3.2.7 Science and Knowledge 
The elements of a discursive formation, namely its objects, types of statement, concepts and 
strategies “can be called knowledge” (Foucault, 1972:201).  Foucault defines knowledge with 
the following four descriptions: a.) knowledge is the domain formed by the various objects of 
a discursive formation (“that of which one can speak in a discursive practice”); b.) knowledge 
also includes the space or the group of functions that the subject of a discourse may occupy to 
speak about the objects of his/her discourse; c.) furthermore knowledge acts as the area of 
coordination and subordination according to which all new statements can be integrated with 
what was already said (the field “in which concepts appear, and are defined, applied and 
transformed”), and lastly d.) knowledge includes all the possibilities of articulation of a 
specific discursive formation on other discursive and non-discursive practices (“the 
possibilities of use and appropriation offered by discourse”).  Not all bodies of knowledge are 
scientific.  No knowledge can exist outside of a specific discursive practice and any discursive 
practice can be defined by the knowledge that it produces.   
Thus far I have described the rules that govern the formation of discourses, as laid out in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge.  In the next section I turn to Foucault‟s description of the 
procedures or systems that control and restrict discourse.  Foucault provided this description 
in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in 1970.  The lecture is titled The Order of 
Discourse and was published in 1981 in a post-structuralist reader, edited by Robert Young 
(1981).  Ian McLeod translated the lecture from the original French.   
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3.3 The order of discourse  
Foucault (1981a:52) puts forward the hypothesis 
that in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, 
organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role it is to ward 
off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its 
ponderous, formidable materiality.   
It is possible for speaking subjects to utter an indefinite number of different statements.  Yet, 
when one considers the unlimited possibilities for formulating new utterances based on the 
permutations provided by the grammar of a particular language and the abundance of 
vocabulary
74
 available to form sentences and phrases, it becomes clear that relatively few 
things are in fact said within specific contexts and during certain historical time periods 
(Foucault, 1972:134).  Foucault (1981a:61) points out three different procedures that are at 
work in modern, western societies to select certain statements for and exclude others from 
discourse.  These are  
i. the prohibition (external or social procedures of exclusion);  
ii. a group of internal procedures of rarefaction75 ; and  
iii. “a rarefaction…of the speaking subjects”.  I shall now pay attention to these three 
procedures.  
  
                                                 
74
 Claims are made that English received its one millionth word on June 10, 2009.  The word is Web 2.0 (The 
Global Language Monitor, [s.a.]).   
75
 Young (1981:49) makes the meaning of „rarefaction‟ clear by noting that “the French term „rarefaction‟ 
includes not only the meaning of the rarefaction of gases, but also the sense of depletion (of supplies), of 
growing scarcity, of dwindling, drying out and exhaustion”.  
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3.3.1 Social procedures of exclusion 
Three social or external procedures of exclusion are at work in discourse.  The first and most 
obvious and familiar of these is the prohibition or taboo.  Foucault (1981a:52) distinguishes 
between three types of prohibition: 
We know quite well that we do not have the right to say everything, that we cannot 
speak of just anything in any circumstances whatever, and that not everyone has the 
right to speak of anything whatever.  
There are thus restrictions on the object of speech, that which we can speak about; on “the 
ritual and circumstances of speech”; and on who owns the privileged and exclusive right to 
the act of speaking.  These three types of prohibition intersect and reinforce one another, or 
compensate for each other, forming a complex, constantly changing grid.  Examples of 
strictly controlled discourses in our time are the domains of sexuality and politics.  Discourse 
may appear to be of little importance, as a transparent and neutral place “where sexuality is 
disarmed and politics pacified” when it is in fact a place where sexuality and politics exercise 
“some of their most formidable powers”.  The taboos that surround discourse reveal its 
connection with desire and power.  Discourse does not only express or conceal desire, “it is 
also the object of desire;…discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems 
of domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the 
power to be seized” (Foucault, 1981a:52-53). 
The second principle of exclusion is a division and a rejection.  Foucault (1981a:53) refers 
here “to the opposition between reason and madness76”.  Since the Middle Ages the speech 
of the madman could not be accepted in the same way that the discourse of the sane is 
accepted.  The madman‟s words were not valued as true, important or legally valid.  He could 
neither enter into a written contract nor even bring “about the trans-substantiation of bread 
into body at Mass”.  Although the madman‟s words were treated as the evidence of his 
                                                 
76
 I am aware that the terms “madness” and “the madman” may seem derogatory to individuals suffering from 
mental illness, their families, friends and caregivers.  However, I am using the terminology that Foucault used 38 
years ago, feeling comfortable that Foucault was not using these specific terms to insult or discriminate against 
people with mental illness.  In fact, Foucault‟s work rather points to the oppression of the mentally ill by society 
and the so-called helping professions.  Acceptable terminology with regards to disability, and mental disability 
in particular, is subject to frequent change and it is therefore, as well as for the reason mentioned above, that I 
decided to use Foucault‟s original words.   
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madness and thus acted as the site for the division between reason and madness, no doctor 
prior to the end of the 1700‟s paid any attention to these words, or to how and why they were 
spoken.  One may then be quick to argue that things have changed and that the madman‟s 
speech is now considered valid and important and receives much attention.  Yet,  
you only have to think of the whole framework of knowledge through which we 
decipher that speech, and of the whole network of institutions which permit someone – 
a doctor or a psychoanalyst – to listen to it, and which at the same time permit the 
patient to bring along his poor words, or, in desperation, to withhold them.  You only 
have to think of all this to become suspicious that the division, far from being effaced is 
working differently, along other lines, through new institutions, and with effects that are 
not at all the same.  And even if the doctor‟s role were only that of lending an ear to a 
speech that is free at last, he still does this listening in the context of the same division” 
(Foucault, 1981a:53).  
Mills (2003:58) gives a recent example to show how the speech of the mentally ill is treated 
as non-existent.  In Britain persons who are certified as mentally ill and have been prescribed 
medications for their conditions are prevented by legislation to refuse treatment.  Thus, when 
a person with mental illness verbally turns down prescribed medication, his/her statement will 
not be acknowledged by the authorities who may force the patient to take the medication.   
The third procedure of exclusion that Foucault (1981a:54) describes is “the opposition 
between true and false”.  It may seem curious and also risky to place the constraint of truth 
in the company of the exclusions mentioned above.  The divisions just mentioned are 
arbitrary or at least dependent on historical contingencies; modifiable and continuously 
replaced; have the support of a network of institutions; and are constraining and violent at 
times.  At the level of the proposition, “on the inside of a discourse”, the divide between true 
and false does not seem arbitrary, modifiable, institutional or violent.  However, when one 
examines the nature and history of our will to truth
77
 and the division that controls our will to 
know, “a system of exclusion, a historical, modifiable, and institutionally constraining 
system” appears (Foucault, 1981a:54).   
                                                 
77
 Foucault uses the phrases „will to truth‟ and „will to know‟ interchangeably.  Sheridan (1980:123) also refers 
to the will to know as the wish to know.  
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The opposition between true and false is historically constituted.  Foucault (1981a:54) 
justifies this statement with the following example.  The Greek poets of the sixth-century 
before Christ regarded the true discourse as the one spoken by men as of right and according 
to the necessary ritual.  It was the discourse that “inspired respect and terror, and to which one 
had to submit because it ruled…; the discourse which dispensed justice and gave everyone his 
share”.  The true discourse, which was associated with the exercise of power, resided in how 
and by whom something was said.  A century later, for Plato‟s generation, a new division 
between true and false was established.  The truth now no longer resided in “the ritualised, 
efficacious and just act of enunciation”, but in the statement itself.  Truth is now found in 
what is said, in the meaning, form and object of the utterance and its relation to the external 
world.  Our will to know received its general form from this division between true and false.  
Our will to know transforms constantly and has its own history which starts at the Platonic 
divide.  Transformations in scientific thinking can at times be read as the results of a 
discovery, “but they can also be read as the appearance of new forms in the will to truth”.  For 
example, the will to truth of the early nineteenth-century is different from that of the early 
seventeenth-century.  The will to know specifies the range of objects to be studied, “the 
functions and positions of the knowing subject” and the material and technical investments in 
the search for knowledge.  The will to know imposes on the knowing subject “a certain 
position, a certain gaze and a certain function…and in some sense prior to all experience” 
(Foucault, 1981a: 54-56).   
The will to truth rests on institutional support, similar to the other systems of exclusion.  The 
truth is reinforced and renewed by layers of practices, such as the educational system and the 
system that distributes information, including libraries, the publishing industry and 
laboratories (Foucault, 1981a:55; Sheridan, 1980:123-124).  Only statements that are „in the 
true‟ are circulated, while those that are considered outside „of the true‟ are excluded (Mills, 
2003:58).  The will to truth is also renewed by the values that particular social systems place 
on particular forms of knowledge.  The will to truth is further likely to affect other discourses 
(Foucault is still speaking of societies similar to his own, which is western European in the 
second half of the twentieth-century).  Examples are the way that Western literature has 
sought for centuries its foundation in notions such as nature, authenticity, sincerity and 
science- “in short, on true discourse”.  The penal system has also gradually loosened its 
connection to religious morality and has, since the nineteenth century, sought its justification 
in the proliferation of social sciences, including sociology, psychology and psychiatry.  “It is 
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as if even the word of the law could no longer be authorised, in our society, except by a 
discourse of truth” (Foucault, 1971:55; Sheridan, 1980: 123-124).   
Of the three systems of exclusion described by Foucault, the will to truth is the most dominant 
and all-pervasive.  The other two systems of exclusion, the taboo and the division between 
reason and madness, are invaded by the will to truth.  Yet, the will to truth is discussed least 
of all.  It is as if it is masked by truth itself.  The reason is perhaps that desire and power are at 
stake in the will to speak the true discourse.  The „true‟ discourse cannot recognise the will to 
truth whereby it is influenced; “and the will to truth, having imposed itself on us for a very 
long time, is such that the truth it wants cannot fail to mask it” (Foucault, 1981a:56; Sheridan 
1980: 124).   
Thus all that appears to our eyes is a truth conceived as a richness, a fecundity, a gentle 
and insidiously universal force, and in contrast we are unaware of the will to truth, that 
prodigious machinery designed to exclude (Foucault, 1981a:56).  
The three social procedures of exclusion operate from the exterior.  They are concerned “with 
the part of discourse which puts power and desire at stake”.  The three procedures just 
discussed are thus those responsible for averting the powers and dangers of discourse, as 
stated in Foucault‟s hypothesis (quoted at the start of this section).  The second group of 
procedures that control and delimit discourse are „internal procedures‟, thus procedures 
whereby discourses control themselves (Foucault, 1981a:56).  I shall now discuss these 
internal procedures of control.   
 
3.3.2 Internal procedures of control 
The internal procedures of control function as principles of classification, ordering and 
distribution.  Their role is to master another dimension of discourse, namely discourse as 
irruption, or chance event (Foucault, 1981a:56; Sheridan, 1980:124).  Foucault specifies three 
internal procedures of control, namely commentary, the author and the „disciplines‟.  I limit 
my discussion of these procedures to the disciplines, since this principle is actively and 
evidently at work in medical discourse and is very helpful for the purpose of the current 
project.   
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The principle of disciplines allows construction, but within narrow confines.  “A discipline is 
defined by a domain of objects, a set of methods, a corpus of propositions considered to be 
true, a set
78
 of rules and definitions, of techniques and instruments”.  Disciplines are 
anonymous systems that may be used by anyone with the desire or ability to do so.  
Disciplines exist where there is the possibility to formulate new propositions, ad infinitum.  
Yet, a discipline does not equal the sum of everything that can be said in truth about 
something.  It does not even encompass all that can be accepted about a single data set 
because “of some principle of coherence or systematicity”.  Medicine, for instance does not 
equal all statements that can be truthfully expressed about illness, in the same way that botany 
does not constitute all that can be said in truth about plants.  Two reasons explain this.  First, 
any discipline contains truth and errors.  These errors are not foreign bodies or residues that 
must be expelled from the discipline in time.  Instead, the errors in a discipline have a positive 
function in that they play an active and necessary part in the history of the discipline.  
Secondly, a proposition must fulfil certain conditions in order to belong to a discipline.  
Foucault (1981a: 60-61) specifies three such conditions.   
 
i. A proposition must refer to a determinate range of objects.  This specified range of 
objects changes from one time period to another.  For example, propositions regarding 
the symbolic value or the virtues and properties of plants, as were made during the 
sixteenth-century and antiquity respectively, were no longer considered „botanical‟ in 
the eighteenth-century.  From the end of the seventeenth-century propositions 
belonging to botany had to concern the visible structure of the plant or the working of 
its fluids.  In the same way propositions that refer to the role of human consciousness 
in the cause (aetiology) and functioning (pathophysiology) of disease were excluded 
from the medical discourse of the nineteenth-century and onwards.   
ii. A proposition must also use conceptual tools of a specific type.  For instance, since 
the nineteenth-century propositions were no longer medical “if it used notions that 
were at the same time metaphorical, qualitative and substantial (like those of 
engorgement, of overheated liquids or of dried-out solids)”.  In fact, such notions 
acquired the status of an individual illusion or popular imagery.  On the contrary, 
propositions belonging to medicine now had to use concepts that were similarly 
                                                 
78
 I substitute the phrase “a play of rules and definitions” in the original translation, with the corresponding 
phrase from Sheridan‟s (1980:126) translation: “a set of rules of definitions”.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  97 
metaphorical but based on a different theoretical model, namely a physiological 
model, such as “irritation, inflammation or degeneration of tissues”.   
iii. Finally, a proposition must refer to a specific body of theory in order to belong to a 
particular discipline.  Propositions connected to the humoral theory of disease were 
excluded from medicine at the end of the eighteenth-century, whereas propositions 
that refer to the theory of disease were accepted.   
 
Each discipline can distinguish between true and false statements within its own limits.  
Before a statement can be judged as true or false it has to meet the complex and heavy criteria 
for inclusion in the discipline, it has to be regarded as being „in the true‟.  Yet, a whole field 
of knowledge is expelled from its borders.   
It is always possible that one might speak the truth in the space of a wild exteriority, but 
one is „in the true‟ only by obeying the rules of a discursive „policing‟ which one has to 
reactivate in each of one‟s discourses (Foucault, 1981a:61).   
Statements regarding the role of consciousness and the social environment in health and 
illness may be true, but are not „in the true‟ of medical discourse.  If human consciousness is 
to be introduced as an object in medical discourse, new conceptual instruments and theoretical 
foundations are needed.   
The discipline is a principle that exercises control in the production of discourse.  It 
determines boundaries for discourse through constant reactivation of the rules.  We are used 
to view the development of a discipline as “so many infinite resources for the creation of 
discourses”.  This may be true, but the discipline is nevertheless a principle of constraint.  It is 
very likely that we will be unable to appreciate its positive and multiplicatory role, if we do 
not also consider its restrictive and constraining function (Foucault, 1981a:59-61; Sheridan, 
1980:126).   
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3.3.3 A rarefaction of the speaking subjects 
Foucault (1981a:61-64) describes a third group of procedures that exercise control over 
discourses.  These procedures determine the conditions in which discourses are applied and 
the rules for those that use a particular discourse, and are therefore rules that limit access to 
discourses.  Put differently, Foucault (1981a:61, 64) is referring here to “a rarefaction of the 
speaking subjects”; procedures whereby discourse controls speaking subjects.  
None shall enter the order of discourse if he does not satisfy certain requirements or if 
he is not, from the outset, qualified to do so.  To be more precise, not all the regions of 
discourse are equally open and penetrable; some of them are largely forbidden (they are 
differentiated and differentiating), while others seem to be almost open to all winds and 
put at the disposal of every speaking subject, without prior restrictions (Foucault, 
1972:61-62).   
The most obvious system of restriction can be referred to as ritual.  Ritual determines the 
qualifications needed by the speaker; the gestures, behaviour, circumstances and the entire set 
of signs which have to accompany the discourse; and also the effectiveness of the words 
spoken, that is their effect on those to whom they are directed, and the limits of their ability to 
constrain.  Medical, as well as religious, judicial and, to a great extent, political discourses 
cannot be dissociated from the framework of the ritual which determines the characteristics 
and roles of the speaking subjects.   
There are also „societies of discourse‟ whose function it is to protect discourse by distributing 
it only according to strict rules so that the participants in the discourse are not dispossessed by 
its circulation.  Within a society of discourse the roles of speaker and listener are not 
interchangeable.  Only a limited group has access to the secret discourse, which they can 
display without revealing the secret.  An example of a society of discourse is the castes of 
poets from archaic times.  These groups of bards possessed the knowledge of the poetry to be 
recited, and they protected this knowledge, often with complex exercises of memory.  One 
could only enter such a group after successfully completing a lengthy apprenticeship.  Such 
closed societies hardly exist in our times.  Yet, even if discourses are now communicated in 
more diffuse structures, these are nonetheless constraining.  The way that medical discourse is 
distributed certainly suggests the notion of a society of discourse.   
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The final system of restriction of the speaking subjects described by Foucault (1981a:64) 
exists on a much broader scale.  He talks about the cleavages in the social appropriation of 
discourses.  Education may be the instrument that gives every individual, in a society similar 
to France in the late twentieth century, access to any type of discourse.  But the distribution of 
education, that which it allows and that which it prevents, follows the path marked out by 
social differences, conflicts and struggles (Foucault, 1981a:64; Sheridan, 1980:127).  “Any 
system of education is a political way of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of 
discourses, along with the knowledges and powers which they carry” (Foucault, 1981a:64). 
Speech rituals, societies of discourse and social appropriations do not exist independently of 
each other.  They are often connected to each other and form great edifices that make sure that 
speaking subjects are distributed into different forms of discourse and that discourses belong 
to certain groups of subjects.   
Foucault (1981a: 64-65) proposes that certain themes in philosophy correspond with the 
processes of limitation and exclusion discussed above, that is the social and internal 
procedures of control and the procedures of subjection by discourse.  Such philosophical 
themes correspond to these procedures by suggesting an ideal truth as the law that controls 
discourse and an immanent rationality as the principle that governs their expression.  These 
philosophical themes also reinforce the systems of control and restriction by denying the 
specific reality of discourse.  It seems to Foucault (1981a:65) that since antiquity Western 
thought has made sure that discourse occupies “the smallest possible space between thought 
and speech.  Western thought seems to have made sure that the act of discourse should appear 
to be no more than a certain bridging (apport) between thinking and speaking”.  It thus seems 
that the reality of discourse has been elided between thought and speech in Western thought 
since the Sophists have been questioned.  An example of a recent theme in philosophy which 
acts in this exclusionary manner is “the idea of the founding subject”, as found in 
phenomenology
79
.  This theme causes the material reality of discourse to be overlooked.  The 
subject is given the task of bringing the otherwise empty forms of language to life through 
his/her utterances.  (S)he intuitively understands the meaning that is deposited in empty things 
by moving through their density and inertia.  “In his relation to meaning, the founding subject 
has at his disposal signs, marks, traces, letters.  But he does not need to pass via the singular 
instance of discourse in order to manifest them” (Foucault, 1981a:65).   
                                                 
79
Young (1981: 49) clarifies some of Foucault‟s references in The Order of Discourse, and specifies that “the 
idea of the founding subject” comes from phenomenology.     
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Foucault (1981a: 66) suggests three decisions or tasks that will enable us to break though the 
traditional conceptual barriers which place limits on what we can say and think.  “We must 
call into question our will to truth, restore to discourse its character as an event, and finally 
throw off the sovereignty of the signifier”.  These tasks carry four specific methodological 
requirements for the study of discourse, namely  
 
i. the principle of reversal,  
ii. the principle of rarefaction,  
iii. the principle of discontinuity and  
iv. the rule of exteriority (Foucault, 1981a:67-68).   
 
In the following section I shall describe these methodological principles. 
 
3.4 Principles for the analysis of discourse  
The four principles for the analysis of discourse can each be summarised by a single term, 
namely the event, the series, the regularity and the condition of possibility.  Each of these 
terms is opposed to another term.  The principle of reversal places the notion of the event in 
opposition to the notion of creation.  The principle of discontinuity places the notion of series 
in opposition to the notion of unity, epoch or theme.  The principle of specificity places the 
notion of regularity in opposition to the notion of originality.  And, the principle of exteriority 
places the notion of the condition of possibility in opposition to the notion of signification 
(Foucault, 1981a:67).  I shall now elaborate on these principles which regulate discourse 
analysis.   
The principle of reversal means that which is traditionally regarded as the sources of 
discourse, such as the author, the discipline and the will to truth, must rather be recognised as 
performing a negative function of cutting-up (segmenting) and rarefying discourse (Foucault, 
1981a:67; Sheridan, 1980:128).   
Foucault wants us to treat discourses as sets of discursive events.  But what is the 
philosophical or theoretical status of the notion of a discursive event?  The event “is neither 
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substance nor accident, neither quality nor process; the event is not of the order of bodies”.  
The event is not immaterial either, since it occurs in material elements.  It is “produced as an 
effect of, and within, a dispersion of matter”.  The event thus has the paradoxical 
philosophical character of a “materialism of the incorporeal” (Foucault, 1981a:69; Sheridan, 
1980:129).   
Foucault (1981b:6) refers to this procedure of analysis as “eventalisation”.  He describes 
eventalisation firstly as “a breach of self-evidence”.  Eventalisation wants to show that it 
wasn‟t necessary for current practices to develop in the way they did.  For instance, “it wasn‟t 
self-evident that the causes of illness were to be sought through the individual examination of 
bodies” (Foucault, 1981b:6).  Eventalisation is a breach “of those self-evidences on which our 
knowledges, acquiescences and practices rest” (Foucault, 1981b:6).  Additionally, the 
principle of eventalisation means that a multiplication of causes is produced and that the 
object of analysis (the event) is then analysed according to the various processes of which it is 
made up.  This second feature of  
eventalisation means rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, 
plays of forces, strategies and so on which at a given moment establish what 
subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary.  In this sense one is 
indeed effecting a sort of multiplication or pluralisation of causes (Foucault, 1981b:6).   
This method will allow the analyst to identify the material aspects that act “upon and within 
discourse” and will also make the links between discourse and the operation of power more 
visible.  Analyses that practice the principle of reversal or eventalisation are politically and 
ontologically stronger than analyses which rely on traditional views regarding the source of 
discourse (Hook, 2001:531).  When discourse is treated as an event it is approached as a 
practice, or as Hook (2001:532) puts it “as an active „occurring‟, as something that 
implements power and action, and that also is power and action”.  Discourse can then be seen 
as more than the mere form and signs of language that represent a reality, and rather as reality 
itself.  “We must conceive of discourse as a violence which we do to things, or in any case a 
practice which we impose on them” (Foucault, 1981a:67).  Discourse thus “is the thing that is 
done” (Hook, 2001:531). 
When the processes of rarefaction have been noticed through the principle of reversal, we 
must not assume that an abundance of uninterrupted discourses can be found beneath them.  
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This is where the other methodological principles must be introduced.  The principle of 
discontinuity states that although processes exist which work to control and delimit 
discourse, it does not imply that  
beneath them or beyond them there reigns a vast unlimited discourse, continuous and 
silent…which we have the task of raising up by restoring the power of speech to it.  We 
must not imagine that there is a great unsaid or unthought which runs throughout the 
world and intertwines with all its forms and all its events…Discourses must be treated 
as discontinuous practices, which cross each other, are sometimes juxtaposed with one 
another, but can just as well exclude or be unaware of each other (Foucault, 1981a:67).   
Foucault‟s (1981a:67) denial of “a great unsaid or unthought” makes it clear that „the ultimate 
truth‟ cannot be discovered and reinstated simply by pronouncing or thinking what has been 
excluded, pushed to the boundaries of the reasonable, or repressed by discourse and its 
systems of control.  While Foucault wants to make the sources that are repressed and 
subjugated by the predominant discourse heard, he does not do so “under the auspices of 
confronting a great untruthfulness with the force of an indisputable truth” (Hook, 1981:536).  
He does not want to prove that other forms of knowledge have a greater or purer truth value 
than the reigning, supposedly true discourse.  Rather, Foucault proposes that pointing out 
discontinuities between the leading discourse and “a strategically organised ensemble of 
historical knowledges” (Hook, 2001: 536) has a particular power to disrupt dominant 
discourses that are viewed as continuous, consistent, immobile and unified (Foucault, 
1977c:147, as cited in Hook, 2001:534).  
Foucault‟s (1981a:67) third methodological requirement is the principle of specificity.  
Foucault expresses this principle in the following passage: 
We must not resolve discourse into a play of pre-existing significations; we must not 
imagine that the world turns towards us a legible face which we would have only to 
decipher; the world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; there is no prediscursive 
providence which disposes the world in our favour.  We must conceive discourse as a 
violence which we do to things, or in any case as a practice which we impose on them; 
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and it is in this very practice that the events of discourse find the principle of their 
regularity
80
.  
In the quotation above Foucault refers to discourse as a practice.  To “throw off the 
sovereignty of the signifier” (Foucault, 1981a:66) it is necessary that the analysis of discourse 
moves beyond textuality to include the physical effects of discourse and the “materiality of its 
practices” (Hook, 2001: 537).  Hook (2001:537) provides the following helpful example: 
when the utterance by a medical professional that a particular person (patient) is a „pervert‟81 
is regarded as an action, a practice or an event, then the utterance seems to border on the 
terrain of materiality, and can more easily be connected to the collection of physical actions 
by means of which such a diagnosis may be arrived at in the first instance.  When discourse 
analysts blur the division between the textual and the material (the discursive and the extra-
discursive) with caution they can prevent an underestimation of the material effects of 
discourse, and the discursive effects of material.   
Foucault‟s final principle for the analysis of discourse is the principle of exteriority.  With 
this principle Foucault (1981a:67) argues that discourse analysis should not 
go from discourse towards its interior, hidden nucleus, towards the heart of a thought or 
a signification supposed to be manifested in it; but, on the basis of discourse itself, its 
appearance and its regularity, go towards its external conditions of possibility, towards 
what gives rise to the aleatory series of these events, and fixes its limits.   
Usually a text or speech is analysed with a desire to move from the exterior to the interior in 
search of the intention or utterances of a founding, transcendental subjectivity (Sheridan, 
1980:102) that initiated the utterance under analysis.  Foucault refers to exteriority in a 
paradoxical way, since he denies its opposite form of interiority.  He wants to recover the 
status of statements as events.  Analysis should seize the irruption of statements in the place 
and moment of their exact occurrence (Foucault, 1972: 136-137).   
Hook (2001:539) views critical readings, searching for meaning within texts, as inadequate 
for two reasons.  The first problem is that of textual relativity which means that any textual 
interpretation that is reasonably argued for, is just as valid as any other such interpretation.  
                                                 
80
 Merquior (1985:82-83) criticises Foucault for completely rejecting “so many established ways to knowledge” 
without offering much sound or solid in the way of an epistemology.   
81
 In other words, the diagnosis of „pervert‟ is uttered.  
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Mere textual analyses therefore have limited use outside the scope of the text in question.  To 
increase its utility, it must be possible to validate the findings of discourse analysis against 
“certain stable reference points outside of the text”.  Examples of extra-textual dimensions 
against which the findings of discourse analysis can be corroborated are “space (geopolitics), 
time (history), architecture or material forms of practice”.  The second problem with analyses 
that focus only on discourse at the textual level, is that discourse is only approached as an 
effect of power, and not also as an instrument of power.  Foucault views discourse as both an 
effect (the result) of power and an instrument (the means) of power and argues that analyses 
should treat discourse as both: “history constantly teaches us, discourse is not simply that 
which translates struggles or systems of domination, but it is the thing for which and by which 
there is a struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized” (Foucault, 1981a:52-53).   
The principle of exteriority places the notion of the condition of possibility in opposition to 
the notion of signification.  Analysis should thus not only concern significations, but should 
pay attention to a variety of contingent circumstances, including material, institutional and 
historical circumstances, which allow certain statements, acts and subjects in specific settings.  
By paying attention to these conditions of possibility the analyst can identify the forms of 
support which create boundaries for the discourse under study and without which particular 
statements could not be uttered (Hook, 2001:540).  Foucault (1972:32) wants discourse 
analysis to understand the relation between groups of statements and events with a very 
different nature, for instance events that are “technical, economic, social, political”.   
Foucault (1981a: 70-73) states that analyses according to these principles can be divided into 
two sets or groups, namely the critical set and the genealogical set.  Critical analyses apply the 
principle of reversal by examining procedures of discursive control in terms of their effects 
and their method of operation.  Analyses in the genealogical group apply the other three 
principles.  Genealogical analyses are interested in examining the formation of discourses as 
influenced by systems of control (that is despite or with the support of systems of control) and 
the norms and contingent material conditions of their “appearance, growth and variation”.  
Critical and genealogical analyses can never be completely separated from one another.  The 
difference between these two sets of analyses is not so much related to their object or domain 
of interest, but rather to their relative perspectives and limits.  The formation of a discourse 
can for example include procedures of control in the same way that systems of control can be 
formed within an established discursive formation.   
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This is an opportune moment to again clarify the goals of the current project, and I would like 
to start with what this dissertation does not aim to achieve.  Firstly, I do not wish to give a 
description of the formation of medical discourse.  Secondly, I do not wish to establish 
whether or to prove that the discourse of natural science influences medical discourse.  
Enough has been written from within and outside the borders of medicine to support the 
statement that medical discourse is fundamentally influenced by the ontology and 
epistemology of the natural sciences.  In the first chapter I described the nature of the natural 
science paradigm and the implications of medicine‟s self-identification as a natural science.  
The aim of this dissertation is rather to investigate the effects of medical discourse, as it is 
influenced by the natural-sciences, on communication between doctors and patients.  With 
this aim in mind, Foucault‟s work is valuable in a number of ways.  To begin with, Foucault 
provides a conceptual framework and terminology according to which medical discourse, as a 
discursive formation with its objects, enunciative modalities, concepts and themes may be 
studied and understood.  Furthermore, Foucault illustrates the factors that are related to the 
various elements of discourse.  Secondly, Foucault‟s work on the procedures that control and 
restrict discourse provides a way of understanding and explaining why everything that can be 
said about sickness and health is not included in medical discourse.  It also draws attention to 
the restrictions on how and by whom medical discourse may be used.  Thirdly, Foucault‟s 
principles for the analysis of discourse enable one to recognise the specific reality of 
discourse.  Medical discourse is thus not merely the representation of natural and empirical 
facts by means of language.  Medical discourse is a discursive practice that is influenced by 
power relations and which also brings about effects of power.  Up until now power as an 
element of discourse has only been hinted at.  The next section will describe Foucault‟s view 
on the nature of power and the relationship between power and discourse.   
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3.5 Discourse and power  
Foucault is credited as the first thinker who introduced the issue of power to the study of 
discourse at a time when discourse analysis was predominantly concerned with the analysis of 
texts
82.  In the following section I shall discuss Foucault‟s view of power and the relationship 
between discourse, or rather knowledge and truth, and power.  I use the subheadings of 
Foucault‟s essay titled The Subject and Power (1984) to structure my writing. 
 
3.5.1 Why study power 
Foucault (1982:208) states that the goal of his work has never been to analyse the 
phenomenon of power.  The general theme of his research was rather the subject.  He studied 
the various methods of objectification that have turned individuals into subjects in the western 
world.  Foucault (1982:209) became aware that humans are placed in complex relationships 
of power and that no tools for the study of power relations existed.  With „relationships of 
power‟, Foucault (1987:11) means the human “relationships in which one wishes to direct the 
behaviour of another”.  The only ways of thinking about power was in relation to the law or 
the state.  In other words, it was only questions such as “what legitimises power?” and “what 
is the state?” that were asked in order to understand power.  Foucault (1982:210-211) 
suggests that “in order to understand what power relations are about, perhaps we should 
investigate the forms of resistance and attempts made to dissociate these relations”.  Examples 
of oppositions to power that have developed in recent years are the oppositions to the power 
which men exercise over women, parents over their children, psychiatry over those with 
mental illness, medicine over the population, health professionals over people with disabilities 
and state governments over the way that citizens lead their lives.  The main objective of all of 
these different struggles is to attack a specific technique or form of power, rather than to 
attack a specific institution, or group, or social class.  The form of power that is resisted is the 
power that transforms individuals into subjects.   
This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the 
individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, 
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 Alessandra Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino make this statement in a question addressed to Foucault for the 
interview entitled Truth and Power (1984:57).   
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imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognise and which others have to 
recognise in him (Foucault, 1982:212).   
The word subject has two meanings.  One may be “subject to someone else by control and 
dependence” or tied to one‟s own identity “by a conscience or self-knowledge”.  In both cases 
a type of power is implied which “subjugates and makes subject to”.  The struggles 
mentioned above are thus “struggles against subjection, against forms of subjectivity and 
submission” (Foucault, 1982:212).   
Foucault (1982:216) talks about “universal philosophy” to characterise the work of thinkers 
like Descartes who asked questions such as “Who am I?”  The I in this question is unique, but 
is also a universal and unhistorical subject.  The I for Descartes may be everyone, in any 
location and at any moment in history.  Foucault (1982:216) contrasts this universal intent 
with the work of thinkers like Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche who asked “What are we? In a 
precise moment of history”.  This latter form of philosophy which takes on the task of 
critically analysing the world that we presently live in, has become more and more important.  
Foucault (1982:216) suggests that the aim of contemporary philosophy should be “to refuse 
what we are”, and not only “to discover what we are”.  What he means is that “we have to 
imagine and to build up what we could be” in order to free ourselves from the subjection of 
modern power structures.   
Foucault (1976:95-96) wants to study and expose domination.  By domination he does not 
mean the strong and broad type of domination that one person or one group exercises over 
others.  He refers to the many forms of domination that are possible in society.  “Not the 
domination of the King in his central position, therefore, but that of his subjects in their 
mutual relations”.  To achieve this Foucault refrains from studying the mechanisms and 
effects of the controlled and legal forms of power in their focal locations.  He rather pays 
attention and tries to locate power as it is exercised at its periphery, “its ultimate 
destinations…where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional and local forms and 
institutions…where it is always less legal in character”.  It is here that power overcomes and 
extends itself beyond the rules of the law which organise and place limits on it, and “invests 
itself in institutions, becomes embodied in techniques, and equips itself with instruments and 
eventually even violent means of material intervention”.   
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Foucault (1976:97) also refrains from conducting an internal analysis of power, at the level of 
the conscious intention or choice of a subject.  His advice is to avoid the complex and 
unanswerable questions such as „who has power?‟; „why does (s)he want to dominate?‟; 
„what do they seek, and by what strategy?‟.  The external face of power should rather be 
studied where it stands in a direct and immediate relationship with “its object, its target, its 
field of application…where it installs itself and produces real effects”.  We must explore how 
power operates at the level of continuous subjugation, the level at which on-going and 
uninterrupted processes subject bodies, dictate behaviours, govern gestures, and so forth.  We 
must question how subjects are “gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted” 
as a consequence of the effects of power.  In short, “we should try to grasp subjection in its 
material instance as a constitution of subjects”.   
Power relations thus exist beyond the limits of the state.  Although the state‟s apparatuses are 
omnipotent, it cannot occupy the entire domain of actual power relations.  Furthermore, the 
state functions on the basis of a range of pre-existing power relations.  The state is a 
superstructure based on a series of power networks regarding for example, “the body, 
sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology” (Foucault, 1984:64).   
 
3.5.2 How is power exercised? 
When Foucault (1982:217) asks the question “how is power exercised?” he does not mean 
“how” in the sense of the effects of power, as in the question “how does power manifest 
itself?”  He wants to know “by what means is power exercised” and “what happens when 
individuals exert power over others?”  To answer this question it is first necessary to draw a 
distinction between power relations and two other types of relationship.  First there is the 
power that is exerted over things and that makes it possible to “modify, use, consume, or 
destroy them”.  This power stems from aptitudes immediately intrinsic to the body or passed 
on by external instruments.  It may be called a “question of capacity”.  Conversely, power is 
also characterised as an influence on the relationships between individuals or groups of 
individuals.  Power relations should also be distinguished from relationships of 
communication.  Relationships of communication transfer information through symbolic 
systems, such as a language or another system of signs.  Although communication is always a 
particular way of acting upon other individual(s) and may have an objective or 
consequence(s) related to power, communication is not a particular feature of power.  
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“Whether or not they pass through systems of communication, power relations have a specific 
nature” (Foucault, 1982:217).  
These three types of relationship, namely relations of power, relationships of communication 
and “objective capacities” should not be thought of as three separate domains.  These 
relationships “always overlap one another, support one another reciprocally, and use each 
other mutually as means to an end”.  Naturally, the interaction between these three forms of 
relationships varies and is irregular.  No general form of equilibrium exists between 
completed activities, communication systems and relations of power in any society.  Yet, one 
comes across “blocks” in which the three types of relationships “constitute regulated and 
concerted systems”.  One may speak of a “capacity-communication-power” blocks.  By 
enlarging the meaning of the word slightly, these blocks may be referred to as disciplines.  In 
disciplines the three relationships are adjusted to each other according to carefully thought-out 
formulae (Foucault, 1982:218-219).  The hospital, for instance makes up a “capacity-
communication-power” block through the way that its space is used, the rules that govern its 
inner life, the various activities which are arranged there, the diverse individuals who exist 
there and interact with one another, each of whom performs a particular role and possesses a 
well-defined character.  The activity which ensures treatment of diseases is developed there 
through a whole collection of regulated communications (such as health professional-patient 
consultations, communication between health professionals from similar and different 
disciplines, signs that indicate treatment outcomes and adherence to treatment, labels that 
distinguish patients according to the type and severity of disease and treatment, signs which 
differentiate health professionals based on their role and position in the institution) and 
through a chain of power processes (such as enclosure, surveillance and the pyramid-shaped 
hierarchy)
83
.   
Disciplines thus illustrate how systems of objective capacity, communication and power may 
be welded together.  They also show different models for the expression of these 
relationships.  In some disciplines the completion of activities are the most important feature 
(such as in hospitals), in others relationships of communication are the most important (as is 
the case in disciplines of apprenticeship), where power relations are given pre-eminence in 
disciplines with a monastic or penitential character.  Some disciplines emphasise all three 
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 I‟ve adjusted Foucault‟s (1982:218-219) example of the educational institution as a “capacity-communication-
power” block, to illustrate how the hospital constitutes such a block, as medical institutions are directly relevant 
to the subject of this dissertation.   
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  110 
types of relationship, such as the military discipline “where a plethora of signs indicates, to 
the point of redundancy, tightly knit power relations calculated with care to produce a certain 
number of technical effects” (Foucault, 1982:219).   
 
3.5.3 What constitutes the nature of power? 
Studies of power in the 1960s described power in terms of prohibition and repression.  When 
power is defined as repression it is seen in a purely juridical manner.  Power is identified with 
a law that forbids, as something that prevents individuals from doing certain things.  From 
this narrow perspective power is seen as something bad that can only have a negative 
function.  Foucault has a much more complex view of power.  Studies of power must not 
make an a priori connection between power and repression (Foucault, 1984: 60-61; Foucault, 
1978:102).  The notion of repression does not capture the productive feature of power 
(Foucault, 1984:60).   
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but say no, do you 
really think one would be brought to obey it?  What makes power hold good, what 
makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn‟t only weigh on us as a force that says 
no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, 
produces discourse.  It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs 
through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is 
repression (Foucault, 1984:61). 
Foucault‟s conception of power also breaks with previous conceptions of power in that 
Foucault does not view power as a possession (Sheridan, 1980:218).  Foucault (1976:98) 
advises that power should not be seen as something that belongs to one person or one group 
who then exercises that power over others.  For Foucault power is a result of the working of 
relationships between social groups and between individuals (Sheridan, 1980:218).  Sheridan 
(1980:218) explains this aspect of Foucault‟s notion of power: 
[Power] is not unitary; it has no essence.  There are as many forms of power as there are 
types of relationship.  Every group and every individual exercises power and is 
subjected to it.  There are certain categories of person – children, prisoners, the „insane‟ 
– whose ability to exercise power is severely limited, but few members of these groups 
do not find some means of exercising power, if only on each other. 
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Foucault (1976:98) views power “as something which circulates, or rather as something 
which only functions in the form of a chain”.  Power is never in a specific location, never 
anybody‟s instrument or possession.  Power establishes a net-like organisation through which 
it is freely circulated and exercised.  Individuals not only circulate between the threads of this 
net, they are also always in the position of concurrently undergoing and exercising this power.  
Ells (2003:215) expresses this idea neatly with the statement that Foucault conceptualises 
people as “both subject to power and subjects of power”.  Individuals must not be thought of 
as the numerous and passive adhesive material for power, or the surface against which power 
strikes and as a consequence crushes or brings individuals under its control.  It is rather the 
case that power constitutes individuals who then act as the elements of its articulation.  One of 
power‟s main effects is that “certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain 
desires, come to be constituted as individuals…The individual which power has constituted is 
at the same time its vehicle.. Individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of 
application” (Foucault, 1976:98).   
Foucault does not view people as “individuals”, in the sense that the word is used in the 
current liberal understanding of persons.  The liberal view holds that people are discrete 
entities capable of making autonomous decisions according to abstract rules or principles.  It 
is assumed that all people are similarly situated.  Foucault‟s description of people differs 
sharply from the liberal view.  He views people as living bodies who are entangled in a matrix 
of power relations.  These relationships are not only with other individual persons, but also 
with institutions.  Foucault acknowledges that differences exist between people and that 
people are influenced and controlled by various social institutions, for instance race, class and 
gender.  A person, or what Foucault refers to as a subject, is fundamentally influenced by a 
particular network of power relations.  Foucault thus views a person‟s identity and interests as 
socially constructed according to the person‟s position within the power network (Ells, 2003: 
218-225).  In his view a person, or the self, “can only be a subject; selfhood does not exist 
outside of being subjected”.  For Foucault consciousness does not exist outside of social 
systems that unavoidably subject.  “There is no self without being a subject, and no being a 
subject without being subjected” (Frank & Jones, 2003:183).  Yet, the Foucauldian subject is 
not merely shaped by the power matrix, (s)he also shapes the power network in at least some 
respects (Ells, 2003:225). 
Two important notions regarding Foucault‟s conception of power are illustrated in the 
paragraphs above.  The first is that power relations are dispersed throughout the entire social 
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body.  Power relations are thus not only located in specific institutions, such as the central 
government of a nation (Mills, 2003:35).  Since the power relations that operate on people are 
so diffuse and ensnare people, their effect may not be noticed (Ells, 2003:215, 218).  
Secondly, power is envisaged as a productive force.  It does not only restrict, but it opens up a 
range of possible behaviour and attitudes.  Importantly, power produces knowledge and 
discourse.  Foucault (1980:52) argues that modern humanism mistakenly views knowledge 
and power as independent of each other.  Instead “knowledge and power are integrated with 
one another”.  When power is exercised knowledge is continuously created, and in contrast 
knowledge constantly causes power effects.  The effects of power that are connected to 
knowledge are “diffused, entrenched and dangerous” and operate throughout society.  
Foucault (1980:52) argues that it is pointless to dream about a point in time when knowledge 
will be independent of power.   
It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for 
knowledge not to engender power. „Liberate scientific research from the demands of 
monopoly capitalism‟: may be a good slogan, but it will never be more than a slogan.  
Mills (2003:69-70) suggests that to illustrate the relationship between power and knowledge 
one may think about the wealth of information and investigations regarding groups that are 
politically and economically marginalised in Western societies, compared to information 
about more privileged groups.  For instance, many books and scientific studies exist on the 
subject of women, homosexuality, non-white races and the working class, whereas relatively 
little information can be found in libraries and scientific databases regarding men, 
heterosexuality, whites and the middle class.  Knowledge about disadvantaged groups may 
work in complex ways to maintain the existing distribution of power.  Similarly knowledge 
produced by disadvantaged groups themselves, may be a very powerful tool for change of the 
status quo.   
It is also important to recognise the relationship between power and truth.  Power relations 
cannot be formed, strengthened or implemented without discourses of truth which work 
through and on the basis of their association with the exercise of power.  “We are subjected to 
the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the 
production of truth” (Foucault, 1976:93).  In societies with capitalist economies and 
democratic governments the highly specific organisation of the relationship between power 
and truth is such that individuals must speak and discover the truth that society demands and 
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needs in order to function.  Power institutionalises, professionalises and rewards the pursuit of 
truth.   
In the last analysis, we must produce truth as we must produce wealth, indeed we must 
produce truth in order to produce wealth in the first place…In the end we are judged, 
condemned, classified, determined in our undertakings, destined to a certain mode of 
living or dying, as a function of the true discourses which are the bearers of specific 
effects of power (Foucault, 1976:94).   
Foucault‟s thesis that power produces knowledge is contrary to the accepted idea that “an 
almost uncrossable line” exists between knowledge, regarded as the domain of truth and 
liberty, and the domain where power is exercised.  Foucault‟s understanding of power 
“deprives knowledge of its apparent objectivity.  It denounces the illusion of truth.  
Knowledge is not so much true or false as legitimate or illegitimate for a particular set of 
power relations” (Sheridan, 1980:220).  For Foucault (1978:106) the development of the 
human sciences cannot be separated from the exercise of power.  The fact that societies or 
human behaviour became objects of scientific study is closely connected to mechanisms of 
power.  In psychology for instance human behaviour became a problem to analyse and 
resolve.  
The institutions and organised activities which accompany scientific discourses possess 
power.  This power has certain effects.  Science exercises power in that it literally forces one 
to make particular statements in order to escape disqualification for being wrong or for being 
a charlatan (Foucault, 1978:106-107).  A “scientific hierarchisation of knowledges” seems to 
exist which disqualifies certain types of knowledges.  A set of subjugated knowledges exist 
that rank low on the hierarchy and are unqualified and disqualified because they do not have 
the sufficient level of scientificity.  An example is the voices of the patient, nurse and doctor 
that are parallel and marginal to the powerful voice of medical knowledge.  Subjects of 
knowledge and experience are thus seen as unimportant in scientific discourses.  These low-
ranking discourses involve a popular knowledge, not in the sense of general common-sense 
knowledge, but knowledges that are local, regional, differential and incapable of unanimity 
(Foucault, 1976: 82-85).   
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Truth is thus also a form of power.  “Truth is a thing of this world:  it is produced only by 
virtue of multiple forms of constraint.  And it induces regular effects of power.  Each society 
has its regime of truth, its „general politics‟ of truth”.  A society‟s regime of truth includes the 
types of discourse that are accepted and made to function as true; the mechanisms that are 
used to differentiate between true and false statements; the techniques and procedures that are 
regarded as valuable in gaining truth as well as the status of those who are given the 
responsibility to say what is accepted as true (Foucault, 1984:72-73).  Foucault (1984:74) 
states that “there is a battle „for truth‟ ”.  Truth here does not mean “the ensemble of truths 
which are to be discovered and accepted”, but rather, “the ensemble of rules according to 
which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true”.  
It is also “not a battle „on behalf‟ of the truth, but a battle about the status of the truth and the 
economic and political role it plays”.  Foucault (1984:74; 1976:93) suggests that a circular 
relationship exists between power and truth.  Systems of power produce, transmit and sustain 
truth and the effects of truth, which in their turn produce and extend the effects of power.   
Foucault (1982:219-220) argues that power is “a set of actions upon other actions”.  “The 
exercise of power is not simply a relationship between partners, individual or collective; it is a 
way in which certain actions modify others”.  Power, in the sense of a noun, does not exist.  
There is not something called power or Power that exists universally in a condensed or diluted 
form.  “Power exists only when it is put in action” (Foucault, 1982:219).  Power is thus a verb 
and not a noun.  Power is “something that does something, rather than something which is or 
which can be held onto” (Mills, 2003:35).   
Power must be differentiated from consent and violence.  Although consent may be an 
instrument or an effect of power, power “is not by nature the manifestation of a consensus”.  
Power differs from violence in the sense that violence is exercised upon a body or things.  
Power is not directly and immediately exercised on others; instead it is exercised upon their 
actions: “an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the 
present or the future” (Foucault, 1982:220).  Another difference between violence and power 
is that violence has passivity as its opposite pole.  When violence is met with resistance its 
only option is to attempt to minimise it.  In contrast, a power relationship is dependent on two 
elements in order to exist.  The first indispensable element of a power relationship is that 
“„the other‟ (the one over whom power is exercised) be thoroughly recognized and 
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maintained to the very end as a person who acts”.  The second necessary element for the 
expression of a power relationship is that “faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of 
responses, reactions, results, and possible interventions may open up”.  It is in this sense that 
power is productive and not only repressive and negative.  Similar to consent, violence may 
be an instrument or result of power, yet it does not constitute the basic nature of power.   
The exercise of power can produce as much acceptance as may be wished for: it can 
pile up the dead and shelter itself behind whatever threats it can imagine.  In itself the 
exercise of power is not violence; nor is it a consent…It is a total structure of actions 
brought to bear upon possible actions:  it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier 
or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless 
always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting 
or being capable of action.  A set of actions upon actions (Foucault, 1982:220).   
The exercise of power is thus to structure the potential field of action of other individuals.  
The element of freedom is included in this definition.  “Power is exercised only over free 
subjects, and only insofar as they are free”.  Free subjects are individuals or groups of subjects 
who have a field of options open to them from which various forms of behaviour and reaction 
may be accomplished.  Where no freedom exists, as in the case of slavery, a physical 
relationship of constraint exists, rather than a power relationship.  Power and freedom are thus 
not mutually exclusive, but have a much more complicated relationship.  Freedom is the 
precondition and the condition for the exercise of power.  Power can only be exercised where 
freedom exists, and freedom is also power‟s constant support, as power would amount to 
physical determination without the possibility of resistance.  “At the very heart of the power 
relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the 
intransigence of freedom.  Rather than thinking of freedom as essential for the exercise of 
power, one should think of the relationship between power and freedom as reciprocal 
incitation and struggle; “less of a face-to-face confrontation which paralyzes both sides than a 
permanent provocation” (Foucault, 1982:221-222)84.  
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 Foucault (1982:222) refers to this relationship with a neologism, namely “agonism”.  The translator‟s note on 
this term states that the neologism is based on a Greek word that means combat.  The translator writes that “the 
term would hence imply a physical contest in which the opponents develop a strategy of reaction and of mutual 
taunting, as in a wrestling match”.   
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3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I provided a relatively detailed account of Michel Foucault‟s work on 
discourse.  I also explained towards which end I will use these theoretical ideas.  Foucault‟s 
work on discourse makes us aware that discourse does not merely represent the social order 
but rather forms an essential part of the social order (Kuipers, 1989:103).  Foucault‟s 
conception of discourse as a configuration of knowledge, power and truth (Mills, 1997:17) 
makes powerful analyses and critiques of systems of power, such as modern medicine, 
possible.  However, for some scholars Foucault‟s very abstract understanding of discourse is 
too remote from the “real world” (Kuipers, 1989:112).  His notion of discourse is removed 
from the particular context(s) wherein it appears and where power is exercised
85.  Foucault‟s 
ambiguous conception of discourse makes it very difficult for (empirical) researchers to link 
linguistic forms with their social functions in real life encounters (Kuipers, 1989:105-106).   
The abstract nature of Foucault‟s theorising about discourse is very suitable for the purpose of 
my general philosophical enquiry.  I do not want to analyse a sample of particular doctor-
patient interactions.  My aim is rather to broadly investigate the influence of modern 
medicine‟s intellectual self-image on communication between doctors and patients.  
Foucault‟s understanding of discourses as regulated practices is very valuable to my project.  I 
want to investigate how the positivist worldview regulates medical discourse and by what 
procedures this discourse is controlled.  I perform these analytical tasks in Chapter 6.  In 
Chapter 7 I shall critique the appropriateness of modern medicine‟s scientific self-image.  
However, before I apply Foucault‟s (and Habermas‟) ideas, I shall describe doctor-patient 
communication in the next chapter. 
  
                                                 
85
 Foucault‟s abstract notion of discourse stands in stark contrast to the approaches to discourse within the fields 
of linguistics and sociology that radically ground discourse “in its context of interaction”.  Scholars from these 
fields often study discourse by analysing transcripts of real life interactions in much detail (Kuipers, 1989:106).  
I described such types of research in the Introduction of this dissertation.  
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Chapter 4 
Doctor-patient communication  
 
“…perhaps the story you finish is never the one you begin” 
Salman Rushdie (1991:491) 
4.1 Introduction  
Chapter 4 is devoted to a description of doctor-patient communication based on the praxis and 
discourse literature on this subject.  The aim of this dissertation is to examine the influence of 
medicine‟s self-understanding as a natural science on the nature of communication between 
doctors and patients.  In chapter 1 I described the nature of medicine‟s intellectual self-image.  
In chapter 2 I described Jürgen Habermas‟ research on Universal Pragmatics.  Following the 
current chapter which describes doctor-patient communication, I shall attempt to analyse this 
form of communication with the help of Habermas‟ universal pragmatics.   
Ainsworth-Vaughn (2003:453) divides the literature on doctor-patient encounters into two 
separate categories which she terms “praxis literature” and “discourse literature”.  In this 
chapter I shall first describe the praxis literature and thereafter the discourse literature.  Praxis 
literature represents the majority of research on doctor-patient interaction.  The research 
studies that form praxis literature are mostly directed towards medical praxis or the 
consultation process and focus on the structure of the consultation “from greeting to closure” 
and describe and measure concepts such as patient and doctor centeredness (Elwyn & Gwyn, 
2006:186).  The praxis literature is atheoretical about language and thus regards language as 
merely expressive, as a transparent vehicle of meaning and communication.  Tanenbaum 
(1998:207) refers to praxis literature as “positivist social-psychological literature”.  Discourse 
literature refers to research that is interested in the “analysis of talk itself” as informed by 
theories of discourse (Ainsworth-Vaughn, 2003:453).  The term „discourse‟ indicates a 
critical view of language.  The structuralist and post-structuralist view of language as a 
system “with its own rules and constraints, and with its own determining effect on the way 
that individuals think and express themselves” is adopted in discourse literature of clinical 
communication (Mills, 1997:8).  Discourse literature is generated from the perspective of 
“qualitative social science and literary studies” (Tanenbaum, 1998:207).   
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4.2 A description of the praxis literature on doctor-patient 
communication  
Scholars working in different intellectual traditions repeatedly comment on the importance of 
communication in the practice of medicine (Tanenbaum, 1998:207).  Sandra J. Tanenbaum 
(1998:207) who conducts research on health services management and policy writes that 
despite the strong technological nature of contemporary health care, the “basic unit” of 
clinical medicine remains one doctor and one patient talking to each other.  According to 
Mishler (1984:5, 12), a respected psychiatrist and qualitative researcher at the Harvard 
Medical School, the talk between doctors and patients forms a significant component of the 
daily practice of clinical medicine and is central to the work of clinical medicine.  In their 
review of the praxis literature on doctor-patient communication, Ong et al. (1995:903) write 
that communication can be viewed as the main ingredient of clinical medicine (Ong et al., 
1995:903). 
Modern medicine is a diverse discipline with many branches, such as family medicine, 
internal medicine, surgery, paediatrics etcetera.  Pellegrino and Thomasma (1982:62-64) 
suggest that the feature common to all the branches of medicine is the clinical event.  The 
authors regard the clinical event as the medical event, and suggest that this event is produced 
by clinical interaction.  They support the latter idea with the following comments.  The goal 
of modern medicine is to restore patients to well-being.  A large body of evidence exists 
which indicates that health and disease, the central concepts of medicine, are not merely 
defined in terms of the state of organ systems, but that the concepts are also evaluative, that is, 
the values of patients, societies and cultures are included in their meanings.  Therefore the 
clinical relationship must be taken into consideration in any attempt to understand modern 
medicine.  The healing relationship into which the doctor and patient jointly enter provides 
the moral nature of modern medicine.  The healing relationship is also the source from which 
doctors and patients derive rights, obligations, privileges and other forms of societal approval.  
Pure scientists, such as physicists, chemists and biologists do not have the same duties and 
rights.   
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Effective communication is vital for the delivery of quality patient care.  Not only does 
effective communication between doctors and patients make the benefits of medical advances 
available to patients, but it provides a sense of professional satisfaction to the doctor.  
Effective or adequate doctor-patient communication includes a variety of components, such as 
the disclosure of medical and social information by patients, the development of doctor-
patient relationships characterised by mutuality and comfort, shared decision-making, 
provision of medical information that patients can understand and responsiveness by doctors 
to patients‟ requests for information.  Yet it is well-known that effective communication is 
challenged by “the intrusion of business into the patient-doctor relationship, the pressures of 
limited time for office visits, the culture of medicalization, and the sometimes all-consuming 
focus on technology” (Teutsch, 2003:1115-1116).  This dissertation investigates the effect of 
medicine‟s understanding of itself as an alleged natural science on doctor-patient 
communication.   
Communication between doctors and patients has been studied with increasing frequency 
over the past 40 years
86
, resulting in a vast body of research belonging mostly to the category 
of praxis literature.  The growth of this research field can be attributed to at least two factors.  
Firstly, the development of technology, particularly the videotape, which made observation of 
doctor-patient encounters easier and more valid and reliable and which therefore has 
increased the quality of empirical research in this field
87
 (Roter et al., 1988: 99-100; Kurtz, 
2002:S24).  The second factor that is related to the growing research interest in doctor-patient 
encounters is the shift in attention that occurred during the past four decades from 
biomedicine to humanistic medicine (Ong et al., 1995:12).  Unfortunately, the immense body 
of praxis literature does not constitute a coherent whole.  Researchers who study the 
communication behaviour of doctors and patients during clinical encounters according to the 
                                                 
86
 A search on 11 February 2013 of the Scopus (online) database based on the keywords “doctor-patient 
communication” delivered a total of 20007 (twenty thousand and seven) results of which 13261 were original 
research articles, 2761 were review articles, 797 were letters, 598 were short surveys, 550 were conference 
papers and 26 results referred to articles in press (the remainder of the results belonged to the following 
document types with the number of results per document type indicated between square brackets: editorials 
[895], notes [836], and erratum [1]).  This impressive body of research grew exponentially over time with less 
than 500 studies published per annum in the period between 1965 and 1996; more than 500 studies published per 
annum between 1997 and 2002, and more than a 1000 reports published per annum between 2003 and 2012 
(with the exception of the year 2010 in which 986 documents on the subject were published in scholarly 
journals).   
87
 Studies that aim to describe the communication behaviour of doctors and patients during clinical encounters 
through observation generally make use of tape-recordings, video-recordings or direct observation by a 
researcher physically present in the consultation.  Researchers analyse the written transcriptions of the observed 
interactions according to a particular interaction analysis system (IAS).   
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praxis literature tradition “are relatively unencumbered by broadly accepted theoretical 
models or methods” (Roter et al., 1988:111).  The published research studies in this field 
focus on a wide variety of aspects related to the doctor-patient relationship and a broad range 
of (often self-invented) tools are used to analyse doctor-patient interactions.  Furthermore, the 
doctor-patient relationship has many facets and dimensions and is considered to be one the 
most complex forms of human interaction.  The factors mentioned above result in a body of 
knowledge that is poorly integrated and fragmented (Roter et al., 1988:111; Ong et al., 
1995:912).  A systematic theory explaining the nature of doctor-patient communication has 
not been developed yet (Ong et al., 1995:915).   
Due to the diversity and size of the praxis literature on doctor-patient communication the best 
way to describe what is known about the behaviour of doctors and patients during clinical 
encounters may thus be to refer to review articles in this field.  In the discussion which 
follows I will mostly rely on the reviews by the following authors: Roter et al., (1988); Ong et 
al. (1995); Willems et al. (2005) and Schouten & Meeuwesen (2006).  It must be noted that 
only studies published in English-language books or journals were included in these reviews.   
In their review of the research on doctor-patient communication, Ong et al. (1995:903-905) 
draw the conclusion that doctor-patient communication serves three purposes, namely to 
create a good inter-personal relationship, to exchange information and to make decisions 
about the treatment of the patient‟s disease.  Information exchange is one of the most 
researched aspects of doctor-patient communication (Ong et al., 1995:906).  Despite the 
availability of sophisticated technology to assist in medical diagnosis and treatment, the 
primary means of information exchange between doctors and patients remains talking (Street, 
1991:541).  Erzinger (1991:95) suggests that doctors and patients each have certain 
communicative tasks to fulfil during clinical communication.  Patients need to describe their 
concerns, clarify the information expressed to the doctor, obtain adequate explanations and 
develop a personal relationship with the doctor.  Doctors‟ communicative tasks are to explore 
the patient‟s symptoms, to interpret and to provide feedback regarding follow-up information 
in the patient‟s medical record, to adequately explain information to patients (using repetition 
as necessary), to give them advice and finally to understand the patient on a personal level.  
The overall success of a clinical interaction is determined by the manner in which the doctor 
and patient assist each other in the completion of their respective communicative tasks.  
Information-giving and information-seeking underlie the communicative tasks of both 
partners in clinical interactions.  Ong et al. (1995:904) describe information exchange during 
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clinical encounters in terms of needs.  Doctors need information to arrive at the correct 
diagnosis and an appropriate treatment plan.  Patients have to fulfil two needs during 
communication with a doctor, namely „to know and understand‟ (for instance what is wrong 
with his/her body) and „to feel known and understood‟ (to know that (s)he is accepted and 
taken seriously by the doctor).  Doctors‟ and patients‟ needs can only be adequately addressed 
when both parties alternate between information-giving and information-receiving.  However, 
information exchange between doctors and patients during clinical encounters is often fraught 
with difficulty (Street, 1991:541).  Research indicates that in almost all circumstances patients 
desire as much information as possible from their physicians, yet doctors appear to 
underestimate patients‟ need for information.  Kurtz et al. (2005:15) cite two research studies 
which claim that doctors overestimate the amount of time that they spend on explanation and 
planning in the consultation by as much as 900%.  Advocates of the patient-centred approach 
to clinical communication encourage doctors to elicit patients‟ views of their illness as well as 
their feelings and expectations related to the disease in order to accomplish effective 
exchange of information (Ong et al., 1995:904-905).   
Medical decision-making is another very important purpose of doctor-patient 
communication.  Whereas paternalism was traditionally regarded as the ideal model for the 
doctor-patient relationship, shared decision-making by doctors and patients regarding the 
patient‟s medical care has been the goal for the last 30 years.  In order to make decisions 
about their health care, patients need information from their doctors (Ong et al., 1995:905).  
As public expectations regarding access to medical information increase, the doctor‟s role 
shifts from “keeper of information to interpreter and integrator of information for patients” 
(Teutsch, 2003:1116).  
Roter et al. (1988) and Ong et al. (1995) also discuss the empirical research on doctor-patient 
communication by referring to the specific communication behaviours that are reported in 
the praxis literature.  Roter et al.. (1988:101-102) grouped the aspects of doctor-patient 
communication that researchers study most frequently into six categories.  These categories 
are:  
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i. information-giving, which implies offering any material which might promote 
understanding and knowledge;  
ii. information-seeking, which refers to all requests for information, clarification or 
greater understanding;  
iii. social talk, which refers to all varieties of non-medical and social communication, 
such as greetings and casual conversation;  
iv. positive talk, which includes all conversations with a positive affective tone or 
intention;  
v. negative talk, which includes all conversations with a negative affective tone or 
intention; 
vi. partnership-building, which includes two types of exchanges namely exchanges in 
which the doctor facilitates participation by the patient, and exchanges which indicate 
the role of the doctor as interpreter and synthesizer, such as when the doctor reflects 
on the patient‟s message.  Although it is possible to think of communication 
behaviours by patients which may fit the category of partnership-building, researchers 
have only studied this variable in relation to the communication behaviour of doctors.   
 
The average length of medical consultations is estimated as 12.35 minutes when practice 
characteristics such as whether the consultation took place in a private versus public health 
care setting, have been taken into account.  Furthermore, it is estimated that on average 
doctors‟ contribution to the speech of the consultation is 60% while patients contribute an 
average of 40% to the consultation.  It is not clear from the research whether the amount that 
each partner contributes to the talk of the conversation is uniformly spread across the different 
phases of the interaction or whether one partner dominates during a specific phase of the 
consultation (for instance during history taking or during the closing segment) (Roter et al., 
1988:108; Ong et al., 906).  Roter et al. (1988:108-109) provide profiles of doctor and patient 
interaction which indicate the frequency of the various types of communication behaviour in 
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doctors‟ and patients‟ conversation.  The median percentages88 that doctors spend on the 
different communication behaviours during a consultation are as follows: information giving, 
38.5%; information seeking, 22.5%; positive talk, 14.5%; partnership building, 10%; social 
conversation, 5% and negative talk, 1%.  The median percentages for patients are as follows: 
information giving, 54%; question asking, 6%; positive talk, 20.5%; social conversation, 7% 
and negative talk, 7%.  These results are summarised in Figure 4.1 below.   
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Figure 4.1: A comparison between doctors' and patients' interaction profiles (adapted 
from Roter et al. [1988:108-109]) 
 
It is clear that doctors‟ and patients‟ interaction profiles differ from each other.  Utterances 
that aim to elicit information from the conversational partner are much more frequent among 
doctors than patients.  It is also clear that patients perform more information-giving 
behaviours during clinical encounters compared to doctors.  Research studies across various 
cultural groups found that doctor-patient encounters are often extremely asymmetrical 
                                                 
88
 The median is a value that indicates an average.  Specifically it refers to the middle point in a distribution of 
data values.  It is also known as the 50
th
 percentile, meaning that it is the point “at which half the cases are above 
it and half the cases are below it” (Neuman, 1997:299-300).  If doctors spend a median percentage of 38.5 of 
their time during communication with patients on information seeking, it means that 50% of doctors spend more 
than 38.5% of their time on information seeking and 50% of doctors spend less than 38.5% of their time on 
information seeking.   
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interviews which are primarily made up of questions by doctors and responses from patients 
(Ainsworth-Vaughn, 1998:6-7).  Various research studies have found that patients are 
reluctant to pose questions to doctors during consultations (Ong et al., 1995:908).  Street 
(1991:541,546) found that the amount of information that patients receive from their doctors 
is influenced by the patients‟ communicative styles (that is the nature of their question-asking, 
opinion-giving and expression of concern) as well as their personal and social characteristics 
(that is age, gender, levels of education and anxiety).  Roter et al. (1988:109,112) performed a 
comparison between empirical studies on doctor-patient communication as part of their 
description of this literature.  They found that white patients received more information and 
positive talk and less questions during consultations compared to non-white patients.  The 
authors comment that it is possible that the differences in doctor-patient communication as a 
function of patients‟ race may reflect differences in communication between doctors and 
patients from different socio-economic groups.  Studies have found that working-class 
patients ask fewer questions to and receive less information from doctors compared to 
middle-class patients.  I shall later discuss in more detail the influence of patients‟ socio-
economic and cultural backgrounds on their communication with doctors.   
Roter et al. (1988:109-112) found no difference in visit length among patients from different 
race groups.  Visit length was however associated with the doctor‟s experience and the health 
care setting in which the communication took place.  Doctors with more experience 
conducted shorter consultations than doctors in training.  In private health care settings 
consultations were shorter and doctors sought less information and made fewer partnership-
building statements, compared to consultations in public health care settings.  Roter et al. 
(1988:112) argue that these findings may mean that experienced doctors are more efficient in 
seeking information from patients and may have more confidence in their ability to diagnose 
disease compared to doctors in training.  Experienced doctors may therefore spend less time 
eliciting information from patients and conduct more efficient consultations than junior 
doctors.  Furthermore it can be argued that doctors in private settings have a financial 
incentive to limit the length of patient visits.   
Another interesting difference between the interaction profiles of doctors and patients is the 
occurrence of negative talk.  This is a rare communication behaviour for doctors, whereas it is 
more frequently used by patients.  Roter et al. (1988:108,115) describe negative talk as 
statements that indicate disagreement, confrontation, antagonism and tension.  However, 
confrontation was only observed in doctors‟ (and not patients‟) communication by empirical 
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researchers.  Roter et al. (1988:109) mention that the literature on doctor-patient 
communication does not pay sufficient attention to partnership-building statements by 
doctors.  The reviewers state that such statements may serve as critical markers for 
interactions with an egalitarian character, or it may point to difficult encounters in which 
patients seem withdrawn, reserved or uncomprehending.   
Researchers of doctor-patient encounters typically focus on verbal communication, and in 
doing so tend to neglect non-verbal communication in their scholarly activities.  
Communication regarding emotions occurs mostly through non-verbal means.  A variety of 
factors are regarded as expressions of the emotional tone of interpersonal clinical encounters, 
such as “tone of voice, gaze, posture, laughter, facial expressions, touch and physical 
distance”.  Two interesting remarks regarding non-verbal clinical communication were made 
by researchers.  The first is the observation that patients are very sensitive and attentive 
regarding their doctors‟ non-verbal communication behaviour.  This may be explained by the 
fact that illness is usually accompanied with emotions such as fear, anxiety and emotional 
uncertainty.  Patients may therefore pay attention to subtle cues in the doctor‟s behaviour to 
determine what they should feel and/or think.  The second observation regarding non-verbal 
communication is that during clinical interactions the majority of patients also actively seek 
information about different aspects of their disease, such as its severity, course and prognosis.  
Messages that are not intended to be sent may leak out through non-verbal communication.  
Patients are very aware of such messages and to discrepancies between a doctor‟s verbal and 
non-verbal messages (Ong et al., 1995:908-909).   
Doctor versus patient controlling behaviours receive much attention in the doctor-patient 
communication literature.  A „high control style‟ of communication may include frequent 
question asking, interruptions, verbal exaggerations to emphasise a point, dramatization, 
argumentation and frequent gesturing.  Traditionally the doctor-patient relationship involved 
high control by the doctor and low control by the patient, meaning that the doctor is the 
dominant partner who makes decisions in what (s)he regards as the patient‟s best interest.  In 
1989 Steward and Roter
89
 wrote that such paternalistic doctor-patient relationships were still 
the most common type of interaction between doctors and patients.  The difference between 
the degree of control that doctors and patients exercise during clinical communication 
                                                 
89
 Steward, M.A. & Roter, D.L. 1989.  Communicating with medical patients.  Newbury Park CA: Sage 
Publications.  This book is cited by Ong et al. (1995).  
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probably stems from patients‟ restricted understanding of medical issues and their intense 
uncertainty, “doctors‟ control of medical information and the institutional roles prescribed for 
the doctor and patient” (Ong et al., 1995:909-910).   
The praxis literature on doctor-patient communication has not paid much attention to the 
vocabulary that is used in clinical encounters.  Yet, vocabulary is an “„ingredient‟ of the 
communication process” and is active during all interactions between doctors and patients 
(Ong et al., 1995:910).  Korsch et al. (1968:862) describe doctors‟ use of medical 
terminology as an “outstanding barrier” to clinical communication.  Bourhis et al. (1989:339) 
view doctors as bilingual; “they speak at least their native everyday language (EL), and they 
also are fluent in a highly specialised register, namely medical language (ML)”.  Conversely, 
patients are only fluent in EL and usually do not understand much of the specialised 
terminology of ML (Bourhis et al., 1989:342).  Bourhis et al. (1989) conducted a survey of 
communication in a Canadian hospital setting focussing specifically on the use of ML and 
EL.  In this study the participating patients perceived themselves as using their limited ML 
35% of the time that they conversed with doctors.  The doctors who participated in the study 
conducted by Bourhis et al. (1989:342-344) estimated a much lower percentage of ML in the 
patients‟ talk during clinical interactions, and reported that patients use ML only 7% of the 
time.  The doctors also estimated that ML makes up 23% of their conversations with patients, 
whereas patients estimated that 49% of doctors‟ talk was delivered in ML during the 
consultation.  The doctors and patients agreed that it is more appropriate for doctors to use EL 
to communicate with patients compared to ML.  Both groups of participants also perceived 
ML as a frequent cause of communication difficulties between doctors and patients.  In their 
view the use of EL seldom led to such difficulty.   
Researchers interested in doctor-patient communication do not only focus on communication 
behaviours, such as those discussed above, but are also interested in the influence of doctors‟ 
communication behaviour on patients‟ behaviour and welfare.  The following four patient 
outcomes
90
 are frequently used to indicate the effectiveness of clinical communication:  
patient satisfaction, patient adherence to treatment, patient recall and understanding of 
information and patients‟ health and psychological outcomes (Ong et al., 1995: 910-912).   
                                                 
90
 The term outcome, as used in the health sciences, can be defined as “an observable consequence of prior 
activity occurring after an encounter, or some portion of the encounter, is completed” (Beckman et al., 1989 as 
cited in Ong et al., 1995: 910).   
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Patient satisfaction was the most recognised and frequently used outcome measure in the 
praxis literature reviewed by Ong et al. (1995: 910-911).  The reviewers report the following 
findings regarding patient satisfaction with clinical communication.  Patients are often 
dissatisfied with the information communicated by doctors.  Part of the reason is that doctors 
frequently underestimate patients‟ need for information.  A strong relationship exists between 
patient satisfaction and doctors‟ information-giving behaviour.  Patient satisfaction is also 
related to the length of the consultation, with longer consultations resulting in greater patient 
satisfaction.  Patients are less satisfied with a dominant and high control style of doctor 
communication compared to doctors who use more affective communication behaviour.  
Affective communication behaviour aims to address the patient‟s need to feel known and 
understood and to form and maintain a positive doctor-patient relationship.  This type of 
communication includes statements and non-verbal behaviour with definite socio-emotional 
content and intent.  Furthermore patients‟ satisfaction with the clinical encounter increases 
when their requests are met (Ong et al., 1995:906).   
Patient compliance or adherence to treatment is also frequently used to study the 
effectiveness of doctor-patient communication.  Yet, research results do not show a clear 
relationship between doctor-patient communication and later patient compliance.  Patients 
often do not follow their doctor‟s advice (Ong et al., 1995:911).  Willems et al. (2005:139) 
state that increased information-giving, positive talk and a participatory style as well as 
empathy by doctors lead to patient compliance.  Patients also often do not recall or 
understand the information that they receive from doctors.  Patient understanding is 
significantly related to the amount of time that the doctor spends on providing information 
and medical opinions.  Furthermore patients often cannot recall much of the information that 
a doctor provided during the consultation.  The communication that takes place at the start 
and at the end of a consultation are the most salient and are therefore better remembered by 
patients, compared to information imparted during the middle-section of the interaction.  It is 
also known that when upsetting information is communicated, such as the diagnosis of a life-
threatening condition, most patients are too shocked to take note of any information provided 
to them thereafter.  Patient recall is also strongly associated with the amount of information 
that the doctor provides to the patient, and with the doctor‟s information-giving behaviour 
(Ong et al., 1995:911-912).   
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Certain aspects of doctors‟ communication are associated with better health outcomes for 
patients, such as reduced controlling behaviours (and more control by patients), more 
affective communication and more information-giving to patients in response to effective 
information seeking on the patient‟s behalf (Ong et al., 1995:912).  Furthermore, doctors‟ 
communication behaviour may affect patients‟ psychological well-being.  Patients‟ 
psychological morbidity as a function of the doctor-patient relationship is a frequent topic in 
psychosocial oncology research.  Various psychological difficulties may arise for patients 
during the diagnosis and treatment of cancer, such as uncertainty, anxiety, depression and 
coping problems.  These difficulties appear to be related to a lack of information (Ong et al., 
1995:912).  Coyle and Sculco (2003:214) found that doctors‟ missteps in communication may 
harm the patient with cancer by causing a loss of hope, a sense of abandonment and reduced 
feelings of dignity and self-worth.  
I mentioned before that patients‟ socio-economic and cultural backgrounds may influence 
their communication with doctors.  Willems et al. (2005) conducted a review of empirical 
research studies to determine whether patients‟ socio-economic status (SES) influenced 
doctor-patient communication
91
.  The authors found a difference in the nature of doctor-
patient communication based on the patient‟s SES.  Patients with a lower SES receive less 
verbal affective communication and less diagnostic and treatment information from doctors.  
Furthermore doctors use a more directive and less participatory consulting style, more 
biomedical talk and question asking and more physical examination during interactions with 
patients from lower social classes.  These patients also have less control over communication 
with doctors.  The differences in doctors‟ communication behaviour can partially be 
explained by differences in the patients‟ communication behaviour.  A patient‟s 
communicative style is directly influenced by his/her personal and social characteristics such 
as age, level of education and gender.  Patients with a higher level of education generally are 
active communicators, that is, they ask questions and are opinionated and use affective 
communication behaviour during interactions with doctors.  This active communicative style 
elicits information from doctors.  A smaller cultural gap also exists between doctors and 
patients who received tertiary education, which may help such patients in their interactions 
with doctors.  In contrast, patients with a low SES ask fewer questions, do not frequently 
express their opinion, do not often display affective communication behaviour and have a 
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 The authors included all doctor-patient communication studies that directly mentioned patients‟ SES, or any of 
the following determinants of SES: level of education, income level or occupation (Willems et al. 2005:140).   
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lower preference for decision-making during clinical interactions.  Such a communicative 
style distances the doctor from the patient and leads to fewer partnership building statements 
by doctors, which further discourages the patient‟s active participation in the clinical 
encounter.  It thus seems that doctors and patients from lower social groups are caught in a 
vicious cycle (Willems et al., 2005:143-144).   
However, Willems et al. (2005:142-144) found that doctors communicate differently with 
different groups of patients, regardless of the patients‟ communicative style.  Doctors provide 
more diagnostic and health information to patients with more education and a higher SES.  
This might be due to an inaccurate assumption by doctors that patients with low levels of 
education and income are not interested in information about their health, or that they will not 
know what such information means.  There is also evidence that doctors do not involve 
patients from lower social classes in treatment decisions to the same extent that patients with 
a higher SES are involved.  Doctors perceive patients with a low SES to have a limited 
interest in and ability to participate in their health care.  Although such perceptions are not 
necessarily accurate, they have a profound influence on doctors‟ behaviour.  Patients with 
lower levels of education are thus doubly disadvantaged: first by their passive communication 
style, and secondly by doctors‟ misperceptions of their need for information.  Willems et al. 
(2005:144) emphasise that variation exists between the communication styles of individual 
doctors, and that exceptions to the generalisations mentioned above are reflected in the 
literature.   
Schouten & Meeuwesen (2006) conducted a review of observational, doctor-patient 
communication studies with the aim of gaining insight into the effects of doctors‟ and 
patients‟ cultural background on communication during clinical encounters.  Fourteen 
research studies were included in their review of which 11 were conducted in the USA, two in 
The Netherlands and one in Australia.  In these studies intercultural doctor-patient 
communication meant that the doctors belonged to the main-stream culture (they are referred 
to as white), and that patients belonged to ethnic minority groups
92
 (Schouten & Meeuwesen, 
2006:23-25).  The reviewers found considerable differences and difficulties to be present in 
the communication between doctors and patients from different cultural groups, compared to 
monocultural clinical interactions.  Doctors display less affective communication behaviour 
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 In the American studies ethnic minority groups were described as Hispanic, Latino, Asian or African 
American.  The two Dutch studies described the ethnic minority patients as Surinamese, Turkish or Moroccan, 
whereas the Australian study described ethnic minority patients as Aboriginal.   
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and provide less information in interactions with patients from ethnic minority groups.  
Patients from ethnic minority groups also speak less and appear less assertive and affective 
compared to white patients.  Very few research studies on inter-cultural clinical 
communication investigate the reasons for and the effects of these differences (Schouten & 
Meeuwesen, 2006:28).   
A number of remarks can be made regarding doctor-patient communication as it was 
described in the preceding pages of this chapter.  Firstly, despite the wealth of praxis literature 
on doctor-patient communication our understanding of this subject remains limited.  Ong et 
al. (1995:903) attribute this to the complexity of the doctor-patient relationship.  There are 
also problems with the theoretical foundation and methodologies of many of the studies 
which form the praxis literature on doctor-patient encounters.  Secondly, it is clear that 
doctor-patient communication is central to the practice of medicine, and a very important 
aspect of the patient‟s illness experience.  Thirdly, it is evident that substantial problems 
occur in the communication between doctors and patients (Kurtz et al., 2005:14)
93
.  It is clear 
that many of these problems are related to factors that may lead to difficult inter-personal 
communication in settings other than health care, such as educational settings.  Examples of 
such factors are differences between the social class and level of education and/or culture of 
communication partners.   
In the next section I shall describe some important insights from the discourse literature on 
doctor-patient encounters.  The discourse literature is younger and much smaller than the 
body of praxis literature (Ainsworth-Vaughn, 2003:453).  I pay specific attention to the work 
of Hunter (1991; 1992), Mishler (1984), Barry et al. (2001); Ainsworth-Vaughn (1998) and 
Anspach (1988).  These authors pay attention to the narratives of the clinical encounter and to 
what we can learn about biomedicine and medical discourse by studying medical case 
presentations.  
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 I also referred to these problems in the Introduction of the dissertation.   
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4.3 Insights from the discourse literature on the doctor-
patient encounter  
4.3.1 Medicine’s narratives  
Kathryn Montgomery Hunter (1939- ) has been teaching courses in humanities to North 
American medical students since the mid-nineteen seventies.  Her formal education was in 
English.  In 1983 she undertook an ethnographic research study aimed at “describing the 
customs and habits and assumptions of medicine‟s teachers and learners” by observing them 
in an academic medical centre
94
 (Hunter, 1991: xxi).  The book and articles that resulted from 
her qualitative research project are highly original and instructive and are often cited in the 
discourse literature on the doctor-patient encounter.   
Hunter (1992:116) claims that “medicine is fundamentally narrative…and its daily practice is 
filled with stories.  Most important are the opening stories that patients tell their physicians”.  
These are the stories by which patients gain entry into “the world of the ill”.  The patient 
describes and explains his/her illness to the doctor, in terms of its events, their chronology and 
its common-sense aetiology or cause (Hunter, 1992:116).  Hunter (1992:116) provides the 
following example of such an autobiographical account: “I‟d been feeling pretty good, even 
with the bursitis – I‟d been doing some overtime – but then today, almost every step I took, it 
hurt something awful”. 
The doctor then interrogates and expands the patient‟s story by questioning the patient 
directly and collecting data through physical and special examinations of the functioning of 
the patient‟s body (Hunter, 1992:116).  Poirier & Brauner (1988:5) state that when the doctor 
starts to question the patient, (s)he also starts to manipulate the patient‟s story by the 
questions that (s)he asks and the manner in which (s)he organises the information according 
to the prescribed format of the medical report.  The doctor thus transforms the patient‟s story 
into medical information.  Later the doctor returns the story to the patient in the form of a 
diagnosis, “an interpretive retelling that points toward the story‟s ending”.  Patients‟ stories 
are thus not the only narratives in medicine.  In fact, Hunter (1992:116) observes that “the 
space between the patient‟s first words to the physician‟s closing recommendation to the 
patient is filled with medicine‟s narratives”.  The doctor‟s discourse about illness also has the 
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 An academic medical centre is affiliated with a university which trains medical doctors and other health care 
professionals.   
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structure of a story.  Medical diagnoses and treatment plans are narrative in the sense of being 
organized in space and time, with one thing resulting in another (Frank, 2010:52).  Medical 
stories have long been a successful manner of managing difficulties in diagnosis and 
treatment.  After the patient has told his/her story, the doctor locates the chronological 
ordering of the illness‟ details in “a narrative taxonomy of similar cases” (Hunter, 1992:116-
117).  The medical narrative enables the doctor to construct a more or less coherent unity 
from the welter of clinical facts about the individual patient (Hunter, 1992:118).   
Hunter (1992: 128) draws a comparison between the nature and rationality of clinical 
medicine and literature.  She uses the metaphor of reading to illustrate the process by which 
doctors interpret the conditions of individual patients.   
The patients are the texts to be examined and studied and understood by the 
physician…Physicians are the readers of these texts, and like all readers, they read by 
understanding the signs and fitting them together into a recognisable, communicable 
whole (Hunter, 1992:118-119). 
The patient-as-text is constituted by the patient‟s report of his/her subjective experience of 
illness (the symptoms), his/her answers to the doctor‟s specific questions, the noticeable signs 
of the body‟s dysfunction which the doctor discovers during the physical examination, and 
finally the results of diagnostic tests which the doctor may have ordered or performed 
(Hunter, 1992:119).  The doctor is a sophisticated reader of this text, comparable to the 
literary critic.  The doctor arrives at the text loaded with theoretical knowledge, assumptions 
and hypotheses.  (S)he has expectations about what will be read, how it should be read and 
how its meaning will be understood.  The doctor‟s status as an expert reader is based on 
his/her familiarity with a wide variety of comparable texts, his/her understanding “of the 
genres (or taxonomy) of those texts” and the traditions from which these texts developed 
(Hunter, 1992:119).   
The doctor‟s medical narrative, for instance the one that is recorded in the patient‟s folder or 
presented to colleagues during hospital ward rounds, does not bear a resemblance to the 
patient‟s experience of the illness (Hunter, 1992:117).  The doctor only reports on those 
details of the patient‟s life that reflects medicine‟s methods and values (Poirier & Brauner, 
1988:5) The doctor does not ask the patient questions about the matters that may trouble 
him/her most, such as the patient‟s pain, the impact of the illness on his/her work and/or 
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family life or his/her anxiety about the severity of the illness.  Instead the doctor asks 
questions regarding other matters, some of which appear unrelated to the patient‟s concerns.  
The doctor pieces together the patient‟s story and his/her answers to the doctor‟s questions 
and translate these into pathophysiological concepts.  Medical students are taught that case 
presentations
95
 should be concise and relevant.  For the purposes of case presentations during 
(academic) hospital rounds, medical trainees are instructed to leave out a detailed chronology 
of the patient‟s history.  Instead they are taught to focus on the history of the patient‟s medical 
problem and its management and to provide a summary of the problems present in the 
patient‟s various organ systems (Anspach, 1988:360,362).  The official record of the doctor‟s 
story sounds official and bureaucratic since the narrator is removed and the tone is 
“prescribed and objective”.  Medical narratives use a “self-enclosed dialect” and follow strict 
rules “that define the genre” (Hunter, 1992:118).  The medical narrative has a strict order and 
uses narrowly descriptive language that does not express emotion.  In the doctor‟s account 
“irrelevancies” are eliminated and abnormal physical details are highlighted.  The medical 
narrative takes this form in order to separate the patient‟s subjective account of discomfort 
and abnormality from the doctor‟s more objective perspective of the case.  The flatness also 
establishes the “emotional detachment” that is regarded as necessary for the on-going and 
ingenious care of the patient.  Furthermore, the style of the medical narrative accentuates the 
pattern of the evidence so that the doctor can identify the “intellectual puzzle posed by the 
illness” without difficulty.  The medical narrative may sound “chillingly unrecognisable and 
scientific”, yet this is precisely the reason for the patient‟s visit to the doctor:  “to have his 
story retold as a medical story as a part of the effort to determine the meaning of the events he 
reports” (Hunter, 1992:117).  A physician-reader is required to transform the ill person into a 
patient with a disease which can be attended to.  “Like the tree that falls in the forest unheard, 
the readerless text has a dubious existence” (Hunter, 1992:122).   
Who is the author of the patient-as-text?  When one considers the active and forceful role of 
the doctor in cases of serious and extended illness, and the doctor‟s centrality in the treatment 
of disease, one might agree with the doctors who see themselves as the authors of the text that 
is the patient.  Yet, Hunter (1992:121) argues, this is a simplistic view which also ignores the 
                                                 
95
 Case presentation refers to a doctor‟s or student-doctor‟s recounting of a case, namely a “medical account of a 
malady constructed from the patient‟s words and body”, to a medical audience (Hunter, 1991:51).  Case 
presentation may take place orally or on paper and may take place on a number of occasions including formal 
conferences (such as morbidity and mortality conferences) or daily rounds, that is when a new patient is admitted 
to a hospital ward or when a new doctor takes charge of a specific hospital ward (Anspach, 1988:360).  I make a 
further comment on doctors‟ usage of the word “case” in a footnote within section 4.3.3 of this chapter.   
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significance of the patient and his/her story.  One may then argue that the doctor and patient 
act as co-authors of the same narrative.  Again Hunter (1992:121) objects: 
As a model for the relationship between physician and patient…co-authorship accords 
the physician a much too central role in the life drama of the person who is ill.  It is 
interpretive work that the physician is doing, not original composition, nor even (except 
in rare cases) co-composition.  Physicians who have attended the funeral of one of their 
patients have this brought home to them in a striking manner.  The discovery that 
neither the physician nor the disease has been the strongest force in a patient‟s life 
comes as a surprise and a relief.   
The following reflections of two doctors serve as examples: 
...the funeral helps me bring “living” and “medicine” into proper perspective.  In a 
special way it gives me perhaps my best understanding of how that person fit into his or 
her community, and how medical care fit into that life – on the patient‟s own ground – 
away from the demeaning patient gowns, the sterile professional uniforms, and the 
white lights of the intensive care unit.  The funeral brings that person back home to the 
community to rest; we are part of that community too (Irvine, 1985:1705)
96
.   
Contrary to common thinking, attending the funerals of special patients does not give 
me closure; rather, attending the funerals provides lasting memories.  My dead patients 
have come to life in ways that I had never known.  Learning about their personal and 
professional accomplishments, I came away from each funeral or memorial service 
wondering whether this was the same person I actually took care of in life (Sherman, 
2002:11).   
After listening to and augmenting the patient‟s story of his/her illness and observing signs of 
the disease in the patient‟s body, the doctor returns to the patient a transformed and 
medicalized version of the story in the form of a diagnosis.  The doctor‟s story may be foreign 
to the patient: “strange, depersonalised, unlived and unlivable 97 , incomprehensible or 
terrifyingly clear” (Hunter, 1992:122).  It is important that the doctor‟s story is reintegrated in 
the form of an interpretation of events into the patient‟s continuing life story – “whether that 
                                                 
96
 I first encountered Irvine‟s striking observation in Hunter (1991:12).   
97
 Where I made use of direct quotations, I have preserved the author‟s original spelling, in favour of the British 
English spelling of my own writing.  
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story is one of health or illness, successful treatment, physical limitation, or approaching 
death” (Hunter, 1992:122).  This may be difficult since the patient‟s story of his/her illness 
experience is distorted, flattened and almost obliterated in its medical version.  When the 
doctor‟s story is laden with medical language it may be nearly unrecognisable to the patient, 
and may have almost no use as an explanation of the patient‟s experience (Hunter, 1992:122).   
A silent tug-of-war over the possession of the story of illness is frequently at the heart 
of the tension between doctors and patients, for that tension is in part a struggle over 
who is to be its author and in what language, a struggle for the interpretation of life (and 
death) events (Hunter, 1992:122).  
Despite the fact that the doctor‟s story partly derives from the story of the patient, and that 
these two narratives each give an account of the same events, the two stories must be 
distinguished.  The stories are told from different perspectives and have different motives and 
themes.  The difference between these narratives is seldom admitted in medicine, yet it is vital 
for the care of the individual patient.  The illness is owned by the person who is ill.  The 
patient‟s experience and story of his/her illness is the fundamental fact in clinical medicine.  
The illness events do not exist for the doctor‟s story, even if the doctor‟s story gives them a 
medical meaning.  Two separate stories thus exist (Hunter, 1992:122-123).   
The patient‟s narrative is a simple chronology, with an implicit aetiology, of the events 
of illness.  The physician‟s narrative, constructed from this report and the findings of 
the physical examination, tells the story of the discovery of the diagnosis.  Thus it is not 
strictly chronological but, beginning with the immediate past, delves into “history” and 
then, by means of tests, moves on into the not yet known (Hunter, 1992:123).   
Individuals who seek health care from doctors trained in biomedicine have often adopted the 
language of scientific medicine into their beliefs and lore about health and disease.  This is 
generally true for members of Western communities.  When such persons feel ill, they 
interpret their symptoms according to the language of the Western folk belief which 
developed from modern medicine, and this preliminary understanding leads them to visit the 
doctor.  They want an expert reader, one with knowledge of these issues and what they mean, 
to provide them with an objective understanding of their illness.  “Patients often seek in the 
physician‟s story the deconstruction of their own interpretation of these symptoms.  „Is it 
serious?‟ the patient asks.  „It‟s not cancer, is it?‟”  The formation of the doctor‟s story, the 
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medical story, is the immediate aim of the consultation.  Despite the importance of this 
reinterpretation for the doctor‟s task and for the patient, the doctor‟s story cannot change the 
precedence of the experience of the patient (Hunter, 1992:122-123). 
 
4.3.2 The voices of doctor-patient interviews 
Elliot G Mishler (1924- ) studied doctor-patient encounters during his tenure as professor and 
psychologist at the Harvard Medical School.  He produced one of the first major books on this 
topic from the perspective of discourse.  In his book on doctor-patient encounters Mishler 
(1984:121) argues that the discourse of medical interviews is a dialectic between two separate 
voices and that it entails “conflict and struggle between two different domains of meaning”.  
The two voices that Mishler refers to are the voices of medicine and of the lifeworld.  In this 
section I shall briefly reconstruct Mishler‟s argument.   
Mishler (1984:5, 60) aimed to describe the characteristic or typical structure of medical 
interviews
98 .  He uses the term “unremarkable interviews” to refer to interviews that 
researchers, doctors and patients with a shared culture intuitively recognise as appropriate or 
“normal and unproblematic”.  This sense of appropriateness is dependent on shared 
understandings and implicit assumptions about the style and content of talk during doctor-
patient encounters (Mishler,1984:59-60).  Mishler (1984:67-68) discovered a “basic structural 
unit of discourse” in unremarkable interviews between doctors and patients.   This unit occurs 
regularly and routinely in unremarkable medical interviews.  The unit consists of three 
consecutive utterances, namely  
 
i. a request or question from the doctor;  
ii. a response by the patient; and 
iii. an assessment or acknowledgement of the patient‟s response by the doctor.   
 
                                                 
98
 Mishler (1984) uses the term „medical interview(s)‟ to refer to doctor-patient interaction(s).  The term medical 
interview was therefore added to the list of synonyms for doctor-patient communication in this dissertation.   
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The doctor then adds a new request or question to this third utterance, and so the next cycle of 
discourse begins.  Medical interviews which are recognised and accepted as standard and 
appropriate tend to be made up of a connected series of these structural units.  The dual 
function of doctors‟ questions, namely to terminate the existing discourse cycle and to 
simultaneously set the next cycle in motion, provides an impression that the medical 
interview possesses coherence and continuity (Mishler, 1984:95).   
The primary function of the basic three-utterance discourse unit is that it allows the doctor to 
control the development and the content of the medical interview.  By being the first as well 
as the last speaker in each discourse cycle, the doctor is in control of the turn-taking system of 
the interaction.  The doctor determines when the patient takes a conversational turn.  The 
doctor also controls the content of the interview through the questions that (s)he asks and the 
assessments that (s)he makes.  All new topics are initiated by the doctor.  The doctor‟s 
questions and assessments selectively pay attention to some particulars in the patient‟s 
responses, while dismissing other details.  A “systematic bias” occurs in the focus of the 
doctor‟s attention.  Only physical signs that are possibly related to the patient‟s symptoms and 
physical details of symptoms receive attention in the doctor‟s speech.  Any mention in the 
patient‟s account of the role that symptoms play in his/her life is systematically ignored by the 
doctor.  The doctor also maintains control of the interview by means of the syntactic structure 
of the questions s(he) poses.  Doctors tend to ask patients closed-end questions which restrict 
the “range of relevance for patient responses” (Mishler, 1984: 69-70, 75-76).   
The clear pattern of unremarkable interviews implies that the discourse of the medial 
interview expresses a specific voice.  Since the doctor dominates the interview Mishler 
(1984:71) refers to this voice as the “voice of medicine”.  The voice of medicine refers to the 
perspective of the biomedical model (Mishler, 1984:90).  The standard diagnostic 
examination, or the unremarkable interview, is a practical application of the biomedical model 
(Mishler, 1984:120).   
Another voice appears in the medical interview, namely “the voice of the lifeworld”.  Patients 
may make an effort to interrupt the dominant voice of medicine by using the voice of the 
lifeworld (Mishler, 1984:77).  Patients use this voice when they speak about problems that 
they experience in life which are related to or resulting from their symptoms (Mishler, 
1984:91).  The voice of the lifeworld describes “the patient‟s contextually-grounded 
experiences of events and problems in her life”.  The temporal characteristics and significance 
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of lifeworld events depend on the patient‟s life situation and his/her social position (Mishler, 
1984:104).  Doctors tend to regard information in the voice of the lifeworld as irrelevant.  In 
unremarkable doctor-patient encounters the doctor is fast to suppress the voice of the 
lifeworld and to reinstate the voice of medicine as the dominant voice in the discourse.  It is 
the dominance of the voice of medicine that brings about the intuitive impression that an 
interview represents standard clinical practice (Mishler, 1984:77).  When patients make an 
effort to sustain the voice of the lifeworld the medical interview appears less typical.  Patients 
may disrupt the routine order of the interview, and thus the voice of medicine, by introducing 
a new topic in the voice of the lifeworld (Mishler, 1984:86-87).  A struggle for control of the 
interview between the voices of medicine and the lifeworld may then occur (Mishler, 
1984:91).  In the words of Arney & Bergen (1984:1-2): 
When the self begins to speak about its experience of suffering an illness, it confronts a 
rule that we all learned governed the traditional medical encounter:  “You shall speak 
only about things the physician designates important to the medical encounter; 
otherwise, keep silent.”  When the self speaks of the experience of being or becoming a 
patient, it speaks about what is important to it, not necessarily about what is important 
to the physician.  And there lies a potential conflict. 
As most studies of doctor-patient interaction, the discourse analysis that has led to Mishler‟s 
(1984:98) findings presented above was based on the „silent‟ assumption of physician 
dominance.  Problems are encountered when discourse analysis which is based on the 
identification of the basic three-utterance discourse unit, is applied to interviews where the 
voice of the lifeworld attempts to interrupt the voice of medicine (Mishler, 1984:88).  Mishler 
(1984:97) argues that although the findings of traditional analytic efforts implicitly criticises 
medical practice by creating an impression of doctor coerciveness and dominance, the 
analysis itself remains located in the voice of medicine. 
The salience of the voice of medicine in the analysis, the findings of physician 
dominance and control, the description of the patient‟s lifeworld concerns as 
“interruptions” – all these ways of formulating and analysing the structure of the 
discourse and its problems function to maintain and reaffirm the dominance of the 
medical voice.  In other words, the analysis remains confined within the phenomenon.  
It does not question the assumptions of the voice of medicine.  In the end, the power of 
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medicine and the dominant role of the physician are intact and untouched (Mishler, 
1984:97).  
Prompted by the realisation of the medical orientation of his former analytic efforts, Mishler 
(1984:99) attempted a fresh approach to the analysis of unremarkable medical interviews.  His 
new approach is based on the assumption that “the patient‟s account is primary”.  During the 
medical interview the patient must tell a story with the theme of a lifeworld problem.  The 
telling of the patient‟s story is interrupted by the doctor‟s speech in the voice of medicine.  
Mishler‟s reanalysis, which he also refers to as „the interruption analysis‟ (Mishler, 
1984:106), produced new insights into the doctor-patient encounter.   
In his reanalysis Mishler (1984:105-112) investigated the manner in which the medical 
interview is shaped and structured through the interaction between the voices of medicine and 
of the lifeworld.  Based on the assumption that the patient‟s account is primary, the structure 
of medical interviews appears to be fragmented and discontinuous, whereas medical 
interviews seemed coherent and continuous from the perspective of physician dominance.  
The impression of fragmentation is created by shifts in the content of the interview as the 
doctor interrupts the voice of the lifeworld and takes up a conversational turn in the voice of 
medicine.  The apparent coherence of the medical interview that was revealed through the 
first method of analysis is achieved by the doctor‟s systematic exclusion of the voice of the 
lifeworld.  Patients also make shifts between the two voices, but this usually occurs within the 
patient‟s conversational turn.  Shifts from the voice of medicine to the voice of the lifeworld 
may occur in the patient‟s speech as (s)he answers the doctor‟s question and then adds 
lifeworld content, perhaps in an attempt to introduce a new topic.  Such utterances by patients, 
wherein shifts between the two voices are made, may be seen “as efforts by the patient to 
maintain coherence and continuity” in the telling of his/her story and over the disruption of 
his/her story by the doctor.   
Again the power of questions in the doctor‟s discourse is evident.  Previously it was 
mentioned that doctors use questions to control the turn-taking system and the structure of 
medical interviews in terms of the sequences of speakers and the length and type of 
utterances.  Mishler‟s (1984:110-112) interruption analysis shows that doctors also use 
questions to control “the flow of content toward the lifeworld or toward medicine”.  The 
doctor‟s questions are almost always in the voice of medicine and they function as “points of 
return from any other utterance”.   
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Every utterance, by either physician or patient, and in either voice, can be followed by a 
question from the physician…All roads lead back to the physician‟s question.  In 
contrast, lifeworld topics introduced by the patient lead only to self-elaboration of the 
topic, at best; the discourse is then returned to point zero by the physician‟s question in 
the voice of medicine (Mishler, 1984:110-112).   
Mishler‟s (1984: 112-120) reanalysis of medical interviews not only attempted to describe the 
structure of the interviews, but also the meaning of the voice of medicine and the voice of the 
lifeworld.  The structure of meaning expressed in the voice of medicine may be characterised 
as follows.  The primary and exclusive emphasis of the voice of medicine is on the 
description of reality based on its objective, physical characteristics, in other words “an 
„objective‟ reality that has standard physical properties for all persons”.  Events are given 
meaning through abstract rules which remove the events from their specific personal and 
social contexts.  This process is referred to as decontextualization.   
The doctor introduces various topics throughout the medical interview.  These topics mostly 
concern the patient‟s symptoms or different stages of the patient‟s life.  The doctor makes no 
connection between the topics that (s)he initiates throughout the interview.  (S)he may ask the 
patient a number of questions related to a particular topic, moving in direction from the 
general to the specific.  The increase in the specificity of the doctor‟s questions pertaining to 
individual topics is aimed at an objective, physical description of the patient‟s symptoms.  
Patients may be confused by questions which are disconnected from the previous 
conversational topic.  Yet, patients attempt to answer the doctor‟s questions, even when some 
questions may appear inappropriate.  It is probable that patients and observers who belong to 
Western cultural groups assume that doctors have good reasons for the questions which they 
ask.  We assume that the doctor uses a specific underlying model of causality which specifies 
relationships between separate symptoms (Mishler, 1984:120).  As Arney & Bergen (1984:8) 
observe, the patient cannot understand the intentions behind the doctor‟s actions.  The patient 
has no language or dictionary to consult in order to make sense of what the doctor does.  The 
structure and content of the doctor‟s questions reflect the biomedical model which regards 
symptoms as significant and the relations between symptoms as indicators of specific disease 
processes.  Yet, no evidence of this model appears in the discourse.  The doctor‟s reasoning 
process remains invisible and inaudible in the medical interview (Mishler, 1984:120; Ten 
Have, 1991:141; Groopman, 2007:8).   
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A vastly different structure of meaning belongs to the voice of the lifeworld.  Meaningful 
causal links exist among the events that patients experience and recount.  These events are 
also self-centered.  Furthermore the patient‟s account in the voice of the lifeworld is coherent.  
This coherence may be achieved by repeated mention of certain states or actions, by 
connections made between the past and the present (for instance by mention of symptoms that 
occurred earlier and which are again experienced at the present time) or by temporal 
organisation of the events described.  However, the coherence of meanings in the voice of the 
lifeworld is difficult to discern in the medical interview due to the doctor‟s disruption of the 
flow and organisation of the patient‟s story.  The patient has to work actively to express an 
account that (s)he finds coherent and meaningful, because (s)he is constantly interrupted by 
the doctor who verbalizes the voice of medicine.  The structure of the doctor‟s questions 
differs greatly from the structure of the patient‟s account.  The doctor‟s questions aim to 
define and classify separate symptoms one after the other, and are not directed at the relations 
among symptoms.  Furthermore, the relations between symptoms which may be inferred from 
the doctor‟s questions have no connection with the causal relations between the life events 
that the patient talks about.   
The doctor‟s interruptions of the patient‟s story remove the contexts in which the patient 
experiences his/her problem.  The doctor is likely to ignore the causal and temporal 
connections between the events that the patient describes.  The doctor pays attention to only 
one element in the patient‟s story, namely the symptom, and removes it from the context of 
the patient‟s life and isolates each symptom from the others.  Mishler (1984:121) concludes 
that  
the discourse of medical interviews is not to be understood primarily as one dominated 
by physicians speaking in the voice of medicine with patients intruding their concerns, 
thereby disrupting its smooth flow.  Rather, discourse is revealed as a dialectic between 
the voices of the lifeworld and of medicine; it involves conflict and struggle between 
two different domains of meaning.   
Seventeen years after the publication of Mishler‟s (1984) study Barry et al. (2001), a group of 
British social scientists, published a study which is in many ways similar to Mishler‟s (1984) 
research.  Some differences between the study by Barry et al. (2001:493) and Mishler‟s 
research are the following.  Mishler‟s data were collected in the middle of the 1970‟s in North 
America from research participants from hospital outpatient departments as well as private 
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practices.  Barry et al.‟s (2001:493) data were collected in England in the late 1990‟s in 
general practice settings.  Only white, male doctors participated in Mishler‟s research while 
50% of the doctors in Barry et al.‟s (2001:493) sample were female and 15% of the 
participating doctors were Asian.  Furthermore, Barry et al. (2001:493) followed a more 
complex methodology compared to Mishler.  Mishler‟s data included only transcripts of 
recorded medical interviews whereas Barry et al. (2001: 493) conducted interviews with 
doctors and patients before and/or after their clinical interactions which were also recorded 
and later transcribed and analysed.  Both Barry et al. (2001:492) and Mishler analysed the 
recorded consultations by means of discourse analysis.   
Barry et al. (2001:487) found four different communication patterns between doctors and 
patients compared to the two-part typology described by Mishler.  The British authors credit 
their more complex data collection strategy with their more complex findings.  Barry et al.‟s 
(2001:493) four-part typology is organised around which voice was used, the voice of 
medicine or the voice of the lifeworld; and by whom, patient or doctor.  The four patterns of 
doctor-patient communication are labelled and described as follows (Barry et al., 2001:487; 
493-499):   
 
i. Strictly Medicine: Doctors and patients speak exclusively in the voice of medicine.  
This communication pattern was observed in consultations regarding acute single 
physical conditions, such as tonsillitis and ear infection, presented by patients in 
emergency health care settings
99
.   
ii. Lifeworld Blocked: Patients‟ utterances in the voice of the lifeworld are blocked.  The 
voice of the lifeworld is blocked by the doctor‟s use of (medical) questions which 
allows the doctor to control the turn-taking system and the content of the interview.  In 
these consultations only glimpses of the lifeworld can be observed
100
.   
  
                                                 
99
 Emergency or unbooked consultations take place in emergency clinics and are different in quality from 
consultations by appointment (pre-booked consultations).  Emergency consultations typically have a shorter 
duration compared to pre-booked consultations and doctors focus on efficient throughput of patients in 
emergency health care settings.   
100
 The first two communication patterns correspond with the patterns reported by Mishler (1984). 
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iii. Lifeworld Ignored: Patients‟ utterances in the voice of the lifeworld are ignored.  
Patients‟ utterances are either entirely or predominantly in the voice of the lifeworld.  
Doctors completely ignore these utterances and speak exclusively in the voice of 
medicine.  The previous two communication patterns were observed in consultations 
regarding chronic physical conditions, such as angina, arthritis and asthma. 
iv. Mutual Lifeworld: Both doctors and patients predominantly speak in the voice of the 
lifeworld and doctors do not block the voice of the lifeworld in patients‟ 
communication.  This communication pattern was observed in consultations with 
patients who presented with psychological problems, most of whom also presented 
with a physical problem, for instance stress and indigestion or anxiety and vertigo.   
 
Apart from discourse analysis Barry et al. (2001:492) also analysed how much of each 
participating patient‟s agenda was voiced in each recorded consultation as well as the 
outcomes of the consultation.  They found paradoxically that the consultations with the best 
outcomes were those in which both parties communicated either in the voice of medicine 
(Strictly Medicine) or in the voice of the lifeworld (Mutual Lifeworld) (Barry et al., 
2001:501).  Interestingly, the Mutual Lifeworld pattern of communication was not restricted 
to specific doctors.  All of the doctors who responded to and communicated in the voice of 
the lifeworld also used the other communication patterns in which they communicated 
entirely in the voice of medicine.  Based on this finding Barry et al. (2001:499) suggest “that 
the communication behaviours are situation specific, or constructed in interaction rather than 
fixed dispositions of individual doctors”.  It seems that doctors choose their communication 
strategy based on their perception of the patient‟s problem as physical or psychological (Barry 
et al., 2001:503).   
The consultations in which the Lifeworld Ignored and Lifeworld Blocked communication 
patterns were used had the poorest outcomes.  These consultations all involved patients with 
chronic physical conditions.  In these consultations the doctors did not pay attention to or 
responded to the patients‟ need to feel known and understood.  The researchers observed 
many instances of doctors side-stepping, ignoring or avoiding the lifeworld issues raised by 
their patients in these consultations and interpret this as a failure on the doctors‟ part to 
recognise each patient as unique.  The Lifeworld Ignored consultations were the most 
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problematic.  The authors observed active dialectical struggles between the voices of 
medicine and the lifeworld in these interactions.  “Here patients repeatedly returned to the 
concerns of the lifeworld and doctors repeatedly ignored them”.  The patient‟s repetition of a 
lifeworld issue in the face of the doctor‟s disregard might suggest that the patient has strong 
feelings about the issue and the patient wants his/her needs to be heard.  In the Lifeworld 
Ignored and Lifeworld Blocked communication patterns doctors do not view the lifeworld 
concerns of patients with chronic, ostensibly, physical problems as valid or relevant to the 
consultation.  Instead, the patient‟s condition is regarded as a physical problem in need of the 
voice of medicine (Barry et al., 2001:495, 502-504).  Ironically, the experiences of the patient 
with a chronic disorder provide the physician with reliable and important evidence for the 
formulation of a treatment plan and the patient‟s personality codetermines the treatment 
outcome.  Furthermore, the patient with a chronic disorder mainly carries out his/her own 
treatment and even diagnostic actions are mainly dependent on his/her consent and 
cooperation (Szasz & Hollender, 1956:587; Burger, 2001:81)
101
.  The lifeworld concerns of 
patients with chronic problems are thus in fact of critical importance to the consultation.   
The Mutual Lifeworld consultations all involved patients with psychological conditions, 
although most of these patients also reported physical problems.  Barry et al. (2001:497) 
comment that it seems as though the lifeworld can legitimately enter the consultation only 
when patients report psychological problems such as “sleep problems due to anxiety, 
unexplainable psychosomatic symptoms, bereavement depression and anxiety, and depression 
due to job stress”.  The researchers describe Mutual Lifeworld consultations as relaxed and 
similar in some ways to ordinary conversations between friends
102
.  In these consultations 
there are evidence of doctors‟ recognition of and respect for patients‟ unique situations as well 
as “a sense of shared humanity”.  The impression is also created of the patient as an equal 
partner with expertise to offer regarding the diagnosis and treatment of psychological 
difficulties.  In Mutual Lifeworld consultations the patient‟s experiences and emotions are 
allowed and are validated as relevant to the medical world (Barry et al., 2001:496-499).  
Strauss et al. (1982:263) report that oncologists might share aspects of their own lives (and 
                                                 
101
 Paradoxically, doctors often view patients who are unwilling or unable to carry out a prescribed treatment 
plan as troublesome, noncompliant and jeopardising “actual useful therapy”.  Such a judgement probably stems 
from the biomedical worldview that does not regard the patient‟s psychological and social situation as relevant 
in treating disease, which is seen as material and unconnected to the psycho-social realm (Burger, 2001:81).   
102
 Barry et al. (2001:497) note that perhaps the Mutual Lifeworld consultations were in some way conversations 
between friends.  With the exception of one, all of the patients in this group had been consulting their doctor for 
more than two years, and in three cases the patient has been visiting the doctor for eight, 10 and 15 years 
respectively.   
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thus use the voice of the lifeworld) with patients suffering from cancer in hospital settings.  
The authors point out that the reason for this “sentimental work”103  by the specialists is 
“primarily to further the therapeutic work”.  The oncologist needs much information about the 
patient‟s lifeworld in order to set the speed of the prescribed treatment.  The doctor also needs 
to communicate in the voice of the lifeworld to monitor the impact of the treatment on the 
patient‟s life.  Strauss et al. (1982:274) suggest that much of the work that health 
professionals do surrounding medical equipment (such as “X-rays, scanners, monitoring 
machines, respiratory equipment, dialysis machines”) in hospitals cannot be performed with 
ease, efficiency or at all if not accompanied by the required sentimental work.   
Barry et al. (2001:500-501) offer the following explanations for the predominance of the 
voice of the lifeworld in psychological consultations.  Firstly, psychological difficulties “are 
more rooted in the lifeworld”.  Although voice of medicine is involved in discussions about 
the causation of psychological conditions (such as the role of the neurotransmitter Serotonin 
in depression), the definitions of these conditions as well as the outcomes of their treatments 
are discussed in the voice of the lifeworld.  Secondly, a person with an acute physical 
condition such as a broken leg can be decontextualized and nevertheless be successfully 
treated.  In the case of psychological conditions such as anxiety the whole person has to be 
studied in context in order to diagnose, understand and treat.  Psychiatry is also the branch of 
medicine in which talking and listening are most openly thought of as therapeutic (Launer, 
1998 as cited in Barry et al., 2001:500).  Thirdly, general practitioners who are not 
specifically interested in psychiatry have less structured routines and pre-set medical formulas 
to rely on when confronted with psychiatric conditions compared to psychiatrists or 
interactions with patients presenting with unitary physical problems.  General practitioners 
may therefore view the voice of the lifeworld as legitimate discourse for the psychological 
consultation.  In the absence of any pre-set medical formulas to follow, the general 
practitioner depends on his/her everyday communication and life skills.   
Barry et al. (2001:501) also make some interesting comments regarding the Strictly Medicine 
pattern of communication.  In the post-consultation interviews with the researchers these 
patients reported that they were satisfied with their consultations.  Barry et al. (2001:493,501) 
                                                 
103
 Strauss et al. (1982:254) define sentimental work as “an ingredient in any kind of work where the object 
being worked on is alive, sentient, reacting – an ingredient either because deemed necessary to get the work done 
effectively or because of humanistic considerations.  Sentimental work has its source in the elementary fact that 
any work done with or on human beings may have to take into account their response to that instrumental work 
(as with medical work); indeed their responses may be a central feature of that work.”  
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also found the Strictly Medicine consultations to be successful in terms of outcomes.  The 
authors did not observe any hints by the patients in these consultations to indicate that they 
wanted to shift the consultation to the voice of the lifeworld.  The patients, who visited 
emergency surgeries without prior appointments for the treatment of single acute physical 
problems might have been quite pleased to communicate in the voice of medicine.  The 
patients were aware of the time-pressures under which doctors work in emergency medical 
settings.  Unless patients had needs for the consultation apart from simple diagnosis or 
treatment, Barry et al. (2001:501) found no evidence in the interview transcripts of objections 
from patients to “being treated as less than unique [in] this type of consultation”.  Barry et al. 
(2001:501) suggest that there may be “certain types of simple physical problems for which 
the patients can be seen as all the same with no adverse consequences”.  The patients in the 
Strictly Medicine consultations might have been goal-oriented with the wish to achieve their 
goal as efficiently as possible.  It is of course also possible that these patients have learned 
through experience that the voice of the lifeworld is not acceptable in emergency 
consultations regarding acute physical problems (Barry, 2001:501).   
Nancy Ainsworth-Vaughn (1998:41-43), whose ethnographic study and analysis of medical 
discourse have greatly contributed to the discourse literature on doctor-patient encounters, 
agrees with Mishler‟s view of power in doctor-patient interactions.  Ainsworth-Vaughn 
(1998:50-51) disagrees with the frequent description of patients as passive during clinical 
interactions in the research literature on doctor-patient communication.  Similar to Mishler, 
she regards the view of the doctor as the dominant party with all the power and the patient as 
the completely powerless participant as a misinterpretation of the complexity of the dynamics 
of the clinical encounter (Ainsworth-Vaughn, 1998:33).  Ainsworth-Vaughn (1998:42-43) 
discovered that during clinical encounters decisions about future actions (for instance, which 
course of treatment to follow) were negotiated between doctors and patients.  She views 
power in medical encounters as a process.  “Power is constructed moment-to-moment during 
interaction, with all participants being involved, in turn, as either its claimers or its ratifiers”.  
This view corresponds with Foucault‟s (1976:98) view of power as something which freely 
circulates between individuals who are always in the position of concurrently undergoing and 
exercising power.   
Ainsworth-Vaughn (1998:43) describes the ways in which power is constructed in doctor-
patient encounters.  One way in which power is constructed is through discourse actions 
which seek to “control the emerging discourse”.  Ainsworth-Vaughn (1998:43) is here 
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referring to the “successful claims to speaker rights” by participants in the medical interview.  
Speaker rights include the right to take a conversational turn, to hold the floor for an 
acceptable period of time, to introduce and pursue a conversational topic and to bring a topic 
of conversation to an end.  Another way in which power is constructed in the clinical 
encounter is through actions which seek to control “plans, decisions, and physical actions”, 
for instance treatment plans.  Doctors and patients use a number of discourse actions to claim 
power during interactions, such as to interrupt or to ask questions (Ainsworth-Vaughn, 
1998:51).   
Control over the emerging discourse and the outcomes of the interaction are available to the 
doctor and to the patient.  However, the doctor may have greater access to and ease in 
securing control.  Doctors claim power during interactions with patients, based on their 
official connection with the social institution of medicine.  Doctors also have a high social 
standing, which provides them with a basis for control of the medical interview (Ainsworth-
Vaughn, 1998:42-43).  The doctor‟s role in the clinical interaction, namely to diagnose and 
treat disease, provides him/her with the right to question the patient.  Patients are aware of the 
bases of doctors‟ claims for power and as a result patients have a need to demonstrate 
deference towards medical practitioners.  “Deference is a universal cultural phenomenon 
whereby speakers acknowledge others‟ socially conferred authority”.  Ainsworth-Vaughn 
(1998:47) refers to the techniques that patients use to demonstrate deference as “mitigation”.  
The social norms for biomedical encounters allow patients to ask doctors for their opinion.  It 
may however be hard for patients to propose a course of action to the doctor, since the doctor 
is culturally viewed as the party who makes treatment suggestions.  When a patient wishes to 
make a proposal during a clinical interaction (s)he may need to present it in a heavily 
mitigated manner.  Patients may show deference in a number of ways during medical 
interviews, for instance by presenting proposals in the form of questions, by asking indirect 
rather than direct questions to the doctor, by answering the doctor‟s question(s) before 
attempting to introduce a new topic for discussion, by using hesitations, by refraining from 
interrupting the doctor‟s speech or by using the respect term „doctor‟.  Patient‟s deference 
must not be mistaken for passivity, which refers to a refusal to claim power.  “Deference is 
not the same as acquiescence”.  Mitigation may however dilute the patient‟s claims to his/her 
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speaker rights and his/her attempts to control the outcomes of the interaction
104
 (Ainsworth-
Vaughn, 1998:44-47).   
An acknowledgement of patients‟ active role in the construction of the discourse and the 
outcomes of medical encounters does not deny that doctors often abuse their positions of 
power (Ainsworth-Vaughn, 1998:33).  Doctors often interrupt patients‟ speech.  This means 
that the doctor takes a conversational turn before the patient has finished his/her turn.  
Ainsworth-Vaughn (1998:33-34) views such interruptions as violations of the patient‟s 
speaker right to complete his/her point while holding the floor.  It also reflects disrespect for 
the patient and a failure on the doctor‟s behalf to view his/her relationship with the patient as 
a partnership.  Often doctors‟ interruptions are not necessary in order to achieve the medical 
aims of the interview.  When doctors interrupt patients‟ conversational turns, the patient has 
to work hard to implement his or her agenda.  Not all patients may be up to this task, and may 
be totally silenced and disenfranchised by a doctor‟s controlling communicative style 
(Ainsworth-Vaughn, 1998:50-51).  My earlier description of the communication behaviour of 
patients with a low socio-economic status, show that these patients are especially vulnerable 
to domination by the powerful voice of medicine.   
 
4.3.3 The language of case presentations 
The extensive research literature on doctor-patient communication has not paid much 
attention to a very important social phenomenon, namely the formal case
105
 presentations that 
doctors deliver to each other in hospital settings.  While many studies aim to describe the 
communication between doctors and patients, very few researchers have paid attention to 
doctors‟ discussions of patients with other doctors (Donnelly, 1986:81; Anspach, 1988:358).  
The sociologist, Renee Anspach (1988) conducted a study of the language of case 
                                                 
104
 Patients may of course also exercise power over future plans by non-verbal means, such as a decision not to 
hand in a doctor‟s prescription for medicine at a pharmacy, or a decision not to return to the same doctor for a 
follow-up appointment (Ainsworth-Vaughn, 1998:43).  
105
 Donnelly (1986:84) reminds us that the word “case” was used for the first time in the eighteenth‟s century to 
refer to “an instance or condition of disease in a patient”.  Yet, over time doctors have come to use the word to 
refer to patients (as opposed to diseases).  The latter use has become so frequent and institutionalized that some 
recent dictionaries explain the word accordingly.  The latter usage of the word “blurs the distinction between the 
patient and his disease” and in my view is a symptom of biomedicine‟s prioritization of disease at the expence of 
concern about the person suffering from illness.   
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presentation
106
.  She argues that case presentation does more than simply convey information 
about patients from one doctor to his/her colleagues.  Anspach (1988:357) argues that case 
presentation “is an arena in which claims to knowledge are made and epistemological 
assumptions are displayed, a linguistic ritual in which physicians…enact fundamental beliefs 
and values of the medical world”.  Case presentations also provide insight into the dynamics 
of medical discourse (Poirier & Brauner, 1988:6).  In this section I report some of Anspach‟s 
(1988) remarks about the language of case presentation and what this reveal about the nature 
of modern medicine‟s knowledge and culture. 
De-personalization occurs in the lexicon and syntax of case presentations.  For instance, a 
disease or organ system often occurs in the subject position of sentences, as in “the bruit 
(murmur) has decreased significantly…”  Doctors certainly know that the diseases or organs 
they refer to are experienced by or belong to particular individuals.  Yet, the language of case 
presentation suggests that one can separate biological processes from the individuals who 
experience them.  The conception of mind-body dualism in medical knowledge is thus 
reflected in the language of case presentation
107
 (Anspach, 1988: 366).  What also becomes 
evident is the way that the medical culture treats patients as objects and devalues patients‟ 
subjective experiences.  Medical treatment is mostly understood to be directed at diseases and 
organs, and not at patients.  Although the format of the case presentation may include room to 
mention some aspects of the patient‟s social circumstances108, this information is seldom 
integrated with the biomedical elements of the patient‟s story.  The format of the case 
presentation does not lead to a holistic understanding of the patient‟s condition or a holistic 
approach to the care of the patient (Poirier & Brauner, 1988:6).  “In its most extreme form, 
the language of case presentation treats the patient as the passive receptacle for the disease 
rather than as a suffering subject” (Anspach, 1988:372).   
It is not only the patient‟s personal identity that is not mentioned during case presentations.  
The identities of the health care professionals who performed the procedures or made the 
                                                 
106
 After the publication of Anspach‟s (1988) study a number of analyses of the medical case history has 
appeared (Fleischman, 2001: 477, 494-495).  However, Anspach study differs from these subsequent studies in 
its clear and perceptive analysis of medical case histories as well as Anspach‟s attempt to discover the 
epistemological assumptions that influence this written genre of medical discourse (Fleischman, 2001:477, 479).  
107
 Anspach (1988:366) points out that the conception of mind-body dualism is also evident in the general 
Western culture.  The disease is separated from the subject when we speak of a person “having a disease”.   
108
 The aspects of the patient‟s social history that are usually included in the case presentation are “the patient‟s 
marital status, occupation, family size and situation, and smoking and drinking habits” (Poirier & Brauner, 
1988:6) 
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observations that are discussed in the case presentation, are also omitted.  Case presenters 
often make use of the “agentless passive voice” when they refer to clinical observations that 
were made or when they make claims to knowledge.  Some examples are: “both babies were 
noted to have respiratory problems on examination” and “the baby was noted to have 
congestive heart failure” (Anspach, 1988:366-367).  Anspach (1988:367) argues that failure 
to mention the person who made the observation suggests that the observer is immaterial to 
what (s)he observed or „noted‟, or that any person would have made a similar observation or 
would have „noted‟ the same „thing‟.  “Using the passive voice while omitting the observer 
seems to imbue what is being observed with an unequivocal factual status”.   
When doctors do use the active voice during case presentations, they often place various 
medical technologies in the subject position of sentences, that is as the agents.  One of the 
examples that Anspach (1998: 367) uses to illustrate this is: “ausculation of the head revealed 
a very large bruit, and angiography showed a very large arterio-venous malformation in the 
head…”  In statements like this neither the person who performed the procedure, nor the 
process of interpretation of the data delivered by the diagnostic instrument is mentioned.  
Furthermore, the use of verbs such as „revealed‟ and „showed‟ seems to suggest that the data 
gathered by means of measurement instruments “was obtained by a process of scientific 
revelation, rather than equivocal interpretation”.  The language of case presentation point to a 
view of knowledge which regards instruments rather than people as the creators of data 
(Anspach, 1988:368).   
While doctors regard the data obtained from measurement instruments as fact, they treat 
patients‟ reports with scepticism, “as subjective accounts with tenuous links to reality” 
(Anspach, 1988:368).  During case presentations doctors often treat patients‟ accounts of their 
symptoms as subjective narratives made up of statements and reports.  Anspach (1988:368) 
provides this example: “the patient reports she was seen in the emergency room and states 
that she has been having uterine contractions”.  On the contrary doctors present information 
obtained from physicians as factual, using verbs such as „note‟, „observe‟ or „find‟.  
“Physicians „note‟, „observe‟, or „find‟; patients „state‟, „report‟, „claim‟, „complain of‟, 
„admit‟ or „deny‟.  The first verbs connote objective reality (i.e., only concrete entities can be 
noted or observed); the second verbs connote subjective perceptions”.  Medical students are 
taught to make a distinction between the subjective symptoms that are perceived only by 
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patients, and objective signs that can be perceived by experts.  The SOAP
109
 system for the 
clinical evaluation of patients and the recording of progress notes is widely used in teaching 
hospitals.  According to this system medical information provided by the patient is classified 
and recorded as subjective, whereas data produced by physicians or measurement instruments 
are regarded as objective (Anspach, 1998:368-369).  Anspach (1988:371) notes that a “clear 
epistemological hierarchy” exists in the language of case presentation in which diagnostic 
technology has more value than the observations made by physicians, which again carry more 
value than patients‟ accounts.   
 
4.3.4 Summary remarks  
I shall now make some summary remarks regarding what can be learned about the doctor-
patient encounter from the discourse literature on this topic.  The discourse literature makes 
us aware of a silent or submerged conflict which can be found beneath the linguistically 
atheoretical descriptions of doctor-patient encounters of the praxis literature.  The conflict is 
between two stories or two voices:  the patient‟s story and the doctor‟s story; the voice of the 
lifeworld and the voice of medicine.  The struggle “is over the possession of the story of 
illness” (Hunter, 1992:122).  It is a conflict over the meaning of illness and disease.  We are 
reminded of Foucault‟s (1981:52-52) words that discourse “is the thing for which and by 
which there is a struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized”.   
The voice of medicine, the medical discourse which is the focus of this dissertation, bears the 
characteristics of biomedicine.  It speaks and moves in a language that the patient often does 
not understand.  The medical voice values and speaks only of the physical aspects of disease.  
Of that which can be observed directly or by means of diagnostic technology.  It is interested 
only in the diseased body.  Neither the person who suffers the disease nor the health care 
professional, the learned reader of the signs of disease, is seemingly important.   
  
                                                 
109
 SOAP stands for: subjective, objective, assessment, plan (Kibble et al., 2006:230).   
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  152 
4.4 Conclusion 
The mind and soul and social network of the patient also suffer disease.  The patient and those 
close to him/her may be harmed by an approach to healing that ignores these fundamental 
aspects of human existence.  The doctor, who entered the medical profession based on 
charitable reasons, either faces daily conflict between his/her humane aspirations and the 
demands of biomedicine, or has lost contact with those initial caring impulses in the process 
of his/her one-dimensional and rigorous training in the method of modern medicine.   
Despite the many and great successes that modern medicine has achieved in the cure and 
treatment of disease, it seems that its conception of mind-body dualism comes at a cost to 
both patient and healer.  In this chapter I aimed to describe the communication between 
doctors and patients during clinical consultations by means of a discussion of the praxis and 
discourse literature on this topic.  In the next chapter I apply Habermas‟ universal pragmatics 
to this description.   
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Chapter 5 
Universal pragmatics and doctor-patient communication  
 
Science has purchased its very great success by the modesty of its ambition.   
Science does not seek to answer every sort of question. 
Sir John Polkinghorne
110
 
 
…in order to accomplish any public or private goals, people have to talk to each other, and in 
more and more cases, the people come from more or less different cultural backgrounds. 
Deborah Tannen (1985: 203) 
5.1 Introduction  
Up to the current chapter, this dissertation has been merely descriptive.  In Chapter 1 I 
described modern medicine‟s intellectual self-understanding.  Thereafter I described 
Habermas‟ universal pragmatics as well as Foucault‟s theory on the nature of discourse.  The 
preceding chapter was devoted to a description of the empirical research literature on doctor-
patient communication.  The current chapter introduces the analytical work of my project.  In 
this chapter I describe doctor-patient communication, as it was portrayed in the previous 
chapter, in terms of Habermas‟ universal pragmatics.  I shall describe doctor-patient 
communication against the background of Habermas‟ model of linguistic communication and 
thereafter I shall discuss the validity claims in doctor-patient interactions.  I start, however, 
with a few notes on the context of clinical communication.  At this stage my aim is not to 
critique modern medicine‟s intellectual self-image.  I undertake the task of criticism in the 
penultimate chapter.   
  
                                                 
110
 This quotation is from the transcript of a talk by Polkinghorne that appears in a book edited by Eric Metaxas 
(2011:9). 
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5.2 The context of doctor-patient interactions  
Doctor-patient interactions take place in a particular social world which allows the two parties 
to understand each other‟s utterances (Skirbekk, 2004:247-248; Tanenbaum, 2006:200).  In 
Habermas‟ terminology this social world forms the background consensus of doctor-patient 
interactions.  The background consensus of doctor-patient communication includes shared 
understandings of the goal and the rationale of biomedicine, the social status of modern 
medicine as well as the public image and the self-image of biomedicine.  In this section I shall 
briefly describe these elements of the background of the doctor-patient encounter.   
The primary goal and rationale of biomedicine is to promote the welfare of patients 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:205).  More specifically the goal of medicine is to restore 
well-being (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1981:62) and to care for those who are sick and 
disabled (Van Leeuwen & Kimsma, 1997:104).  When medicine is unable to cure disease its 
goal is to restore well-being by managing a patient‟s illness or, when this is not possible, to 
reduce suffering (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1981:62).  An implicit assumption of beneficence 
exists in the medical profession and its institutional contexts.  The moral requirement of 
beneficence, that is the requirement to contribute to the welfare of others, demands more from 
doctors than merely to avoid harm to their patients (that is the moral requirement of non-
maleficence) (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:197).  Doctor-patient interactions occur against 
the background of the assumption of beneficence and non-maleficence.  Patients therefore 
expect that doctors will attempt to help them and that doctors will act in the patients‟ best 
interests (Skirbekk, 2004:246).   
The social status of modern medicine is another important element of the background of 
clinical consultations.  Patients and their caregivers are likely to invest a lot of authority in 
doctors (McDougall et al., 2006:36) due to modern medicine‟s successes in discovering cures 
for diseases and to prevent or ameliorate suffering and disability (Barry et al., 2001: 490-491; 
Le Fanu, 1999:xv), the association between modern medicine and science (Montgomery, 
2006:39; Miles, 2007:548), as well as the decline in organised religion in many Western 
societies (Helman, 2007: 125-126).  This is particularly true in times of crises when patients 
are seriously ill and/or confronted with disability.  Patients “have been taught that medicine 
and science can, or should be able to, fix almost everything” (McDougall et al., 2006:33,36).  
It is probably due to the association between modern medicine and science, and the standard 
image of science that is prevalent among the general public, that patients expect certainty and 
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very few errors from doctors (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1981:58).  Patients expect that doctors 
will be able to cure disease, or at the very least will be able to make sense of what is 
happening to the patient (McDougall et al., 2006:33, 36; Frank, 2010:54).  Yet, as McDougall 
et al. (2006:37) warn, “there is always the danger…that a doctor held in such high esteem 
may fall – he has, indeed, a long way to fall”.  The reality is that doctors cannot cure 
everything and do not always have (satisfactory) answers to patients‟ questions.  Patients‟ 
faith in modern medicine and in doctors may thus go beyond the rational and the expectations 
of and pressures on doctors are often unfair.  What happens when doctors cannot deliver on 
patients‟ expectations?  Patients and/or their caregivers may feel frustrated and angry at 
doctors‟ uncertainty and may blame doctors for the uncertainty that they themselves feel.  
Doctors again may feel like failures (McDougall et al., 2006:33, 35, 37; Waymack, 2009: 
228).  
They may heroically try to do more and more investigations to find a cause or a cure 
when they suspect – or even know – that this quest is hopeless.  They may protect 
themselves from their own sense of helplessness and despair at not being able to help by 
trying to cut off emotionally, and by retreating into the position that because modern 
medicine is scientific, emotions are irrelevant to the best care of patients…All these 
reactions, though not ideal, are human and understandable.  It requires an enormous 
change not only on the part of doctors themselves, but also in what we expect of them, 
for doctors to behave differently under very difficult circumstances (McDougall et al., 
2006:33). 
The final element of the background of clinical communication that I want to describe is the 
public and the self-image of biomedicine.  It is probably fair to say that similar to medical 
doctors (Kriel, 2000: 10; Simon, 2010:337), at least the majority of patients with a Western 
background have an image of medicine as a (natural) scientific enterprise (Montgomery, 
2006:30).  The patient who views modern medicine as scientific expects his/her subjective 
account of illness to be translated into an objective medical story by the doctor so that the 
patient can determine the meaning of his/her story (Hunter, 1992:117).  It is probably also fair 
to say that biomedical doctors are respected and have authority in most communities due to 
their superior knowledge (Måseide, 1991:554; Van Niekerk, 2002a:261) and their 
commitment to deliver important services to patients and their caregivers (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2009:7).  For these reasons patients are likely to answer doctors‟ questions and to 
do what is requested of them during consultations and to follow doctors‟ treatment advice 
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(even if the doctor‟s advice goes against the patient‟s wishes111).  These patients assume that 
doctors have good reasons for the questions that they ask and the requests and 
recommendations that they make (Mishler, 1984:120) and may even assume that “the doctor‟s 
word [is] law” (Barry et al., 2001:493).  This assumption is closely linked with the 
assumption of beneficence and with Western communities‟ faith in science.  
It is important to consider the question of whether it is appropriate to examine doctor-patient 
communication through the lens of universal pragmatics, since Habermas‟ (1979:4) 
aforementioned research project takes only consensual speech actions into consideration.  A 
consensual speech action is an “idealized case of communicative action…in which 
participants share a tradition and their orientations are normatively integrated to such an 
extent that they start from the same definition of the situation and do not disagree about the 
claims to validity that they reciprocally raise” (Habermas, 1979:208-209).  Later in this 
chapter I argue that doctors and patients do not always accept the validity claims that underlie 
the other party‟s utterances during the medical interview.  The description of doctor-patient 
communication in Chapter 4 made it clear that medical discourse is often problematic.  Yet, a 
case can be made that the background consensus against which doctor-patient communication 
occurs, as described in the paragraphs above, makes doctor-patient interaction an “idealized 
case of communicative action” in the sense indicated by Habermas (1979:208) in the 
quotation above. For this reason I regard it as appropriate to view doctor-patient 
communication in terms of universal pragmatics.  Other scholars (Tanenbaum, 1998; 2006; 
Skirbekk, 2004; Greenhalgh et al., 2006)
112
 have used universal pragmatics in the study of 
doctor-patient communication with success and I shall refer to some of their ideas in this 
chapter.  The next section is a discussion of doctor-patient communication based on 
Habermas‟ (1979) universal pragmatics.   
 
                                                 
111
 Some of the patients who participated in the research of Barry et al. (2001:493) followed doctors‟ treatment 
advice (of using antibiotic treatment) even though this was against the patients‟ wishes.  The patients did not find 
room during the (emergency) consultations to discuss their treatment preferences with their doctors.  However, 
there is also evidence to the contrary.  When patients‟ need for information is not satisfied and they feel the 
doctor did not take their concerns, requests and beliefs regarding treatment seriously, they may decide not to 
follow the doctor‟s treatment advice (Stevenson et al., 2000:834, 836). 
112
 Greenhalgh et al. (2006:1171-1172, 1184) drew on Habermas‟ work on communicative action in their study 
of interpreted primary care consultations, that is consultations between general practitioners, patients and 
interpreters.  They found Habermas‟ theory useful for their purposes.  Although Greenhalgh et al.‟s (2006) paper 
provided me with insight into the application of Habermas‟ universal pragmatics to the study of doctor-patient 
communication; I do not refer to it in this chapter, since my focus is on doctor-patient dyads as opposed to the 
triads studied by these scholars.   
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5.3 Universal pragmatics and doctor-patient communication  
5.3.1 A description of doctor-patient communication based on 
Habermas’ model of linguistic communication 
I want to describe doctor-patient communication against the background of Habermas‟ 
(1979:65-68) model of linguistic communication (see Table 2.1 for a tabular description of 
this model).  Some general characteristics of the medical interview are the following.  
Doctors‟ and patients‟ communication behaviour are asymmetrical in terms of information 
seeking and information giving.  Research indicates that doctors spend more time seeking 
information during consultations than providing information.  The opposite is true of patients.  
Furthermore, it is estimated that on average doctors‟ contribution to the speech of the 
consultation is 60% while patients contribute an average of 40% to the consultation (Roter et 
al., 1988:101-102, 108).  The medical interview consists of different phases which correspond 
to the stages of the clinical method
113
.  The initial phase of the medical interview is aimed at 
discussing the nature of the patient‟s symptoms.  After the doctor has performed the physical 
examination and, if indicated, the appropriate special investigation(s), (s)he communicates the 
diagnosis to the patient.  The third phase in the medical interview is aimed at discussing the 
treatment plan for the identified disease.  The asymmetry and three-phase process of the 
medical interview makes it a special form of interaction compared to the interactions of 
everyday life.  The unequal balance of power in the doctor-patient relationship is another 
factor that makes doctor-patient interactions unique.   
 
5.3.1.1 Doctors’ communication 
Doctors mostly communicate in the cognitive mode of language use.  The theme of this mode 
of communication is the contents of utterances as statements about experiences and states-of-
affairs, expressed as knowledge claims that can be either true or false (Habermas, 1979:53).  
The doctor‟s utterances refer to the domain of reality that Habermas (1979:66) terms 
“external nature”.  External nature refers to the segment of reality which the subject can 
perceive and manipulate.  This includes inanimate nature as well as all objects and situations 
which can directly or indirectly be accessed through sense experience.  Constative speech acts 
belong to the cognitive mode of communication.  In the cognitive mode of language use the 
                                                 
113
 The clinical method is described in section 4 (Clinical biomedicine) of Chapter 1.   
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validity claim of truth is stressed.  The pragmatic function of speech acts in the cognitive 
mode of language use is to represent facts.  A speaker who wants to fulfill this pragmatic 
function must be able to produce a grammatical sentence and “to select propositional content 
in such a way that he represents…an experience or fact (so that the hearer can share the 
knowledge of the speaker)” (Habermas, 1979:29)114.  The achievement of this pragmatic 
function is assessed against the validity conditions for truth (Habermas, 1979:33).   
Doctors‟ dominant use of the cognitive mode of communication stems from the positivist 
ontology of modern medicine
115
.  As Mishler (1984:71, 90) remarked, the doctor speaks in the 
“voice of medicine” which refers to the perspective of the biomedical model.  This is the 
perspective of the natural sciences which includes monistic materialism, the belief that 
“everything that exists is physical” (Blackburn, 2005:238).  Modern medicine‟s positivist 
ontology prescribes a positivist epistemology.  In this epistemology an empiricist assumption 
exists namely that all real or reliable knowledge stems from sense observation.  Empiricism 
further claims that there is a reality that can be known objectively without being influenced by 
observer or theoretical bias.  It is thus assumed that knowledge gained empirically is 
objective, which means that this type of knowledge is viewed as a reflection of the nature of 
reality as it truly is, unclouded by the personal reactions of the knowing subject to that which 
(s)he experiences (Rossouw, 1980:3; Nel, 1981:89; Van Niekerk, 1992:49).  Another 
principle of positivist epistemology is the principle of verification.  This principle states that a 
statement can only be accepted as true if it is known by which observations of reality the 
statement could be verified (Kriel, 2000:15).  The validity conditions for the truth of a 
statement from a positivist perspective are that the observations on which the statement is 
based can be identified and that these observations can be described in quantifiable terms.  In 
the positivist world-view all immaterial phenomena, that is phenomena that cannot be 
measured through objective observation are regarded to be outside the realm of science and 
are awarded a lower status. The positivist world-view of biomedicine thus only includes one 
of the domains of reality listed by Habermas (1979:66-67), namely „the‟ world of external 
nature.  I mentioned in Chapter 1 that modern medicine‟s approach to problems of the mind 
or abnormal behaviour is to focus almost exclusively on the biological or physiological 
                                                 
114
 This quote is from Habermas (1979:29).  I used McCarthy‟s 1978 translation (McCarthy, 1978:280) in favour 
of the somewhat less lucid 1979 version.   
115
 It is necessary to briefly repeat some of the issues discussed in Chapters 1, 2 and 4 to provide a context for the 
upcoming discussion of doctor-patient communication based on Habermas‟ (1979) universal pragmatics.   
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aspects of such disorders.  Psychotherapy or „talking‟ to the patient as a means of treatment is 
not a well-integrated intervention in the medical discipline of psychiatry.   
 
5.3.1.2 Patients’ communication 
Modern medicine‟s positivist world-view has a definite impact on the way that it understands 
its three central concepts, namely patient, disease and therapy.  In modern medicine the 
patient is very often reduced to a biological organism composed of loosely connected parts or 
organs.  This biological system is believed to exist and function independently of the mind.  
Similarly disease and its causes are understood as biological and mechanical in nature.  
Disease is regarded as the necessary and sufficient reason for malfunction of the body.  
Following from the conceptualisation of disease as a physical phenomenon, biomedical 
treatments are all physical in nature, taking the form of for instance, pharmaceutical products, 
surgery or radiation therapy (Kriel, 2000:23-25; Marcum, 2008:394-397).   
A description of patients‟ utterances according to Habermas‟ (1979:68) model of linguistic 
communication will refer to a different domain of reality, a different mode of communication, 
different validity claims, and a different theme and pragmatic function than was the case in 
the above description of doctors‟ utterances.  Patients communicate in the voice of the life-
world
116
.  Patients use the voice of the lifeworld when they speak about problems that they 
experience in life which are related to or resulting from their symptoms (Mishler, 1984:91).  
The voice of the lifeworld describes “the patient‟s contextually-grounded experiences of 
events and problems in her life” (Mishler, 1984:104).  Patients mostly communicate in the 
expressive mode of language use.  The theme of this mode of communication is the speaker‟s 
intention.  Patients‟ utterances refer to the domain of reality that Habermas (1979:67) terms 
“internal nature”.  Internal nature refers the to the subject‟s own subjectivity which (s)he 
communicates or conceals “in a first person attitude”.  This domain includes all desires, 
feelings, intentions and so forth “to which an „I‟ has privileged access and can express as its 
own experiences before a public”.  Representative speech acts belong to the expressive mode 
of communication.  In the expressive mode of language use the validity claim of truthfulness 
is stressed.  The pragmatic function of speech acts in the expressive mode of language use is 
to express intentions.  A speaker who wants to fulfll this pragmatic function must be able to 
                                                 
116
 Throughout this dissertation I use the term „lifeworld‟ as it is defined by Mishler (1984:91).  I do not attach 
Husserl‟s meaning to this word.   
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produce a grammatical sentence and “to express his intentions in such a way that the 
linguistic expression accurately renders what is meant (so that the hearer can trust the 
speaker)” (Habermas, 1979:29)117.  The achievement of this pragmatic function is assessed 
against the validity conditions for truthfulness (Habermas, 1979:33).  The consequences of 
the speaker‟s actions have to prove that the intention (s)he expressed is truly the intention 
which guided his/her behaviour (Habermas, 1979:64).   
Patients thus speak about their subjective experiences and feelings regarding illness.  Yet 
modern medicine is the prevailing approach to health care in many Western and other 
developed countries.  Biomedicine is also rapidly developing into the main approach to health 
care in the developing and Eastern world (Marcum, 2008:393).  Patients who visit biomedical 
doctors have often adopted the language of scientific medicine into their beliefs and lore 
about health and disease.  This is generally true for members of Western communities.  When 
such persons feel ill, they interpret their symptoms according to the language of folk beliefs 
which developed from modern medicine, and this preliminary understanding leads them to 
visit the doctor (Hunter, 1992:122).  The distinction between medicine and the lifeworld is 
problematic in the light of the role of biomedical language in modern societies and the 
manner in which this language has become part of modern subjects‟ accounts of themselves 
(Silverman, 1987 as cited in Barry et al., 2001:501).  However, mutual misunderstanding may 
occur when either the doctor or the patient uses a medical term as these two parties often do 
not interpret medical terms in similar ways (Helman, 2007:151).  As Hunter (1992:122-123) 
puts it: 
The use of the same terms for the same events suggests (especially to those who use 
them daily) that physician and patient are talking about the same thing, telling the same 
story.  But often only the physical signs and their diagnostic labels are the same; the 
understanding and the concerns are entirely different. 
  
                                                 
117
 This quote is from Habermas (1979:29).  I used McCarthy‟s 1978 translation (McCarthy, 1978:280) in favour 
of the somewhat less lucid 1979 version.   
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Patients also do not understand the doctor‟s behaviour.  The doctor‟s actions and speech are 
based on the biomedical model which is not accessible to patients.  It remains invisible and 
inaudible in the medical interview (Mishler, 1984:120).  Patients have no language or 
dictionary to consult in order to make sense of what the doctor does (Arney & Bergen, 
1984:8).   
It would be wrong to paint a picture of doctor-patient interactions wherein the doctor always 
and only communicates in the voice of medicine and the patient always and only 
communicates in the voice of the lifeworld.  Barry et al. (2001:493-494, 496-499) found that 
(some) doctors at times speak in the voice of the lifeworld and that some patients speak 
exclusively in the voice of medicine and that these consultations generally have good 
outcomes and lead to patient satisfaction.  Doctors and patients tend to speak exclusively in 
the voice of medicine during consultations regarding acute single physical conditions such as 
tonsillitis and ear infection presented by patients in emergency health care settings.  
Conversely, both doctors and patients tend to speak predominantly in the voice of the 
lifeworld during consultations which involve psychological problems.   
 
5.3.1.3 The interactive mode of communication in doctor-patient 
interactions 
According to Habermas (1979:42) communication in language is only possible when the 
speaker and hearer simultaneously become involved in two levels of communication when 
communicating with each other regarding a particular topic, namely “the level of 
intersubjectivity” and “the level of propositional content”, or “the level of experiences and 
states-of-affairs”118  (Habermas, 1979:41-42; McCarthy, 1978:282).  Speakers and hearers 
must simultaneously reach an understanding on both communicative levels if they wish to 
communicate their intentions to each other.  Every speech act explicitly raises one particular 
validity claim in accordance with the mode of communication that it belongs to, yet it is also 
                                                 
118
 “The level of intersubjectivity” is the communicative level on which speaker and hearer, by means of 
illocutionary acts, set up the relations which allow them “to come to an understanding with each other”.  The 
“level of propositional content” is “the level of experiences and states-of-affairs about which they want to reach 
an understanding in the communicative function determined by” the communicative level of intersubjectivity 
(Habermas, 1979:41-42; McCarthy, 1978:282) (this quotation is from McCarthy‟s 1978 (p. 282) translation). 
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implicitly inhabited by the other two validity claims.  Each speech act thus fulfills all three of 
the pragmatic functions, namely to “represent something in the world, to express the 
speaker‟s intentions, and to establish legimate interpersonal relations” (Habermas, 1979:33; 
Tanenbaum, 1998:206).  The doctor and patient therefore create their relationship (the so-
called doctor-patient relationship) with their utterances, which are mostly constative and 
representative speech-acts.   
It is not only constative and representative speech acts that occur in doctor-patient 
interactions.  Regulative speech acts are also present, such as commands or requests (as 
when the doctors command or request patients to perform certain actions during the physical 
examination or as part of a treatment plan, or when either of the two parties request 
information from the other); warnings (for example by doctors against patients‟ unhealthy 
behaviours); and recommendations and advice (for instance by the doctor regarding the 
treatment for the diagnosed disorder).  Regulative speech acts belong to the interactive mode 
of communication.  The theme of this mode of communication is the relation between the 
speaker and the listener.  The interactive mode of communication is connected to the domain 
of reality which Habermas (1979:66) terms “society”.  “Society” refers to an environment or 
“symbolically prestructured segment of reality” that the subject “conforms to or deviates from 
in the ego-alter attitude of…a participant in a system of communication”.  Valid interpersonal 
relations, institutions, cultural values, traditions and so on belong to this domain of reality.  In 
the interactive mode of language use the validity claim of rightness is stressed.  The pragmatic 
function of speech acts in the interactive mode of language use is to establish interpersonal 
relations.  A speaker who wants to fulfill this pragmatic function must be able “to carry out a 
speech act in such a way that it satisfies recognized norms or accepted self-images (so that the 
hearer can agree with the speaker in these values)” (Habermas, 1979:29)119.  The achievement 
of this pragmatic function is assessed against the validity conditions for rightness (Habermas, 
1979:33).  In the interactive use of language a “speech-act-immanent obligation to provide 
justification” is offered by the speaker.  Regulative speech acts include only the offer to point 
to, if needed, “the normative context” from which the speaker obtains the “conviction” that 
his/her utterance is correct, in other words that “the speech action performed fits an existing 
normative background”(Habermas, 1979:64).   
 
                                                 
119
 This quotation is from Habermas (1979:29).  Again I used McCarthy‟s 1978 translation (McCarthy, 
1978:280) in favour of the somewhat less lucid 1979 version.   
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The question that now arises is “What does a legitimate doctor-patient relationship look like?”  
This legitimacy can be described in terms of the status of each party‟s right to perform the 
various types of speech acts.  The right to perform a particular type of speech act depends for 
example on the speaker‟s role or status, accepted norms and conventions, established 
relational patterns and recognised values (McCarthy, 1978:289).  One can also use the 
concept of “speaker rights” to describe the legitimate doctor-patient relationship.  Speaker 
rights include the right to take a conversational turn, to hold the floor for an acceptable period 
of time, to introduce and to pursue a conversational topic and to bring a topic of conversation 
to an end (Ainsworth-Vaughn, 1998:43).   
The doctor-patient relationship does not resemble everyday relationships between equals.  
Due to doctors‟ knowledge, skills and power over disease and the authority that society has 
bestowed upon them because of it, the practitioners of scientific medicine have become 
accustomed to unilaterally shape the structure of their relationships with patients.  The 
medical profession argues that the powerful benefits that modern medicine can bestow on 
patients depend on the condition that doctors have the freedom to determine the nature of the 
doctor-patient relationship.  The doctor-patient relationship is viewed as a contract into which 
the doctor enters with the patient.  The patient can benefit from the doctor‟s scientific 
knowledge and skills if the doctor determines the contractual terms and supervises the 
patient‟s (and/or the patient‟s caregiver‟s) compliance with these terms.  The nature of the 
doctor-patient relationship is thus determined by the doctor based on the physician‟s special 
knowledge and the assumption of his/her benevolence towards the patient (Jonsen, 1990:87-
94).   
The doctor‟s unilateral construction of the doctor-patient relationship is evident in the 
structure of the unremarkable medical interview described by Mishler (1984).  Mishler uses 
the term “unremarkable interview” to refer to interviews that researchers, doctors and patients 
with a shared culture intuitively recognise as appropriate or “normal and unproblematic” and 
thus fitting the normative context (Mishler, 1984:59).  A “basic structural unit of discourse” 
occurs regularly and routinely in unremarkable medical interviews.  The unit consists of three 
consecutive utterances, namely  
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i. a request or question from the doctor;  
ii. a response by the patient; and  
iii. an assessment or acknowledgement of the patient‟s response by the doctor.   
 
The doctor then adds a new request or question to this third utterance, and so the next cycle of 
discourse begins.  Medical interviews that are recognised and accepted as standard and 
appropriate tend to be made up of a connected series of these structural units (Mishler, 
1984:68). 
From the structure of the unremarkable interview it appears that only the doctor has the 
right to perform certain regulative speech acts.  The doctor‟s role and status gives him/her 
the right to question the patient.  The social norms for biomedical encounters allow patients to 
ask doctors for their opinion.  It may however be difficult for patients to suggest a course of 
action to the doctor, since the doctor is culturally viewed as the party who makes treatment 
suggestions.  When a patient wishes to make a suggestion during a clinical interaction (s)he 
may need to present it in a manner that demonstrates deference towards the doctor.  For 
instance by presenting suggestions in the form of questions, by asking indirect rather than 
direct questions to the doctor, by answering the doctor‟s question(s) before attempting to 
introduce a new topic for discussion, by using hesitations, by refraining from interrupting the 
doctor‟s speech or by using the respect term „doctor‟ (Ainsworth-Vaughn, 1998:42-47). 
In unremarkable interviews the doctor controls the development and content of the 
interaction.  The patient is not afforded the right to take the first turn in a discourse cycle.  
The doctor is the first and the last speaker in each discourse cycle and is thus in control of the 
turn-taking system of the interaction.  The doctor determines when the patient takes a 
conversational turn.  The patient is thus also not allowed to introduce and to pursue a 
conversational topic and to bring a topic of conversation to an end.  The doctor controls the 
content of the interview through the questions that (s)he asks and the assessments that (s)he 
makes.  All new topics are initiated by the doctor (Mishler, 1984: 69, 76).   
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In the unremarkable interview the doctor communicates in the voice of medicine.  His/her 
questions and assessments are focussed on the concerns of biomedicine, namely the 
symptoms experienced and the signs presented by the patient.  The doctor ignores content in 
the voice of the lifeworld in the patient‟s utterances.  Should a patient raise lifeworld issues in 
the interview, the doctor is fast to suppress the voice of the lifeworld and to reinstate the voice 
of medicine as the dominant voice in the discourse.  It is the dominance of the voice of 
medicine that brings about the intuitive impression that an interview represents 
standard clinical practice (Mishler, 1984:77).  Medical interviews in which patients initiate 
and attempt to sustain conversational topics in the voice of the lifeworld appear less typical 
(Mishler, 1984:86-88).  A struggle for control of the interview between the voices of 
medicine and the lifeworld may then occur (Mishler, 1984:91).   
I stated earlier that although doctor-patient interaction may be described as an idealized case 
of communicative action which takes place against a particular background consensus, the 
problems of communication between doctors and patients are well documented.  In the next 
section I will pay attention to the validity claims that are raised and responded to during 
doctor-patient interactions in an attempt to understand the problematic character of doctor-
patient interaction.   
 
5.3.2 Validity claims and doctor-patient communication 
A speaker who wants to bring about understanding has to use an utterance that is 
comprehensible, true, sincere and right.  Furthermore, the speaker has to suppose that these 
claims to validity can be justified.  A speaker and hearer have reached understanding if the 
hearer accepts the validity claims raised by the speaker (Habermas, 1979:3).  When the hearer 
accepts the validity claim that was raised by the speaker, the hearer “acknowledges the 
validity of symbolic structures; that is, he acknowledges that a sentence is grammatical, a 
statement true, an intentional expression truthful, or an utterance correct” (Habermas, 1979:4-
5).  The four validity claims which are implicitly raised and reciprocally recognised constitute 
the background consensus of communicative action in everyday contexts.  This background 
consensus is crucial for reaching understanding (Habermas, 1979:3-4; Thompson, 1984:262; 
Van Niekerk, 1992:190).  The validity claims may thus also be thought of as “four different 
dimensions in which communicative interaction can break down or suffer disturbances” 
(McCarthy, 1978:288).   
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In the next section I follow Skirbekk (2004:246-247) in discussing how doctors and patients 
may respond to each other‟s utterances and the validity claims underlying these utterances.  
However, whereas Skirbekk focussed on hypothetical doctor-patient interactions regarding 
chronic lower back pain, an illness for which no specific cause can be identified and which 
cannot be observed objectively, I will discuss hypothetical interactions about acute and 
chronic physical disorders, as well as interactions about psychological conditions (which are 
often accompanied by physical problems).  I structure my discussion around these different 
types of disorders based on Barry et al.‟s (2001:439-499) finding that different patterns of 
doctor-patient communication exist and that these patterns seem to correspond with the type 
of disorder that the patient suffers from.  I will first consider likely consultations about single 
acute physical disorders.  I divide this discussion according to (some of) the different phases 
of the medical interview, namely history taking, communication about the diagnosis and 
communication about the treatment plan.  Each phase is directed at a particular consecutive 
task and is therefore somewhat different in character from the other phases of the interview 
(Ten Have, 1991:139).   
 
5.3.2.1 Consultations about single acute physical disorders 
A doctor will most likely open and continue the history taking phase of the interview with 
questions regarding the patient‟s reason(s) for attending the consultation (Ten Have, 
1991:142) (such as “Tell me what is the reason for your visit”), the nature of the patient‟s 
symptoms and factors that might be related to the “still-to-be-diagnosed disease” (Kriel, 
2000:22) such as the history of disease in the patient‟s family, the patient‟s work history and 
lifestyle.  The doctor thus performs regulative speech acts during the history taking which 
stresses the validity claim of rightness.  The patient is likely to accept the doctor‟s questions 
since the doctor‟s role in the clinical interaction, namely to diagnose and treat disease, 
provides him/her with the right to question the patient (Ainsworth-Vaughn, 1998:42-43).  The 
doctor‟s tasks are to investigate the case and to listen to the patient‟s complaints, while it is 
the patient‟s task to report his/her symptoms and to answer the doctor‟s questions (Ten Have, 
1991:140).  As Hunter (1992:117) notes, the patient‟s reason for visiting the doctor is to have 
his story transformed into a biomedical story as part of his attempt to discover the meaning of 
his symptoms.   
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Barry et al.‟s (2001:493) research shows that patients with acute physical disorders are likely 
to communicate in the voice of medicine.  The patient is thus likely to report his /her physical 
symptom(s) to the doctor in response to the latter‟s questions.  The patient‟s utterances about 
his/her symptom(s) are representative speech acts which refer to the subjective world of the 
patient and which stress the validity claim of truthfulness.  Skirbekk (2004:247) states that the 
doctor may respond in one of two ways to the patient‟s validity claim of truthfulness.  The 
doctor either believes that the patient is truthful or not.  The doctor‟s response to the 
truthfulness of the patient‟s representative speech acts regarding his/her illness is probably 
greatly influenced by what the doctor observes by means of the physical and other 
examinations.  If the doctor finds physical evidence to explain the patient‟s symptoms (s)he 
will regard the patient‟s report of his/her symptom(s) as truthful.  Conversely, when no 
observable evidence can be found for the patient‟s complaint(s), the doctor may not take the 
patient‟s subjective experience seriously.  When the doctor‟s examination provides no 
physical evidence to explain the patient‟s symptoms it does not necessarily mean that there is 
no pathophysiologic cause for the symptoms.  It may also mean that biomedical science has 
not yet discovered the pathophysiologic cause of the symptoms and therefore the doctor does 
not know what to look for or how to look for it.   
The patient may attempt to suggest a cause for his/her symptoms to the doctor.  The utterance 
may be in the form of a statement or may be mitigated (Ainsworth-Vaughn, 1998:47) by the 
question form.  The patient cannot explain his/her symptoms according to the biomedical 
model.  (S)he uses folk belief (which for the Western patient may be largely based on the 
biomedical model) to explain his/her subjective illness experience.  How might a doctor 
respond to the validity claims underlying a suggestion regarding the cause of the illness by the 
patient?  The doctor will not regard the utterance as true before (s)he can verify it by means of 
the clinical method.  Whether or not the doctor believes that the patient is truthful about 
his/her understanding of the cause of the illness is probably not of much importance.  Yet, a 
patient may be seen as violating the norms of doctor-patient interaction by suggesting a cause 
for his/her symptoms.  It is not the patient‟s role to make (uninvited) suggestions during the 
consultation.  Instead it is the patient‟s role to cooperate with the doctor (Ten Have, 
1991:140), for instance by answering all questions as truthfully and thoroughly as possible 
and to cooperate in the doctor‟s examination of his/her body so that the disease may be 
biomedically identified and treated.  Since patients typically do not take initiative during the 
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medical interview, doctors tend to reach treatment decisions that are mainly based on the 
medical professional‟s perspective on the case (Ten Have, 1991:141).   
Following the history taking phase of the interview and examination process, the doctor will 
communicate the identified diagnosis to the patient.  The doctor will do this with a constative 
speech act (for example “You have otitis media120”).  This utterance stresses the validity 
claim of truth and has a connection with “the” world of external nature (Habermas, 1979:68).  
The diagnosis is the outcome of the clinical method according to which the doctor formulates 
and confirms a specific hypothesis in biomedical terms and by biomedical methods (Kriel, 
2000:22-23).  The diagnosis that the doctor pronounces is based on a link between the 
symptoms reported by the patient and the physical signs of disease in the patient‟s body as 
found by the doctor.  The patient will most likely accept the doctor‟s validity claim121 since 
(s)he wants a biomedical explanation for his/her subjective illness experience.  The patient 
typically trusts the doctor as an expert regarding (scientific) knowledge and examination of 
the body and disease (Heritage & Maynard, 2006:364).  Furthermore, the doctor‟s utterance 
validates the patient‟s subjective illness experience and allows the patient to take on the rights 
and benefits of the “sick role”, such as to temporarily avoid his/her obligations towards the 
social groups that (s)he belongs to (for example family and colleagues) and to receive care 
from these social groups (Helman, 2007:128).   
After the doctor has communicated the diagnosis to the patient the treatment plan needs to 
be discussed.  Shared decision-making is supported more and more as an ideal model of 
decision-making about treatment in the clinical consultation
122
 (Ong et al., 1995:905; Charles 
et al., 1997:681).  Charles et al. (1997:685-688) suggest that shared treatment decision-
making has four key characteristics, namely: 
  
                                                 
120
 Otitis media refers to an infection of the (middle) ear.   
121
 In a review of the literature on doctor-patient interaction in primary health care settings, Heritage (2005:98) 
found no reports of patients that explicitly disagreed with the diagnoses that were made by their doctors.  
122
 Shared decision-making is not the only treatment decision model that receives attention in the literature.  
Other models include the paternalistic, the informed and the physician-as-agent decision-making models 
(Charles, et al., 1997:682-683).   
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i. At least two participants are involved, namely the doctor and the patient; 
ii. Both parties (doctor and patient) take steps to participate in the decision-making 
process about treatment; 
iii. Both parties must share information; 
iv. A treatment decision is taken and both parties agree to the decision. 
 
According to the shared decision-making model a doctor and patient can thus reach 
agreement about the treatment option to follow by means of an open discussion about each 
party‟s preferences (Charles et al., 1997:688; Stevenson et al., 2000:838).  This view parallels 
Habermas‟ (1979:3) description of agreement as the outcome of communicative action, or 
action aimed at understanding.   
Empirical research indicates that all patients desire information regarding their illness and the 
treatment options available (Charles et al., 1997:683; Guadagnoli & Ward, 1998:337).  
However, patients have diverse preferences in terms of participation in treatment decision-
making.  Informed patients may prefer to make the treatment decision independently or may 
want to delegate or share this responsibility to or with the doctor (Charles et al., 1997:683).  
Guadagnoli and Ward (1998:329) reviewed the empirical research literature on patient 
participation in decision-making about medical care.  Due to the methodological limitations 
of the reviewed research these reviewers found it difficult to draw clear conclusions about 
whether patient involvement in medical care and treatment decision-making results in 
improved medical outcomes “such as reduced pain and anxiety, quicker recovery, and 
increased compliance” (Guadagnoli & Ward, 1998:332-335).  However, they argue that 
patient participation in decision-making is justified on humane grounds alone and is in 
line with a patient‟s right to self-determination…although not all patients will want to 
take control of their medical care, it is still important that their concerns, desires, and 
values be incorporated into decisions about their care (Guadagnoli &Ward, 1998:329, 
337).   
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Despite the research findings mentioned above and the advocacy of the use of shared 
decision-making, empirical research indicates that shared decision-making is not the norm in 
practice (Stevenson et al., 2000:838; Stevenson, 2003:291).  Ten Have (1991:141) writes that 
the discourse literature on doctor-patient communication supports the conclusion that there is 
a tendency for decisions that are mainly based on the doctor‟s perspective on the case, 
guided by his questioning and relative lack of knowledge of the relevancies stemming 
from the patient‟s orientation to the problem…it takes specific efforts on the part of 
patients to counter tendencies leading to such a result, unless physicians take steps to 
provide them with occasions to influence the proceedings.  
I will now make some comments about the types of speech acts that patients may (want to) 
use during the second half of the medical interview and how doctors may respond to such 
speech acts.  After the doctor has communicated the diagnosis to the patient (s)he will talk 
about the treatment of the disorder.  In the case of single acute physical disorders the doctor 
will most likely want to prescribe medication.  Research performed in various countries 
shows that most clinical consultations entail the doctor writing a prescription (Stevenson et 
al., 2000:830).  Whether or not the treatment decision (for instance whether or not to use 
medication(s), or which medication(s) to use) will be jointly reached generally depends on the 
doctor.  As Charles et al. (1997:687) write: 
By and large, physicians set the norms of interaction in the medical encounter.  If the 
physician is not motivated to share decision-making, the patient cannot force this to 
happen.  Her only option is to seek out another physician whose expectations about how 
the decision-making process should occur is similar to hers. 
A doctor may thus simply declare, with a regulative speech act, that (s)he recommends or 
prescribes a specific treatment for the patient‟s disease (“I am giving you something to help 
with your cold/infection ” or “I will give you _______ for your _______”)123.  A doctor with 
a less paternalistic style may phrase his/her treatment advice more tentatively or 
interrogatively and collaboratively.  For instance: “I think we should treat this with _______”.  
The doctor‟s regulative speech act(s) stresses the validity claim of rightness and is connected 
to the social domain of reality.  Patients are likely to accept the doctor‟s structuring of the 
decision-making process.  According to the norms of doctor-patient interaction, the doctor 
                                                 
123
 These examples are based on the findings of Stevenson et al. (2000:833).   
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determines the rules of the interaction and the patient should comply with this arrangement in 
order to benefit from the doctor‟s special knowledge and skills (Jonsen, 1990:90).   
The doctor thus determines the norms of interaction in the medical interview (Charles et al., 
1997:687).  What do we know about information exchange during the final phase of the 
medical interview?  Research has found little evidence of information sharing between 
doctors and patients and of patient participation in decision-making in general practice 
consultations (Stevenson et al., 2000:839).  Doctors are mostly willing to answer patients‟ 
questions aimed at clarification of topics such as how the prescribed medication should be 
taken (“How much should I take of this medicine?”) and what the patient can expect of the 
medication (“Are there side-effects?”)124 (Ten Have, 1991:149; Stevenson et al., 2000:836).  
Questions such as these stress the validity claim of rightness.  Doctors typically accept and 
answer such questions from patients since sharing the requested information with patients is 
connected with the doctor‟s professional role of treating disease. Furthermore, such questions 
from patients do not bring the doctor‟s treatment advice into question and are thus not a threat 
to the doctor‟s authority.  The doctor probably assumes that the patient asks such questions to 
better comply with the dispensed advice.  Finally, these questions are related to the external 
world – the only world that biomedicine is comfortable to speak about.   
However, research shows that doctors underestimate patients‟ need for information and 
generally do not give patients enough information (Kurtz et al., 2005:15).  Patients whose 
information needs have not been met might not adhere to the prescribed treatment.  Doctors 
are often not aware of patients‟ non-adherence to prescribed treatment.  Doctors also often do 
not adequately respond to patients‟ concerns regarding the prescribed treatment or requests 
regarding treatment (Stevenson et al., 2000:833-834, 836).  Voiced concerns or requests 
regarding the prescribed treatment by patients contravene the norms of doctor-patient 
interaction.  The doctor is culturally viewed as the party who makes treatment suggestions 
and the patient‟s role is to comply with the doctor‟s suggestions. Patients are thus likely to 
present their concerns and requests regarding treatment in a mitigated manner during the 
medical interview (Ainsworth-Vaughn, 1998:48-49).  Doctors often do not notice patients‟ 
voiced concerns in the interaction, or may interrupt or ignore patients‟ requests (Mishler, 
                                                 
124
 It must be kept in mind that patients from lower socio-economic groups and patients from cultural minority 
groups ask fewer questions to and receive less information from doctors compared to wealthier patients from 
mainstream cultural groups (Roter et al.,1988:109, 112; Schouten & Meeuwesen, 2006:28).  I discussed the 
influence of patients‟ socio-economic and cultural backgrounds on their communication with doctors in Chapter 
4.  
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1984:105-112; Stevenson et al., 2000:834,836; Kurtz et al., 2005:14-15).  When patients‟ 
concerns and requests are not attended to during the medical interview, they may decide not 
to follow the doctor‟s treatment advice (Stevenson et al., 2000:834, 836).  In addition, doctors 
are unlikely to elicit patients‟ beliefs regarding medicine during the medical interview.  It is 
very difficult for patients to volunteer their beliefs regarding medicine to the doctor (for 
example: “I do not like to use antibiotics”).  Doing so may entail rejecting the prescribed 
treatment (Stevenson et al., 2000:836-838), which contravenes the norms of doctor-patient 
interaction, as explained above
125
.   
The above shows that doctors frequently do not share enough information with patients, nor 
do they elicit or pay attention to patients‟ (attempts to express) concerns, requests and beliefs 
regarding treatment.  Doctors probably do not recognise the validity claim of rightness that 
underlies patients‟ uttered concerns, requests and perceptions regarding treatment.  Voiced 
concerns and requests regarding the prescribed treatment by patients contravene the norms of 
doctor-patient interaction.  The doctor is culturally viewed as the party whose special 
knowledge, skills and experience allow him/her to make good treatment suggestions and the 
patient‟s role is to comply with the doctor‟s suggestions126.  Yet, I want to argue that there are 
more reasons for doctors‟ dismissal of patients‟ concerns, requests and beliefs.  Reasons 
closely connected to modern medicine‟s intellectual self-image.  Stevenson et al. (2000:838-
839) questioned doctors on their views regarding shared decision-making.  The British 
general practitioners who participated in Stevenson et al.‟s research did not regard patients‟ 
perceptions regarding medicine as relevant to their professional task.  Patients' perceptions 
belong to the world of internal nature and express patients‟ subjective feelings, desires 
etcetera (Habermas, 1979:67).  Biomedicine‟s positivist worldview does not accommodate 
subjective knowledge.  To my mind this goes a long way towards explaining why doctors 
tend to regard patients‟ perceptions about treatment as irrelevant.  Stevenson and her 
colleagues (2000:838-839) also found that doctors might not regard patients as requiring 
                                                 
125
 Ironically, doctors seem to assume that patients will voice their opinions regarding medication on their own 
initiative during the medical interview when they are uncomfortable with the doctor‟s treatment suggestion 
(Stevenson et al., 2000:837).  This possibly indicates that doctors are not sufficiently sensitive or have become 
desensitized to the power and knowledge divide between doctor and patient and the implication thereof for 
patients‟ communication behaviour during the medical interview.  
126
 However, it seems that doctors‟ perceptions of patients‟ (with single acute physical conditions) expectations 
regarding prescription medicine play an important role in doctors‟ prescription decisions.  Cockburn & Pitt 
(1997:521-522) found that if a doctor perceives that a patient with a single acute physical disorder expects a 
prescription, (s)he is 10 times more likely to prescribe medication to that patient.  I noted at the start of this 
chapter that patients often have high expectations of modern medicine and that doctors may indeed feel 
pressured to live up to patients‟ expectations.   
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information about medicine.  The doctors who participated in their study were also of the 
opinion that patients do not have the will or ability to take part in decision-making regarding 
their health care, since patients do not generally understand medical language and medical 
problems.  In my view doctors‟ frequent apathy towards sharing information and treatment 
decisions with patients stems to a great extent from biomedicine‟s understanding of its three 
central concepts, namely patient, disease and therapy, as merely physical in nature.  The 
doctor is mainly interested in physically treating the observable disease located in the 
patient’s body.  Mastery of biomedicine is necessary to achieve this aim.  According to the 
biomedical tradition the patient‟s mind has no role to play in the treatment of disease.  This 
explains why doctors may not think that patients need information about treatment or that 
patients should participate in treatment decisions.   
The first two characteristics of Charles et al.‟s (1997:685-688) model of shared decision-
making are thus not generally present in doctor-patient communication.  As a result the third 
and fourth characteristics do not usually appear either (Stevenson et al., 2000:839).  Even 
when doctors and patients share information, doctors may not take patients‟ contributions 
seriously.  If information is shared between doctor and patient, it is often not used as a basis 
to develop a consensus regarding the preferred treatment or to reach an agreement on the 
treatment to be carried out (Stevenson et al., 2000:839; Stevenson, 2003:292).  It thus appears 
that doctors and patients do not reach agreement in the Habermasian sense, that is by means 
of communicative action, regarding the treatment to be implemented.  Habermas (1979:3) 
states that communication partners can reach agreement if the speaker raises four validity 
claims (comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness and rightness) “and suppose that they can be 
vindicated” and the hearer can accept these validity claims.  Agreement in this sense is not 
possible since doctors typically do not allow or regard patients‟ speech acts concerning 
treatment as important.  Doctors therefore also do not accept the validity claims underlying 
such utterances by patients.  The consequence of doctors‟ failure to communicate with 
patients with the aim of reaching agreement regarding treatment, is that patients may not 
adhere to doctors‟ treatment advice (and often the doctor will not be aware of this non-
adherence).  The financial cost of non-adherence is high considering the cost of unused or 
wrongly used medication, as well as the cost of additional medical consultations, laboratory 
tests, medication and so forth (Kurtz et al., 2005:16).   
It can thus be said that doctors do not generally act communicatively in their interactions with 
patients.  On the contrary, a case can be made that doctors act strategically during medical 
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interviews
127
.  Strategic action is not aimed at achieving understanding, but wants to achieve 
self-determined goals, for instance by using power (Van Niekerk, 1992: 182; Skirbekk, 
2004:246).  The doctor does not attempt to rationally motivate the patient regarding the 
doctor‟s treatment advice.  Nor does the doctor allow him/herself to be rationally motivated 
by the concerns, requests and beliefs of the patient.  The doctor does not respond to the 
patient as an autonomous and rational being.  The doctor also doesn‟t reveal his/her full 
humanity in interactions with patients.  The biomedical doctor acts as a technician of the 
machine called the human body.  (I am referring here to a hypothetical biomedical doctor and 
not a specific individual.  The behaviour of this hypothetical doctor fits the descriptions in the 
research literature of doctors‟ seemingly typical communication behaviour during 
consultations.  I do not suggest that all doctors disregard the rationality and autonomy of their 
patients or that the doctors who do so, always act in this way.  I also do not imply that doctors 
who interact minimally with their patients do not care about them.) 
 
5.3.2.2 Consultations about chronic conditions 
Consultations regarding chronic conditions generally have poor outcomes and particularly 
problematic communication between doctor and patient (Salmon, 2000: 110-111; Barry et al., 
2001:502; Ariss, 2009:909).  The term „chronic conditions‟ includes patients with physical 
symptoms for which a physical pathology can be identified as well as patients with physical 
symptoms for which no physical pathology can be found.  The latter group of patients are 
considered as having psychosomatic disorders and are referred to as „somatising patients‟ 
(Salmon, 2000:107).  Patients with chronic disorders are often described as “frequent 
attenders” in the literature on general medical practice and doctor-patient communication 
(Salmon, 2000:105).  Frequently attending patients pay 10 or 12 visits per year to their 
general practitioners, compared to the average rate of one to three visits to the general 
practitioner per year among the majority of the population (Ariss, 2009:909).  Ariss 
(2009:909) mentions research findings which indicate that although frequent attenders 
constitute a small percentage of the general population (approximately 3%) they roughly 
                                                 
127
 Hyde et al. (2005:69) found evidence in nursing records of strategic communication by nurses towards 
patients.  Their analysis of patients‟ nursing records in four Irish hospitals revealed little evidence of 
communicative action by nurses.  The authors conclude that nursing records display a biomedical view of the 
patient‟s body, disease and treatment and that the promotion of “notions of partnership, autonomy and self-
determination” contained in current nursing theory is not reflected in the nursing records analysed.  The authors 
acknowledge that nursing documentation may not be a valid representation of actual nursing practice (Hyde et 
al., 2005: 71,73).  
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make up a fifth of general practitioners‟ total consultations.  Patients with chronic disorders 
may have significant knowledge and opinions about the state of their health and the treatment 
and management of their illness due to their frequent contact with health care professionals 
and their experience of living with illness (Ariss, 2009:909).  I shall first discuss clinical 
consultations regarding chronic disorders with identifiable physical aetiologies and thereafter 
I shall focus on consultations regarding chronic disorders for which no physical pathology can 
be identified.  I refer to the first category of patients as patients with physical chronic 
conditions in order to make a distinction between these two groups.   
Barry et al. (2001:494-496) found that patients with chronic conditions mainly or exclusively 
(attempt to) speak in the voice of the lifeworld throughout the medical interview, yet these 
contributions are blocked or ignored by doctors who conduct the interview in the voice of 
medicine.  Patients may persist in raising lifeworld issues despite the doctor‟s failure to pay 
attention to such utterances.  In interviews of this kind dialectical struggles between the voice 
of medicine and the voice of the lifeworld, “two different domains of meaning” (Mishler, 
1984:25), occur.  A patient‟s repetition of a lifeworld issue in the face of the doctor‟s 
disregard suggests that the patient has strong feelings about the issue and that the patient 
wants his/her needs to be heard (Barry et al., 2001:495).  Doctors probably disregard patients‟ 
utterances in the voice of the lifeworld since these utterances are connected to the subjective, 
inner world of the patient.  Biomedicine views the patient, disease and its treatment 
exclusively in physical and objective terms.  This is probably an important reason why the 
doctor does not consider patients‟ subjective experiences as valid or relevant to the 
consultation (Barry et al., 2001:504).  However, patients with chronic physical conditions 
commonly have “poorly understood or non-improving symptoms and undiscovered or 
undiagnosed problems” (Ariss, 2009:909).  The experiences of such patients may provide the 
doctor with reliable and important evidence for the formulation of a treatment plan.  
Furthermore, the patient with a chronic disorder also mainly carries out his/her own treatment 
(Szasz & Hollender, 1956:587).  The lifeworld concerns of patients with chronic problems 
are thus of critical importance to the consultation and are wrongly dismissed by the 
biomedical doctor.   
Ariss (2009:909) made an interesting finding in a recent study that investigated doctor-patient 
communication regarding physical chronic disorders in general practice settings in northern 
England.  He found that doctors accept the knowledge claims of patients with physical 
chronic disorders regarding topics such as “illness management, medication and test results”.  
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Such knowledge claims “are associated with the long-term nature of patients‟ conditions” 
(Ariss, 2009: 916,918).  Below are two examples of this from Ariss‟ (2009: 916-917) paper: 
 
 The patient states the result of a blood test (“My ESR was 26 in September” 128) and 
the doctor agrees with this statement
129
; 
 The patient explains how he used prescribed steroids to treat a recurrence of 
symptoms of chronic pulmonary disease (“I took six steroids and then weaned myself 
off”) and the doctor‟s reply indicates agreement (“That‟s fine.  You know your 
chest”).   
 
Yet, none of the doctors who participated in Ariss‟ (2009:918) study accepted utterances from 
patients that attempted to interpret or describe the patients’ problems from a biomedical 
perspective.  Discussion and debate about these topics were strongly avoided.  In instances 
where overt disagreement about such issues occurred, this was quickly resolved as each party 
„retreated‟ to his/her “realm of epistemic authority” (Ariss, 2009:918).  For instance, one 
patient communicated the following opinion to her doctor regarding the treatment of her back 
pain: “I know nowadays they do tell you not to do bed rest, don‟t they.  But I have to say in 
all honesty, unless I have some bed rest it‟s no.  I can‟t walk.” The doctor did not engage with 
this topic raised by the patient.  Instead he changed the topic and commenced to the next 
phase of the consultation with the following utterance:  “Okay.  I have given you back 
exercise chart before”130 (Ariss, 2009:913).  Ariss (2009: 918) comments that this finding 
indicates that doctor-patient “interactions are characterised by a style of participation which 
minimises the need for rational debate in order to continue on the grounds of an established 
consensus or the acknowledgement of contrary positions”.  I earlier made a similar comment.  
It seems that the doctor‟s biomedical perspective may withhold him/her from acting 
communicatively in the consultation.  The doctor usually does not attempt to reach 
understanding with the patient.  The doctor-patient interaction often does not terminate in 
agreement, which means “reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and 
                                                 
128
 I do not directly quote from the transcripts included in Ariss‟ (2009) paper in these two examples.   
129
 The doctor could confirm this statement by consulting the patient‟s chart which the doctor had in front of 
him. 
130
 The last two quotations in this paragraph were taken directly from Ariss‟ (2009:913) transcripts. 
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accord with one another” (Habermas, 1979:3).  Both doctors and patients have knowledge 
that has relevance to the consultation.  The doctor has scientific and technical knowledge 
regarding the diagnosis and treatment of disease.  The patient has the experience of illness and 
preferences regarding its treatment (Stevenson et al., 2000:830).  A patient with a chronic 
condition often has considerable knowledge regarding his/her disorder due to its long-term 
nature and the patient‟s regular contact with health care workers (Ariss, 2009:918).  In the 
typical biomedical interview knowledge is not exchanged in a manner that facilitates 
understanding, agreement and shared decision making (Charles et al., 1997:687-688; 
Stevenson et al., 2000:839).  Biomedical doctors rarely regard patients‟ descriptions and 
interpretations of their illness conditions and treatment preferences as valid.  According to 
modern medicine‟s positivist world-view only verifiable, objective knowledge gained by 
suitably qualified individuals through biomedical techniques are acceptable to describe 
disease, interpret symptoms and formulate treatment plans.  The consequence of doctors‟ 
neglect to reach agreement with patients may be that patients do not adhere to doctors‟ 
treatment advice without doctors‟ knowledge of this non-compliance.   
I now turn my focus to consultations regarding chronic disorders for which no physical 
pathology can be identified.  It is believed that somatising patients‟ symptoms reflect 
heightened sensitivity to ordinary bodily sensations or social or emotional causes (Salmon, 
2000:106).  Disagreement between doctors and patients frequently occurs, probably at least as 
often as instances of non-compliance by patients.  Yet, such disagreement is seldom overt.  
Overt conflict may however occur in consultations with somatising patients when the patient 
demands physical treatment that the doctor is not able or willing to provide.  Somatising 
patients also seem to seek doctors to validate their symptoms and to allow them to adopt the 
sick role (Salmon, 2000:108).  Interactions between patients and doctors in the absence of 
identifiable physical pathology may be “a kind of „tug-of-war‟, in which each party [attempts] 
to resolve the encounter by pulling it into their own territory” (Salmon, 2000:110-111).   
The patient will state his/her symptom(s) to the doctor (for example “I have pains in my 
back”131).  The doctor will be left uncertain about the validity claim of truth that underlies the 
patient‟s initial complaint when his/her examination of the patient‟s body cannot identify a 
physical cause for the patient‟s symptom(s).  The doctor can only state to the patient what 
(s)he knows (for instance “We can‟t find anything wrong”).  If the doctor accepts the validity 
                                                 
131
 The examples of utterances by a patient and a doctor in this paragraph are directly quoted from Skirbekk 
(2004:245-246).   
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claim of truthfulness that underlies the patient‟s initial complaint, the doctor may also answer 
the patient in the expressive mode of communication with an utterance that discloses the 
doctor‟s subjectivity (for instance “I understand you‟re in pain –back pains can hurt a lot”) 
(Skirbekk, 2004:245-247).  The patient may accept neither an utterance by the doctor that 
denies evidence of his/her symptoms in the objective world, nor an utterance that refers only 
to the subjective world (Salmon, 2000:110; Skirbekk, 2004:247).  When such disagreement 
occurs between the communication partners in a medical interview each party may attempt to 
influence the other “by emphasising the area over which [(s)he has] privileged knowledge”.  
For the doctor this is the “world inside the patient‟s body” to which the doctor has exclusive 
access through biomedical tests and instruments.  The patient‟s domain of privileged 
knowledge is the unpleasant or unbearable nature of his/her symptoms and the psychosocial 
suffering that (s)he experiences because of these bodily symptoms (Salmon, 2000:110).  
Somatising patients may therefore continue (to attempt) to communicate in the voice of the 
lifeworld while the doctor blocks or ignores such utterances and communicates solely in the 
voice of medicine (Barry et al., 2001:494-496).  Doctors may experience a sense of failure 
and pressure when they do not satisfy patients‟ expectations.  In response to these feelings 
they may zealously attempt to find the cause and to treat the patients‟ symptoms (McDougall 
et al., 2006:33).  Somatising patients frequently undergo physical investigation and treatment, 
which include invasive procedures and long-term treatment that are often ineffective, risky 
and costly (Salmon, 2000:105).   
It is clear that medical interviews regarding chronic conditions with no identifiable physical 
cause may be among the most problematic doctor-patient interactions.  Here the doctor, who 
has been taught according to the biomedical tradition to perceive all disease as physical, is 
uncertain about the cause and appropriate treatment of the patient‟s illness, since the doctor 
can find no physical pathology with the usual biomedical techniques.  The biomedical doctor 
may therefore deny the reality of the patient‟s symptoms.  The patient may be desperately 
upset by this outcome, since (s)he wants the doctor‟s authoritative validation of his/her 
symptoms, “something to refer to in the objective world” (Skirbekk, 2004:247).  In the 
modern Western world one is allowed the rights and benefits of “being sick” only after a 
biomedical doctor has pronounced one sick.  It seems that the biomedical model is ill-suited 
to deal with chronic disorders for which no physical pathology can be identified.  It leaves the 
doctor uncertain and helpless and may harm patients.  Once again a Foucauldian view of 
power in the medical interview appears.  It is not only the doctor who possesses and exercises 
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power.  Patients can exercise significant power over doctors (Salmon, 2000:111)
132
.  I shall 
further discuss power in doctor-patient interactions in the following chapter which describes 
medical discourse based on the work of Foucault. 
 
5.3.2.3 Consultations about psychological problems (accompanied by 
physical disorders) 
Interesting comments can be made about the influence of doctors‟ biomedical intellectual 
self-image on doctor-patient communication when one considers the empirical research 
findings on doctor-patient interactions regarding psychological problems (that are 
accompanied by physical disorders).  Barry et al. (2001: 496-499) described interactions 
between general practitioners and patients who presented with psychological problems
133
 as 
“Mutual Lifeworld” consultations.  In this pattern of communication both partners 
predominantly communicate in the voice of the lifeworld and doctors do not block the voice 
of the lifeworld in patients‟ communication.  One of the explanations that Barry et al. (2001: 
500-501) offer for this finding is the following.  General practitioners who have a limited 
interest and training in psychiatry may have less structured routines and pre-set medical 
formulas to rely on when confronted with psychiatric conditions compared to psychiatrists or 
interactions with patients presenting with single, physical problems.  General practitioners 
and medical (as opposed to psychiatric) specialists may therefore view the voice of the 
lifeworld as legitimate discourse for psychological consultations.  In the absence of any pre-
set medical formulas to follow, the doctor depends on his/her everyday communication and 
life skills.   
It thus seems that when a doctor (who is not a psychiatrist) becomes aware that a patient 
experiences a psychological problem, the doctor sets aside his/her biomedical perspective and 
methods since these are irrelevant to emotional problems.  For instance when the patient uses 
an utterance such as “I had a problem earlier in the year…you know my daughter was ill” 134.  
                                                 
132
 Greenhalgh et al. (2006:1172, 1182) found that even socio-economically deprived patients from “Black and 
Minority Ethnic populations” in London (United Kingdom) who communicated through interpreters with their 
doctors, developed strategies to control aspects of their interactions with general practitioners in the National 
Health Service (NHS). 
133
 In most such cases patients also reported a physical problem, such as indigestion or vertigo (Barry et al. 
2001:497).  Vertigo is a symptom that results from a disorder in the inner ear.  A patient with vertigo has the 
sensation of “whirling or spinning” (Martin, 1994:282).  
134
 This example is quoted from a transcript included in Barry et al.‟s (2001:498) paper. 
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In such cases the doctor accepts the patient‟s representative speech act and the validity claims 
it raises.  The doctor is likely to continue communication regarding the emotional problem in 
the voice of the lifeworld.  The following reply by a doctor to the complaint quoted earlier in 
this paragraph is an example from Barry et al.‟s (2001:498) research:  “How is that sorting 
itself out?”  Barry et al. (2001:497-499) found that Mutual Lifeworld consultations have good 
outcomes and lead to patient satisfaction.  It thus seems that patients accept doctors‟ 
communication regarding patients‟ emotional problems in the voice of the lifeworld.  Barry et 
al. (2001:496-499) remark that in some ways Mutual Lifeworld consultations resemble 
everyday conversations between friends.  The authors noticed “a sense of shared humanity” 
and equality in these consultations.  The doctors allowed the patients to talk about their 
experiences and emotions and treated these as relevant to the medical interview.  There is thus 
evidence of doctors communicating with patients as equals and as human beings.  It seems 
that this style of communication emerges when patients complain of emotional problems and 
the doctor cannot follow his/her usual biomedical formula of behaviour and interaction.   
Researchers have noted that medical students‟ interviewing skills change as they progress 
through their training programmes.  First year medical students typically use their natural 
interaction skills to communicate with patients and collect more psychosocial information 
than organic-factual information during the medical interview (Helfer, 1970:623-627; Preven 
et al., 1986:843-844).  Helfer (1970:626) offers the following explanation for this 
observation: “…freshmen do not have the experience, understanding, or vocabulary to obtain 
many of the organic-related facts.  Therefore, they must talk about something so they interact 
at a more interpersonal level.” 
As students progress to the more senior years of study and become more versed in 
biomedicine, their style of interaction with patients change.  Senior medical students tend to 
obtain more factual, biological information from patients and to ask more leading questions 
during the medical interview compared to junior students who collect more psychosocial than 
biologic information from patients (Helfer, 1970:625).  It thus seems that the biomedical 
model has a definite influence on doctors‟ communication skills.  As doctors become more 
practiced in modern medicine, their natural ability to interact with patients and to gather 
information from them is suppressed and they rely on the routines and formulas of 
biomedicine to interact with patients (Barry et al., 2001:501; Helfer, 1970:625).  Helfer 
(1970:626) makes the comment that “…it [is] not infrequent, after watching a few senior 
[medical students‟] interviews, to gain the impression that one [is] observing two computers 
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talking to each other.  The senior had been programmed to ask specific questions in a specific 
order and manner…” 
 
5.3.2.4 Intelligibility 
Thus far in my discussion of validity claims in doctor-patient communication I have taken the 
validity claim of intelligibility for granted.  According to Habermas (1979:2) one of the 
conditions for reaching understanding is that the speaker has to use an utterance that is 
comprehensible in order for the speaker and the hearer to understand each other.  From my 
description of doctor-patient communication in Chapter 4 it is clear that doctors‟ utterances 
are often not intelligible to patients.  Doctors‟ use of medical language (ML), the specialised 
terminology of modern medicine, causes communication difficulties between doctors and 
patients.  In effect, misunderstanding may occur when either of the two parties uses medical 
terminology, since doctors and patients often do not attach the same meaning to medical 
terms (Helman, 2007:151).   
When misunderstanding occurs the hearer should indicate this to the speaker.  That is the 
hearer must call the validity claim of intelligibility into question, so that the misunderstanding 
can be solved within the interactive context “such as through explication, elucidation, 
paraphrase, translation, semantic stipulation” (McCarthy, 1978:288).  However, due to the 
power and knowledge assymetry between doctors and patients as well as the insufficiency of 
time in the standard medical interview, the patient may not indicate his/her problem with 
understanding to the doctor and/or request clarification.  Doctors are not inclined to pay 
attention to patients‟ problems with understanding during the medical interview.  Firstly, due 
to their frequent usage of ML, it may be problematic for doctors to distinguish between 
everyday language (EL) and ML.  As Bourhis et al., (1989:345) explain: 
After years of medical practice, it may be difficlt for doctors to clearly differentiate 
between medical and everyday language when discussing medical issues with their 
patients.  Terms commonly used within medical language may be perceived by doctors 
as everyday language.  Words and expressions classified as belonging to the ML corpus 
may only be those used least frequently by doctors themselves.   
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Secondly, doctors may not regard it as important that patients understand all that is discussed 
during the medical interview.  Doctors may even have the percepion that patients are not 
interested in or able to take part in decision-making regarding their health care (Stevenson et 
al., 2000:839) and therefore doctors may not take the trouble to ensure that patients 
understand all that is said during the medical interview.  Biomedicine concentrates on the 
patient‟s body and the physical aspect of disease.  The patient‟s mind, and therefore his/her 
understanding of the issues related to his/her health care, are not important in the biomedical 
consultation.   
 
5.4 Conclusion  
I explained in the Introduction of this dissertation that my aim is not to perform a discourse 
analysis of doctor-patient communication.  My aim is rather to use the thoughts of 
philosophers regarding communication (Habermas) and discourse (Foucault) to gain insight 
into the influence of modern medicine‟s intellectual self-image on communicatively effective 
care to patients.  In this chapter I made comments about doctor-patient communication based 
on Habermas‟ (1979) universal pragmatics.  I concluded that it is appropriate to use 
Habermas‟ ideas about communicative action to comment on doctor-patient interactions.   
Doctor-patient communication takes place against a particular background consensus which 
includes shared understandings of the goal and the rationale of biomedicine, the social status 
of modern medicine as well as the public image and the self-image of biomedicine.  Yet, 
doctors and patients communicate from different perspectives.  The doctor‟s professional 
perspective is turned to the world of external nature.  (S)he mostly communicates in the 
cognitive mode of language use.  The patient mostly communicates about his/her world of 
internal nature in the expressive mode of communication.  Due to their different perspectives, 
doctors and patients may not accept the validity claims that underlie each other‟s utterances 
about the nature, causes and treatment of disease.  When either member of a doctor-patient 
dyad does not accept the validity claim(s) implicit in the other‟s speech act(s), their 
“communicative interaction can break down or suffer disturbances” (McCarthy, 1978:288).  It 
is not only the different perspectives of the doctor and patient that threaten the success of their 
communicative interaction.  The social domain of reality dictates the status of each party‟s 
right to perform the various types of speech acts as well as the speaker rights of each party.  
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The norm states that the doctor determines the rules of the medical interview.  Shared 
decision-making about the treatment of the patient‟s disease can only happen if the doctor 
feels so inclined (Charles et al., 1997:687).  The different perspectives of the doctor and 
patient and the dominance of the doctor are not necessarily problematic, as in the case of 
consultations regarding single acute physical conditions.  However, it often causes (mostly 
covert) disagreement in consultations regarding chronic disorders.  
It seems that doctors and patients seldom reach agreement through communication in their 
formal interactions.  Communicative partners achieve agreement and understanding through 
mutual recognition of each other‟s rationality, that is when the speaker attempts to rationally 
motivate the hearer with his/her speech act(s).  Generally speaking the doctor, influenced by 
the biomedical model, does not focus on the patient‟s rationality and thereby impedes 
communicative action in the medical interview.  The doctor tends not to respond to the patient 
as an autonomous and rational being.  The doctor also tends not to reveal his/her full 
humanity in interactions with patients.  It appears that doctors and patients neither discuss 
problematic validity claims with each other in the interactive context of the medical interview 
nor at the discursive level.  This means that they are left with the alternatives of breaking off 
communication altogether or changing to strategic action (Habermas, 1979: 3-4; McCarthy, 
1978:288-289).  It is important to remember that the patient is not a powerless participant in 
the doctor-patient relationship.  Although it may be difficult for the patient to secure control 
over the emerging interaction, (s)he may also exercise power over the outcomes of the 
consultation by non-verbal means.  The patient may for example decide not to follow the 
doctor‟s treatment advice, or not to return to the same doctor for a follow-up appointment, or 
to seek help outside the realm of biomedicine, for instance from a homeopath (Ainsworth-
Vaughn, 1998:42-43; Skribekk, 2004:247).  A failure to reach understanding in the medical 
interview may harm the patient and/or the doctor and may waste resources.   
In Chapter 7 of this dissertation I take on the task of critiquing the appropriateness of modern 
medicine‟s intellectual self-image.  There I want to discuss the validity claims of truth and 
rightness in doctor-patient communication.  I want to consider what appropriate conceptions 
of truth and rightness would be for modern medicine.  Such conceptions have to acknowledge 
the rationality of patients and the proper relation between modern medicine and science.   
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Chapter 6  
An application of Foucault’s thoughts on discourse to 
medical discourse 
 
What gets us into trouble is not what we don‟t know, 
it‟s what we know for sure that just ain‟t so. 
Mark Twain
135
 
 
Professions tend to be right in what they affirm, and wrong in what they ignore. 
Anthony R. Moore (1978:3) 
 
The dream of reason did not take power into account. 
Paul Starr (1982:3) 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter continues the analytical work of the dissertation that was started in the previous 
chapter.  In the preceding chapter I described doctor-patient communication in terms of 
Habermas‟ universal pragmatics.  In the current chapter I apply Foucault‟s thoughts on the 
nature of discourse to medical discourse.  The structure of the current chapter resembles the 
structure of Chapter 3, in which I describe Foucault‟s theory about the nature of discourse.  
Chapter 3 has two main parts.  The first part deals with Foucault‟s understanding of discourse 
and the second with Foucault‟s view of power.  The current chapter, in which I apply 
Foucault‟s thoughts on the nature of discourse and power to medical discourse, follows the 
two-part structure of Chapter 3.  In the first part of this chapter I describe medical discourse as 
a discursive formation and a discursive practice.  I also describe (some of) the procedures of 
limitation and exclusion that have an effect on medical discourse.  In the second part I 
describe the nature of power in doctor-patient relationships.  As in the introduction to the 
previous chapter I point out to the reader that the task of critiquing modern medicine‟s 
intellectual self-image is reserved for the final chapter and is thus not undertaken in this 
chapter.   
                                                 
135
 As cited in Tilburt & Geller (2007:819).   
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6.2 Medical discourse  
When I use the word medical discourse in this dissertation I am referring to the discourse of 
the medical profession and specifically the discourse surrounding the interaction between a 
doctor and a patient in a clinical setting, such as a hospital ward or consulting room.  Foucault 
(1972:90) considers the term discourse in at least three ways in his work: “sometimes as the 
general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and 
sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements”.  When I 
speak of medical discourse in the context of Foucault‟s writings, I am using the term in the 
second or third senses of his above definition of discourse.  I thus use the term medical 
discourse to refer to  
 
i. a particular or “an individualizable group of statements” that has a regularity 136 
between its elements (Foucault, 1972:41, 90).  The group of statements that I refer to 
is the statements that doctors may legitimately use when talking to or about patients.   
ii. The rules responsible for the production, distribution and circulation of doctors‟ 
statements (Foucault, 1972: 90; Young, 1981:48).   
 
I thus use the term medical discourse to refer to the rules that doctors (have to) follow when 
they think and talk about health and disease (in order to be regarded as competent).   
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 Foucault (1972:41) clarifies what he means with “regularity” as follows: “an order, correlations, positions and 
functionings, transformations”. 
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6.2.1 A note on method 
Foucault‟s definition of discourse indicates that he is not as interested in actual utterances or 
texts as in the rules and structures or practices that generate meaningful utterances and texts 
(Mills, 1997:7; Hall, 2001:72).  Applying Foucault‟s ideas on discourse to medical discourse 
thus allows me to move beyond the actual words of some specific doctors and to describe the 
general rules of medical discourse (Young, 1981:48).  Foucault‟s work on discourse is 
therefore very suitable for the aim of the current research project, namely to investigate the 
influence of medicine‟s intellectual self-image on communication between doctors and 
patients.  Foucault‟s ideas on the procedures that control and restrict discourse provides a way 
of understanding and explaining why everything that can be said about sickness and health is 
not included in medical discourse.  It also draws attention to the restrictions on how and by 
whom medical discourse may be used.  Foucault‟s thoughts on discourse also enable one to 
recognise the specific reality of discourse.  In Foucault‟s view medical discourse is not merely 
the representation of natural and empirical facts by means of language.  Medical discourse is a 
discursive practice that is influenced by power relations and which also brings about effects of 
power.  My work in this dissertation is thus conducted at a meta-theoretical level (attempting 
to describe how it happens that conversations between doctors and patients are produced the 
way they are) instead of the analytical level (describing and explaining what happens in actual 
doctor-patient encounters) (Mills, 2003: 117).  
What follows in this chapter is not a discourse analysis.  Neither do I follow any other 
systematic method of analysis that is described in the literature on qualitative research 
methods.  I do not attempt to apply Foucault‟s (1972) archaeological method, as it is set forth 
in The Archaeology of Knowledge.  I also do not follow the genealogical method that is 
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derived from Foucault‟s work (Armstrong, 1990: 1225)137.  I do not wish to give a description 
of the formation of medical discourse.  Instead, I make use of Foucault‟s invitation to 
researchers “to make what they can of his work” (Mills, 2003:7).  Foucault (1975, as cited in 
Patton, 1979:115) expressed the following words in an interview with Roger-Pol Droit that 
was published in the French newspaper Le Monde in 1975: 
…a book is made to be used in ways not defined by its writer.  The more, new, possible 
or unexpected uses there are, the happier I shall be.  All my books…are, if you like, 
little tool-boxes.  If people want to open them, to use this sentence or that idea as a 
screwdriver or spanner to short-circuit, discredit or smash systems of power, including 
eventually those from which my books have emerged… so much the better! 
I begin my application of Foucault‟s work on discourse by describing medical discourse as a 
discursive formation.  I outline the elements of medical discourse, namely its objects, 
concepts and theory or theme.  Thereafter I consider medical discourse as a discursive 
practice.  Finally, I describe (some of) the procedures of limitation and exclusion that have an 
effect on medical discourse.  I base my Foucauldian inspired analysis of medical discourse on 
the descriptions of this discourse in scholarly books and articles.   
Before I commence with the tasks listed above, I want to draw attention to the difficulties 
contained in the assumption that medical discourse constitutes a unity.  Medical discourse 
certainly can be spoken of as a unity since there is a regularity between its elements.  A 
regularity also exists in terms of who uses medical discourse, whom is addressed in this 
discourse, where this discourse is used, and the status of those sanctioned to use it.  However, 
                                                 
137
 A small number of studies have been published that use Foucault‟s work in various ways to analyse (aspects 
of) twentieth-century medical knowledge and practice (Heaton, 1999:760).  For example, Heaton (1999:759) 
examined the discourse of informal care and Chambers and Narayanasamy (2008:155) examined nurses‟ 
construction of health.  The authors of both studies refer to their work as Foucauldian analysis.  Heaton‟s 
(1999:760) study is an empirical analysis of mainly health policy documents.  She addresses questions such as 
„What are the conditions of possibility of the discourse of informal care?‟; a discourse that emerged in the 1970s.  
Chambers and Narayanasamy (2008:157-158) interviewed nurses and analysed the interview transcripts in terms 
of “the regularity and variability of patterns, use of rhetoric, adoption of subject positions, resistance and 
acceptance of dominant discourses”.  I could not find a published study that applied Foucault‟s work of 
discourse to medical discourse in a way similar to my practice in this dissertation.  Heartfield (1996:100) 
performed a discourse analsyis of nurses‟ case notes (nursing documentation) that was guided by “the elements 
of Foucault‟s archaeology”.  My study is different from Heartfield‟s in at least the following two ways.  Firstly, I 
analyse medical discourse in general, and do not use a particular text(s) as the basis of my analysis.  Secondly, I 
focus on doctor-patient (spoken) communication and not on nursing documentation.   
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Foucault tells us that the unity of medical discourse should not be accepted uncritically.  We 
must consider what is left out of or disallowed to enter the discourse of medicine
138
.   
 
6.2.2 The unity of medical discourse  
To speak of medical discourse as a unity, as a particular or “an individualizable group of 
statements” (Foucault, 1972:90), is problematic.  Foucault (1972:23-29) urges us to question 
those ideas, categories and theories whose validity seem self-evident and that organise our 
discourses according to the principle of continuity.  He suggests that the principle of reversal 
be applied to the study of discourse.  This means that what is traditionally regarded as the 
sources of discourse, such as the discipline and the will to truth, must rather be recognised as 
performing a negative function of cutting-up (segmenting) and rarefying discourse (Foucault, 
1981a:67; Sheridan, 1980:128).  Foucault (1981b:6) wants us to think of discourses as sets of 
discursive events.  He refers to this task as “eventalisation”.  Eventalisation includes “a breach 
of self-evidence, of those self-evidences on which our knowledges, acquiescences and 
practices rest” (Foucault, 1981b:6).  Eventalisation wants to show that it wasn‟t necessary for 
current practices to develop in the way that they did.  For instance, “it wasn‟t self-evident that 
the causes of illness were to be sought through the individual examination of bodies” 
(Foucault, 1981b:6).   
What is the source of biomedical discourse?  What defines the limits of what can be said and 
thought by modern medical doctors?  This is the biomedical model of disease which 
exclusively developed from and uses the natural sciences (Dixon, 1983:360; Schwartz & 
Wiggins, 1985:356).  I explained in Chapter 1 that this model views disease solely as a 
deviation from what is normal with regard to the measurable biological variables of an 
individual patient.  The psychological, social and behavioural aspects of illness are not 
included in the biomedical view of disease.  The biomedical model is reductionistic in the 
sense that it regards disease as purely physical in nature and as caused by a disturbance in the 
“smallest isolable component” of the biological system, for instance the biochemical level 
(Engel, 1977:130-131).   
                                                 
138
 Van Leeuwen and Kimsma (1997:106) point out that disagreement between medical practitioners from 
different countries about “medical decisions at the end of life”, such as the differences on this matter between 
doctors from the United States and doctors from the Netherlands, illustrate that unity as well as diversity exist in 
medical discourse.   
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Modern medicine is experiencing a crisis of care.  The positivist worldview of modern 
medicine does not allow the doctor to pay attention to the patient as a whole.  The doctor‟s 
focus is on the patient‟s disease.  The important question to ask is whether the biomedical 
model of disease is “adequate for the scientific tasks and social responsibilities” of medicine 
(Engel, 1977:129).  I consider this question in the next chapter.  Here I want to follow 
Foucault‟s suggestion to use a principle of reversal in thinking about the source of discourse.  
Not all possible statements about the patient, disease and treatment exist in medical discourse.  
The biomedical model of disease makes the formulation of statements and new propositions 
about the physical nature and the physical treatment of disease possible, but prevents 
statements about the psychological and social aspects of illness.  Doctors may of course utter 
statements about patients‟ illness experiences.  However, such statements are not scientific 
and fall outside the limits of medical discourse and when a doctor utters such a statement 
(s)he is strictly speaking not acting as a modern medical doctor.  The biomedical model of 
disease is thus a source of medical discourse, but it also performs the negative function of 
dividing and depleting possible statements about illness and disease (Foucault, 1981a:67; 
Sheridan, 1980:128).   
Foucault (1972:23-29) wants us to question the theories that organise our discourses and give 
them the appearance of unities.  The validity of the biomedical model of disease seems self-
evident to the Western world.  This model has become the Western world‟s point of view on 
disease.  Due to the model‟s status as “the dominant folk model of disease” in the Western 
culture, the limitations of this model are easily overlooked (Engel, 1977:130).  Engel 
(1977:130) describes the status of the biomedical model of disease as dogma.  Whereas a 
scientific model undergoes revision or is abandoned when it fails to adequately explain all 
facts regarding a particular phenomenon, a dogma requires that contradictory facts “be forced 
to fit the model or be excluded”.  Foucault (1981b:6) wants us to break out of the self-
evidences on which our knowledge and practices are based.  He wants us to realise that the 
“facts” and “the „real‟ world” of the natural sciences are not self-evident and transparent.  
They require analysis and are the unrecognised effects of prior analyses (Sheridan, 1980:217).  
We need to consider that it was not necessary for current practices to develop in the way they 
did.  It was not necessary for the biomedical model of disease to become the scientific and 
folk model of disease in the West.  In The Birth of the Clinic Foucault (1973) argues that 
modern medical discourse arose under particular historical conditions and in relation to other 
types of discourse.  Foucault stresses that discourse has a “contingent, nonrational and 
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arbitrary character” (Kuipers, 1989:104).  Medical knowledge could have developed in 
another direction.  The validity of the biomedical model of disease is thus not self-evident.   
 
6.3 Medical discourse as a discursive formation: The elements 
of medical discourse 
Foucault (1972:40-41) uses the term discursive formation to refer to a group of statements 
which has a regularity (“an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations”) 
between its elements.  The elements of a discursive formation include its objects, concepts 
and themes or theories.  To study the elements of medical discourse is to look “inside the 
head” of modern medicine.  It may be thought of as a study of modern medicine‟s rationality.  
Medical discourse informs doctors‟ thoughts and statements, including their conversations 
with patients.   
The elements of medical discourse are fundamentally influenced by the nature of clinical 
biomedicine as “a technology that consists of the practical application of the natural sciences 
to human illness and health” (Schwartz & Wiggins, 1985:333).  Medicine views itself as a 
science and specifically a natural science.  Scientific practice can be defined as the systematic 
acquisition and transfer of knowledge.  Modern science is driven by a particular aim.  “It is 
the aim of the human intellect to arrive in a disciplined manner at a totality of coherent, 
rationally justifiable, and universally valid insights about the various aspects of reality” 
(Rossouw, 1993:95, my translation).  The aim of rational justification means that fellow-
subjects must be motivated by evidence to accept scientific insights.  Evidence serves as the 
rational justification for scientific views and findings (Rossouw, 1993:96).  Therefore, science 
only studies those subjects that can by some means directly present particular aspects of 
themselves to researchers (Schwartz and Wiggins, 1985:345).  The different facets of the aim 
of science require that the process of knowledge acquisition be conducted in a disciplined 
manner.  This discipline is evident in the strict demarcation of the problem domains that are 
scientifically investigated (Rossouw, 1993:96).  The strict delimitation of the domains of 
scientific study means that the concepts of science are abstract.  The concepts of any 
particular science focus on only a few features of its subject matter and exclude other features 
of the same subject matter.  In biomedicine the reality of the patient is reduced to the abstract 
concepts of the natural sciences, “such as biochemistry, microbiology and physiology” 
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(Schwartz & Wiggins, 1985:336-337).  The abstract, natural scientific concepts of 
biomedicine may hinder the practice of humanistic medicine.  Yet Van Niekerk (1999:237) 
reminds us that the strategy of isolating problem domains for experimental investigation is 
central to the impressive success of medical and other modern sciences (Van Niekerk, 
1999:237).   
Medicine understands itself, and is understood by society, as a natural science (Simon, 2010: 
337).  Medicine thus shares the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the natural 
sciences paradigm or positivist world-view, as they were described in Chapter 1.  These 
assumptions directly influence the elements of medical discourse; and thus what biomedicine 
can say about its subject matter, namely human health and disease (Schwartz &Wiggins, 
1985: 354).  I shall now describe the objects, concepts and theory of medical discourse. 
 
6.3.1 The objects of medical discourse 
The objects of a discursive formation are “that of which one can speak in a discursive 
practice” (Foucault, 1972:201).  How are the objects of medical discourse delimited?  
Biomedicine‟s positivist world-view only allows discursive objects that belong to the material 
world and that can therefore be studied empirically and objectively.  Two authors eloquently 
and succinctly state what the objects of medical discourse are.  Foucault (1973: xi) writes in 
The Birth of the Clinic that “…the singularity of the patient, …that region of „subjective 
symptoms‟ that –for the doctor – defines …the world of objects to be known.”  The linguist, 
Suzanne Fleischman (2001:475), writes in her overview of the scholarly literature on 
language and medicine that “medical language…is an abstract discourse about disease and 
organs; it is not about patients and their experience of illness.”139  The objects of medical 
discourse are thus disease and the bodies of patients.   
Medical discourse can only speak about physical disease, in other words disease of the body.  
Only observable signs of disease and physical treatments can be spoken of in the diagnostic 
and therapeutic tasks of biomedicine.  In its task of diagnosing disease, medicine wants to 
                                                 
139
The physician William Donnelly (1986:88) makes a similar observation about grand rounds and 
clinicopathologic exercises.  He writes that “…almost everything said about the patient in a typical 
clinicopathologic exercise in the New England Journal of Medicine could be said as well for a lesser primate 
with remarkably good health insurance.  The message is clear: disease counts; the human experience of illness 
does not.”   
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“communicate directly with disease” (Rich et al., 2008:221).  In this doctor-disease 
communication the person who suffers from the disease plays a passive role and is silenced.  
(S)he is the substance or medium in which the disease exists (Fleischman, 2001:476; Rich et 
al., 2008:224).  As Rich et al. (2008:223) put it: “the patient is simultaneously important, as 
the medium in which disease is recognised, and irrelevant, as clinical ephemera.”  Due to 
biomedicine‟s commitment to empiricism patients‟ diagnoses and treatment results are 
expressed in terms of measurable information, preferably in the numerical language of 
laboratories.  Human information about disease, such as doctors‟ observations or clinical 
judgements or patients‟ emotional reactions is limited in medical discourse.  Feinstein 
(1987:223-224) describes what is excluded from empirical or “hard” clinical data: 
Among the soft information excluded by this [empirical] model are data about a 
patient‟s spectrum of symptoms, severity of illness, co-morbidity, disability, and all the 
distinctly human reactions – love, hate, joy, sorrow, distress, gratification – that 
differentiate people from animals or molecules.  The exclusions have also diverted 
attention from the clinician‟s traditional obligation to offer relief and comfort, not just 
cure.  Consequently, the results of treatment today are often reported with hard data 
about death, survival, disease and adverse reactions, but suitable information is not 
assembled to show many important human benefits of modern therapy.   
The body is an object of medical discourse and in medical discourse the body is an object.  
In the natural science paradigm “the body is regarded as nothing but a self-contained material 
object, reductively conceptualised in terms of a physics of mechanisms, and studied, as if it 
were just an object, in isolation from its inhabited world” (Levin & Solomon, 1990:517).  
Since biomedicine is interested only in material reality and that which can be objectively 
measured, the patient is reduced to his/her body and has “the status of object” (Foucault, 
1973:xv).  Medical discourse is not about patients but about their bodies and the diseases that 
affect those bodies (Fleischman, 2001:475).  The human body is the primary object of 
biomedical interventions and treatment outcomes “are measured with objectively quantifiable 
instruments” (Tilburt & Geller, 2007:820).   
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6.3.2 The concepts of medical discourse 
Medicine is a practical science.  A distinction exists between the practical sciences and the 
pure sciences.  The pure sciences want to discover the truth concerning their subject matters.  
Practical uses or goals are irrelevant to the pure sciences since they merely want to generate 
knowledge regarding the nature of reality.  Physics and biology are examples of pure 
sciences.  On the contrary, practical sciences can be described in terms of their practical 
goals.  The concepts of a practical science are all relevant to the particular goal(s) of the 
science.  Medicine is a practical science.  Its goals are the promotion of health and the 
treatment of disease in human beings.  Medicine does not merely want to gain knowledge 
about human health and disease.  Medicine includes those concepts of the pure sciences that 
are relevant to human health promotion and the treatment of disease in human life (Schwartz 
& Wiggins, 1985:346-347).   
Medicine thus makes use of the pure sciences that provide knowledge relevant to its goals and 
pursuits.  Examples of the pure sciences used by biomedicine are anatomy, physiology, 
microbiology and biochemistry.  Nevertheless, medicine also moves beyond the relevant pure 
sciences to develop concepts that belong to medicine alone (Schwartz & Wiggins, 1985:353).  
Schwartz & Wiggins (1985:353) provide the following example of a concept peculiar to 
medicine: 
The notion of hepatitis, for example, is peculiar to medical science.  Medicine could 
never have developed such a notion, however, if it had not utilized and extended some 
of the well-established principles of physiology and biochemistry - not to mention 
anatomy, pathology, and microbiology.  Hepatitis is not an item in these pure sciences 
because its conceptualization need arise only if science is aiming at promoting health 
and treating illness.   
Medicine‟s natural scientific intellectual self-image impacts its understanding of its central 
concepts.  The concepts of medical discourse are abstract.  The positivist epistemological 
assumptions of objectivity and empiricism mean that medicine views its concepts as observer-
neutral and corresponding to a completely independent, objective reality that can be 
physically measured (Levin & Solomon, 1990:534; Tilburt & Geller, 2007:820).  Kriel 
(2000:23-24) lists the following as among the central concepts of medicine: patient, disease 
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and therapy.  The patient as well as disease processes and causality are regarded as merely 
biological or physical in nature.  Similarly, biomedical treatments are physical in nature and 
are understood as functioning objectively and mechanistically (Kriel, 2000:23-24).  I shall 
now elaborate on each of these three concepts of medical discourse.   
The natural science paradigm‟s ontological assumptions of dualism and materialism 
fundamentally influence medicine‟s concept of the patient.  A mind-body dualism still exists 
in medicine.  The mind and body are viewed as distinct from one another (Levin & Solomon, 
1990:528).  The material aspects of reality are the subject of the natural sciences.  The natural 
sciences are only interested in human beings as physical systems, equivalent to all other 
organic or inorganic physical systems.  The patient is thus reduced to his/her body.  Human 
experience is not part of the subject matter of the natural sciences and is therefore ignored by 
medicine (Schwartz & Wiggins, 1985:355).  Schwartz & Wiggins (1985:336) elaborate on 
medicine‟s materialistic view of the patient: 
[The biomedical] model substitutes for the concrete reality of the patient a construct 
derived exclusively from the natural sciences such as biochemistry, microbiology, and 
physiology.  In this manner, the reality of the patient is subsumed entirely under the 
abstract concepts of these sciences.  The patient‟s life is reduced to whatever these 
abstractions can express. 
Since medicine‟s interest is in the patient‟s body, the next question to answer is: “what is 
medicine‟s conception of the human body?”  In line with the positivist ontology modern 
medicine conceptualises the body concretely, empirically and mechanistically.  The body is 
seen as a totality of separately functioning parts (Levin & Solomon, 1990:552; Burger, 
2001:81).  The structure and the functioning of the body are regarded as a product of the 
interaction of its smallest constituent parts.  Helman (1991:1080) draws our attention to the 
possibility of patients adopting a mechanistic conception of the body from their doctors 
and/or the media.   
Patients may believe…, that their bodies are repairable machines that can be diagnosed, 
measured, monitored, and even kept alive by other machines.  This new body image is 
reflected in language: “nervous breakdown”, “blow off steam”, “recharge batteries”, or 
“reprogramme myself”.  Some patients, as a result, regard their doctors as mechanics, 
plumbers, electricians, or carpenters, rather than as healers. 
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The concept of disease is the most important subject of medical practice and science (Van 
Leeuwen & Kimsma, 1997:105; Hofmann, 2001:211).  Corresponding to its natural scientific 
intellectual self-image, medicine has a realist
140
 conception of disease.  According to this 
view disease is conceived of “as a thing” (Hofmann, 2001: 221).  Realists are of the opinion 
that diseases form part “of the underlying structure of the natural world”141.  A specific 
instance of a disease is consequently a certain sort of “identifiable physical entity”142, which 
in conjunction with other particular examples of the same disease, constitute a natural kind.  
As a result, the course of the disease in any particular patient is predictable as it is “guided by 
natural law and the underlying structure of the world” (Simon, 2010: 335).  Diseases then are 
not invented, but must be discovered (Hofmann, 2001:221) in specific patients and “as 
general types” (Simon, 2010:335).  Despite the view that diseases are empirically identifiable 
(Rich et al., 2008:222), disease conditions are not considered as independent material objects 
by realists.  In other words, realists do not identify diseases with their causes (Simon, 
2010:343).  Conditions are understood as having material constituents, for instance the 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis in the disease condition referred to as tuberculosis.  Yet 
tuberculosis is not equated to its biological pathogen.  As Dixon (1983:359) puts it:  “disease 
as a concept… represents an organization of thought…”143 
Modern medicine‟s concept of disease represents a break with the humoral theory of illness of 
Hippocratic medicine.  I described the transformation of medicine from Hippocratic to 
biomedicine in Chapter 1.  I will briefly recapitulate this description for the reader‟s benefit.  
Hippocrates and his followers saw disease as a single, uniform entity (Van Niekerk, 
2002:227-228).  In Sigerist‟s (1933:181, as cited in Jonsen, 1990:84) words, “Hippocrates 
recognized only disease, not diseases.”  The biomedical concept of disease differs starkly 
from this pre-modern notion.  Modern medicine recognises various separate types of disease.  
Each type of disease has a characteristic set of signs and symptoms and an identifiable and 
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 The realist position on disease may also be referred to as „ “ontological”, “Platonic”, “Cnidian”, …, 
“rationalist”, “pro-ontological” and “naturalistic” ‟ (Hofmann, 2001:221).  The realist position is denied by anti-
realist theorists who propose that diseases are not real but socially constructed entities (Simon, 2010:335).   
141
 With “underlying structure of the physical world” is meant “the structure of the natural world that, according 
to realists…, lies behind the physical features of the world we are directly aware of and explains the presence of 
natural kinds, laws of nature, and/or other regularities found in the natural world” (Simon, 2010:335).   
142
 “Entity” here must be broadly interpreted as referring to the states or processes of organisms (Simon, 
2010:33).   
143
 Stempsey (2000: 324) makes the interesting point that, strictly speaking, doctors do not need a concept of 
disease.  The distinction between health and disease has no effect on practical medical decisions.  The decision 
to provide medical treatment does not depend on the presence of disease.  Persons receive medical treatment for 
a variety of conditions that are not diseases, for instance plastic surgery.  Then again, certain conditions that are 
generally considered as diseases may not be medically treated, such as asymptomatic benign tumors.   
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distinct pathophysiological cause (Jonsen, 1990:85).  The modern disease concept has 
allowed modern medicine to answer some of the basic problems that puzzled humankind and 
caused great suffering and death for millennia, such as infection and contagion (Lewinsohn, 
1998:1263).  Yet, modern medicine has not reached a full understanding of disease.  Every 
question that science answers, leads to countless new questions.   
The modern concept of disease has changed from identification with the clinical manifestation 
of disease until the early eighteen hundreds, to a representation of the “essential” cause of 
each specific disease (the theory of cause [Hyde et al., 2005:73]), in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries (Copeland, 1977:529).  Feinstein (1987:218) explains this change and 
illustrates it with some examples. 
Until the scientific revolution that began with the routine use of necropsy in the early 
nineteenth century, disease was perceived and named as a clinical manifestation: a dis-
ease.  Fever, cyanosis, asthma, and the falling sickness (epilepsy) were diseases.  After 
the underlying morphologic, chemical, and microbial causes of many clinical diseases 
were revealed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the concepts and names of 
human ailments were changed, whenever appropriate to indicate the “essential” 
etiologic cause of each disease
144
.  Consumption became tuberculosis or metastatic 
cancer; dropsy was replaced by such entities as congestive heart failure.  The clinical 
diseases of angina pectoris and familial haemolytic jaundice were converted into the 
morphologic diseases of coronary arteriosclerosis and spherocytosis.  With further 
scientific progress, the etiological concepts and names were expanded to include 
external invasions (such as microbial agents), internal dysfunction (such as chemical 
imbalances), and genetic displacements (in chromosomes).   
Disease today is understood as pathology on the molecular level (Helman, 2007:123).  
Biomedical scientists attempt to define disease “in the language of microscopic or 
radiographic morphology, biochemistry and molecular biology” (Hofmann, 2001:220).  As a 
result medical discourse about disease and biomedical technology is “rigorously up-to-date, 
highly nuanced, and often precisely quantified” (Donnelly, 1986:81).  A unified concept of 
disease does not (yet) exist in biomedicine.  Particular disease concepts may be based upon 
gross anatomical defects (a fracture, for example), microscopic changes in anatomy (for 
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 Feinstein (1987:218) cites the following source here in his paper:  Faber, K. 1923.  Nosography in modern 
internal medicine.  New York: Hoeber. 
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example arterial-septal cardiac defect), specific causative agents (for example infection with a 
known micro-organism), specific deficiencies (for example vitamin deficiencies), genetic 
abnormalities (for example sickle cell anaemia), physiological or biochemical irregularities 
(for example arterial fibrillation), groups of clinical signs and symptoms (for example aplastic 
anaemia), or simply a description of abnormalities (for example peptic ulcer) (Engle & Davis, 
1963:517-518; Copeland, 1977:530).  Modern medicine views diseases as objects.  Disease is 
seen as an independent entity and not as part of the patient (Cassell, 1976:143).  The 
biomedical disease concept does not include any psychological, social or cultural factors.   
Biomedicine‟s reductionist disease concept is frequently criticised by scholars as well as 
patients and their caregivers since it doesn‟t accommodate metaphysical terms such as 
personhood, partnership, care and healing (Van Leeuwen & Kimsma, 1997:105).  For 
instance, Donnelly (1986:86) points out that medical discourse seems to favour words that 
pathologize human situations to everyday language to talk about the human experience of 
illness.  “Words like apathy, anxiety, denial, depression, and manipulative come easily to the 
clinician‟s tongue.  We seldom hear determined, discouraged, hopeful, optimistic, pessimistic, 
courageous, brave, valiant, sad, happy, and the like.”  Another example is Barry et al.‟s 
(2001:494-495) finding, which I elaborated upon in Chapter 4, that doctors tend to block or 
ignore patients with chronic physical conditions‟ utterances about difficult life experiences 
related to their symptoms.  The outcomes of such doctor-patient interviews are typically poor.  
Furthermore, biomedicine understands symptoms - that is patients‟ complaints of suffering or 
behavioural deviations - simply as reflections or manifestations of disordered bodily 
processes.  However, research from a variety of social science traditions indicate that an 
individual‟s experience and the clinical manifestation of a specific biomedical condition are 
strongly influenced by psychological, social and cultural factors.  Sociological and 
anthropological research suggest that systematic variation in the clinical behaviour of 
different cultural groups includes variation in the specificity of medical complaints, the style 
of medical complaining in diverse clinical settings, the nature of anxiety about the meaning of 
symptoms, the focus on particular organ systems, and the response to therapeutic strategies 
(Good and Good, 1980: 170, 172).  
Modern medicine‟s disease concept also leads to problems in the practice of medicine itself.  
Firstly, the modern disease concept expresses disease “as a single-state entity, [and] not as a 
dynamic clinical course.”  A diagnostic label such as diabetes mellitus or coronary artery 
disease does not provide a prediction of the various ways in which the disease may develop in 
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a particular patient.  Yet, these different patterns of development are critical distinctions when 
a doctor assesses prognosis and therapy (Feinstein, 1987: 218).  Feinstein (1987:218) 
illustrates how the same disease may evolve differently in different patients:  
Some patients never know they have diabetes mellitus until it is accidentally discovered 
late in life; others lose limbs, go blind, and die during adolescence.  Some patients with 
coronary artery disease lead active, relatively unrestricted, long lives; others are 
incapacitated or dead before the age of 50.  
A patient‟s prognosis is estimated based on his/her “spectrum of symptoms, severity of 
illness, rapidity of disease progression, or concomitant major co-morbidity” (Feinstein, 1974, 
as cited in Feinstein, 1987:218).  Yet these features are not reflected in disease labels and 
concepts.  Since modern technology has started to make diagnostic evidence available to 
clinicians in the second half of the twentieth century, for instance via laboratory tests and 
imaging, the task of diagnosis is no longer the physician‟s main intellectual challenge.  The 
biggest scientific challenge of today‟s doctor is prognosis and not diagnosis.  Today‟s doctor 
must choose effectively between numerous treatment options.  To achieve this task the doctor 
must be able to predict the outcomes for patients in different groups of each disease and to 
assess the effect of treatment “in each prognostic group”.  Nonetheless, prognosis does not 
receive much scientific attention (Feinstein, 1987:219).   
Secondly, the current system of disease classification is inadequate for the reason that 
“disease is cited according to what it is but not what it does” (Feinstein, 1987:219-220).  
Disease names represent the essence of a specific disorder but do not indicate what has taken 
place in the spectrum of symptoms and the functional severity of disease for individual 
patients (Feinstein, 1974, as cited in Feinstein, 1987:220).  For instance, a patient diagnosed 
with diabetes mellitus “may or may not have acidosis and vascular complications”.  Similarly, 
a patient with cancer of the colon “may or may not have bleeding, intestinal obstruction, 
ascites or cachexia”145.  Nevertheless, most patients receive treatment or are hospitalised due 
to the functional effects of the severity of disorders, and not because of the pathological 
essence of disease.  For example, a patient with chronic pulmonary disease may receive 
treatment for respiratory failure or a superimposed infection instead of the disease itself.  For 
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 For the benefit of the reader without a medical background I define the following inaccessible biomedical 
terms.  Acidosis indicates the presence of excessive acid in the body fluids (Acidosis, [s.a.]).  Ascites refers to 
“excess fluid in the space between the tissues lining the abdomen and abdominal organs” (Ascites, [s.a.]).  
Cachexia refers to a loss of appetite and body fat (Hypothalamic tumor, [s.a.]).  
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this reason a scientific classification of functional severity is needed for prognosis, treatment 
and for satisfactory evaluation of the cost of care (Feinstein, 1987:220).   
The final concept of medical discourse that I will describe is treatment.  In keeping with the 
positivist world-view and the corresponding realist conception of disease, biomedical 
treatment is conceived of as physical in nature and as functioning objectively and 
mechanistically (Jaspers, 1989:256; Kriel, 2000:24).  Examples of biomedical treatments are 
pharmacological products or other technological remedies and surgery (Kriel, 2000:24; Hyde 
et al., 2005:73).  Physical treatment may even be deemed appropriate for the treatment of 
psychosocial problems with purely social causes (Hyde et al., 2005:73)
146
.  This propensity is 
referred to as “a pill for every ill” (Hyde et al., 2005:70).  Since biomedical treatment is 
physical in nature, treatment results are commonly reported with physically measured 
information (Feinstein, 1987:223).  In Donnelly‟s (1986:86) opinion medicine does not have 
an adequate language to talk about caring for terminally ill patients in acute-care hospital 
wards.  He explains as follows: 
“Symptomatic and supportive”?  “Palliative care”?  The latter term seems especially 
limp, inconsequential, passive, and hardly up to the important and challenging task of 
caring for the very sick.  And although the phrase “happy death” may still have meaning 
for individuals brought up in the Christian tradition, “happy” or “good” death is not part 
of medicine‟s vernacular, and such a goal, individualized for a particular patient, cannot 
be given formal recognition in management discussions among [medical personnel].  
 
6.3.3 The theory of medical discourse 
Physicians have used theoretical models to think about and to understand the nature of disease 
and how to treat it in every era of the history of medicine.  It appears that these respective 
theoretical models were acceptable in their eras of reign.  Yet, most models are later found to 
be faulty (Feinstein, 1987:215).  Modern medicine‟s theoretical model of disease is known as 
the biomedical model.  I earlier stated that the biomedical model is based on the natural 
sciences, namely physics, chemistry and biology (Schwartz & Wiggins, 1985:333).  
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 For instance, Irving (2002:408) observed that elderly, hospitalised patients in Australia were treated with 
antipsychotic medication for agitation, which might have been caused by unmet daily needs, such as relief of 
physical discomfort.   
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Therefore, it views the body and disease as purely physical in nature (Engel, 1977:131).  
Medical practice or clinical medicine is perceived as the application of the natural sciences to 
the treatment of disease and the promotion of health in human beings (Schwartz & Wiggins, 
1985:333)
147
.  The biomedical model does not accommodate the psychological, behavioural 
and social dimensions of illness (Engel, 1977:130).  Yet, I have stressed throughout this 
dissertation that the non-material aspects of illness are of real consequence for the diagnosis 
and treatment of disease.  Scientific medicine demands physical evidence as support for all 
statements about illness and disease.  Medicine must take into account that its object of 
inquiry is a suffering human being.  Evidence of disease should not only include observation, 
but also the testimony of the sufferer (Engel, 1985:362).   
 
6.4 Medical discourse as a discursive practice 
Foucault (1972:54) refers to discourses as “practices that systematically form the objects of 
which they speak”.  He urges us through his analytic principles of reversal and specificity to 
view discourse as more than the linguistic signs used in speech and writing.  Foucault 
(1981a:67; Hook, 2001:532) wants us to treat discourses as practices, in other words as 
actions.  For Foucault discourses do not merely describe reality, discourses constitute reality.  
When analysts consider discourses as practices, they are able to appreciate the material effects 
of discourse (Foucault, 1981a:66; Hook, 201:537).  Foucault (1977:199) defines discursive 
practices as follows:  
Discursive practices are characterised by the delimitation of a field of objects, the 
definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of 
norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories.  Thus, each discursive practice 
implies a play of prescriptions that designate its exclusions and choices.   
On the one hand discourse appears as a productive phenomenon which brings forth 
utterances, concepts and effects (Mills, 1997:17).  On the other hand Foucault‟s (1981a:67) 
principle of reversal focuses our attention on the negative, limiting function that a discipline, 
such as biomedicine, performs on discourse.  Doctors and patients can only produce 
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 The principles of the natural sciences, in particular basic biomedical science, are used to explain the 
mechanisms of disease.  Yet, the principles that are followed in decisions concerning patient management are 
derived from the following non-clinical sciences: biostatistics, epidemiology, economics and sociology 
(Feinstein, 1987:217).  
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utterances of a certain kind (Van Leeuwen & Kimsma, 1997:102-103).  The objects of 
medical discourse are limited to the material world.  The objects of medical discourse are 
mainly the bodies and organs of patients and (physical) disease.  The only legitimate 
perspective for agents of biomedical knowledge is the positivist world-view.  Consequently, 
efforts to elaborate on the concepts and theory of biomedicine must be made in accordance 
with the natural-science paradigm.  The lifeworld of the patient and of the doctor have a very 
limited place in medical discourse.  In Van Leeuwen & Kimsma‟s (1997:103) words, medical 
discourse “allows one particular type of experience and simultaneously suppresses or 
devalues certain other more personal and intimate or subconscious experiences.”  During the 
medical interview the patient‟s story of his/her illness is transformed into medical discourse.   
 
6.5 The order of medical discourse  
According to Foucault (1981a:61) there are three different procedures at work in modern, 
Western societies to select certain statements for and exclude others from discourse.  These 
three procedures are:  
 
i. social or external procedures of exclusion;  
ii. internal procedures of control;  
iii. a rarefaction of the speaking subjects.   
 
I shall now describe (some of) the procedures of limitation and exclusion that have an effect 
on medical discourse.  I describe the procedures that I identified through reading scholarly 
literature on medical discourse and by my own reflections on the subject.  It is certainly 
possible that more procedures of limitation and exclusion operate in medical discourse than 
the ones I next describe.   
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6.5.1 Social procedures of exclusion at work in medical discourse  
Social procedures of exclusion operate from the outside of discourse.  They are concerned 
“with the part of discourse which puts power and desire at stake”.  These procedures are 
responsible for averting the powers and dangers of discourse (Foucault, 1981a:56).  One 
particular social procedure of exclusion clearly operates in medical discourse, namely “the 
opposition between true and false”.   
The modern, western world has a scientific worldview.  The ontological and epistemological 
assumptions of this worldview as well as the findings and the meanings achieved through 
scientific endeavours form the true discourse of the modern period.  The true discourse of 
the society at large is echoed in the medical discourse of its time.  What does the division 
between true and false look like in modern medicine? 
In medical discourse facts or true statements concern the material reality that can be studied 
objectively and empirically.  A statement is true if it precisely signals “the „natural‟ order of 
human biology” (Good & Good, 1981:179).  The soundest sources of knowledge are facts 
about molecular and cellular physiology as well as the findings of randomised controlled 
clinical trials.  In contrast, the findings of the humanities and the social sciences are regarded 
as less reliable sources of knowledge, due to the more subjective nature of these fields of 
enquiry.  For this reason the human and social sciences are mostly excluded from medical 
education and human and social research are unlikely to receive financial support from 
biomedical institutions (Burger, 2001:81; Tilburt & Geller, 2007:820).   
I earlier stated that modern medicine has a realist conception of disease.  According to this 
understanding diseases are empirically identifiable entities.  Furthermore, diseases are 
believed to exist independently of the patient whose body merely acts as a host for or the site 
of disease.  Modern medicine‟s conception of disease creates a division between the 
scientifically knowable signs of disease in or on a patient‟s body and the symptoms of 
disease that patients experience and report.  In biomedicine a distinction is thus made between 
the objective signs and the subjective symptoms of disease (Rich et al., 2008:222).  Anspach 
(1988:371) identified a “clear epistemological hierarchy” in medicine.  The most respected, or 
the truest, form of knowledge is gained with the use of technology, such as in a laboratory.  
Slightly lower on medicine‟s epistemological hierarchy are observations made by physicians.  
At the bottom of the hierarchy are patients‟ reports about their illness experiences, in other 
words information about disease symptoms.  Symptoms that cannot be explained by one of 
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the higher forms of medical knowledge, such as the findings of the physical examination of 
the patient or laboratory data, are often not regarded as valid by doctors.  In Donnelly‟s  
(1986:86) long-standing experience as a doctor based at a teaching hospital in North America 
patients with unexplained symptoms may be suspected of imagining their symptoms or even 
of being alcoholics.   
 
6.5.2 Internal procedures of control at work in medical discourse 
Internal procedures of control operate from the inside of discourse.  These are the procedures 
whereby discourses control themselves.  The internal procedures of control function as 
principles of classification, ordering and distribution.  Their role is to master discourse as 
irruption, or chance event (Sheridan, 1980:124; Foucault, 1981a:56).  The principle of the 
discipline is actively and evidently at work in medical discourse.   
The principle of the discipline allows the generation of new propositions but also forbids 
certain propositions to enter the borders of medical discourse.  According to Foucault‟s 
(1981a:67; Sheridan, 1980:128) principle of reversal the discipline acts as a source as well as 
an inhibitor of discourse.  It is a creative as well as a restrictive mechanism.  To be allowed 
into a discipline a proposition must form part of the true discourse of the discipline.  This 
means that a proposition must fulfil the following three conditions.   
 
i. It has to refer to a determinate range of objects;  
ii. it has to use conceptual tools of a specific type;  
iii. it has to refer to a specific body of theory.   
 
The objects, concepts and theory of medical discourse are deeply influenced by the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions of natural science.  I explained above that the 
objects of medical discourse are strictly material, its concepts are abstract, and that the only 
valid theory of disease is the biomedical model.  The discipline of modern medicine disallows 
propositions containing discursive elements of a different nature to form part of its discourse.   
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6.5.3 A rarefaction of the speaking subjects of medical discourse 
The third group of procedures that exercise control over discourses perform “a rarefaction of 
the speaking subjects”.  These are procedures whereby discourse controls speaking subjects 
(Foucault, 1981:61).  Foucault (1981:61-64) identifies three such procedures, namely: 
 
i. the ritual; 
ii. societies of discourse;  
iii. the social appropriation of discourses.   
 
These procedures determine the conditions in which discourses are applied and the rules for 
those that use a particular discourse, and are therefore rules that limit access to discourses.   
Ritual determines the qualifications needed by the speaker; the gestures, behaviour, 
circumstances and the entire set of signs which have to accompany the discourse; and also the 
effectiveness of the words spoken, that is their effect on those to whom they are directed, and 
the limits of their ability to constrain (Foucault, 1981:62).  It seems that much of doctors‟ 
interactions with or about patients are guided by ritual.  The medical anthropologist Cecil G. 
Helman (1991:1081) describes the hospital as “a tiny self-contained city, with its own history, 
hierarchies, uniforms, rituals, and slang”.  Doctors‟ consultation rooms and health care clinics 
also fit this description.  Medical discourse includes the rituals of the consultation, or the 
clinical method, and the case presentation.  These rituals contain purely physical actions as 
well as speaking and writing (for instance of medical reports, referral letters, medical 
certificates and on prescriptions).   
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Who is qualified to use medical discourse?  The answer is simply, those who are formally 
educated and recognised as medical professionals.  That is mainly those who obtained degrees 
in medicine and surgery at universities
148
 and who work as doctors.  What circumstances 
accompany medical discourse?  Medical discourse (as defined for the purposes of this 
dissertation) occurs in interactions between doctors and patients and their families or 
caregivers.  Such interactions take place in the social institutions of medicine, namely 
hospitals, clinics and consultation rooms (Van Leeuwen and Kimsma, 1997:102).  The 
circumstances of medical discourse are thus that a person who is socially recognised as an 
authority on matters of health and disease, is consulted by a person with a corresponding need 
in an official setting.  How do the two main actors, the doctor and the patient, behave 
during a consultation?  The actions of both participants are predetermined by the format of 
the clinical method.  Doctors are taught in medical school to structure their interactions with 
patients according to the clinical method, and patients learn to anticipate and to cooperate 
with this method from their earliest interactions with doctors.   
The clinical method contains a number of actions that the doctor systematically performs.  
The doctor first interrogates the patient about his/her symptoms and possibly related factors.  
This is known as history taking.  Thereafter (s)he examines the patient and may perform or 
order some special diagnostic investigations.  Next (s)he identifies the disease label that best 
fits the results of the preceding diagnostic tasks and then prescribes treatment appropriate for 
the identified disease (Kriel, 2000:22-23).  The patient‟s role during the consultation is to 
cooperate with the doctor.  The patient is expected to answer the doctor‟s questions during 
history taking as thoroughly and truthfully as possible and to adequately perform the actions 
required of him/her during the physical examination.  The verbal behaviour of doctors and 
patients during consultations also has a specific structure.  In Chapter 4 I related Mishler‟s 
(1984:67-68) discovery of a “basic structural unit of discourse” in what the author terms 
unremarkable interviews between doctors and patients.  This unit occurs regularly and 
routinely in unremarkable medical interviews.  The unit consists of three consecutive 
utterances, namely  
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 Universities usually do not allow just anyone who wishes to study medicine to do so.  At most medical 
faculties only a predetermined number of students are selected to follow medical degree programmes.  This is 
mainly due to the large number of prospective students interested in medicine as an occupation (partly or 
perhaps mostly due to the prestige of the profession) and the limited resources available to provide this training.  
The selection is largely based on the candidate‟s most recent academic achievement.   
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i. a request or question from the doctor;  
ii. a response by the patient; and  
iii. an assessment or acknowledgement of the patient‟s response by the doctor.   
 
The doctor then adds a new request or question to this third utterance, and so the next cycle of 
discourse begins.  Medical interviews that are recognised and accepted as standard and 
appropriate tend to be made up of a connected series of these structural units and are therefore 
termed “unremarkable”.  Mishler (1984:77) and Barry et al.‟s (2001:494-496) research has 
shown that doctors generally block or ignore statements by patients that diverge from the 
structure of typical or unremarkable medical interviews.  This is especially true in 
consultations about chronic physical conditions, such as angina, arthritis and asthma.  Patients 
may attempt such diversion by asking questions or introducing conversational topics, 
especially if these concern psychosocial matters.  The doctor largely determines the nature of 
the doctor-patient interaction.   
The next question to answer regarding the ritual in medical discourse is, what signs 
accompany medical discourse?  Medical discourse is based on what Harrison (1972:3) 
refers to as the “empiricist theory of language”.  The empiricist theory of language shares 
many of the ontological and epistemological assumptions of biomedicine (Good & Good, 
1981:179).  According to the empiricist theory of language the utterances of a language can 
be divided into two categories, namely basic and non-basic utterances.  Basic utterances have 
“contact with the world”.  They are attached to “bits of „the world‟” in the mind of the 
language user.  Examples of basic words are „red‟, „cold‟ and „dry‟.  Basic utterances refer to 
direct sensory experiences.  Non-basic utterances receive meaning from an association with 
basic utterances.  Examples of non-basic utterances are syncategorematic and abstract words 
such as „not‟, „unless‟, „however‟ or „heretical‟ and „subsume‟.  It is thus through basic 
utterances “that meaning enters a language”.  Meaning attaches to a basic utterance by means 
of a conventional stipulation that stipulates “simply that a given language element shall 
henceforth be associated with a given world element” (Harrison, 1972:9-13, 33).   
Within biomedicine the elements of medical discourse are viewed as references to the 
material world, in particular to biological realities.  The meaning of the words and phrases of 
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medical discourse are constituted in relationship to these realities.  The meaning of 
biomedical terms is thus seen as free of social context and of the perspective of the speaker.  
In biomedical practice, research and education statements are true and valid if they accurately 
reflect the material world.  Patients‟ statements are also interpreted in relationship to the 
material world.  The material world that medical discourse refers to is universal and is not 
connected with or influenced by cultural and social contexts (Good, 1977:51-52; Good & 
Good, 1981:181).  According to the empiricist approach to language, different languages are 
simply different sets of words that represent universal realties.  This theory has a very 
practical and uncomplicated understanding of translation.  The task of translation is simply 
seen as the selection of the appropriate words or labels for entities that exist throughout the 
world (Swartz, 1998:27-28).   
Earlier I paid attention to the content of medical discourse by describing its objects, concepts 
and theory.  Here, I want to focus on how language is used by the authorised speakers of 
medical discourse.  In Helman‟s (1991:337) words “…medical professionals form a 
privileged subculture, with their own language, rituals of healing, and the use of powerful 
symbols, such as the white coat”.  Dixon (1983:362), a family physician and scholar makes a 
similar statement: “The medical community is identified by, and identifies its members with, 
a particular language.”  Bourhis et al. (1989:339) refer to this language as medical language.  
In sociolinguistic terms medical language forms an occupational register (Fleischman, 
2001:473).  Fleischman (2001:473) translates and quotes the following illustrative description 
of medical language by the French scholar Jammal
149
: 
…medical language, the occupational register of a tribe of white-coated speakers that 
gets passed from one generation of physicians to the next through the highly ritualised 
institutions of medical education.  It is widely recognised as what sociolinguists would 
call an “in-group dialect,” i.e. largely opaque outside the medical “confraternity.” 
What are the characteristics of medical language?  The most prominent feature of medical 
language is probably its large specialised vocabulary.  This vocabulary is also known as the 
jargon of medical practitioners and scientists.  Donnelly (1986:83) gives the following 
description of the vocabulary of medical language. 
                                                 
149
 Jammal, A. 1988.  Les vocabulaires des spécialités médicales : pourquoi et comment les fabrique-t-on ?  (The 
vocabularies of medical specialties :  why and how are they created ?) Meta, 33(4): 535-41.    
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This language is dominated by an elaborate vocabulary for laboratory findings and 
disease entities…It is good and proper language for both the well and not-so-well parts 
of human beings.  It includes the extraordinary precise language of biochemistry and 
immunology and the finely nuanced language of pathology. 
Medical terms slip into everyday or ordinary language.  For instance, some psychological 
terms form part of English to the extent that they are listed in everyday English language 
dictionaries.  The words depression, eating disorder and psychopath appear in the Oxford 
Dictionary.  However, the meanings of medical terms in everyday language often differ from 
the meanings of these terms in medical language
150
.  These differences in meaning for doctors 
and patients have the potential to cause misunderstandings during clinical communication.  
What further complicates doctor-patient interactions is that both parties may be unaware of 
such misunderstandings when they occur.  Misunderstandings during consultations may result 
in patient dissatisfaction and non-compliance with treatment advice (Hadlow & Pitts, 
1991:193, 195).   
Another striking feature of the way that doctors use language is the large amount of 
abbreviations they use during interactions with each other or other medical professionals.  
This behaviour particularly occurs in hospital settings where more than one doctor or medical 
professional attends to a patient.  Perri Klass (1984:C2) gives the following description of her 
introduction to the esoteric language of doctors as a junior medical student at Harvard 
Medical School.   
“MRS TOLSTOY is your basic L.O.L. in N.A.D., admitted for a soft rule-out M.I.,” the 
intern announces.  I scribble that on my patient list.  In other words Mrs Tolstoy is a 
Little Old Lady in No Apparent Distress who is in the hospital to make sure that she 
hasn‟t had a heart attach (rule out a myocardial infarction).  And we think it‟s unlikely 
that she has had a heart attack (a soft rule-out).   
If I learned nothing else during my first three months of working in the hospital as a 
medical student, I learned endless jargon and abbreviations.  I started out in a state of 
primeval innocence, in which I didn‟t even know that “s C.P., S.O.B., N/V” meant 
“without chest pain, shortness of breath, or nausea and vomiting.”  By the end I took the 
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 It is also possible that lay persons have different understandings of medical terms among themselves.  
Hadlow & Pitts (1991:194) found that 46% of a sample of British patients understood the term “eating disorder” 
to mean “indigestion or stomach ache”.   
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abbreviations so for granted that I would complain to my mother the English Professor, 
“And can you believe I had to put down three NG tubes last night?”  “You‟ll have to tell 
me what an NG tube is if you want me to sympathize properly,” my mother said.  NG, 
nasogastric – isn‟t it obvious? 
The jargon and abbreviations that doctors use are neither purely scientific in nature nor what 
one would expect from professionals who work benevolently and non-malevolently and with 
the utmost respect for those whom are sick or injured.  Donnelly (1986:82) refers to this 
language as slang.  Slang, or informal medical language, is not taught in the classrooms of 
medical schools and does not appear in medical textbooks (Coombs et al., 1993:987).  Again 
Klass (1984:C2) provides some examples. 
And then there is the jargon that you don‟t ever want to hear yourself using.  You know 
that your training is changing you, but there are certain changes that you think would be 
going a little too far.  The resident was describing a man with devastating pancreatic 
cancer.  “Basically he‟s C.T.D.,” the resident concluded.  I reminded myself that I had 
resolved not to be shy about asking when I didn‟t understand things.  “C.T.D.?” I asked 
timidly.  The resident smirked at me.  “Circling The Drain.”  The images are vivid and 
terrible.  “What happened to Mrs  Melville?”  “Oh, she boxed last night.” To box is to 
die, of course. 
It is mostly doctors in some stage of training who are familiar with and use slang (Coombs et 
al., 1993:992).  These include the undergraduate students, interns and residents that Klass 
(1984:C2) refers to
151
.  Rude forms of slang are seldom used by or in front of senior medical 
staff, unless they have somehow indicated their approval thereof (Donnelly, 1986:82)
152
.  It is 
also not used in front of patients.  Medical slang is what the sociologist Erving Goffman 
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 The [English] terminology that refers to the positions of medical workers in hospitals is confusing since it is 
not transparent to the layperson, and differs between Britain and the United States of America.  The term 
medical student refers to an undergraduate student who studies at a university towards a degree in medicine and 
surgery.  An intern (USA) or a house officer (Britain) is a person who has nearly completed or who has 
completed his/her medical degree “…and who is working at a hospital to get further practical experience” 
(Oxford Advanced Learner‟s Dictionary, 2005:727, 780).  A resident (USA) or a registrar (Britain) is a doctor 
who works in a hospital and who is training as a specialist in a specific area of medicine (Oxford Advanced 
Learner‟s Dictionary, 2005:1243, 1226).   
152
 Donnelly (1986:82) emphasises that not all slang used by (trainee) doctors in hospitals is impolite.  Coombs 
et al. (1993:995, 997) describe one of the functions of informal medical language as a means of exercising 
creativity, humour and wit in an authoritarian environment.  Donnely (1986:82) provides the following examples 
of lively and playful metaphors used by young doctors: “Some residents talk of giving patients “tune-ups” when 
correcting abnormal blood biochemical abnormalities.  Tune-ups may then lead to “good numbers” for, say, 
blood electrolyte, urea, createnine, and glucose values.  House staff may chart these numbers in a quickly 
sketched diagram of squares and triangles.  If the numbers are good, one may hear that the patient is “euboxic.”” 
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(1959:128) refers to as „a backstage language‟.  Doctors (and possibly other health care 
professionals) use this language when they can say: “it‟s just us”.  Other individuals are not 
meant to understand the medical backstage language (Watson, 2011:2).   
The question of the purpose of doctors‟ occupational register is provoked by the preceding 
description of medical language and how it is used.  What do doctors achieve by using their 
occupational register?  I found three answers to this question in the literature on medical 
language.  Firstly, as with all occupational registers, medical language is an efficient 
communication system for the transfer of messages between specialists.  “Within knowledge 
communities, …[occupational registers] provide a practical and convenient shorthand for 
talking about complex matters specific to a field” (Fleischman, 2001:475).  Secondly, medical 
jargon (including slang) helps to cultivate feelings of closeness and loyalty among persons 
who are working under immense pressure as well as to soften tragedy and relieve strong 
emotions (Klass, 1984:C2; Coombs et al., 1993:995; Watson, 2011:39).  Medical students, 
interns and residents probably use slang as a strategy to survive and expedite their stressful 
and exhausting work in hospitals.  Their stress is related to working long hours and getting 
little sleep while they are still acquiring the knowledge and skills associated with their tasks 
and to constantly being assessed by their seniors in a strict and sometimes harsh manner
153
 
(Donnelly, 1986:82; Coombs et al., 1993:992; Watson, 2011:42).  Clinical work may also 
lead young doctors (and/or student doctors) who work in teaching or public hospitals to 
experience strong emotions, for example anxiety, uncertainty, frustration and anger.  Such 
emotions are caused by the ever-present threat of death in hospitals, the worry of 
unintentionally contributing to a patient‟s death, and patients who do not follow treatment 
advice and/or show little concern for their health.  Using slang may enable practitioners to 
release feelings that are incompatible with compassion, the appropriate emotion for doctors, 
and to communicate them to a group of understanding insiders (Coombs et al., 1993:995-
997).  Medical students are usually very pleased with learning and mastering medical 
language since this means that they are becoming part of a very selective and prestigious in-
group.  Medical students (partly) use informal medical language to help them feel that they 
are making the transition from being mere students to becoming real doctors (Klass, 1984: 
C2; Coombs et al., 1993:993).  Thirdly, slang provides doctors with a private means of 
                                                 
153
 Watson (2011:42), an ethicist, recounts a conversation with a senior physician who told her that residents 
often face anger from their patients and their caregivers as well as the residents‟ superiors.  The use of slang and 
even gallows humour may thus be a form of emotional nourishment for overworked, sleep deprived and 
emotionally undernourished residents.  
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communication.  Some informal medical language develops out of doctors‟ practical need to 
discuss sensitive topics in front of patients and their families.  In such situations doctors fear 
that patients and their significant others or caregivers may be harmed if they understood what 
was said or speculated about the patient and his/her condition (Coombs et al., 1993:995).  
Klass (1984: C2) provides an example of medical language that creates some privacy for 
doctors in their clinical work: 
This linguistic separation between doctors and patients allows conversations to go on at 
the bedside that are unintelligible to the patient.  “Naturally, we‟re worried about adeno-
C.A.,” the intern can say to the medical student, and lung cancer need never be 
mentioned. 
The final question to address regarding the ritual in medical discourse concerns the 
effectiveness of the words spoken.  In other words, what is the effect of medical discourse 
on those to whom it is directed, and what is the limit of its ability to constrain (Foucault, 
1981:62)?  Medical discourse contains power and its power extends beyond the consultation 
room and hospital ward.  When the effects of medical discourse are considered its character as 
a practice becomes more clear.  Medical discourse diagnoses and prognosticates.  It declares 
ill persons as sick or not
154.  Medical discourse may be used to express a patient‟s life 
expectancy and is used to classify patients‟ diseases as acute or chronic, benign or malignant, 
curable or not.  Diagnostic and prognostic statements may have profound effects on how 
patients and their caregivers perceive and respond to illness and/or disease.  Medical 
discourse is also used to dispense treatment advice.  It may be used to advise or order a 
patient to keep to his/her bed, to be admitted to hospital, to undergo risky diagnostic 
procedures or treatments such as radiation, or even to be placed in quarantine in the case of 
highly infectious and dangerous diseases.  The diagnoses, prognoses and treatment regiments 
that are pronounced in medical discourse can thus validate or invalidate the ill person‟s 
adoption of the sick role.  Should the patient be pronounced “sick” (s)he may deserve certain 
societal rights and benefits, such as permission to stay home from work or to receive a grant 
from the state.  The effects of medical discourse are also felt outside of biomedical 
institutions.  Due to its status and power medical discourse influences other societal 
                                                 
154
 Here, I again use the distinction between the terms illness and disease that occurs in medical anthropology.  I 
explained in a footnote in Chapter 1 that illness in this sense refers to the patient‟s and his/her caregivers‟ 
experience and understanding of being unwell, whereas the term disease describes the modern doctor‟s 
understanding of this process.   
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discourses and practices.  For example, within legal and penal discourses medical discourse 
may be used to declare a person as responsible or not for his/her illegal actions, or eligible for 
parole based on medical grounds.   
Like all forms of authority and power, medical discourse may be challenged or ignored.  The 
ability of medical discourse to constrain is limited by the patient‟s right to make autonomous 
decisions about his/her health care.  First of all the patient can decide whether nor not (s)he 
wants to consult a biomedical doctor, and often which individual or type of doctor (s)he wants 
to consult.  Of course ill persons who choose to seek healing outside of modern medicine or 
through self-help will probably not benefit from the powers of modern medicine to cure 
disease or to relieve suffering.  Secondly, patients with the capacity to make autonomous 
decisions can choose to follow or to reject treatment advice.  Yet, despite the established 
bioethical principle of respect for patient autonomy in the Western world, doctors often do not 
fulfil this obligation and may paternalistically make decisions on behalf of the patient.  The 
doctor‟s power is especially strong in situations where the encounter with a patient is not 
voluntary.  These are cases where the doctor acts as an administrator on behalf for the state.  
Starr (1982:11) explains and provides examples of doctors‟ (and other professionals‟) 
authority in involuntary encounters.   
In the modern state, professionals often stand between people and benefits they desire 
or penalties they fear.  Social workers, teachers, and doctors certify those who come 
before them as eligible or ineligible to receive welfare payments, graduate from school, 
or gain exemption from military service.  As gatekeepers into and out of various 
institutions, professionals acquire means of ensuring compliance quite independent of 
any belief in the moral basis of their authority.   
Medical language, especially as described above by Jammal, also makes one think of 
Foucault‟s other two processes of rarefaction of speaking subjects, namely societies of 
discourse and the social appropriation of discourses.  Medical language is possessed by a 
few and cannot be owned by just anyone.  Medical language belongs to the medical 
professionals.  It belongs mainly to those who are admitted to medical schools to train as 
doctors.  Medical professionals are schooled in medical language through their formal 
education in the classrooms of universities, but also through their interactions with teachers, 
senior colleagues and peers and at the bedsides of patients.  Medical language is thus passed 
on to new generations through medical education and the distribution of medical education is 
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highly regulated.  Usually medical schools select only a few of many applicants to study 
medicine.  At most universities this selection is largely based on the respective candidates‟ 
most recent academic achievements and medical degree programmes are usually filled with 
the applicants with the highest academic marks.  Unsuccessful candidates, like all health care 
consumers, do not gain formal access to medical language.  Some unsuccessful applicants to 
medical schools may have had experiences of denied access in other social arenas, such as 
access to decent schools.  The distribution of medical education and medical language is 
likely to mirror the distribution of other benefits, privileges or even human rights in a 
particular society.  As in all societies of discourse, the roles of speaker and listener are not 
interchangeable in medical discourse (Foucault, 1981a:63).  However, within the past two 
decades the Internet has made medical knowledge more accessible to those outside the 
medical profession than ever before.  Yet, medical professionals remain the ones with the 
authority to use medical language and the experts on its use and meaning.  They are also the 
ones who protect medical discourse through a highly regulated system of education.   
Foucault‟s ideas on the procedures that control and restrict discourse provides a way of 
understanding and explaining why everything that can be said about sickness and health is not 
included in medical discourse.  It also draws attention to the restrictions on how and by whom 
medical discourse may be used.   
 
6.6 Medical discourse and power  
In the final section of this chapter I shall describe the nature of power in doctor-patient 
relationships and interactions.  I base my analysis on Foucault‟s understanding of power and 
on the published empirical research reports on doctor-patient communication.   
Modern medical discourse is a scientific discourse.  It speaks the truth of modern times about 
health and illness.  It is therefore a discourse with power (Foucault, 1978:106-107).  The 
modern medical doctor is the authorised speaker of this discourse.  The power of medical 
discourse and medical practice, which together I term medical power, has certain effects on 
medical professionals, patients and on their interactions.  A consultation between a medical 
professional and a patient, the latter without validated knowledge and skills related to the 
diagnosis and treatment of disease, is not a meeting of equals.  The balance of power in the 
doctor-patient encounter is skewed in the clinician‟s favour.  Patient populations are 
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significantly and perhaps unacceptably influenced, or even controlled, by medical 
professionals and health care institutions (Ells, 2003:217).  The other side of the matter is that 
patients mostly voluntarily consult physicians in order to gain specific health-related benefits.  
Before I examine the nature of power in the doctor-patient relationship, I shall briefly present 
Paul Starr‟s (1982) interpretation of the basis of the doctor‟s authority.   
 
6.6.1 The basis of the doctor’s power 
“Authority, in its classical sense, signifies the possession of some status, quality, or claim that 
compels trust or obedience” (Starr, 1982:9).  Authority includes two sources of control, 
namely legitimacy and dependence.  Legitimacy depends on the subordinate‟s acceptance of 
the (superior‟s) demand for obedience.  Dependence rests on the subordinate‟s judgement of 
the unpleasant consequences of disobedience (Starr, 1982: 9-10).  Professionals claim two 
types of authority, namely social and cultural authority.  Social authority entails control over 
others‟ actions by giving commands.  Doctors practice social authority over patients when 
they (aim to) control their actions by giving them instructions or advice.  However, the 
doctor‟s social authority over patients rests on the other type of authority, doctors‟ cultural 
authority.  For the doctor to dispense treatment advice, they have to name and evaluate the 
patient‟s condition.  In other words, they need to interpret the symptoms and signs the patient 
presents with.  Patients consult doctors to find out if they (really) are sick, and what the 
meaning of their symptoms is.  They want to know, for instance, if their condition is treatable 
and what implications it has for some other aspects of their lives.  Doctors have the authority 
to “evaluate the nature of reality and experience, including the „needs‟ of those who consult 
them….Authority, then, also refers to the probability that particular definitions of reality and 
judgements of meaning and value will prevail as valid and true” (Starr, 1982:13).  Starr 
(1982:13) refers to this type of authority as cultural authority.  The doctor‟s cultural 
authority is antecedent to their social authority (Starr, 1982: 13-14). 
The authority to interpret signs and symptoms, to diagnose health or illness, to name 
diseases, and to offer prognoses is the foundation of any social authority the physician 
can assume.  By shaping the patients‟ understanding of their own experience, physicians 
create the conditions under which their advice seems appropriate (Starr, 1982:14).   
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Let us return to dependence and legitimacy as the conditions for authority.  The most 
important basis of patients‟ dependence on doctors is the latter‟s superior competence (Starr, 
1082:11).  Doctors‟ specialised and extensive knowledge and skills enable them to cure and 
treat many forms of disease.  This is what patients need from doctors (Beisecker, 1990:106).  
Doctors also often obtain power from patients‟ psychological dependency upon their healers.  
This is especially true in the context of longstanding doctor-patient relationships and anxiety 
provoking conditions.  A patient‟s emotional dependence on his/her health care provider may 
inhibit him/her from changing providers if (s)he is unsatisfied with some aspect of their 
regular provider‟s service.  The legitimation of doctors‟ professional authority entails three 
claims.  Firstly, they do not claim authority as individuals but as members of a community.  
This community objectively validates the knowledge and competence of its members based 
on shared standards.  Secondly, the standards of the professional community are based on 
rational inquiry and empirical evidence.  Thirdly, the professional‟s advice and judgement are 
directed towards the substantive value of health.  To the degree that a medical professional 
violates the values and standards of practice of their professional community, his/her exercise 
of authority is illegitimate, and in the extreme case (s)he will be guilty of malpractice (Starr, 
1982:12-13, 15).   
 
6.6.2 The nature of power in the doctor-patient relationship  
Foucault (1984:61) conceptualises power as a productive force.  His theory of power 
suggests that power produces the subjects, discourse(s), knowledge, and practices or “rituals 
of truth” related to the doctor-patient interaction.  Power also produces resistances to these 
social constructions (Irving 2002:406).  Seen in this way, medical power does not simply 
restrict the ways in which doctors and patients may behave.  It also opens up a range of 
possible behaviour and attitudes in the realm of clinical medicine, and produces social 
benefits and costs.  Furthermore, Foucault (1976:98) conceptualises power as something that 
circulates.  He denies that power can belong only to a particular person or group of people 
“who then exercises that power over others”.  Instead, he proposes that individuals are always 
in the position of concurrently undergoing and exercising power (Foucault, 1976:98).  
According to Foucault‟s (1976:98) conception of power the doctor and patient cannot be 
contrasted as the powerful and the powerless in the doctor-patient relationship (Bates, 
2005:425).  Each of them is “subject to power and subjects of power” (Ells, 2003:215).  Yet, 
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the patient‟s ability to exercise power is limited compared to that of the doctor (Sheridan, 
1980:218).  
For Foucault (1982:221) the exercise of power is to structure the potential field of action of 
other individuals.  In the doctor-patient relationship power struggles are to a great extent 
played out in the communicative interaction between the actors.  In this context the exercise 
of power seems to be “about shaping the possibilities for talk” (May et al., 1996:197).  The 
struggle is not only about who talks and how, but also, perhaps mainly, about what is 
discussed (and about what remains undisclosed).  This view of power in the doctor-patient 
relationship may explain the description of clinical encounters in empirical research reports as 
tacit negotiations (Stivers, 2002:1127, Heritage, 2005:96) and contests.   
 
6.6.3 The subjects of doctor-patient interactions 
Foucault‟s theory of power suggests that power produces the subjects of the doctor-patient 
interaction.  What is the nature of the patient-subject that medical power creates for the 
doctor-patient interaction?  The ideal patient is passive and obedient to the bearer of medical 
knowledge, namely the doctor.  (S)he presents her/himself as an object for the medical gaze.  
The medical gaze is subordinating, silencing and non-reciprocal (Rendell, 2004:36).  To 
become a patient an individual needs to be questioned, examined and pronounced as sick by a 
doctor.  The process of diagnosis produces the individual as a medical subject (Frank & 
Jones, 2003:180).  The individual is thus subjected to the knowledge that the medical 
professional(s) develops about him/her (Heartfield, 1995:101).  The patient‟s body and the 
disease it carries are the objects of medical knowledge.   
The physician is also produced as a particular type of subject by medical power.  (S)he is a 
member of the medical profession and performs her/his work in or in collaboration with 
medical institutions.  The doctor must speak the socially accepted truth about health and 
disease.  (S)he needs to think, speak and act in ways that correspond with the biomedical 
model, the theory of medical discourse, as well as the standards of medical practice and the 
rules of medical institutions.  The doctor must embody medical knowledge, skills and 
practices.  (S)he is thus also subject to medical power (Måseide, 1991:552).  
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6.6.4 The productive nature of medical power 
Foucault (1984:61) conceives of power as a productive force.  (Partly) based on a 
Foucauldian conception of power, Måseide (1991:557) argues that power is an essential 
precondition “for competent and adequate clinical practice”.  Legal and professional standards 
stipulate such competence and patients often demand it.  For this reason Måseide (1991:552) 
argues that power in medical interactions is “always necessary” and “often benign”.  The 
doctor needs control over the medical encounter in order to structure it according to the 
rationality of the biomedical model.  The doctor‟s relative dominance in the medical interview 
may allow him/her to identify the patient‟s medically relevant problem(s).  It is the doctor‟s 
duty to collect medically significant and sufficient information from each individual patient.   
Even patient-centred practitioners are liable to decide when they have enough 
information and when to interrupt the patient‟s talk in order to change the consultative 
process in a medically rational way.  This is not only the doctor‟s right, but his or her 
professional duty.  The doctor must decide when it is time to make enquiries about 
what, or when it is time for the patient to prepare for the physical examination 
(Måseide, 1991:554).   
Medical power thus produces knowledge about the patient.  The doctor can also use his/her 
power in the medical interaction to (attempt to) convert the patient “into an adequate object 
for medical intervention” (Måseide, 1991:555-556).  Technology often plays a large part in 
medical assessment and intervention.  For the effective and efficient use of technology in 
clinical settings, patients need to accept it and cooperate with medical personnel in its use.  
Doctors may use controlling interactional techniques, such as instructing and directing, to 
prepare patients for and accomplish their cooperation with the use of technology in clinical 
practice.  The doctor may thus transform the patient into an adequate medical object through 
“relationally regulating endeavours” (Måseide, 1991:556).  Another accomplishment that 
doctors may attain through their dominance in the doctor-patient relationship is the 
management of time in consultations.  Doctors may restrict patients‟ talk with subtle forms of 
interactional control (Måseide, 1991:556).   
Doctors‟ power can thus be viewed as a productive force and as necessary for competent and 
adequate medical practice.  Patients also have access to power in the doctor-patient 
relationship and may employ their power in productive ways.  Relationships of power may 
thus produce benefits to the individuals involved.  However, this productive power is a “two-
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  218 
edged phenomenon”.  On the other side of the benefits produced by power, there is “what 
people give up in order to become the subjects of systems that benefit them” (Frank & Jones, 
2003:182).  For instance, in the description of the identities of doctors and patients above it 
was clear that the subjective experiences of each are disallowed in the clinical encounter.  To 
my mind this is a direct consequence of the modern ideal of clinical medicine as a replication 
of the method of natural science.  I shall critique this view of clinical medicine in the next 
chapter.   
 
6.6.5 The circulation of power in the doctor-patient relationship 
Corresponding to Foucault‟s contention that power doesn‟t only belong to one social group, is 
the popular view among medical sociologists that the medical profession is one of a number 
of important countervailing powers in society.  These countervailing powers include, but 
depending on the national context and its sociological character, are not limited to; the state 
and third-party payers of health care, health care consumer groups, the medical-industrial 
complex that produces products and services for profit, and non-biomedical health care or 
wellness traditions (Light, 1995 as cited in Light, 2000:203).  Differences between the 
interests, cultures and goals of these parties may cause difficulties, yet noteworthy alignments 
are possible.  Each of these countervailing powers seeks, to varying degrees and in different 
ways, to fulfil its interests.  A dominant force in a network of countervailing powers will over 
time produce imbalances, excesses and neglects that upset or threaten its opposite forces and 
estrange the larger public (Light, 2000:203-204).  These opposite forces will then work, 
separately or jointly, towards creating a balance of power that better promotes their interests.   
In the meeting between a doctor and patient contests about the content and the outcome of the 
interaction may arise.  Hunter (1992:122) refers to the “silent tug-of-war” that doctors and 
patients have over ownership of the story of illness.  Mishler (1984:121) describes the 
“conflict and struggle between two different domains of meaning” in the medical interview.  
Although power in the clinical consultation does not belong to the doctor alone, it is easier for 
him/her to exercise power in this context compared to the patient.  Yet the doctor‟s power is 
limited by certain other forms of power.  Doctors are subject to legal and professional 
standards and norms (Måseide, 1991:556-557), including their professional codes of ethics.  
Doctors will violate those standards and codes if they attempt to force patients to comply with 
their suggestions, or harm patients with their specialised knowledge and skills (Starr, 
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1982:11).  Doctors do not have the power to coerce patients into compliance.  On the 
contrary, patients need to authorize the doctor‟s power through adequate participation in the 
latter‟s clinical tasks (Bates, 2005:426).   
Similarly, the doctor does not need to give the patient an opportunity to describe his/her 
psychosocial experience of the illness.  Yet, the limits of the interaction are not determined by 
the doctor alone.  The patient may attempt to obstruct or to interrupt the doctor‟s 
conversational course, for example by remaining silent (May et al., 1996:199) or by 
volunteering additional information in response to the doctor‟s biomedically orientated 
questions (Beisecker, 1990:111).  From a Foucauldian perspective of power, multiple 
possibilities of interacting with the powerful medical discourse are open to patients (Bates, 
2005:425-426).  Patients may also attempt to influence doctors‟ treatment recommendations.  
Stivers
155
 (2002:1127) found that some parents of paediatric patients overtly advocate for 
antibiotic treatment of their children‟s acute disorders.  Although this behaviour occurred 
rarely in the researcher‟s sample, the parents succeeded at times to pressure doctors to 
prescribe antibiotics against the doctors‟ diagnostic convictions (Stivers, 2002:1123).  The 
current configuration of the power network that crosses through the health care context calls 
for patient and/or caregiver participation in treatment decision making.  This places doctors 
before the delicate task of encouraging and maintaining patient participation, while resisting 
pressure from patients to act in ways that compromise their professional integrity (Strivers, 
2002:1127).   
Empirical evidence indicates that patients differ in their communication behaviour towards 
doctors.  Research findings suggest that most patients desire some power in the consultation, 
such as access to information and input in clinical decisions, yet few behaviourally demand it 
during their interactions with doctors.  Certain factors antecedent to doctor-patient 
communication seem to affect patients‟ communication behaviour during clinical encounters.  
These include sociodemographic and situational factors.  Research results show that patients 
with a high social status are more likely to ask doctors questions and to receive information 
from them, compared to patients from other social classes.  Some characteristics of high 
status patients are; a high income, a high level of education and membership of the same 
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 Stivers (2002:1112) studied interactions between paediatricians and parents in private health care settings in 
Southern California.  The children of the participating parents were between 2 and 10 years of age and 
complained of “ear pain, throat pain, cough, or congestion”.  These interactions can thus be classified as acute 
care, private, paediatric consultations.   
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cultural and gender group as the doctor.  However, situational factors seem to be the best 
predictors of assertive communication behaviour by patients (Beisecker, 1990:107-109; 116-
117).   
Beisecker (1990:108-109) reviewed the empirical research literature on patient power, and 
identified the following situational factors as powerful predictors of assertive communication 
behaviour by patients during the clinical encounter: the patient‟s type of illness, the reason for 
the consultation, the length of the interaction, the presence of a companion, and whether the 
consultation is the patient‟s first or a repeat visit to the doctor.  Beisecker (1990:116-117) 
suggests that when patients seek information from doctors or attempt to participate in 
treatment decisions, they may be attempting to obtain control over their medical condition as 
oppose to control over the physician.  In her opinion patients‟ desire to gain control over their 
illness and its treatment, may explain why situational factors are such strong predictors of 
assertive communication behaviour by patients during clinical consultations.   
The relatively recent increase in the availability of medical knowledge in the public sphere 
has been making the boundaries of the society of medical discourse much more permeable.  In 
the twenty first-century patients have easier access to medical knowledge than ever before in 
the history of modern medicine.  Those with access to the Internet (and who are literate) have 
a wealth of medical knowledge at their fingertips.  Matters related to health, disease and 
health care are also frequently discussed and reported on in the media.  Various television and 
radio shows devoted to health and health care exist.  Some of these are even presented by 
doctors who may become world-wide celebrities
156
.  In some countries, such as the United 
States of America and New-Zealand, the manufacturers of prescription medications may 
advertise directly to consumers through media such as television, radio, magazines, 
newspapers and the Internet (Donohue et al., 2007:674 ,680).  The presence of medical 
information in the public arena allows patients to become the subjects of medical knowledge.  
Knowledgeable patients have greater access to power in the doctor-patient relationship (Bates, 
2005:427, 431).   
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 Examples are the American television shows „Dr Oz‟ and „The Doctors‟ that are also aired on South African 
television.  The shows are hosted by medical specialists who so became celebrities.   
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6.6.6 The relationship between medical discourse and power 
Foucault wants us to think of discourse as more than the form and signs of language (Hook, 
2001:532).  For him the concept of discourse includes the rules that determine what can be 
said and by whom it can be said.  He understands discourses as regulated practices (Foucault, 
1972:90).  Discourse is closely related to power.  Power produces discourse, knowledge and 
truth, which in their turn strengthens the systems of power they were born from (Foucault, 
1976:93; 1980:52; 1984:74).  Struggles for power, are therefore also struggles for discourse 
and truth and the effects of truth.  Seen from Foucault‟s perspective on power, much of the 
conflict and contest in the doctor-patient encounter are struggles for the possession and 
meaning of medical discourse.  They are struggles about what counts as true with regards to 
health and disease and who has the right to speak this truth.   
 
6.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I applied Michel Foucault‟s thoughts on the nature of discourse to medical 
discourse.  Based on Foucault‟s atlas of the anatomy of discourse, I dissected medical 
discourse to identify its objects, concepts and theory.  Modern medicine‟s intellectual self-
image is that of a natural science.  Its elements are based on the ontology and epistemology of 
natural science.  The statements of medical discourse are about material objects, in other 
words, that which can be studied empirically and objectively.  The objects of medical 
discourse are disease and the bodies of patients.  Medical discourse has abstract concepts.  
The patient as well as disease processes and causality are conceptualized as merely biological 
or physical in nature.  Similarly, biomedical treatments are physical in nature and are 
understood as functioning objectively and mechanistically (Kriel, 2000:23-24).  In Foucault‟s 
terminology the biomedical model of disease can be referred to as the theory of medical 
discourse.  The biomedical model is based on the natural sciences.  The medical fraternity 
perceives medical practice as the application of the natural sciences to the treatment of disease 
and the promotion of health in human beings (Schwartz & Wiggins, 1985:333).   
Foucault (1981a:61) puts forward the proposition that in modern, Western societies certain 
procedures internal and external to discourse work to control discourse.  These procedures 
select certain statements for and exclude others from discourse.  I described how „the 
opposition between true and false‟, „the discipline‟, as well as „the ritual‟, „societies of 
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discourse‟ and the „social appropriation of discourse‟ control medical discourse.  Only 
statements commensurate with the ontological and epistemological assumptions of natural 
science function as true in medical discourse.  The principle of the discipline allows novel 
but true statements to enter medical discourse, and rejects statements with objects, concepts or 
theories outside the truth of biomedicine.  Medical professionals are the authorised speakers 
of medical discourse.  They are also the ones who protect medical discourse through a highly 
regulated system of education.   
In the final section of this chapter I described the nature of power in doctor-patient 
relationships and interactions based on Foucault‟s conception of power.  Foucault views 
discourse and power as closely related.  Power struggles do not only take place by means of 
discourse, they are also struggles for the possession of discourse (Foucault, 1981a:52-53).  
Seen from Foucault‟s perspective on power, much of the conflict and contest in the doctor-
patient encounter are struggles for the possession and meaning of medical discourse.  They 
are struggles about what counts as true with regards to health and disease and who has the 
right to speak this truth.   
The task of applying Foucault‟s thoughts on discourse and power to medical discourse, as it is 
described in the empirical research literature on this topic, was challenging.  I attribute this 
difficulty to two characteristics of Foucault‟s work.  First, the detail and the abstract nature 
with which Foucault describes discourse.  Yet, Foucault‟s abstractness was what made his 
work attractive and useful for my purpose.  Second, the fact that Foucault‟s work on discourse 
and power does not form a coherent body of knowledge (Sheridan, 1980:225).  As Sheridan 
(1980:225), who translated most of Foucault‟s writings into English, explains in his book 
about the philosopher‟s work:  
There is no „Foucault system‟.  One cannot be a „Foucaldian‟ in the way one can be a 
Marxist or a Freudian: Marx and Freud left coherent bodies of doctrine (or 
„knowledge‟) and organizations which, whether one likes it or not…, enjoy 
uninterrupted apostolic succession from their founders.  If Foucault is to have an 
„influence‟ it will no doubt be as a slayer of dragons, a breaker of systems.  Such a task 
should not be seen as negative; indeed it is the system-building that is the real negation.   
I followed Foucault‟s invitation to researchers, “to make what they can of his work” (Mills, 
2003:7).  Foucault‟s description of discursive formations gave me a framework for the 
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analysis of the internal structure of medical discourse.  His understanding of discourse as a 
regulated practice allowed me to examine the influence of the positivist paradigm on the 
discourse of the medical profession.  Viewing medical discourse as a discursive practice 
draws attention to the restrictive function of medical discourse.  While new statements or 
facts that stem from biomedical research are unproblematically assimilated into medical 
discourse, statements outside of the natural scientific truth are denied entry into the discourse.  
No analysis of medical discourse should ignore the power struggles that accompany doctor-
patient encounters.  Foucault‟s conception of power as productive and as “circulatory” is 
extremely valuable in accounting for the behaviour of doctors and patients towards claiming 
power in the consultation.  Foucault‟s understanding of power as something that circulates 
counters the common and unconvincing belief that doctors are all powerful and patients 
completely powerless in consultations.  The Foucauldian conception of power draws attention 
to the powers acting on physicians and on the possibilities of resistance that are open to the 
subjects of doctor-patient interactions.   
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Chapter 7 
A critique of the appropriateness of modern medicine’s 
scientific self-image, conclusions and recommendations 
 
The reductionism of biomedical science and clinical practice, grounded in an empiricist 
semantics and epistemology, has produced both the dramatic progress in understanding and 
treating disease and the loss of holism and humanism in clinical practice that has made the 
past few decades both the best of times and the worst of times in medical history. 
Good & Good (1981:179) 
7.1. Introduction  
In this chapter I critique the appropriateness of modern medicine‟s scientific self-image for 
the task of providing medical care to individual patients.  My critique involves the following 
three issues.  Firstly, whether the practice of medicine, that is clinical biomedicine, is 
correctly thought of as a natural science.  Secondly, the impact of modern medicine‟s 
intellectual self-image on doctor-patient communication; and thirdly an appropriate 
conception of truth for the context of clinical medicine.  I shall also critique the 
appropriateness of the norms for doctor-patient interactions in Western and westernized 
societies.  At the end of the chapter I make some concluding remarks and recommendations 
based on the dissertation as a whole.   
Before I start my critique a brief overview of the argument advanced thus far in this 
dissertation is called for.  I commence with such an overview in the section below. 
 
7.2 The influence of modern medicine’s intellectual self-
image on doctor-patient communication  
The practical problem that inspired this dissertation is the crisis of care in modern medicine.  I 
am referring to the common phenomenon of patients and their caregivers feeling uncared for 
in their dealings with medical professionals (Schwartz & Wiggins, 1985:331; Fehrsen, 2000: 
xvii).  Patients‟ feelings of neglect stem from the medical profession‟s tendency to focus 
almost solely on the patient‟s disease, without considering other aspects of patients‟ lives and 
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experiences that are related to their illness (Schwartz & Wiggins, 1988 in Kriel, 2000:40). 
Doctors acquire this reductionist form of clinical practice through their medical education and 
the structure of their work environments.  Reductionist medicine may also leave doctors 
feeling frustrated and unfulfilled. Especially those individuals who want to care holistically 
for patients.  I should add that it particularly seems to be persons with chronic physical 
conditions who have a need to feel known and understood by their doctors.  These patients 
often want to communicate with their doctors about the problems they experience in their 
lives which are related to or resulting from their symptoms (Mishler, 1984:77).  Yet, such 
communication attempts are often blocked or ignored by doctors (Barry et al., 2001: 494-496; 
501).  In contrast, the needs of many individuals with single acute physical conditions, such 
as throat or ear infections, appear to be restricted to the diagnosis and treatment of their 
biological problems.  Such patients may not need or even want to talk to their doctors about 
matters related to their psychological and social lives (Barry et al., 2001: 493-494).  In cases 
like these, especially in emergency room consultations, the biomedical model of health care 
may be entirely adequate and even appropriate.  Nonetheless, the findings of empirical 
research indicate that effective doctor-patient communication is necessary in all 
circumstances for optimum medical care.  
I am particularly interested in the communication between doctors and patients during 
consultations.  Doctor-patient communication is central to the practice of medicine (Gatens-
Robinson, 1986: 175-176; Malterud, 1995:184; Montgomery, 2006:34).  Interaction between 
doctors and patients accomplish many of the tasks of the consultation, for instance arriving at 
a diagnosis, establishing the doctor-patient relationship, information exchange and shared 
decision-making (Charon et al., 1994:955; Ong et al., 1995:903-905).  Yet, this instance of 
communication is known (by patients and researchers) to be problematic.  The greatest 
problems seem to be that doctors usually do not communicate sufficiently with patients and 
do not regard communication with patients as important for their clinical work.  Doctors tend 
to dominate the medical interview.  On average they talk more than patients during the 
interview, and they ask more questions than they answer (Roter et al., 1988:101-102, 108).  
Doctors pose mostly biomedically orientated questions to patients.  They also habitually 
interrupt patients‟ speech and thereby hinder patients from stating their main reason for the 
medical visit or some of their major concerns about their illnesses.  Doctors also usually do 
not provide enough information to patients or involve them sufficiently in decisions and 
discussions about treatment plans (Kurtz et al., 2005:14-16).  I once approached a doctor to 
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take part in an empirical research study on doctor-patient communication.  She was uncertain 
about participating in the research, which involved videotaping and analysing interviews 
between doctors and patients.  She told me: “I do not talk to patients much.  I work with my 
hands.”  This lady was known by her colleagues as a committed and a caring doctor.  She 
worked in a public hospital in South Africa in a clinic for adult patients with HIV/Aids.  
Doctors‟ notorious communication skills do not mean that they do not care for their patients.   
I put forward the claim that the difficulties of doctor-patient communication can to a great 
extent be attributed to modern medicine‟s intellectual self-image.  Medicine understands itself 
as a natural science.  Medical research, medical education and medical practice are all rooted 
in the natural sciences.  Furthermore, medicine‟s conception of science corresponds with the 
standard image of science that developed from the logical positivist school of thought.  In 
order to philosophically investigate the influence of modern medicine‟s intellectual self-image 
on communication between doctors and patients, I turned to (some of) the work of Jürgen 
Habermas on communication and to Michel Foucault‟s work on discourse and power.  I 
applied these two philosophers‟ thoughts on communication and discourse to the current 
academic knowledge about the nature of doctor-patient communication and medical discourse 
(the latter is summarised in Chapter 4 of this dissertation).   
My analyses delivered the following insights.  Doctors and patients communicate from 
different perspectives during clinical consultations.  The doctor‟s biomedical perspective is 
focussed on the external world, whereas the patient‟s perspective is turned towards his/her 
experience of illness.  Medical discourse, that is the discourse that doctors have available to 
speak and to think as doctors, is based on the ontology and epistemology of the natural 
sciences.  From the biomedical perspective, only statements in accord with positivism are 
regarded as true.  The different perspectives of the doctor and patient often means, especially 
in consultations about physical chronic conditions, that the two participants do not accept 
each other‟s statements and therefore fail to reach agreement and understanding in their 
interaction.  The doctor‟s biomedical perspective places him/her at risk of overlooking the 
patient‟s rationality during the medical interview and may lead to a failure on the doctor‟s 
behalf to attempt to rationally motivate the patient with his/her utterances so that agreement 
and understanding can be achieved.  The difficulties in clinical encounters that are caused by 
differences in perspective are exacerbated by the unequal distribution of power between the 
doctor and patient in these situations.  The doctor usually has the greatest share of power in 
the doctor-patient relationship.  The different perspectives of the doctor and patient often lead 
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to conflict and contest in medical interviews.  However, due to the power imbalance between 
the two participants, patients usually express their opinions and wants in an indirect and 
mitigated manner.  One of the best descriptions of the conflict between doctors and patients is 
by Hunter (1992:122), who calls it “a silent tug-of-war over the possession of the story of 
illness”.  Much of the conflict and contest in the doctor-patient encounter are struggles about 
what counts as true with regards to health and disease and who has the right to speak this 
truth.  In Hunter‟s (1992:122) words it is “a struggle for the interpretation of life (and death) 
events.” 
It can thus be said that medicine‟s natural scientific self-image creates difficulties in doctor-
patient communication.  To my mind medicine‟s positivist orientation explains many of the 
problems in doctor-patient communication, such as the ones mentioned earlier in this section 
and in detail in Chapter 4.  This basic observation is seldom, if ever offered in the scholarly 
literature on clinical communication.  It has the potential to inspire reforms in medical 
education and clinical practice that will tangibly improve the quality of doctor-patient 
interactions for both groups of participants.  Something that recent reforms in clinical 
practice, such as the movement towards patient-centred medicine, are yet to achieve (Pilnick 
& Dingwall, 2011:1374). 
 
7.3 A critique of the appropriateness of modern medicine’s 
scientific self-image  
I now begin my critique of the appropriateness of modern medicine‟s scientific self-image.  
Firstly I address the question of whether medicine is correctly thought of as a natural science.   
 
7.3.1 But is it a natural science? 
Is clinical biomedicine a natural science, “in the realist Newtonian sense we learned in high 
school”? (Montgomery157, 2006:16).  This is certainly the perception of medicine held by 
many, if not most, doctors and members of society (Montgomery, 2006:30).  I want to 
emphasise that my focus here is on clinical medicine, and that I do not discuss the scientific 
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 Montgomery (2006) is the same author as Hunter (1992).  Hunter (1992) changed the name she publishes 
under to Montgomery sometime after her 1992 publication.   
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nature of medical research or medical education.  I use the terms clinical medicine and 
medical practice interchangeably to refer to the activity of a doctor administering medical 
care to a patient.   
Several medical scholars (such as Dornhorst, 1981; Donnelly, 1986; Malterud, 1995; Kriel, 
2000; and Miles, 2007) as well as researchers from the social sciences and the humanities 
(such as Gatens-Robinson 1986; Montgomery, 2006; and Waymack, 2009) deny the 
commonly held (crude and unreflective [Montgomery, 2006:30]) view that clinical medicine 
is a natural science.  I agree with these researchers.  When one considers the goal of clinical 
medicine, the nature of its object of knowledge - the individual patient, and the nature of 
clinical rationality it is clear that clinical medicine is not a natural science.  Let us consider 
these aspects of medical practice one by one.  
The goal of clinical medicine is to diagnose and treat the diseases suffered by particular 
individuals.  It is aimed at relieving specific patients‟ symptoms and at curing their diseases.  
The goal of the biomedical sciences is to create knowledge that enlarges and solidifies our 
scientific understanding of health and disease in general (Waymack, 2009: 216-217).  The 
practicing physician gathers information about the signs and symptoms of disease in his/her 
patient as well as (some of) the factors that might impact on the patient‟s health.  Science is 
aimed at creating generalizable or universal knowledge.  The goals of scientific reasoning are 
precision and predictability whereas the reasoning of the doctor tending to his/her patient is 
aimed at finding the best possible answer under the particular circumstances (Montgomery, 
2006:43).  A necessary difference exists between medicine and science.  The scientist is 
expected to act as a disinterested observer during the research process.  However, the doctor‟s 
moral duties towards the patient forbid him or her to regard the patient as a research subject.  
The doctor‟s task is not to test therapies, but to treat the patient‟s disease (Montgomery, 
2006:32) to the best of his/her ability and in accordance with the patient‟s desires in this 
regard.   
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The object of knowledge of clinical medicine is the individual patient
158.  This “object” is 
very different from the relatively stable and simple physical phenomena, for example 
molecules, studied by certain natural sciences.  Almost everything that we might wish to 
know about such simple phenomena can be explained by referring to the physical and 
chemical mechanisms to which they owe their continuing existence and characteristics.  
Scientists‟ generalizations about the behaviour of simple physical matter are mostly perfectly 
reliable (Gorovitz & MacIntyre, 1976:56).  Knowledge about such matter is thus to a large 
degree certain knowledge (Montgomery, 2006:43).  The certainty of knowledge about simple 
physical substances stems from the fact that very little diversity exists between such 
phenomena.  Each instance of a molecule of a particular kind, say a water (H2O) or a sodium 
chloride (NaCl) molecule, is much like any other instance of the same type of molecule 
(Gorovitz & MacIntyre, 1976:58).  In contrast to the relative uniformity of matter such as 
molecules and much to the frustration of doctors, individual human patients are subjectively 
and biologically unique (Waymack, 2009:221).  The following three examples illustrate this 
fact and the element of uncertainty in the practice of medicine that stems from it.   
Firstly, a drug or vaccine that is effective and safe to use in most people may be ineffective 
and even dangerous or at the worst fatal in others.  For instance, it is estimated that one or two 
individuals in every one million that receive the small pox vaccine, may die as a result.  
Fortunately many of the risk factors for serious side effects from the smallpox vaccine have 
been identified and health care workers can take care not to administer the vaccine to such 
individuals (Gorovitz & MacIntyre, 1976:58-59; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2003:2)
159
.  Secondly, when a young woman diagnosed with early stage breast cancer is told 
that she has a 82% chance of being disease-free and alive in five years‟ time (after 
immediately undergoing surgery to remove the cancerous growth, followed by 
chemotherapy), she and her physician(s) have no way of knowing whether she will be one of 
the 82% with no signs of the disease after five years, or one of the 18% who did not recover 
(Montgomery, 2006:15).  “What about me?”, she will want to know.  But unfortunately, in 
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 Clinical medicine can also be directed at populations as in the case of health promotion activities.  An 
example of a health promotion activity aimed at a group of people is a doctor (or another health care 
professional) that gives a talk to a group of people on preventing a particular disease(s).  Such talks often 
concern chronic diseases of lifestyle, for example heart disease and diabetes, and are aimed at populations at risk 
of developing these disorders.   
159
 Admittedly, recent advances in scientific knowledge and technology help to explain some of the biological 
variability among individuals and thereby increase the power of clinical medicine.  For instance, genetic factors 
may determine whether a drug will be useful to, or worthless or dangerous for a particular patient (Waymack, 
2009:221).  Doctors with knowledge of the genetic determinants of drug efficacy and the technology to utilize 
such knowledge will be able to practice a much more certain form of medicine.  
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Montgomery‟s (2006:194) words:  “Statistics don‟t say.  Survivors survive entirely; those 
who die are completely dead.  No one survives 82%...”  Finally, the symptoms of patients 
with the same diagnoses can differ dramatically (Feinstein, 1987:218; Montgomery, 2006:3).  
For instance, patients with appendicitis are typically between 10 and 30 years of age and 
arrive at a doctor‟s office or a hospital emergency room with complaints of abdominal pain.  
The patient typically has a fever, reports recent constipation and experiences acute pain when 
pressure is applied to and then withdrawn from a particular place on the abdomen.  Yet, the 
elderly can also suffer appendicitis and their symptoms are usually less severe.  Furthermore, 
not all patients with appendicitis complain of constipation (Waymack, 2009:224).   
The question that nags is whether complete knowledge of human biology and pathology, 
supported by relevant technology will not solve the problems that the uniqueness of 
individuals causes for clinical medicine?  An affirmative answer to this question seems to be a 
fantasy.  Clinical medicine will never be a science in the positivist sense.  Even after the last 
biological puzzle has been solved, human beings will remain biographically, psychologically, 
socio-economically, politically, spiritually and culturally unique (Montgomery, 2006:34-36; 
Waymack, 2009:221).  Unlike simple physical phenomena, human beings (similar to other 
complex phenomena like animals, hurricanes and salt marshes) are affected by variables that 
cannot be controlled (Gorovitz & MacIntyre, 1976:56; Montgomery, 2006:32).  Eric Cassell 
(2004:201) explains why patients cannot be fully known through science.   
Sick persons, unlike livers or enzymes, do not meet the criteria as objects of science.  
They cannot be completely known or known apart from the knower, and they cannot be 
measured solely in the objective terms of science.  They never exist isolated in space.  
Their behaviour is influenced by where they are.  They are ultimately individual and 
therefore inevitably different one from another.  They are never and cannot ever be 
isolated in time – all persons sick and well are influenced by the times in which they 
live and all have a history and a future, both of which are essential to understanding 
them.  Persons can never be analysed or understood as though there were no others 
acting on them.   
Clinical medicine in itself is not a science.  At least not in the realist positivist sense that 
medicine is commonly thought of.  Clinical medicine is the practice of caring for those who 
are sick and treating their diseases, and of preventing (further) disease and disability in the 
sick and those at risk of becoming sick.  It is a practice that requires knowledge of scientific 
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information and clinical research as well as specialised skills and experience (Montgomery, 
2006: 3, 16, 32-33).  To say that clinical medicine is not a science does not mean that it is not 
scientific.  Indeed, medical practice depends on scientific knowledge and technology.  After 
years of observing doctors and medical students work, teach and learn in academic hospitals, 
Montgomery (2006:33) describes the character of clinical medicine as follows:   
[Medicine] is far more than a body of scientific knowledge and a collection of well-
practiced skills, although both are essential.  It is the conjunction of the two:  the 
rational, clinically experienced, and scientifically informed care of sick people.  Its 
essential virtue is clinical judgement, the practical reasoning or phronesis that enables 
physicians to fit their knowledge and experience to the circumstances of each patient.  
Details of human biology and countless bits of technological information are called 
from memory, along with their own experiences and those reported by others, and the 
whole is focussed by (and on) the details of a particular patient‟s illness.   
Doctors do not reason the way that scientists do.  The latter reason deductively, from the 
general to the specific, or top-down (Montgomery, 2006:46; Miles, 2007: 549).  However, the 
doctor‟s task and moral obligation is to focus on the specific patient and to determine the 
nature of that patient‟s health problem(s).  It is not possible for the doctor to directly apply 
his/her generalizable scientific knowledge of biological facts and laws, such as 
pathophysiology, to diagnose and treat disease in individual patients.  The difficulty in 
connecting scientific knowledge with the subjective experiences of particular patients lies in 
the imprecise and abstract nature of biological laws as well as the unrelenting uniqueness of 
the individual (Montgomery, 2006:32, 38; Waymack, 2009:220-221).  Doctors reason “from 
the particular to the general and then (for confirmation) back again” (Montgomery, 2006:32).  
Montgomery (2006:32) illustrates the clinical reasoning process: 
[Doctors] start with the details of the present illness – is the pain sharp or dull?  what 
makes it better? – all the while fitting the answers into a complex and general taxonomy 
of paradigm cases of disease.  Because understanding an individual instance of illness 
requires an inquiry into its circumstances, diagnosis is an interpretive negotiation of the 
particular signs and symptoms and their development over time.  The goal is their 
narrative coherence in a diagnosis that accounts for all the evidence.   
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The tasks of clinical medicine, namely diagnosis, prognosis and treatment of disease, are 
complex and potentially uncertain in nature and require the use of clinical judgement – that 
is the ability to establish the best possible course of action in particular circumstances 
(Montgomery, 2006:37-38, 43).  Most traditional models of rationality does not allow for the 
concept and practice of judgement (Van Niekerk, 1990:179).  Traditional models of 
rationality state that a rational decision, action or belief has to be based on an assessment of 
the relevant evidence through the use of appropriate rules (Brown, 1988:vii in Van Niekerk, 
1990:179).  Yet, some philosophers of science regard judgement as a key element of 
rationality.  Brown (1988:137, in Van Niekerk, 1990:180) defines judgement as “the ability to 
evaluate a situation, assess evidence and come to a reasonable decision without following 
rules”.  Hannah Arendt describes judgement as a mode of thinking that focuses on the 
particular rather than the universal (Van Niekerk, 1990:181, 187).  Following Kant‟s analysis 
of „reflective judgement‟, Arendt conceptualises judgement as thinking particulars.  This way 
of thinking does not incorporate particulars in general rules.  It moves from the specific to the 
universal instead of the opposite direction.  “It involves discriminating and discerning the 
particular in its particularity” (Van Niekerk, 1990:181).   
Harold Brown developed a model of rationality in which judgement is the most important 
concept (Van Niekerk, 1990:185)
160.  Two of the main features of Brown‟s judgement model, 
as summarised by Van Niekerk (1990:185), are the following.  Firstly, the idea of a rational 
agent is considered as fundamental and ideas such as „rational belief‟ as derivative.  A 
rational belief is understood as a belief that is reached by a rational agent.  According to 
Brown the opposite is maintained in traditional models of rationality.  In traditional rationality 
models the role of the rational agent is not treated as important and emphasis is placed on the 
logical connections between the evidence and the belief that is developed from that evidence.  
Secondly, Brown characterises a rational agent by her ability to make judgements in 
situations where there is a lack of adequate rules to determine her decision.  A clear 
difference is again evident between the judgement model of rationality and traditional models 
of rationality.  According to the judgement model it is not the availability of rules that makes 
rational action possible, as it is maintained in the traditional models.  On the contrary, the 
judgement model states that we rely on our ability to be rational particularly when we have no 
rules to follow.  Judgement is thus seen as a key feature of rationality.   
                                                 
160
 See Brown, H.I. 1988.  Rationality.  London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.  
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Judgement, as conceptualised by Brown and Arendt, is clearly of great importance and 
relevance in the rationality of clinical medicine.  Doctors work with individual and unique 
human beings.  They work with one patient at a time and every patient is different in one or 
more ways from the patients the doctor has treated in the past, even if they (appear) to suffer 
from the same disease.  It is especially in situations where the „rule‟ does not apply that 
doctors need to exercise their clinical judgement.  Such as when the signs and symptoms of a 
particular patient‟s disease do not fit the typical disease profile, or when a treatment plan is 
not followed by the expected and desired outcomes, or when a procedure does not go 
according to plan.   
The rationality of clinical medicine is thus different from the rationality of the natural 
sciences.  Clinical rationality is, as it must be, suited to its object and its objectives.  Clinical 
medicine is a practice and the nature of its rationality is interpretive, dialogical and 
narrative - not deductive (Gatens-Robinson, 1986:167, 175; Montgomery, 2006:37; 
Waymack, 2009:221-225).  I presented Hunter‟s (1992) view that clinical medicine is 
essentially narrative in nature in Chapter 4.  Waymack (2009) summarises Hunter‟s account 
well in the quotation below:   
…when one observes what physicians do in the clinical setting…we find them telling 
stories.  The practice of medicine is built upon and conducted through narratives 
(Waymack, 2009:218)…It is how the patient informs the physician of his or her 
“complaint.”  It is how the physician gathers more information from the patient and 
weaves that narrative into a medical story.  It is how medical students and residents 
learn clinical decision-making.  And when the medical story is somehow returned to 
patients, it becomes how they may come to understand their suffering and their personal 
prospects in the medical context of diagnosis, prognosis and treatment (Waymack, 
2009:220).   
Narrativists
161
 like Hunter (1992) or Montgomery (2006) oppose the view that clinical 
medicine is a positivist science.  They argue that doctors bridge the gap between their 
universalizable, scientific knowledge and the non-universalized individual patient through 
narrative and interpretive reasoning (Waymack, 2009:220, 225).  I shall briefly reconstruct 
this argument drawing mostly on Waymack (2009:221-225).  The doctor‟s task is to find out 
what the matter is with the particular patient.  The physician can begin this task only by 
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 I borrow this term from Waymack (2009:225).   
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listening to the patient – listening to the patient‟s story and to his/her body.  The doctor gains 
knowledge about the particular by facilitating a dialogue of well-positioned questions and 
their informative answers.  To facilitate such a dialogue requires a wide range of knowledge 
of various sorts (Gatens-Robinson, 1986:175).  The physician works with the patient to 
transform the patient‟s highly subjective story into a medical story that is more objective in 
nature.  A more generalised version of the particular patient‟s story is needed so that the 
doctor can measure it against the variety of medical stories in his/her vast and well-organised 
database of past cases.  The doctor builds up this database throughout his/her education and 
work career, including by routinely listening to and presenting case histories in a group of 
medical professionals.  The cases in the physician‟s database are general in nature and are 
arranged in an accessible taxonomic order.  In a sense these cases are narrative in nature.  As 
Waymack (2009:222) explains:  “They will not be mere Polaroid snapshots, but instead will 
be plotted stories with characters, events, and chronological ordering all organised to make 
these stories meaningful.” 
The doctor prunes the patient-autobiography by identifying its medically important features 
and cutting out or bracketing its purely subjective features.  The physician preserves and 
organises the parts of the patient‟s story that are of medical consequence according to the 
structure of medical case histories.  To create a medical story the doctor thus performs the 
narrative tasks of editing, translating and even co-authoring.  This is an interpretive activity 
quite different from the method of disinterested observation that is used in the natural 
sciences.  The doctor thus transforms the patient‟s initial story, a story in the patient-
autobiographical genre, to a narrative in the medical genre.  The general medical genre 
contains sub-genres, for instance “infectious, autoimmune, metabolic, vascular, neoplastic, 
genetic” (Montgomery, 2006:63).  Each sub-genre also consists of a number of subspecies.  
The doctor formulates a hypothesis and eventually a conclusion regarding the individual 
patient‟s condition by matching the newly created medical narrative with a specific medical 
sub-genre and subspecies.  The relevant sub-genre and subspecies also provide the doctor 
with information about the treatment and prognosis of the patient‟s (possible) disease.  
Similar to other experts, doctors solve familiar problems through pattern recognition based on 
a vast supply of memory and experience (Waldrop, 1984:1282).   
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The rationality of clinical medicine is thus narrative or case-based.  In Montgomery‟s 
(2006:46) words “case narration is the principle means of thinking and remembering – of 
knowing – in medicine.”  This rationality is shared by other professionals, such as lawyers, 
moral philosophers and detectives, whose work is based on the particular case.  The doctor 
follows the rational process of abduction to decide what a specific case is a case of.  
Montgomery (2006:47) explains this process as follows: 
Reasoners start from a particular phenomenon and, using preliminary evidence, 
hypothesise its possible causes; those hypotheses are tested against details revealed by 
closer examination.  This circular, interpretive procedure moves between generalities in 
the taxonomy of disease and particular signs and symptoms of the individual case until 
a workable conclusion is reached.  
Clinical medicine is thus not a natural science.  It is best described as “a learned, rational, 
science-using practice” (Montgomery, 2006:36).  Science is a tool instead of the soul of 
clinical medicine.  To perform his/her clinical tasks the doctor needs knowledge of the 
biomedical sciences, adequate clinical experience and skills, as well as knowledge of the 
vagaries of the human condition (Montgomery, 2006:41).   
A further question nags.  Why does a significant portion of the medical profession continue to 
regard clinical medicine as a science of the positivist sort when the nature of their knowledge 
and their clinical experience should lead them to deny this view of medical practice?  At least 
three interrelated explanations can be offered.  The most obvious of these is that medicine‟s 
position of status and power in modern societies stems to a large extent from the scientific 
nature of much of its information (Montgomery, 2006:39; Miles, 2007:548).  Modern, 
Western societies regard scientific knowledge and reasoning as epistemologically superior.  
The second explanation is of a practical nature.  The doctor acts on behalf of the patient.  
(S)he has to make important and occasionally vital decisions regarding the medical care of 
individual patients.  To perform these tasks requires certain knowledge.  One of the main 
strategies that physicians use to reduce the unavoidable uncertainty of their practice is to 
regard, albeit with scepticism, the best obtainable information as real, absolute and reliable.  
These are the characteristics of natural science (Montgomery, 2006:39; Miles, 2007: 548).   
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The final explanation is psychological.  People cannot live their everyday lives as gloomy 
sceptics, even though some recognise in moments of serious philosophical reflection that the 
possibility of absolutely reliable and objective knowledge from the practice of empirical 
science is unlikely.  We find it extremely difficult to sustain ambiguity and vagueness in our 
beliefs.  Patients, especially those for whom the prospect of serious illness brings on a life 
crisis, want complete and certain knowledge for themselves and their doctors.  We want our 
doctors‟ knowledge to be complete, we want them to be able to apply that knowledge to our 
particular circumstances with precision, and we want to know with certainty that their 
suggestions will be helpful to us.  Who would want to disappoint such high expectations of 
one‟s profession?  Who would not want to offer the desperate patient some certainty?  And so 
a folie a deux between doctor and patient may be born.  The doctor pushes aside the 
uncertainty of his/her knowledge and practice and offers the patient the certainty of positivist 
science.  This strategy may turn out well in most cases.  It also breeds unrealistic expectations 
of medicine in patients and physicians alike.  When bad outcomes occur patients are 
disappointed and angered and often put the blame on their doctors.  Lawsuits against doctors 
may arise out of anger and perceptions of error and neglect.  Doctors who convince 
themselves that clinical medicine is a positivist science may experience undeserved self-doubt 
and low levels of self-confidence in the face of poor outcomes, and may unjustly confess to 
professional malpractice (Montgomery, 2006:39-40; Waymack, 2009:227-228).   
 
7.3.2 The impact of medicine’s intellectual self-image on doctor-
patient communication 
An obvious criticism of modern medicine‟s self-image, particularly in the context of this 
dissertation, is that it impacts negatively on doctor-patient communication; when effective 
clinical communication
162
 is essential for health care.  The above description of the narrative 
rationality of clinical medicine illustrates the importance of interaction between the doctor 
and the patient for the doctor to diagnose and treat the patient‟s disease and to make 
prognoses.  Yet, empirical research findings indicate that doctors tend to restrict 
communication with patients, and that doctors generally do not appreciate the importance of 
                                                 
162
 Effective or adequate doctor-patient communication includes a variety of components, such as the disclosure 
of medical and social information by patients, the development of doctor-patient relationships characterised by 
mutuality and comfort, shared decision-making, provision of medical information that patients can understand 
and responsiveness by doctors to patients‟ requests for information (Teutsch, 2003: 1116). 
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talking and listening to patients for clinical medicine.  Doctors‟ communication behaviour 
impacts on their patients.  Patients‟ satisfaction with their health care, their adherence to the 
treatment prescribed, their ability to understand and to recall the information provided by the 
doctor, and even their health and psychological well-being may be affected by the doctor‟s 
manner of communication.  It seems that the aspects of the doctor‟s communication behaviour 
that have the biggest impact on the patient are the extent and the manner of information 
sharing by the doctor, and the doctor‟s style of communication.  Consultations during which 
doctors take time and trouble to share information with patients, are not overly domineering 
and display affective communication behaviour
163
 have better patient outcomes than 
consultations without these qualities.  Unfortunately these qualities are frequently absent from 
doctor-patient interactions and patient satisfaction, adherence to treatment, as well as recall 
and understanding of the information imparted by doctors are typically poor.  Adequate 
information exchange during clinical interactions and a participatory doctor-patient 
relationship are also needed for shared decision-making about the treatment plan to be 
followed.   
Modern medicine‟s positivist world-view impacts negatively on clinical communication 
because of its one-dimensional focus on the external reality.  Theoretically clinical 
biomedicine is exclusively interested in the patient‟s body and the physical disease or 
abnormality present in that body.  Yet, the patient who suffers disease is not a purely physical 
being.  His/her mind as well as the social and cultural dimensions of his/her life play an 
important role in how (s)he experiences illness, what (s)he wants from and how (s)he behaves 
towards the doctor and how (s)he will respond to the doctor‟s advice and requests.  Clinical 
medicine has the greatest potential to be successful if it considers the psychosocial aspects of 
the patient‟s life.  The doctor‟s door to the psychosocial element of patient‟s life is 
communicative action, that is action “aimed at reaching understanding” (Habermas, 1979:1).  
However biomedicine‟s positivist epistemology means that doctors often do not view 
communication with patients as important beyond asking the patient about the nature and the 
development of his/her symptoms and his/her general medical history.  The doctor views the 
information that the patient shares about his/her symptoms as tentative until it can be verified 
as true by means of (more) objective observation.  Doctors typically do not share enough 
information with patients, nor do they elicit or pay sufficient attention to patients‟ (attempts to 
                                                 
163
 Affective communication behaviour aims to address the patient‟s need to feel known and understood and to 
form and maintain a positive doctor-patient relationship.  This type of communication includes statements and 
non-verbal behaviour with definite socio-emotional content and intent (Ong et al., 1995:906).  
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express) concerns, requests and beliefs regarding treatment.  In Chapter 5 I argued that 
doctors‟ frequent apathy towards sharing information and treatment decisions with patients 
stems from biomedicine‟s focus on the physical treatment of observable disease in the 
patient‟s body.  According to the biomedical tradition the patient‟s mind has no role to play in 
the treatment of disease.  The biomedically trained doctor is therefore unlikely to be interested 
in the patient‟s illness experience or his/her thoughts.  The doctor is also not likely to engage 
the patient‟s mind in the treatment decision, or to be concerned with the patient‟s 
understanding of and agreement with the information and decisions imparted.  The 
biomedical model does not sufficiently accommodate communicative action between the 
doctor and the patient.  This is an important reason for unsatisfactory results or even failure in 
biomedical practice, as for instance in the medical care of persons with chronic disease.   
 
7.3.3 The biomedical conception of truth  
My analysis of doctor-patient communication based on Habermas‟ universal pragmatics (in 
Chapter 5) indicates that biomedicine‟s scientific conception of truth may create many of the 
above mentioned problems in clinical interactions and may result in poor patient outcomes.  
The „true‟ statements of medical discourse are about the material aspects of reality.  The 
biomedical understanding of the concept of truth is concerned with a characteristic of certain 
statements.  Truth refers to the correctness and precision of these statements.  These 
statements are regarded as correct because they refer to facts that were determined through 
stable and scientifically established procedures and therefore can be verified by anyone with 
the necessary expertise (Rossouw, 1982:102).  The true statements of medical discourse 
precisely signal “the „natural‟ order of human biology” (Good & Good, 1981:179).  The 
question is whether this narrow, scientific understanding of truth is appropriate for the context 
of clinical medicine?  And if not, what would an appropriate conception of truth be for 
medical practice?  In response to the first question and in the light of my argument that 
medicine‟s positivist world-view negatively influences clinical communication and 
consequently the quality of clinical medicine, I answer „no‟.  I expand on this answer later in 
this section (see 7.3.3.2).  In response to the second question, Hennie Rossouw (1982) 
provides a rich, quite poetic and very useful conceptualisation of truth for the context of 
communication between a doctor and a patient.  I shall now reconstruct Rossouw‟s argument 
and shall then, as indicated above, continue my critique of modern medicine‟s understanding 
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of truth in the light of Rossouw‟s description of an appropriate concept of truth for clinical 
medicine.  
 
7.3.3.1 Rossouw’s (1982) conceptual analysis of the truth as an ethical 
duty 
Rossouw (1982:102-103) argues that we should distinguish between the meaning of the 
concept of „truth‟ in scientific discussions and investigations, and the meaning of the concept 
of „truth‟ in everyday relations and interactions between individuals, such as interactions 
between a doctor and patient around a sickbed.  Everyday relations and interactions transcend 
the limits of the scientific discussion by far.  The agents of scientific discussions are 
ultimately interchangeable and anonymous subjects of information, whereas everyday 
interactions occur between named individuals within a responsible community.  Rossouw 
(1982:102) makes the point that in the scientific context the meaning of the concept of „truth‟ 
“is synonymous with the correctness of factual assertions” (my translation)164.  However, to 
speak the truth in everyday relations and interactions is an ethical duty, and not simply a 
matter of correctness of factual assertions.  Correctness is the norm and ideal in the scientific 
conversation.  If a statement is not correct it means that a mistake was made.  To make a 
mistake is not an action that can be morally judged, but at the utmost exposes the agent to 
epistemic criticism.  A correction can undo a mistake.  Conversely, the opposite of telling the 
truth as an ethical duty is to tell a lie.  Lying is ethically reprehensible.  To be undone a lie 
must be forgiven.   
Rossouw (1982:103-104) next addresses the question of what it is that makes a person 
ethically guilty towards his fellow-man when he tells a lie?  Rossouw answers that the telling 
of a lie is an ethically blameworthy act because it involves a violation of trust.  Trust is a 
fellow-man‟s well-founded expectation that my actions, including my speech acts, will be of 
help to him in his life orientation in relation to the future (“toekomsgerigte 
lewensoriëntering”).  When I lie to my fellow-man I am deliberately letting him down.  By 
telling a lie I am not steering him in a direction that is good and beneficial to him, but I am 
leading him astray and upsetting his life orientation.  Rossouw argues that as a violation of 
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 The direct quotations from Rossouw (1982) are my translations of the original work in Afrikaans.   
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trust, the lie is “the breaking or undermining of an agreement” (my translation).  This 
agreement refers to  
the foundation of the everyday community in which we as name-carrying individuals 
live and exist together.  The agreement is not a contract with written rules, but rather a 
mutual understanding based on trust, an assurance of trust that joins us in a mutual 
responsibility for one another.  Through this agreement we are accountable to each 
other and we have claims on each other.   
What is this agreement that connects us to one another through trust about?  For Rossouw 
(1982: 103-104) it is about  
the understanding that we will serve each other in the common disclosure of the reality 
in which we as persons have to find our way, that is in which we have to seek a life 
orientation and a destination of our existence (“bestaansbestemming”).   
The agreement is primarily a speech-agreement in which the common, life orientating 
disclosure of the reality takes place in the concrete, inter-subjective conversation.  When we 
communicate we share the way in which we orientate ourselves in the reality with each other.  
The bond-like character of the concrete conversation gives us the authority to speak, but it 
also makes us responsible to each other for the quality of our statements.  This is the ethical 
imperative that we signal with the word „truth‟ in the everyday vernacular (Rossouw, 
1982:104).   
Rossouw (1982:104) thus makes the case that in the context of everyday relations and 
interactions „to tell the truth‟ does not merely amount to conveying bare or brute facts, no 
matter how correct the facts may be.  The philosopher now explicates the concept of truth as 
an ethical duty (Rossouw, 1982: 104-106).  The truth in this sense does not consist of bare 
facts.  Bare facts are abstractions that are established by methodological restriction of the full 
extent of reality.  The aspects of reality that are not included in naked facts are the most 
important aspects of reality for the name-carrying individual engaged therein.  The truth is 
never bare.  Rossouw (1982:104) illustrates this point colourfully in the following quotation.  
“To tell the truth, is not a „strip-tease‟.  The truth is always dressed – textile, text and context.  
The truth is a coherence in which the frayed threads of isolated facts are woven into a 
pattern.”  The meaning of factual information forms part of the truth, in other words the 
concept of truth includes the importance or the value of the information for the person whom 
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it affects.  Factual information derives its meaning from the context in which it functions for 
concrete persons.  The context determines which facts are, and are not, germane to the point 
in question for the individual in his/her concrete situation.  Rossouw (1982:104) concludes 
that to tell the truth as an ethical duty does not only mean to convey correct, but bare facts.  
To tell the truth as ethical duty involves a discussion of the context in such a manner that “the 
meaning of the facts in their pertinence can be understood.”   
Another aspect of the truth as an ethical duty is that the truth is productive.  It gives rise to an 
adequate action and an appropriate attitude.  The action of telling the truth is only completed 
once it is understood, once the person addressed has meaningfully received it and it 
appropriately affects his/her life orientation.  Also included in the concept of truth is the 
outcome of the conveyed message.  When one wants to speak the truth in the moral sense you 
must take responsibility for the influence of your words on the course of events, for the way 
the listener reacts, and for the way in which your words are understood and processed.  The 
productive character of the truth places it in a necessary relationship to time.  There is a 
“moment of truth” that needs to arrive.  Telling the truth becomes effective at a fixed hour.  
“The truth asks for the right word at the right time.” Since telling the truth as an ethical duty 
is only completed when the truth is understood, speaking the truth requires time.  
Understanding is a process that involves taking possession of and becoming familiar with the 
meaning of what was revealed.  “Understanding takes time”.  The only way the conveyed 
truth can bear its fruit is slowly (Rossouw, 1982:105).   
A third aspect of the truth as an ethical duty is that the truth is never brute.  The truth is not 
something that one can stand or cannot stand, but rather something one can stand on.  “The 
truth clothes the bare facts into meaningful information that contains guidelines for human 
behaviour, that opens up new possibilities for life orientation.”  The truth thus liberates and 
shapes the future.  Since the truth is not brute, the truth cannot be brutally spoken.  Brute facts 
can be fired like missiles while the one who fires the weapon remains out of range.  Someone 
who speaks the truth as an ethical duty cannot stay out of range.  The bond of trust makes him 
fully responsible for the manner in which his statement arrives and takes root.  To speak the 
truth has the well-being of the other as purpose (Rossouw, 1982:105).   
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Based on his conceptual analysis of the truth as an ethical duty, Rossouw (1982:106) draws 
some conclusions about telling the truth to patients in clinical medicine.  He states that the 
patient, as a fellow human being in suffering, has a right to the truth.  The patient‟s right does 
not relate to the simple facts of a medical diagnosis and prognosis.  The patient, especially in 
the case of serious and chronic disease, has the right to have the reality of his situation 
communicated to him in a manner that allows him to understand the meaning of what is 
happening to him.  The relevant facts must be woven together in such a way that they can 
become productive truth for patient‟s the specific situation.   
On the question of „how‟ the truth should be shared with a patient, Rossouw (1982:106) does 
not think that a system of technical rules or instructions can or should be stipulated.  Yet he 
emphasises that the person who conveys the truth to the patient should have time for the 
patient.  The truth that must be delivered is not contained in correct and precise information in 
a readily comprehensible form.  The truth that has to be communicated is “the formation of 
the meaning of the reality” (“die sinwording van die werklikheid”).  The formation of 
meaning takes time.  To help the patient with this process requires time.  “To have time for 
someone means that you care for him.” 
 
7.3.3.2 A critique of the appropriateness of the biomedical conception of 
truth 
The biomedical concept of truth corresponds with the scientific concept of truth.  Whereas 
this is an appropriate notion of truth for biomedical science and research, it is not an 
appropriate understanding of truth for clinical medicine.  As I argued earlier, clinical 
medicine in itself is not a natural science or the direct application of (natural) science.  The 
doctor-patient encounter is clearly not a case of scientific activity in which the identities of 
the persons involved are of no consequence.  Medical practice is rather a form of what 
Rossouw (1982:102) refers to as everyday interaction.  It is a meeting between two named 
individuals who stand in a particular relationship with one another.  They meet with a shared 
goal, namely to identify the patient‟s condition as a specific medical entity and to find an 
appropriate treatment for the condition.  In the context of the clinical consultation to speak the 
truth cannot simply mean to utter statements that have been or can be established as 
scientifically correct.  To speak the truth in the doctor-patient encounter is an ethical duty.   
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The doctor has a moral obligation to tell the truth, in the broad sense described by Rossouw 
(1982), to the patient for the following reasons.  Firstly, the doctor‟s moral obligation to 
respect the patient’s autonomy compels him to tell the patient the truth about her condition 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:289).  The doctor has a duty to convey to the patient the 
information that is pertinent to the latter‟s situation in a way that leads to understanding.  The 
doctor‟s conversation with the patient should strengthen the patient‟s autonomy so that her 
knowledge and understanding of the relevant information can be used in her decision making 
about the course(s) of action to follow with regards to the management of her disease 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:103, 289).  Secondly, as in all everyday interactions a bond 
of trust exists between the doctor and the patient as conversational partners.  When name-
carrying individuals communicate with one another they implicitly promise to speak the truth 
and not to deceive each other.  Whereas strangers have an obligation of general beneficence 
towards each other, doctors have an obligation of specific beneficence towards their patients.  
When a patient initiates a relationship with a medical professional, for instance by making an 
appointment to consult the physician, that patient enters into a contract with the professional.  
This contract entitles the patient to receive the „whole truth‟ from the doctor and assigns the 
obligations of veracity and beneficence to the doctor.  Within the doctor-patient relationship 
the patient has a corresponding duty to be truthful in her disclosures to the doctor 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:205-206, 289) so that the doctor can successfully perform his 
professional tasks.   
The positivist conception of truth is thus not appropriate for the context of clinical medicine.  
Merely declaring bare facts to the patient without concern about how she receives the 
information or the outcome of the message, is not adequate or ethical.  The doctor has an 
obligation of beneficence towards the patient.  The goal, rationale and justification of 
medicine are to promote the well-being of patients (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:205).  The 
patient in her entirety, body and mind, suffers disease.  Especially in the case of serious 
and/or chronic disease, illness disrupts the patient‟s life and even her life-orientation.  The 
patient has a need to understand what is happening to her body, what she can do about it, and 
how the disease and its treatment may affect her life and relationships.  The doctor can fully 
perform his duty of beneficence towards the patient only if he acknowledges that it is the 
whole person who must be helped.  The doctor‟s duty to promote the patient‟s welfare is not 
limited to physical treatment of the disease(s).  The doctor‟s duty includes sharing 
information about the disease and its management with the patient in a manner that makes the 
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information meaningful to and productive for her.  When the patient has received, understood 
and processed the information she desired, along with receiving physical treatment for her 
disease and/or symptoms, the doctor has adequately fulfilled his obligation of beneficence 
toward her.  It is then that the patient‟s right to the truth about her condition has been upheld.  
Sharing information with the patient in a way that leads to understanding is also necessary for 
the health care she receives to be effective.  The patient needs to receive and understand 
information about the treatment of her disease so that she can remember and correctly follow 
the treatment advice and therefore improve physically and psychologically.   
A further implication of the argument that the conceptualisation of truth as „an ethical duty‟ is 
appropriate for the context of clinical medicine, is that the doctor has to view the utterances 
of the patient as valid.  The biomedical doctor is trained to treat subjective information and 
patient‟s anecdotes of illness with scepticism (Montgomery, 2006:48).  In general, doctors do 
not believe patients‟ symptom reports unless they can be verified by corresponding signs of 
disease in the patients‟ bodies.  However, since the doctor-patient encounter is a type of 
everyday interaction, a bond of trust should exist between the two participants.  They each 
have a responsibility not to mislead the other with his/her speech acts.  The doctor ought to 
trust the patient, meaning that the doctor should believe in and rely on the moral character of 
the patient.  The doctor should have reasonable confidence that the patient will act (and 
speak) with morally good intentions and according to appropriate moral norms (Beauchamp 
&Childress, 2009:41).   
When a patient tells a doctor about a symptom, such as pain, that the doctor cannot 
empirically explain; the patient is nevertheless, most probably, reporting an experience that is 
real.  It is important that the doctor acknowledges the patient‟s experience, even though his 
biomedical technologies cannot account for it.  If the doctor rejects the patient‟s complaints 
without hesitation due to a lack of empirical proof to back it up, it will leave the patient with a 
range of negative emotions for example hurt, anger, frustration and feeling distrusted.  It may 
also do severe and perhaps irreparable damage to the doctor-patient relationship.  In such 
circumstances a more appropriate, therapeutic and „truthful‟ response from the doctor would 
be to acknowledge the patient‟s experience, to admit that medical science cannot explain 
everything or solve all problems, and to treat the patient‟s symptoms as safely as possible.  
The treatment may simply be to support the patient emotionally, to provide practical advice 
and even to suggest safe alternatives to medical care.  Granted, there will be patients that 
intentionally try to deceive their doctors, for instance in cases of addiction to prescription 
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medicine(s) or of feigning illness to receive benefits from the government or an insurance 
company.  However, in most instances malingering patients will make up a small minority of 
the doctor‟s case load.  The doctor should be aware that patients may malinger and he should 
be able detect this behaviour and to address it in a professionally adequate and morally correct 
manner.  
Just as doctors should regard patients‟ symptom reports as valid, they ought to treat patients‟ 
utterances in the „voice of the lifeworld‟ as valid.  I described the voice of the lifeworld in 
Chapter 4 and reported the findings of empirical research, namely that doctors typically 
ignore or block patients‟ utterances about the lifeworld; especially during consultations about 
chronic physical conditions.  Patients use the voice of the lifeworld when they speak about 
problems that they experience in life which are related to or resulting from their symptoms 
(Mishler, 1984:91).  In medical interviews doctors usually view the content of lifeworld 
statements as immaterial, since it does not fit into modern medicine‟s discursive formation 
and the scientific understanding of truth.  However, patients‟ utterances in the voice of the 
lifeworld are about the meaning of their symptoms for their everyday lives.  Included in 
Rossouw‟s (1982:104) definition of the truth as an ethical duty, is the meaning of factual 
information.  Utterances in the voice of the lifeworld should thus be treated as important in 
medical interviews.  The doctor has duties of beneficence and veracity towards the patient.  
These duties include supporting the patient in the formation of the meaning of living with the 
particular disorder.  To perform this task the doctor needs to listen to and take seriously the 
patient‟s utterances about her illness experience.  Moreover, as I indicated in Chapter 5 (see 
5.3.2.2), in the case of consultations about chronic physical conditions the patient‟s illness 
experience contains information that the doctor should consider to formulate an adequate 
treatment plan and is thus of primary clinical consequence.  The doctor does not only have to 
avoid ignoring or blocking the patient‟s utterances in the voice of the lifeworld, but he should 
also elicit and encourage them.   
The final implication of the conceptualisation of truth as an ethical duty in the context of 
doctor-patient interactions that I want to point out concerns the use of time in medical care.  
Rossouw (1982:105-106) makes it clear that speaking the truth as an ethical duty requires 
time.  To tell the truth in medical consultations, especially when it entails serious and/or 
chronic conditions, takes time.  It is necessary that the doctor puts aside sufficient time to 
communicate the truth to the patient so that she can understand the information and can 
appropriately integrate it into her life orientation.   
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7.4 A critique of the appropriateness of the norms for 
doctor-patient interactions  
I described the norms for doctor-patient interactions in Western and westernized societies in 
Chapters 1, 5 and 6 (in particular under 5.3.1.3 in Chapter 5).  For the benefit of the reader I 
now briefly summarise this description.  The meeting between doctor and patient is 
conventionally not a meeting of equals.  The doctor is usually the dominant person in the 
medical interview.  (S)he determines the rules of the clinical interaction and directs the 
encounter.  Customarily only (s)he is afforded the right to perform certain regulative speech 
acts, such as to suggest treatment plans.  Shared decision-making about the treatment of the 
patient‟s disease can only happen if the doctor feels so inclined (Charles et al., 1997:687).  
The doctor also controls the development and content of the interaction.  (S)he determines the 
conversational topics and controls when the patient takes conversational turn(s).  The patient 
is typically not allowed to introduce, pursue or end a conversational topic.  The doctor usually 
restricts the topics of the interaction to what can be accommodated with the biomedical 
perspective on health and disease.   
The question I address here is whether it is proper for the doctor to have such a high measure 
of control over the medical interview?  I agree with Måseide (1991:557) that the doctor needs 
power in the consultation to competently and adequately perform his/her clinical functions.  
For example, the doctor must raise specific topics and question the patient about particular 
aspects of his/her illness experience in order to generate a diagnostic hypothesis and a 
treatment plan.  Such conversational leadership by the physician is appropriate.  As Måseide 
(1991:552) points out, this type of power is “always necessary” and “often benign”.  The 
doctor‟s use of power to accomplish his/her clinical tasks illustrates Foucault‟s (1984:61) 
conception of power as a productive force.  In so far as the doctor needs to control the 
interaction to competently and adequately attend to the patient, the patient - as a partner in the 
process of diagnosing and treating the disease - has a duty to comply with the doctor‟s 
direction.   
However, the doctor‟s conversational dominance should not infringe on the patient‟s 
conversational and autonomy rights.  As in other everyday conversations both participants in 
the doctor-patient encounter should have the right to introduce, maintain and terminate 
conversational topics; to take conversational turns; and to speak without being unreasonably 
interrupted.  Patients have a right to receive sufficient information, in a manner that facilitates 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  247 
understanding and decision-making, about the diagnostic and treatment procedures that their 
doctors recommend as well as about the diseases they suffer from and the impact it may have 
on their lives.  This right should be respected regardless of whether the patient explicitly asks 
for the information or not.  Patients also have the right to (an opportunity to) express their 
concerns, requests and beliefs about their illnesses and/or their treatment; and to have such 
expressions taken seriously by their physicians.  Empirical research indicates that although all 
patients desire information regarding their diseases and the treatment options available 
(Charles et al., 1997:683; Guadagnoli & Ward, 1998:337), not all patients (and the same 
patient does not always) prefer to independently decide on the course to follow with regards 
to treatment.  Some (and sometimes) patients want to delegate or share this responsibility to 
or with the doctor (Charles et al., 1997:683).  Irrespective of whether the patient wants to 
independently make the treatment decision, it remains important that the doctor enquires 
about and incorporates the patient‟s concerns, desires, and values into decisions about his/her 
health care (Guadagnoli &Ward, 1998:329, 337).  Research findings suggest that 
consultations during which patients‟ conversational and informational rights are honoured, 
have better patient outcomes compared to consultations where these rights are not respected.  
Corresponding to patients‟ conversational, informational and autonomy rights are doctors‟ 
duties of beneficence and respect for patient autonomy.   
The intellectual self-image of the modern medicine can easily prevent the doctor from tending 
to the patient‟s needs and rights which extend beyond physical treatment of his/her disease.  
More specifically, medicine‟s positivist world-view is very likely to keep the doctor from 
sufficiently talking and listening to the patient and from drawing the patient‟s mind into the 
practice of medicine.  Inadequate attention to the patient‟s mind can easily result in less than 
optimum and ethical health care.  For it is never only the patient‟s body that suffers disease 
and therefore never only the body that should be cared for.  Health care that pays insufficient 
attention to the patients‟ non-material needs and rights also has the danger of turning the 
doctor into an (extremely learned and skilled) technician as opposed to a caring healer.  A 
purely natural scientific form of medicine may in most cases mean poor job-satisfaction and a 
one-dimensional occupational experience for the physician.  A humanistic doctor needs the 
same level of scientific and technical knowledge and skill as a purely biomedical doctor.  Yet, 
the humanistic physician requires additional knowledge and skill, namely to attend to the 
psychological and social aspects of the patient‟s illness experience. 
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7.5 Concluding remarks and recommendations  
I conclude that modern medicine‟s intellectual self-image has a pervasive and negative 
influence on communication between doctors and patients during clinical consultations.  This 
is because medicine‟s positivist world-view results in an almost exclusive focus on the 
physical aspects of disease in clinical medicine.  The patient‟s mind and his/her social world 
are not of great significance from the natural scientific perspective.  Medical professionals 
may thus easily regard their clinical task solely as the physical treatment of physical 
disorders.  They are very likely to consider many communicative activities as unrelated to 
their clinical task, such as eliciting the patient‟s concerns and reason(s) for scheduling an 
appointment; allowing the patient to talk about his/her illness experience and to respond to 
such utterances in earnest; providing the patient with sufficient information and ensuring 
his/her understanding of the information, and facilitating the patient‟s involvement in 
treatment decision-making.  Inadequate doctor-patient communication can easily affect the 
quality of medical care and patient outcomes in a negative manner, as well as diminish the 
quality of the doctor‟s occupational experience.  For this reason I conclude that medicine‟s 
natural scientific intellectual self-image is not appropriate for the task of providing medical 
care to individual patients.  Two additional reasons support this conclusion, namely the 
misidentification of clinical medicine as a natural science and the inappropriateness of a 
scientific conception of truth for the context of doctor-patient interactions.  Effective 
communication should be recognized as an integral component of good clinical medicine.  It 
is not a component that can be added to or removed from the practice of medicine depending 
on the doctor‟s orientation with little effect on the quality and the outcome of the health care.   
Based on these conclusions a few questions need to be addressed, namely: what do we want 
from doctors? What are the implications for the medical profession of the conclusion that 
medicine‟s intellectual self-image negatively affects doctor-patient communication and is 
inappropriate for clinical medicine? What about the factors apart from medicine‟s intellectual 
self-image that affect the interaction between doctors and patients?  I now address these 
questions in the order they are listed above.   
What is it that we want from doctors?  Most people, or at least most of those with acute 
physical conditions, will probably answer that they want competence in diagnosis, treatment 
and prognosis from their physicians; and that if the doctor is kind whilst performing these 
functions they will see it as a bonus.  Yet, I argue, supported by the findings of empirical 
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research, that competence in diagnosis, treatment and prognosis as well as ethical medical 
practice is dependent on effective doctor-patient communication.  My plea for sufficient 
interaction with the patient is not a plea for good bedside-manners.  It is a plea for recognition 
of the non-material aspects that impact on the causation, experience and treatment of disease 
and the non-scientific components of competent clinical practice.  Only recognition of and 
attention to these aspects can transform clinical medicine and save it from its current crisis of 
care. 
Greenhalgh et al. (2006:1184) formulate a more specific question related to the question 
above, and describe this as a question that has not been debated much; namely: “How much 
of the lifeworld should be admissible within the primary care consultation?”  The authors 
themselves do not offer a response to their question.  I propose that Mishler‟s (1984:91) 
original definition of the voice of the lifeworld in clinical medicine, namely the voice that 
patients use when they speak about problems that they experience in life which are related to 
or resulting from their symptoms, demarcates the purview of the doctor‟s responsibility for 
lifeworld issues adequately.  It would be inappropriate to suggest that the doctor be involved 
in the patient‟s lifeworld beyond what concerns the patient‟s experience of illness and disease.  
The involvement of medicine in patients‟ lives beyond what can be seen as holistic medical 
care, intrudes on the roles of other legitimate professions and institutions in society, such as 
psychology, the family unit, the clergy etcetera.  However, it is the duty of the medical 
profession to care for injured and diseased persons.  To care for the patient means that the 
doctor is concerned about the patient as a suffering individual.  It is the doctor‟s duty to attend 
to the physical and mental needs of the person suffering from disease.   
The next question to address is about the implications for the medical profession of the 
proposition that medicine‟s intellectual self-image negatively affects doctor-patient 
communication and is inappropriate for clinical medicine.  I shall not respond to this question 
in depth since it falls outside the scope of the current project.  I offer the following broad 
remarks and recommendations on this topic.  Firstly, the medical profession will do well to 
transform its intellectual self-image and world-view to better agree with the nature of clinical 
practice and to make room for the psychological and social dimensions of the patient‟s life 
within health care.  Such a world-view will facilitate effective doctor-patient communication 
and thereby contribute to quality and ethical clinical medicine and good patient outcomes.  
Secondly, I recommend that the medical profession revise its conception of science.  Modern 
medicine‟s positivist conception of science may be replaced by an intellectually more robust 
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and updated theory of science.  Such a theory will acknowledge that interpretive reasoning, as 
is characteristic of the rationality of clinical medicine, and knowledge without guaranteed 
certainty, are legitimate elements of science (Waymack, 2009:225-227).  Yet, if one considers 
the psychological explanation offered earlier for the continued adherence to a positivist 
conception of science by most members of the medical profession, it seems unlikely that the 
current perception of science in medicine will change easily or soon (Waymack, 2009:228)
165
.   
Foucault (1981a:66-68) makes some very useful suggestions for resisting the procedures that 
control and restrict discourses in the form of his principles for the analysis of discourse.  
According to Foucault‟s recommendations, the first requirement for any group, within or 
outside of medicine, that wishes to transform medical discourse (so that medical practice and 
doctor-patient communication can be transformed) is to become aware of the processes that 
rarefy medical discourse.  My recommendation for the medical profession is to cultivate 
consciousness of medical discourse.  Firstly it is necessary for the profession to realize the 
reality of discourse.  This realization includes recognising that the language that doctors have 
available to think, talk and write about health and disease – that is medical discourse - does 
not simply and innocently represent facts about the material world.  It is necessary to realise 
that medical discourse itself constitutes reality.  It is a practice controlled by rules.  The 
profession need to realise that the biomedical model of disease is not only the source of 
medical discourse, but also a force that restricts.  Whilst this model allows endless new 
positivist statements to be generated and to enter medical discourse, it refuses statements at 
odds with the discursive elements of medical discourse entry into this discourse.  In additional 
to an awareness of the procedures that control and restrict what doctors can utter about health 
and disease, consciousness of the processes that control who may use medical discourse and 
how, is also necessary.  Further, it is necessary that physicians become aware of the close 
connection between discourse and power and that discourse is both an effect and an 
instrument of power.   
I advocate for consciousness among the medical profession of medical discourse as a 
discursive practice, the procedures that control medical discourse and maintain it as the 
dominant discourse about health and disease, the discourses that are repressed by medical 
                                                 
165
 It also has to be acknowledged that the medical profession with its current natural scientific self-image is not 
well positioned to respond positively or meaningfully to appeals to transform its world-view and conception of 
science.  This is because the profession has “no mechanism to perform such fundamental, paradigm-changing 
cognitive acts”.  However, through critical contributions of the sort this dissertation hopes to make, such 
transformation may become possible (Kriel, 2013). 
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discourse, and the types of subjects that medical power casts doctors and patients as.  To 
stimulate such consciousness is the contribution I wish to make with this dissertation.  I want 
to point out the reality of medical discourse and its effects on doctors, patients and on their 
interaction with one another.  It is my hope that a deeper awareness of the reality and the 
effects of medical discourse will persuade the profession, in the interest of its duties of 
beneficence and respect for patient autonomy, to work towards creating a world-view that can 
contain the aspects of reality that cannot be known empirically and purely objectively.  
However, this will require the profession to relinquish some of its current power over patients 
and in the health care arena in general.  The prospect of giving up some of its power may 
discourage the profession as a whole to transform its view of reality and the manner in which 
it operates.  Yet, the decision of whether to (attempt to) transform medical discourse does not 
simply lie in the hands of the medical profession.  Power is also available to others who are 
affected by medical discourse.  These countervailing powers include those who are unduly 
influenced by medical discourse, as well as those whose goals and interests are in conflict 
with medical discourse.  Such groupings, which include doctors who want to practice 
humanistic medicine, can attempt to destabilize the dominant discourse and to make their 
voices heard.  
The third question that I want to address is about the factors besides medicine’s intellectual 
self-image that affect the interaction between doctors and patients.  Throughout this 
dissertation I have emphasized that various factors influence doctor-patient communication, 
such as the characteristics of the context in which the communication takes place as well as 
the personal characteristics of the participants in the interaction.  I do not suggest that a 
broadening of medicine‟s world-view and a transformation of its intellectual self-image will 
completely prevent difficulties in communication between doctors and patients.  Clinical 
communication will probably always remain one of the most complex forms of interaction 
(Chaitchik et al., as cited in Ong et al., 1995:903) in the modern world and will therefore 
remain susceptible to difficulties.  Examples of factors that will continue to influence doctor-
patient communication negatively, regardless of medicine‟s self-image, include time pressure, 
linguistic and cultural differences between doctors and patients, and communicative reticence 
in patients with a low socio-economic status.  However, a form of medicine that is responsive 
to the psychological and social dimensions of disease has the potential to mitigate most of the 
difficulties that may arise in the interaction between a doctor and a patient.    
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I conclude with a few remarks on the larger significance of the work undertaken in this 
dissertation.  I consider the value of this research as pointing out a factor that is usually 
overlooked in scholarly work on clinical communication as well as in the design of 
interventions to improve this form of interaction.  The factor I am referring to is the natural 
scientific intellectual self-image of modern medicine.  I have argued that medicine‟s positivist 
view of reality pervasively and negatively influences clinical interaction.  As yet I have not 
encountered another instance of this argument in the literature on doctor-patient 
communication.  It is unlikely that educational approaches and interventions with the goal to 
improve the interaction between doctors and patients will have much or lasting success while 
doctors are taught to approach their clinical work in a positivist manner.  The current project 
should be followed up by more detailed proposals of an appropriate world-view and 
intellectual self-image for clinical medicine.  Once such a world-view is formulated and 
accepted by the medical fraternity, it should lead to changes in what and how medical 
students are taught.  The influence of a broadened world-view on doctor-patient interactions 
can then be investigated.  Based on the insights delivered by the current philosophical 
investigation, I am confident that a world-view that can accommodate the psychological and 
social aspects of reality will lead to more effective clinical communication and better patient 
outcomes.   
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